The Reluctant Tommy

[Ruth Ward]

The Reluctant Tommy

(Written by Ronald Skirth; Edited by Duncan Barrett; Published by Macmillan 2010)

In his WW1 memoir Ronald Skirth (Bombardier 120331; 293 Siege Battery R.G.A.) describes his war time experiences on the Western Front and in Italy - including seeing some of his closest friends die, 'suffering under a cowardly commanding officer' and experiencing shell-shock and amnesia. These experiences cause a growing disillusionment with the army, war and killing. Half-way through his military service he has an epiphany in which he acknowledges himself as a conscientious objector. This leads him to commit small acts of sabotage deliberately miscalculating the trajectory of the first shot fired so as to give the enemy a 'warning' and thereby keeping his promise to God not to 'help to take another human life'. Skirth claims that some of the official documents were deliberately falsified by his C.O. and the commander-in-chief in order to cover up blunders, and create an opportunity for self-advancement. The memoir also details the new relationship between himself and his future wife.

My interest in this book has been detailed in several posts on the Great War Forum http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php . The research notes stemming from it were sent to the Imperial War Museum (December 2010) for their consideration, together with a report I commissioned by fourteeneighteen/research, and a book review by P. Tomaselli. The Imperial War Museum, after reviewing the Ronald Skirth collection, on which 'The Reluctant Tommy' is largely based, have stated that: "The catalogue entry will be updated to stress that anybody consulting the Skirth memoir should exercise caution in accepting anything in it as fact." (NB The previous statement I made about Museum's decision to permanently withdraw the Skirth papers from their catalogue was made in good faith following a letter I received from them (dated 1.2.2011). The Museum have since apologized to me for not making their intentions explicit at the time. (Letter dated 25.3.2011).

The research is detailed below together with some additional information identified more recently. However, I have edited the original text to improve understanding, and correct minor errors. Repetition of some information is unavoidable. (Please note that I am an amateur family historian not a professional researcher).

Edit (15/9/14) - The research given below was posted in 2011 and since then I have continued to investigate Skirth's 'memoir' and the academic support purportedly given to it. Consequently, the research has developed quite considerably. I completed the study this year (2014) and a copy of it is now held in the Department of Collections Access library at the Imperial War Museum. Please see the thread Ronald Skirth's 'Memoir' for more information about this.

The PSS Mona's Queen (11)

Skirth (p.34) says that he, & 999 other troops, were taken from Southampton to Le Havre on the PSS "Mona's Queen" (11) arriving 1st April 1917. He states that the Mona's Queen was "got" by a submarine (- implying it was either hit, or sunk) during its return journey.

Records show (IoMSPCo.) that the Mona's Queen left Southampton on 6th February, 1917 carrying 1000 troops bound for Le Havre. Twenty miles from France she was torpedoed by a submarine, & damaged as was the submarine. However, she continued to Le Havre, discharged the troops, & returned to Southampton for repairs. She was back operating as a troopship by 17th March 1917.

• Skirth's account of this event is inaccurate.

Christmas Day 1917

Skirth claims (p.123) that at 11.00 am on Christmas Day, 1917 the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Cavan, addressed a special Christmas Parade of the first contingent of B.E.F. in Italy including all personnel of 293 Siege Battery.

The unit war diary (Dec 1917 May 1918) has the following entry for that day: "Xmas Day." The same war diary shows entries for "Ordinary Parades" on various dates, "Inspection by O.C. XI_^th Corps" on 1^st January 1918, & "Battery position inspected by C-in-C" on 6^th February 1918.

• It is very unlikely that such a parade took place as Skirth describes

Jock Shiels

Skirth (p.84) describes how his close friend and comrade, Jock Shiels, was killed by a shell in the first week of November 1917 during Passchendaele. "Memory plays tricks, but the happenings of that particular day are so indelibly impressed in it they could never be forgotten."

The CWWGC (via 'Geoff's Search Engine') shows that J. Shiels (Bombardier 83515, 293 SB) died on 18^th July, 1917.

• Skirth is most likely incorrect about the date his friend died.

Battery at half-strength, no lorries, and no Howitzers

According to Skirth (p.145), by the end of April 1918, after 4 months, 293 SB was at half-strength in personnel, and no lorries, or Howitzers had arrived.

The unit war diary (Dec 1917 May 1918) shows that by end of April 293 SB had 4 guns. 2 were taken to gunnery school by Left Section on 6^th February. On their return they left the 2 guns at the school, but brought back 2 guns taken over from 391 SB. The Battery is recorded as executing a variety of shoots counter-battery, instructional & concentration together with the amounts of ammunition used throughout those 4 months. One gun may have been temporarily out of action for a very short time due to a faulty A tube.

• It is very unlikely that 293 SB did not have any guns or ammunition during this time.
• The Battery was not undermanned as Skirth implies. One section of the Battery (roughly half) attended gunnery school from 6th Feb - 6th April

The 94^th Brigade war diary for the period (Appendix 1, April 1918) states that: "One great obstacle has been the shortage of transport. No 3-ton lorries are allowed up the mountain roads, and for the first fortnight all light lorries were employed in carrying ammunition, so batteries received practically no R.E. material."

The 3-ton lorries were available, but not allowed to use the mountain roads. Light lorries were available, but for 2 weeks were used to carry ammunition.

• It is likely that Skirth's claims are incorrect.

Shorts

Skirth states (p.153) that he, and the troops generally, were not issued with shorts, or allowed to wear them despite the heat. (He buys two pairs, but only wears them around the OP in case he is seen by officers). He also describes an officer reprimanding him for wearing shorts, and ordering him to put his regulation uniform on (p.193).

The Official History (p.174) states that: "Here the weather was so hot even in May that the troops wore khaki drill shorts and Egyptian helmets,"

A photograph shows one of Skirth's comrades, Gnr. Hamilton (of 293 SB), wearing shorts & Egyptian helmet.

• It is highly unlikely that Skirth was not given, or not allowed to wear shorts during hot weather.

Leave

According to Skirth (p.239) "They (Ella & his family) saw that other Tommies rarely had to wait six months (for leave), whereas in my case more than sixteen had gone by." He claims that his leave was deliberately put back by his C.O. Snow(don), as a disciplinary measure for his admission to being a conscientious objector.

The Official History (p.254) states that: "He (Lord Cavan) also had in mind the question of leave; this was important, as six thousand men had not had any leave for eighteen months or more;" (as of August 1918).

• Skirth was in the majority of men who had not had any leave, not in a minority of one as he implies.

Battle of Asiago 15^th June 1918 Number of Guns in action, Shells & Rifles

Skirth (p.232) claims that 293 SB only fired 1 shell on 15th June, and that they had "...exactly 48 100-pounder shells...". He also claims (p.232) that 293 SB only had one gun in action after the "accident".

The 94th Brigade War Diary (June 1918) shows that 293 SB fired over a 1,000 rounds of something on that date, and were shelling almost continuously for over 9 hours.

• Skirth's claims about the number of shells available are very suspect.

It is also extremely unlikely that one howitzer could be fired almost continuously for nine hours, and that it could fire over 1000 shells in that time.

• Therefore it is likely that more than one gun was in action.

Skirth states (p. 232) that 293 SB did not have any rifles.

The article 'Our Artillery In Italy' (p.148) describes how, "...in some cases the gunners made effective use of their rifles at close quarters when almost surrounded by the enemy...".

• Contrary to Skirth's claim, it is more likely that the personnel of 293 SB had rifles than had not.

Tree Top Observation Posts on the Asiago Plateau

Skirth (p.276) describes an observation post about 60' up in amongst two closely grown cypress trees - 'Cipressi OP' which provided 'a splendid panoramic view' and was 'quite unique'.

Hugh Dalton (p.115 & p.142) also describes an OP - 'Claud' situated 90' up in a pine tree: "The view was superb." However, he also states that the Italians, British Field Artillery and the French all had OPs in the vicinity. "The pine trees on that summit were literally, full of eyes."

• It is unlikely that Skirth's OP was 'unique'.

The Incident of No 1 Gun being Fired at a Rock Face

Skirth describes an incident (Chapter 7) in which the No. 1 gun, one of two new "untested" and "unregistered‟ Howitzers, was sited in a dangerous position (to the gun crew) and, on orders, fired at an unknown target. The shell hit a rock face and exploded prematurely killing two of its gun crew, injuring five others and putting the gun out of action.

The article ‟Our Artillery In Italy‟ (p.148) states that, "...our position was on a forward slope of a pineclad ridge...observation over the enemy lines was exceptionally good. Battery positions were dotted about in the forest...". The same article also describes the difficulties involved in finding gun platforms, siting and 'registering' the guns, and making the necessary calculations and corrections to achieve accurate shelling due to the nature of the terrain, (and the need to remain undetected by the enemy). It goes on to say that these problems were resolved.

"By the period he was writing about in Italy British artillery had reached heights of professionalism that it was not to scale again until El Alamein. It is inconceivable that a gun could have been so positioned as to be impossible to fire without killing the crew - they'd have known it just as much as Skirth and would have refused any order and would have had it moved." (P. Tomaselli: 'A Shameful Fantasy')

• It is highly unlikely that such an accident took place in the way Skirth describes, as the batteries' personnel were well aware of the difficulties, and acted to resolve them.

The 94th Brigade War Diary (June 1918, Appendix 111, "Casualties") shows that the June casualties for the entire brigade (5 siege batteries) were:

- Officers Killed - Nil

- Officers wounded 3 (2 remained at duty)

- Other Ranks Killed 1 (Gnr. Walter Booker, 123309; 293 SB; 15/6/1918)

- Wounded - 12 (5 remained at duty).

• Skirth's claims about the number of 293 SB's gun crew killed are inaccurate, and mostly likely the number of wounded.
• The 94th Brigade War Diary (June 1918, Appendix 1) states that, "No gun was put out of action...".

Bromley

Skirth (p.226) accuses Bombardier R. Bromley of "negligence" & says that he is partly to blame for the deaths and injuries sustained in the accident. He also states (p.174) that R. Bromley was the new B.C.A. and that his Military Medal was given: "For meritorious service to his Battery Commander throughout the operation." (p.240)

B. Bromley is given as 'Lance-Bombardier' in the 94th Brigade War Diary for June 1918, Appendix 11 - Honours & Awards, "Authority dated 25-6-18", and also on his Military Medal card. In a letter to Mrs Bromley, dated 1 July 1918, informing her of B. Bromley's MM, Captain H. Evatt addresses B. Bromley as "Bombardier". A photograph of 293 SB taken circa November 1918 shows B. Bromley wearing a single chevron on the sleeve of his uniform - denoting "Bombardier".

• B. Bromley was not a Bombardier at the time of the accident; he was a Lance Bombardier (an appointment not a rank).
• B. Bromley was not a "new-comer" to 293 SB, and Skirth was likely to have known him long before June 1918.
• B. Bromley received an MM "...as a result of the action of June 15th 1918...". (94^th Brigade war diary) and not for the reason Skirth gives.

According to 'British Artillery 1914-19', (p.14), "In a battery of 6-in. howitzers, each section consisted of about 18 men and was commanded by a lieutenant. The section included a sergeant, who commanded one subsection, with a bombardier (lance corporal) to deputise for him. A corporal, also supported by a bombardier, commanded the other subsection". Typically each subsection operated one gun.

• It is extremely unlikely that, as a Lance Bombardier, B. Bromley could have been in command of a subsection/gun.

Snow(don)

Skirth (p.240) claims that Snow(don) was awarded a Bar to his DSO, & promoted to the rank of "Lieutenant Colonel" (as one of a number of officers and other ranks given awards) for his participation in the Battle of Asiago Plateau, 15 June, 1918.

"As a result of the action of June 15th, the 94th Brigade was awarded 3 M.C's for Officers, and 1 D.C.M. and 7 M.Ms for other ranks...". (94th Brigade War Diary, June 1918, Appendix 11).

Snow(don) was not promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel as Skirth states (p.240) until 31st January, 1923. (London Gazette, 16 February, 1923, p.1152). He was not promoted to the rank of "acting Lieutenant-Colonel" until 7th November 1918. (Supplement To The London Gazette, 6 December, 1918, p.14466).

• As Brigade Commander, Snowdon had every opportunity to falsify the records, but he did not. He did not receive any awards, or promotion, as a direct consequence of his part in the June 15th battle.

The "Concocted‟ Report

According to Skirth (p.228), Lord Cavan visited his OP in the mountains on the afternoon of 15th June 1918. He claims that Cavan and Snow(don) used this opportunity to "concoct" a report which was used for their own glorification and self-advancement. He later claims (p.175) that "...the official account of my battery's action is completely false, - in fact, a tissue of lies."

The "Official History of the War, Military Operations Italy 1915-1919" (p.212) states that Lord Cavan visited 48th Division HQ on that afternoon.

In addition the 94th Brigade War Diary shows that 293 SB were still engaged in active shelling on that afternoon, so it is doubtful that Cavan would have put himself at such great personal risk by visiting the Battery. Further, Snow(don) was Commander of 94th Brigade at this time (15th June 1918, Battle of Asiago), and therefore unlikely to have been with 293 SB. Further, it is likely that Capt H. Evatt became "Second in Command‟ of 293 SB in Snow(don's) absence.

• It is highly unlikely that Cavan and Snow(don) had either the time, or opportunity to "concoct" a report as Skirth claims and, therefore, it is unlikely to have existed.

Original Members of Battery still in 293 SB in early July 1918

Skirth claims, (p.234), that in early July 1918 " - owing to war casualties, sickness, transfers, promotions etc., only two of the 130 men who sailed from Southampton on 31 March 1917 were still with the battery: the man on the other side of the table and me." i.e. Skirth & Snow(don).

The CWWGC (via 'Geoff's Search Engine') shows 11 casualties (killed) for 293 SB during their period of active service (from 31/3/1917 to 31/12/1918)
·

• It is very likely that Skirth exaggerated the number of casualties at this time.

Bernard Bromley & George Hamilton were with the Battery from the outset, & both remained in it until demobbed. (Photographic evidence, Medal Index cards)

• Skirth was incorrect about the number of original members of 293 SB still with the Battery at this time.

Skirth "Mentioned In Dispatches"

According to Skirth (page 241) in April 1919, he received a letter from the "now Colonel R.A. Snow D.S.O. etc., etc.," stating that he (Skirth) "...had been Mentioned in Dispatches." as a consequence of his "...untiring devotion to duty...".

I can find no such notice in The London Gazette.

Snowdon was not made a Colonel until 7th September, 1927 (London Gazette, 18 October, 1927, p.6553).

• Skirth is unlikely to have been awarded 'Mentioned In Despatches', and Snow(don) was not a colonel in 1919. Therefore it is extremely unlikely that Snow(don) wrote to him as he claims

The Official History's Specific Praise of 293 SB

According to Skirth (p.175) "The official history of the Italian campaign specifically praises the 'magnificent contribution' made by the officers and men of 239 Siege Battery, RGA".

The official history contains no such specific praise. The only specific reference to 293 SB is in a list of brigades and divisions under "Battle Formation", Appendix 1, (p.389). The nearest the official history gets to any praise is: "On the whole, it was a great day for counter-battery groups " (p.200) of which 293 SB was one.

Neither does the official history contain any specific account of 293 SB during the battle. It does use a quote from the article 'Our Guns In Italy' (Journal of the Royal Artillery) which singles out the siege batteries generally for 'some gallant deeds' (p.148) but, again, there is no specific mention of 293 SB.

• There is no specific praise, or specific account of 293 SB in the official history, which runs contrary to Skirth's claims, and supports my previous suggestion that there was no such "concocted" official report.

The following statements are taken from the section headed 'Cartography' (p.145). They relate, mostly, to Skirth's description of the battery's location, that of his mountain, and the position of the observation posts Cavella, Castello and Bella Vista just before the Battle of Asiago, June 15th 1918.

1. "Now I must transport you to the foothills of the Italian Alps, about sixty miles north-west of Venice." (p.145).

It is significant that Skirth uses 'foothills' and 'alps', but does not name the Asiago Plateau - a notable geographical feature sitting just above the foothills, and the site (and name) of the battle. In fact Skirth only names the Asiago Plateau once in the whole chapter. (See point 8).

2. Referring to the battery, Skirth says: "The sector we were to take over stretched for about 6.5 kilometres, and ran most of the way along the top of a mountain ridge, which, according to my map, was at an altitude of between 1,000 and 1,500 metres above sea-level." (p.146).

Skirth does not name the mountain/ridge despite knowing its altitude and having a map.

If Skirth's mountain ridge is between 1000-1500 metres above sea-level, and the Plateau (according to Francis McKay) is, roughly, 1006 metres (3,300 feet) above sea-level, this means that the distance from Plateau to mountain ridge is between 0-494 metres, approximately, and therefore, perhaps, more accurately described as a hill. Francis McKay says of the Asiago Plateau: "In the north, from Val Sugana, mountains rise to 6,5000 feet. The central plain, 3,300 feet above sea-level, is rolling pasture land, ... To the south are low hills, then the escarpment." (p.18).

According to the unit war diary, the battery was located on Mt. Busibollo at least until early May. Mt. Busibollo, 1200m, (according to Official History map), is just west of and adjacent to Mt. Magnaboschi. Given that the altitude of the Plateau is 1006m and that of Mt. Busibollo 1200m, the difference between the two is about 194m which, again, suggests a hill and fits within the altitudes Skirth gives. Thus it can be argued that Skirth is referring to a position on Mt. Busibollo, but describing it in a way which seeks to persuade the reader that it is much higher than it really is and without actually naming it. Of course Skirth could be talking about a completely different mountain ridge, but the highest peak (in the Allied sector) indicated on the map is Cima di Fonti, 1519m - giving a maximum ridge altitude of 513m, approximately, from the Plateau.

Both Mt. Busibollo and Mt. Magnaboschi are in the Plateau's southern ridge: "...less mountainous than the ridge to the north, and completely in our possession." (Dalton, p.112).

3. "The half-strength personnel of the battery were billeted in and around the village of Piovene, which was a picturesque half-inhabited place surrounded by vineyards and maize fields." (p.148).

The unit war diary ends on 5th May at which time the battery was still on Mt. Busibollo. There is no mention in the diary of separate billets at Piovene. The diary also refers to "settling in" on two separate days following the move, suggesting the men were in dug-outs on Mt. Busibollo. Piovene is in the Astico gorge, on the plain 3,500 feet below the Plateau, as Skirth indicates (p.148), but it would seem to be a very impractical arrangement to have the men billeted there, whilst the guns were on Mt. Busibollo.

4. "This part of the Italo-Austrian frontier was defended by a system of forts, trenches, dug-outs and O.Ps. strung along the mountain crests." (p.149).

According to Hugh Dalton: "Our front line ran along the southern edge of the Plateau, and, on the right, along the lower slopes of the southern ridge, just inside the pine woods. On the left, further west, it ran mostly on the flat and more in the open. Where the Val d'assa turned west, our front line ran on one side of the shallow gulley and the Austrian on the other. The British front line ran along the foot of these wooded slopes where they came down to the edge of the Plateau." (p.112).

The Official History map confirms Dalton's description. Therefore it is highly unlikely that the defence line was 'strung along the mountain crests' in the way Skirth describes.

5. "The defence line ran roughly east and west, except in the centre where the configuration of the mountain ridge caused it to run north to south for 300 to 400 yards." (p.149)

This statement is something of an over-simplification, but roughly correct when looking at the Official History maps. However, as Skirth has not provided a map for the reader (or any other context) the information does not help them to visualize the defence line within the geography of the Plateau, or in relation to the Austrian, French and Italian positions.

6. "The eastern (i.e. nearer) end was marked by the Bella Vista Observation Post ... From Bella Vista, the trenches ran roughly westwards for nearly four miles to what I will call my mountain, Cima San Pietro (St. Peter's Peak) rising all the time. Here reaching the mountain's precipitous west face, they came to an abrupt end." (p.149).

The eastern end of the defence line is the furthest end. If it existed, Bella Vista O.P. would be at this furthest, east end with the trenches running west and stopping at the east face of Skirth's mountain. The defence line did not rise all the time. (See point 4)

7. "Hollowed out of the rock beneath the Peak was the O.P. that became my personal hide-out, unnamed when I took possession of it, but soon christened 'Cavella'. The cave was ...about 200 feet below the mountain summit." (p.150)

"Cima San Pietro" is not indicated on the Official History, or any other maps used in this research, which is puzzling given it is the only mountain Skirth actually names. However, there is a village called San Pietro Val d'Astico, which is just north of Castelletto, but would have been in Austrian-held territory.

8. "To start with, the mountain in which the O.P. was situated was the end peak of the 4,000-foot-high range running west from the Asiago Plateau." (p.150).

The western side of the Asiago Plateau is bounded by the Astico gorge. This statement also suggests that Skirth's mountain was not actually on the Plateau.

9. "Cavella looked across the narrow Astico gorge, here over 3,000 feet deep, at a stretch of ten to twelve miles of Austrian-held territory ... and the jagged peaks of the snow-capped Dolomites in the far distance." (p.150).

If the Dolomites were visible from Cavella, then the O.P. would look out north, or north-eastwards across the Ghelpac stream or, possibly, Val d'Assa, not over the Astico. If Cavella did look out over the Astico gorge i.e. looking west, the view would be of mostly Italian-held territory not Austrian.

10. "Far below, at the foot of my mountain and completely out of sight, a feeder stream, - the upper course of which I could not see, - came down from the snow-mountains in the north and made a T-junction with the Astico, and the combined waters made a sudden left-hand turn beneath the western edge to flow southwards towards Piovene and eventually the sea." (p.151)

Only 'east' and 'right' are left out of this confusing description. If Skirth is to be believed, then the feeder stream he is referring to is probably the Val d'Assa. Thus, Cavella O.P. overlooks the junction of the rivers Astico and Assa and is, therfore, in the Italian sector. However, as Dalton (p.117) acknowledges: "British, French and Italian Battery's were all mixed together in this sector." Therefore it is possible that the British had O.Ps. in the Italian sector. It should be noted though, that Skirth claims: "...there was nobody to take over from. Not one single Italian, Frenchman, Australian, or even mountain goat." (p.146).

11. "Venturing out from the trenches to the edge of the ravine ...I looked down on a colossal wall of rock nearly three thousand feet deep...At the bottom, like a silver ribbon, lay the Astico stream." (p.152).

The British front line trenches faced part of the Val d'Assa and the Ghelpac stream, not the Astico. It is possible that Skirth was looking south over the escarpment and the plain beyond. However, it is doubtful whether there would be any trenches in this position, as it faced Italian and Allied-held territory.

12. Castello O.P. - "This was a second Observation Post and its window was in the vertical face of the mountain's western flank. The prospect from the look-out opening...included a tiny church squatting on the summit of an isolated hill...Madonna di Castello." (p.151).

"However, if my gunnery expert observed from Castello, the O.P. on the south side of my mountain..." (p.179).

Skirth gives contradictory positions of Castello O.P.

13. Referring to the drawing/map (p.200) Skirth says: "This sketch may help you to visualize the setting. I found it impossible to suggest the breadth and depth of the gorge separating the opposing forces' positions."

The Val d'Astico (gorge and river) is clearly marked on the left, and running vertically to the top of the page. This is not the gorge separating the opposing forces. Where Skirth has written "Gorge of the Astico River" (at the top) it should read Val d'Assa, making the area Skirth has labelled "Austrian-Held" correct. (The Val d'Assa does form a T-junction with the Val d'Astico, although it is obscured somewhat in the drawing by Cavella O.P).

Skirth's drawing actually shows and Italian-held sector - the one to the left of the British sector. Skirth has also moved the entire British defence line west into the Italian sector. According to maps in the Official History, the British defence line started, roughly, just south of the junction between the Ghelpac stream and the Assa river and extended eastwards to finish south of Asiago at this time.

Surprisingly, the drawing shows gun-site #1, the scene of the supposed crest-clearance accident, positioned in the open, whilst gun-site #2 seems to be in more hilly terrrain. There also appear to be two other gun-sites marked although these are not labelled. (The unit war diary for 7th April, 1918 indicates that the battery had four guns not two as Skirth has claimed).

According to the unit war diary, on 30th March 293 Siege Battery: "Moved to position on Mt. Busibollo...", which is not shown on Skirth's drawing - probably because it was well to the east.

• Throughout his description Skirth emphasises and exaggerates the mountainous/hilly terrain, whilst minimizing any reference to other types, such as, meadows, hollows and the Plateau iteself. This is done deliberately in order to make the supposed crest-clearance accident, described later on, seem far more plausible to the reader than it might otherwise do.
• Skirth's assortment of units of measure: feet, yards, miles, metres and kilometres makes it very difficult to compare one thing with another and to determine relative altitudes. Although, superficially, his description may appear accurate, it has been deliberately contrived so that the positions he gives of the British defence line, 293 Siege Battery, Cima San Pietro, and the O.Ps. Cavella, Castello and Bella Vista cannot be located with any certainty on a map - even his own sketch map. (Obscuring their location prevents verification of them). This is very surprising given that Skirth claims he, "...was reputed to be the best map-reader the battery possessed." (p.146); consulted with the Italian Tourist Board; verified locations in appropriate books; consulted with the Imperial War Museum and referred to his own diary-journal. (p.xvii).

War Story No. 1: After the Battle, Messines

In his account of 8^th June, 1917 (p.66) Skirth explains that, "For various reasons, information about the whereabouts of our infantry had failed to reach usIt was essential to find out our infantry's new positions. Until they were carefully plotted on our maps we could not fire a round without endangering our own chaps' lives." (p.68)

The unit war diary for 8^th June, 1917 states that the battery, "Continued the bombardment up till 8.40 pm. The battery then pulled out to a new positionand came under the orders of X group H.A" The battery was continuing with its 'program' as per the entry for the previous day. The unit diary does not mention any difficulty with telephone lines, or communications on 8^th June, 1917 despite the fact that these problems are sometimes mentioned on other days in the diary, for example, 23^rd March, 1917 and 10^th June, 1917. Thus, it seems likely that the battery was firing for most of the day on 8^th June, 1917 and that any problems with communications were insignificant contrary to Skirth's claim.

In the same account Skirth claims that three men, Lt. Hedges, Bill and Geordie, who were detailed with him to collect the information about the infantry and lay a telephone line to the new front line, were all killed on 8^th June 1917 due to shell explosions that occurred during their mission. According to Skirth, he and the men were roughly two-and-a-half to three miles away from the battery when this happened. (p.70)

The unit war diary does not record any deaths on this day and neither does the CWWGC. However, the unit war diary does record Gunner Emsley wounded on 7^th June 1917, and one man killed, two men wounded one of whom later died, on 12^th June, 1917. According to the unit war diary, the two men who died did so, because of a shell which exploded, "a little way from the battery where the men were drawing water." The CWWGC gives the two men as L. Cardwell and A. Northover. Cardwell was from Lancashire, and Northover from Dorset (UK, Soldiers Died in the Great War, 1914-1919). No man named 'Hedges' and no man of the rank 'Lieutenant' died whilst on active service with the battery. (CWWGC).

It seems very unlikely, then, that Skirth's account of 8^th June, 1917 (War Story No.1) took place in the way he describes, if it took place at all. The History of The Royal Artillery (p.186) referring to the period 7^th 14^th June, 1917 states that, "Communications linking this mass of guns and observers and the infantry was complex." However, it does acknowledge that, despite this, "the old problem of keeping contact with the foremost infantry was still there."



In this account Skirth also contradicts himself by stating that, "Bill and Geordie weren't telephonists at all, - they had never laid a line in their lives." (p.68), yet he goes on to state that, "Bill and Geordie, line-testing, found communication with the Command Post cut" (p.71).



In his account of 8^th June, 1917 Skirth makes several contradictory statements about Windy Clark. First, he says that on return from the mission he is hauled into the back of a lorry by Jock and Windy (Clark) (p.74) but, later, states that Windy joined the battery at Ypres as a replacement for Geordie (who Skirth claims died 8^th June, 1917). (p.79)

Skirth then goes on to say that Windy became his trainee telephonist (p.77) but, later, Skirth says, "Repairing field telephone lines was a job I could do pretty well, having learnt a lot from watching Windy." (p.347)

Skirth also claims that, "The little journal in which I managed to keep a record of my adventures gives a detailed account of the events of 8 June 1917." (p.66). The evidence, given in relation to the whole of Skirth's account for this date, suggests that his record for 8 June 1917 was very inaccurate if, in fact, there ever was any record.


Passchendaele, & War Story No. 2: Tragedy at Passchendaele

Skirth claims that, during the first week of November, 1917, he was 'knocked out' by an exploding shell close to where he, and his friend, Jock Shiels, were taking cover. He states that Jock is killed. (p.102). Skirth suggests, in the following chapters, that the explosion precipitated his 'shell-shock' and that this, together with Jock's death, contributed to his subsequent nervous breakdown.

According to the CWWGC & 'UK, Soldiers Died in The Great War', Bombardier John Shiels, Reg. No. 83515, a Scot from East Lothian, died on 18^th July 1917. He is the only Scot, and 'Shiels', listed as having died whilst on active service with 293 Siege Battery.

Skirth describes 'Jock' in very endearing terms and says they were very close friends. He claims that: "Memory plays tricks, but the happenings of that particular day are so indelibly impressed in it they could never be forgotten." (p.84). Assuming, that Skirth's friend, 'Jock' Shiels is actually John Shiels, then Skirth's claim that 'Jock' died in November, 1917 wholly inaccurate, as it had occurred almost four months previously. It shows that his account of 'Passchendaele' could not have taken place at the time he says it did if, in fact, it took place at all. George Sidney Burch, a gunner with 293 SB, did die at Passchendaele on 9^th November, 1917 but, given all that Skirth says about his relationship with 'Jock', it would seem difficult to believe that he confused 'Jock's' death with that of George a southerner, like himself, from Kent.

If Skirth was confused about when his account of 'Passchendaele' happened, and it had occurred at the time of John Shiels' death, that is on 18^th July, 1917, and following the Battle of Messines 7^th-14^th June, then Skirth's given position of the battery, 'just over the crest of Passchendaele Ridge' (p.84) is also wholly inaccurate, as the brigade war diary states they were positioned at Proven (north-west of Poperinge). This possible, but unlikely confusion would also seriously undermine another of his claims that of having experienced a period of amnesia - 'The Lost Months' - from November 1917 to March 1918. (p.103).

An alternative possibility is that Skirth's 'War Story No. 2: Tragedy at Passchendaele' is a wholly fictionalized account designed to create a context in which he can further negatively stereotype his Commanding Officer as a 'lunatic' (p.88) and 'bloody maniac' (p.94) and so present himself in a very favourable and sympathetic light to the reader.

From all of the foregoing it seems that Skirth's account of this incident at 'Passchendaele' culminating in the explosion, which he implies precipitated his 'shell-shock' and contributed to his 'mental breakdown', is extremely unlikely to have occurred. Consequently, serious doubts are raised as to the legitimacy of these claims and also regarding the accuracy and existence of his supposed contemporary diary/journal. Additionally, there are questions to be asked about Skirth's motives for writing this account and his, seeming, lack of respect for the memory of at least one of his comrades John Shiels.


Report: Bernard Bromley MM and "The reluctant Tommy"- by Chris Baker

In connection with research into Bernard Bromley MM carried out by fourteeneighteen|research, you asked us to look at the possibility that he was the Bromley named in the Book "The reluctant Tommy" by Ronald Skirth. As the results of searches make the conclusions uncertain and open to interpretation, I thought I would respond to this specific point personally rather than as part of the report.

I have examined in detail the statements made by Skirth, particularly around the incidents of 15-16 June 1918 when 293 Siege Battery RGA came under attack in the Asiago. Based on my findings, I can only characterise "The reluctant Tommy" as unreliable as a reference source. Here are some examples:

The death of Sergeant R. Waller, supposedly awarded a posthumous Distinguished Conduct Medal.

o No man named R. Waller died with the RGA at any time in the war; in itself this means little as Skirth obviously falsified the name of his Commanding Officer, so perhaps others were too.

o The only DCM awarded to the whole 94th Brigade for the period was to Sergeant Joseph Hobbs, who survived the war. He was not with 293 Siege Battery but was a member of "X" Battery RGA. His citation says that he "Under continuous enemy bombardment of high-explosive and gas shells this N.C.O., who was No. 1 of the detachment, kept his gun in action throughout, notwithstanding the fact that both dial sight and clinometer were destroyed. He set a splendid example of coolness and determination to his detachment. He has previously done fine work".

The Military Cross awarded to an officer named Hemming-Wale.

o There was no officer by that name in the army.

o No Military Cross for this period was awarded to anyone in the battery.

The claim by the Commanding Officer, "R. A. Snow", presumably H. S.K. Snowdon, to have been awarded a Bar to his DSO and to have been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel for his part on 15-16 June 1918.

o He was never awarded the Bar (having already been awarded the DSO before this action) and was only promoted to Acting Lieutenant Colonel in November 1918.

o Skirth says that "whoever was in charge [of the battery] that morning, Snow probably ". Snowdon appears to have been in command of all of 94th Brigade RGA at the time.

o The comment that the Commander-in-Chief (Lord Cavan) had then visited Snowdon to concoct a false report is just fanciful and as far as I can see has no credibility.

Skirth says he reported that two men of the battery's No 1 Section had died of wounds. The diary of 94th Brigade RGA says that of the entire brigade of several batteries, just one man died and twelve were wounded, five of whom remained at duty. Searching the records of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission we could only find one man who was identified as having been serving with the battery and lost his life in the relevant period: Gunner 123309 Walter Booker, who is buried in Magnaboschi British Cemetery.

My impression is that, whether due to poor memory or a wilful desire to write negatively about various people, Skirth overstated or misrepresented the realities of the period. In other words, the context is unreliable and any claim to the actions or behaviours of an individual simply can not be trusted, and in no case have I found a single name (other than his own) that corresponded with a real one. Even Skirth's pal Alf Sparrow, whom you might expect to be accurately named, does not appear to exist as such: there is no man who served in the army under that name who could have been in the position (motor transport driver) that Skirth refers to.

Now, with regard to Bernard and whether he is the R. Bromley to which Skirth refers. Aside from the "conversations" between them, the facts that Skirth uses are:

That Bromley was "years older":

o This is true of Bernard;

That Bromley arrived and took the role of Battery Commander's Assistant from Skirth:

o The research evidence does not confirm that Bernard had been an original member of the battery when it first went overseas and can not rule out that he "arrived" from a different unit, but equally it is possible that he had been with the battery since its formation; (NB Since this report, a photograph of 293 SB at Ewshott camp circa Januar y 1917 has been identified. It clearly shows Bromley & Skirth with the other Battery personnel . This confirms that Bromley was an original member of 293 SB, and that he could not have been a 'newcomer' as Skirth states.).

That he was a Bombardier when he arrived and was a Sergeant after the June 1918 incident:

o Bernard was only a Gunner when he first went overseas and was still at the substantive rank of Gunner on 11 November 1918;

o Bernard had been appointed as a Lance Bombardier by October 1918. There is definitely no evidence of substantive promotion to Sergeant but I can not rule out a temporary promotion on an Acting basis;

That he was awarded the Military Medal as a result of the Asiago fighting:

o This is also true of Bernard, as it is confirmed in the Brigade war diary;

That his name was R. Bromley:

o Only two men of this name served in the Royal Garrison Artillery, but sadly the service records of neither have survived so I can not confirm service (or not) with the battery. One, 330139 Reginald G. Bromley, definitely reached the rank of Sergeant. The other, 90979 Reginald Hugh Bromley, was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in February 1918. Neither was awarded a Military Medal or any other gallantry award. (NB Only 2 men from 293 SB received Military Medals for action on 15^th June 1918 Gnr. A. Wilbur & L/Bdr. B. Bromley- 94^th Brigade war diary - Ruthw)

In other words, the evidence neither confirms nor provides a firm denial that Bernard was R. Bromley. Given the general unreliability of the account frankly I doubt whether Bernard was the man being referred to or even whether a Bombardier/Sergeant who behaved in the way portrayed even existed.

I regret that I am unable to be any more definite on the matter.

__________________________________________

Finally, it is worth noting the following points made in the introduction to 'The Reluctant Tommy':

[Phil Tomaselli]

It has to be said this is a splendid piece of work. Congratulations.

[centurion]

It has to be said this is a splendid piece of work. Congratulations.

But you didn't need to quote it all again.

[Ruth Ward]

It has to be said this is a splendid piece of work. Congratulations.

Thank you ever so much. Praise indeed! Plus, you've given me the perfect opportunity to say a huge THANK YOU for your book review on Amazon. I'm sure it added considerable weight to the rest of the research I sent to the Imperial War Museum.

Regards

Ruth

[Piorun]

Well done, Ruth!! We know that you have a personal connection to this matter but that does not make it any the less relevant. Indeed, it can be argued that your connection is at least equal to Skirth's and your research is considerably more reliable. May I make a professional suggestion? Re-read your post and copy-edit it. There are a few wee mistakes that may be held to detract from your obvious scholarship. My only other comment refers to the first "inaccuracy" regarding the troopship. You have made an assumption as to Skirth's meaning. This is unsupportable and, in my opinion, doesn't help or hinder your argument. "Got" could just as easily mean "hit" as "sunk". This assumption could lead to a suggestion of inaccuracy on your part. That would be a pity as the rest of that paragraph clearly points out his failings.

Phil: you could edit your post to remove the whole of Ruth's post that you've quoted, thus reducing bandwith use (I've heard the term but have no idea what it means other than "taking up room" )

Cheers, Antony

[Ruth Ward]

Well done, Ruth!! We know that you have a personal connection to this matter but that does not make it any the less relevant. Indeed, it can be argued that your connection is at least equal to Skirth's and your research is considerably more reliable. May I make a professional suggestion? Re-read your post and copy-edit it. There are a few wee mistakes that may be held to detract from your obvious scholarship. My only other comment refers to the first "inaccuracy" regarding the troopship. You have made an assumption as to Skirth's meaning. This is unsupportable and, in my opinion, doesn't help or hinder your argument. "Got" could just as easily mean "hit" as "sunk". This assumption could lead to a suggestion of inaccuracy on your part. That would be a pity as the rest of that paragraph clearly points out his failings.

Phil: you could edit your post to remove the whole of Ruth's post that you've quoted, thus reducing bandwith use (I've heard the term but have no idea what it means other than "taking up room" )

Cheers, Antony

Thanks, Antony.

What do you mean by a copy-edit? I'm struggling with some of the formatting because the text looks fine in 'full edit', but goes wrong after I've 'posted' it. If there are other sorts of errors, you may need to point them out - can't see the wood for the trees any more!

Ruth

[squirrel]

Well done Ruth - researched and explained very well.

[Piorun]

Hello, Ruth. Copy-editing means scanning the copy (what you've written) word by word, line by line to catch errors in spelling, grammar and context, plus a wee bit. If it helps, I'll gladly have a go for you. PM me with your e-mail. Cheers, Antony

[MichaelBully]

A well written piece or research- very helpful. Thank you for posting it here. With best wishes. Michael

[Magnumbellum]

Agreed.

[MichaelBully]

I have bought a second hand copy of 'The Reluctant Tommy' and have finished reading it. I tried, whilst taking on board Ruth's research, to go through the book slowly and objectively as possible.

To me it seems that the appeal of the book is based on the fact that Skirth adopted the technique of such writers as Robert Graves and Vera Brittain -in writing about the Great War years afterwards- as being very personal. The feeling that they will tell you just about anything their lives . Yet Graves and Brittain were alive when their work was published so could be questioned concerning their motives for writings and the validity of their work.

There are many people who view the Great War as a 'sensless slaughter' and adopt the 'lions led by donkeys' stance. Having a text claiming to be an eye witness account in which an ordinary tommy gets disillusioned by the war, gives what is meant to be 'first hand' evidence of army bungling and men being sacrificed needlessly by heartless superiors, such as his account of Asagio Plain in June 1918 and his libelling of Bombadier Bromley , must give certain readers the 'feelgood' factor. Their view of the Great War being seemingly endorsed rather than challenged.

Tthe way Skirth portrays himself as standing up to superior officers such as his clashes with Major Snow seems to be playing to the gallery. And everyone loves a decent love story, which is a major theme of the book.

What is most frustrating is that as well as 'The Reluctant Tommy' being so hopeless when it comes to cross referencing, such as deliberately getting the number of his division wrong , and any check on his friend Jock Shiels who was meant to have been killed in action in November 1917 already being dead for several months, there are instances such as Passhendaele -where the young Skirth has a verbal confrontation with Major Snow, ( page 95) which are just impossible to verify from records or any other eye witness account. Maybe it happened, maybe it didn't. But the reader is asked to believe that it did.

'The Reluctant Tommy' is being presented as factual, yet the reader is meant to accept an account of an incident that took place in 1917 being written down in the 1970's , edited for publication thirty years on. Although the editor in the introduction state that

"Writing more than half a century after the event, Skirth knew that 100 per cent accuracy would be impossible" ( page xvi) ...yet we can also read that Skirth stated

"In regard to the historical accuracy of the actual happenings I have chosen there is no doubt in my mind whatever (page xvii)

And this seems to be too much of a paradox.

Whatever happens next- and I'd be quite happy for a campaign to be started to request that bookshops and libraries move 'The Reluctant Tommy' to the 'fiction' section- perhaps something constructive might appear. Firstly that any more discovered memoirs that are unpublished on the Great War are either thoroughly checked before publication , and secondly that bodies such as the Imperial War Museum stress in print that when anthologies quoting from memoirs held in their archives, that it is made very clear that the accuracy of the memoirs can not be vouched for.

[Ruth Ward]

Hello

I've added a new section to this review based on statements from the section headed 'Cartography'. (The new bit precedes Chris Baker's report). Any comments, particularly regarding any corrections needed, would be appreciated.

(I have wondered about including a map & possibly photos, but am worried about copyright issues).

Many thanks

Ruth

[MichaelBully]

Thanks for updating the review- I am re-reading The Reluctant Tommy (TRT) and cross referencing with your review and Chris Baker's research. I will certainly be re-reading the section on Italy again with the new 'cartography' section in mind. TRT seems to be looking more and more suspect.

I have been thinking about the Asagio Plateau today as Vera Brittain's brother Edward Brittain was killed in action there on 15th June 1918 .

One general question, has anyone seen Skirth's War Service records at the NA -if they are available? Also was wondering about the same for Jock Shiels/Bombadier J. Shiels?

With all good wishes

Michael Bully

[Chris_Baker]

The records of Skirth and Shiels are among the missing.

[David Filsell]

An almost forensic examination - fascinating and most impressice. It set me thinking. I know, for instance, that Graves book is riddled with innacuracies - not least his claim to have read his own obituary in the Times. Sasson incorrectly, apparently, tells the tal;e of casting his medal into the Mersey. I have copies of a set of personal letters from a member of the RWF at Ypres who claims to have faced a cavalry charge. The fact is that Old Soldiers do tell lies.

I suspect that many personal accounts written after the war could be analysied to similar effect as that revealed by CB.Obviously errors are misleading. But apart from those who kept detailed diaries memories do fade, become muddled and conflated. I have certainly told tall tales from time to time - and frankly can no longer remember whether they are true false or embrodered for effect. Equally clearly there were those who wrote their books having seen some kind of light, formed opinions ingnornace of the true reality or to make a point.

But a fascinating piece. Thanks Chris.

[MichaelBully]

I agree with a lot that you say David, yet on the other hand from my research in to Vera Brittain's 'Testament of Youth'.....looking back at the years 1914-1925 , written in 1929- (early) 1933, published 1933, it seems that a great deal stands up to cross referencing. I have been to The National Archives and looked at the war service records of some of the men who are mentioned and Vera Brittain's version of events stands up relatively well.Of course Vera Brittain had her own agenda, so to speak in writing, 'Testament of Youth'. We have to make due allowance for the fact that Vera was aware in 1933 that a mass European war could break out again, and her work is obviously connected to her world view of 1933.

The problem with The Reluctant Tommy (TRT) is , as I mentioned on my post of 2nd May 2011 on this thread, is that so much of Skirth's account of his service in the Great War as presented in TRT is constructed in a fashion that it makes it very difficult to cross reference with other sources. Skirth appears as the sort of person who will sit in a bar or cafe and tell you his life story, and his most intimate thoughts, yet at the same time he is simultaneously covering his tracks. And in respect of Vera Brittain or Rupert Graves, at least they wrote their experiences of the Great War when they were alive and relatively young, and could be held to account. When Skirth appears to denigrate other soldiers posthumously , then he can't be questioned.

I'd love to know more about Seigfried Sassoon and the possibility that he didn't throw his medal into the Mersey.

[kenf48]

I'd love to know more about Seigfried Sassoon and the possibility that he didn't throw his medal into the Mersey.

here you go Michael http://www.telegraph...or-auction.html

and his 'Soldiers Declaration' that allegedly accompanied the act

http://www.oucs.ox.a...eclaration.html

I think the biggest problem I have with Skirth's memoir, as I've said before, is not that an old soldier's memory is flawed but the fact it is promoted to further a twenty first century agenda by his supporters and publicists and in so doing denigrates the service and memory of his comrades. The difference is that Graves acknowledged in an essay two years after the book was published that he he wrote it to appeal to all sections of society and to 'make a lump of money'.

Graves account was never lodged at the IWM Archive and picked up by modern 'researchers' as an account of a 'remarkable soldier who demonstrated his objections to the war while serving' although unlike Sassoon, Skirth did not say so at the time.

Ken

[MichaelBully]

That's great Ken. Information much appreciated. Which essay are you refering to in respect of Graves here? Best wishes , Michael Bully

[kenf48]

That's great Ken. Information much appreciated. Which essay are you refering to in respect of Graves here? Best wishes , Michael Bully

"P.S. To Goodbye to All That" cited in Paul Fussell's 'The Great War and Modern Memory' (in his section on 'The Caricature Scenes of Robert Graves') where Graves enumerates the obligatory ingredients of a modern memoir, a section of the essay is reproduced listing those ingredients.

Ken

[Piorun]

here you go Michael http://www.telegraph...or-auction.html

and his 'Soldiers Declaration' that allegedly accompanied the act

http://www.oucs.ox.a...eclaration.html

I think the biggest problem I have with Skirth's memoir, as I've said before, is not that an old soldier's memory is flawed but the fact it is promoted to further a twenty first century agenda by his supporters and publicists and in so doing denigrates the service and memory of his comrades. The difference is that Graves acknowledged in an essay two years after the book was published that he he wrote it to appeal to all sections of society and to 'make a lump of money'.

Graves account was never lodged at the IWM Archive and picked up by modern 'researchers' as an account of a 'remarkable soldier who demonstrated his objections to the war while serving' although unlike Sassoon, Skirth did not say so at the time.

Ken

Interesting comment, Ken. Perhaps another problem with Skirth's "memoir" is that it smells of self-justification. If one looks carefully at the picture Skirth unwittingly paints of himself (perhaps he didn't consider that coins have two sides and photographs have negatives - or, at least, they used to), I believe that one can discern a portrait of a self-centred, rather poor soldier who had a great deal of difficulty fitting into the realities of army life. I detect elements of paranoia in his "it's their fault, they're wrong" descriptions. He comes across as a post-war poser and I really do sense that he's a cunning one at that. As so clearly shown in the cartography section of ruthw's analysis, he does seem to be deliberately "fudging" the details so that his real footsteps can't be traced. I'm not sure that his memory was at all flawed. I think it was extremely sharp - and it pricked him. His "memoirs" weren't written in an isolated garrett. He travelled back to Italy and, apparently, employed the resources of the Italian authorities. My personal opinion is that Skirth intended this as an effort in self-justification in order to protect his own "reputation" should it be challenged after the war. This is a far from uncommon trait in people whose conscience bothers them. Antony

[Ruth Ward]

I think it's worth remembering that Ronald Skirth wasn't the one who published his 'memoir' and, in fact, seems to have been very keen to keep it private. There is an article in the Bexhill Observer (on-line) in which Jean Skirth relates an incident which, I think, shows very clearly that her father did not want his journals to be made public. http://http://www.bexhillobserver.net/news/bexhill-news/flanders_turned_ronald_into_the_reluctant_tommy_1_1402407 . This incident is mentioned in the introduction to TRT, but made light of by the editor. (I also wonder whether Jean Skirth was, perhaps, persuaded against her better judgement to allow the journals to be published. After all she donated to them to the IWM, not to the publishers).

Skirth was, obviously, a veteran of the Great War and must have had his reasons for writing his memoir in the way that he did. In doing the research it has become very apparent that Skirth has deliberately set about contradicting, at every opportunity, official sources like the Official History, the war diaries and the official maps in order to throw the proverbial spanner in the works. (I'm not suggesting here that Official sources are alway correct, they're obviously not, but Skirth seems to have an almost obsessive compulsion to contradict them). I also think that Skirth may have taken offence at statements in these official sources and others, such as Norman Gladden's - 'Across The Piave' and used his 'memoir' as a way of addressing, or counter-balancing them. All the errors and fictionalisation point to Skirth's desire to present an alternative, pacifist's view of his military service to a reader who he assumes will be unsympathetic, ignorant of the workings of a siege battery and Italy as a WW1 theatre of war. I wonder if, in reality, the young Ronald Skirth performed his WW1 military duty willingly and to the best of his ability - possibly even enthusiastically. Reflecting on all this in later life, as a pacifist (and assuming that at least is true) he might have been horrified at his actions then and his naive understanding of war. He might also have felt very angry that his younger self had been duped, or comandeered by the government/military in order to commit murder on their behalf. It seems to me that Skirth has 'sacrificed' his (and his comrades) actual ww1 military service for, in his eyes, the greater good of pacifism.

Ruth

[Chris_Baker]

Ruth, I found another interesting pice of evidence today. It concerns "Lieutenant Salisbury", who supposedly quietly gave Skirth sight of the dastardly Snowdon's "tissue of lies" report about 15 June 1918. Well, the good Lieutenant is John Salusbury, and having seen his service record today I can tell you that he was away on a course at the time of the battle and for some time afterwards. There is no way he was in a position to have done as Skirth claims. I have a copy. When I've had a chance to download and sift it all I'll send it on.

[Ruth Ward]

Ruth, I found another interesting pice of evidence today. It concerns "Lieutenant Salisbury", who supposedly quietly gave Skirth sight of the dastardly Snowdon's "tissue of lies" report about 15 June 1918. Well, the good Lieutenant is John Salusbury, and having seen his service record today I can tell you that he was away on a course at the time of the battle and for some time afterwards. There is no way he was in a position to have done as Skirth claims. I have a copy. When I've had a chance to download and sift it all I'll send it on.

That's amazing! Many thanks, Chris.

[Piorun]

Ruth: your sympathetic interpretation of Skirth's motives does you a great deal of credit, especially under the circumstances. In my heart, I hope that you are correct. In my head, I cleave to my interpretation. Either way, I do agree that Skirth probably did not want to publish. It was more in the way of an "if you're reading this you'll know I'm dead" type of testament. I also agree that his daughter has been taken advantage of. Kindest regards, Antony

[Seany]

Hi Chris,

I'm attempting to reconstruct the identities of the company of 293 battery and understand more about this batteries history and who these men were.

I'm constantly looking for those who served.

May I get a copy of the records For Lt. Salusbury please?

Sean

Ruth, I found another interesting pice of evidence today. It concerns "Lieutenant Salisbury", who supposedly quietly gave Skirth sight of the dastardly Snowdon's "tissue of lies" report about 15 June 1918. Well, the good Lieutenant is John Salusbury, and having seen his service record today I can tell you that he was away on a course at the time of the battle and for some time afterwards. There is no way he was in a position to have done as Skirth claims. I have a copy. When I've had a chance to download and sift it all I'll send it on.