Planned German Battle Cruiser raids on convoys

[MikB]

The point, which you have missed, is that the German ships were as equally long ranged as the British. Iron Duke 8100 nautical miles at 12 knots, König 8000 nautical miles at 12 knots.

You'd better try to correct Wikipedia, then - it gives Iron Duke as 14,000 nm @ 10 kn.

It looks to me that the point you're so agressively trying to make is that German ships were better than British, really they won, and history's judgement is biased and wrong.

Sorry, but that's hogwash. In both wars the German surface navy was at least as prone to mistaken judgement and technical failure as the British - for example the near-catastrophic breakdown of Moltke in the Norwegian raid.

Loss of distant water bases and weak afloat support made cruiser warfare very difficult in WW1 after the annihilation of Von Spee's squadron - and you indicated in your first post in this thread that you understood that, so I don't see why you take the tone you do now.

Regards,

MikB

[Signals]

certainly not for action with the Grand Fleet.

This was never German tactic to take on the GF because of numbers, so no idea why you would state the obvious.

for example the near-catastrophic breakdown of Moltke in the Norwegian raid.

Exagerated a tad, see how far up they went, see where the RN was based, had the RN wanted action here then it would have been catastrophic for Moltke. To take on the German navy at this stage would mean losing ships themselves, and as i have read many cabinet documents there was concern that after the war Britian was going to slip to 3rd with their navy behind Japan & the USA as these countries were building new battlecruisers and battleships with lesssons of Jutland learned, the British were building nothing like this, so presevation on current numnbers and winning the war by keeping the ring was the chosen method.

[Gary Charles]

If Iron Duke could go 14000nm at 10kts, they must have been using Kryptonite as fuel. (and by that way that should read "British histories judgement")

[ionia]

certainly not for action with the Grand Fleet.

This was never German tactic to take on the GF because of numbers, so no idea why you would state the obvious.

Exagerated a tad, see how far up they went, see where the RN was based, had the RN wanted action here then it would have been catastrophic for Moltke. To take on the German navy at this stage would mean losing ships themselves, and as i have read many cabinet documents there was concern that after the war Britian was going to slip to 3rd with their navy behind Japan & the USA as these countries were building new battlecruisers and battleships with lesssons of Jutland learned, the British were building nothing like this, so presevation on current numnbers and winning the war by keeping the ring was the chosen method.

Stating the obvious is sometimes nescessary.

Irrespective of your reading of Cabinet documents, you must be aware that this attempt by the HSF on the Scandinavian convoys was an occasion when the Germans were particularly careful of their wireless security and it was not until MOLTKE broke wireless silence that the Admiralty was alerted to German forces being at sea. The Grand Fleet sailed from Rosyth but the HSF (and MOLTKE) had too much of a start on their return to base. In order for the Grand Fleet to have intercepted the HSF the former would have had to sail from Rosyth some nine hours before the MOLTKE's signal was deciphered.

[Signals]

There is only a partial story there re Motlke in your post, so would be very interested to hear her exact movements after her mishap.

[ionia]

There is only a partial story there re Moltke in your post, so would be very interested to hear her exact movements after her mishap.

As far as I am aware, her movements were as follows, all times being reduced to GMT.

At 0520 on 24th April, when about 60 miles west of Egero, MOLTKE signalled visually to Hipper in the HINDENBURG that her starboard engine was out of action. She began to settle by the stern. Her midships engine failed shortly after as water continued to enter. She was ordered to fall back on the battle fleet. Hipper was also handicapped by the VON DER TANN reporting that she could not do more than 21 knots because of bad coal.

At 0643 MOLTKE wirelessed Scheer and Hipper that she could not move and Hipper decided to reverse course to join her, instructing SEYDLITZ to prepare to take her in tow. At 0930 MOLTKE was in sight and at 1015 the HSF battle squadrons, when Scheer ordered the OLDENBERG to take her in tow and ordered Hipper to carry on with the task of intercepting the convoy.

The battlefleet then turned south for home at about 11 knots and was seen by J6 off Horn Reef at about 0400. When about 40 miles north of Heligoland the MOLKE, by then proceeding slowly under her own power, was hit by a torpedo from the British submarine E42 (about 0630 on 25th April). Nevertheless, she made it into the Jade.

[Signals]

Here is the summary from her actual war diary, seems she was being towed around for 2 days. Where was the GF Based?

Summary S.M.S. Moltke log.

Wednesday 24.4.1918

6.10am Starboard inner turbine over speeds due to loss of propeller.

6.15am Middle engine floods.

10.38am Taken in tow by S.M.S. Straßburg. Tow line breaks.

11.13am Taken in tow by S.M.S. Oldenburg.

4.53pm Port engine makes slow speed.

Thursday 25.4.1918

5.40pm Cast loose from tow.

7.37pm Torpedo hits ship to port.

Friday 26.4.1918

8.56am Anchor on Wilhelmshaven Roads.

E42 Logs states,

5.49 pm fired Port beam Tube.

6.34 pm fired Starboard Bow Tube

J6 logs State,

4.10 am, dived to avoid light cruisers & destroyers.

5.30 am 5 battlecruisers steering WSW.

[ionia]

My apologies for the error in the time of E42's torpedo attack; it should, of course, have been 6.30pm (rather than am) on the 25th April. The torpedo fired at about 1740 was directed at another target.

MOLTKE seems to have been under tow by the OLDENBURG for about 31 hours.

By April the Grand Fleet had moved south to Rosyth, about 300 nm from the track of the HSF on this sortie and about 360 nm from Horns Reef (neglecting minefields!).

[Signals]

And what did the Grand Fleet do about this, what was their reaction?

[ionia]

And what did the Grand Fleet do about this, what was their reaction?

Whilst I have been happy to play along with your question and answer session, I think it is your turn to tell us what the Grand Fleet did

[Signals]

Oh no, I’m asking as i need some fulfilment on the wonders of the GF’s wonderful work after Jutland.

I have always wondered why this serious issue was never dealt with either, dated 23/1/1918. The attack though was not for the GF.

[Signals]

Cabinet Papers

With the solitary exception of the battle-cruiser “Hood," the navy therefore possesses no capital ship which embodies the vital and momentous lessons of Jutland, which battle revealed that all ships designed before that date are liable to instant and complete destruction by the exposure of their magazines to the new developments of shell-fire. This being the case, it is imperative, if the morale and fighting efficiency of the Fleet are to be maintained, that it should be provided with ships that are free from these grave defects and in which the Navy can feel confidence.

July 15, 1921.

With the exception of Hood, mmmm. Cordite only.

[Gary Charles]

Hey Simon and MikB,

You have really tossed me a curly one this time.

R.A. Burt has Iron Duke range as 8.100nm at 12kts, and Conways has her at 7.780nm at 10 knots. Your Wiki mates have 14.000nm at 10 knots, and that's further than New Zealand to England. Pretty handy that.

I am confused, and not quite sure who to go with. Wiki or Conways???

And whats this "It looks to me that the point you're so agressively trying to make is that German ships were better than British, really they won, and history's judgement is biased and wrong." I didn't say any of that, they are your words. Please refrain from personal abuse and please don't try to put words in my mouth.

[Signals]

OK IONIA,

finding it hard to comment on the aggressive tactics deployed by the GF after Jutland. But when you are ready i will be all ears. Anyway, why did they not tackle German battlecruisers coming out on a daily basis as suggested in the earlier post in 1918, considering the mission these vessels were employed at the time and the grief it was causing England, what were they worried about? The world's greatest navy had been reduced to a reactionary fleet. Our friend Winnie had a pretty fair idea and as a man there at the time.

If the naval authorities decide that no aggressive naval action on a great scale is possible, and that the fleet can only "keep the ring," it then follows that the battle fleets and cruiser forces maintained in commission should be strictly limited to what is necessary for that restricted role: and the surplus materiel, stores, and expert personnel should be released for other purposes. The guns and ammunition should go to the front. The officers and expert ratings should go to the Tanks or to the air, where they are greatly needed.

July 7, 1917.

W. S. C.

And keeping with this threat, the worry for the GF in relation to raids on convoy's and the east coast was news of the Mackensen Class, as it was simply put, they will have 4 ships that we will have no answer to.

[ionia]

OK IONIA,

finding it hard to comment on the aggressive tactics deployed by the GF after Jutland. But when you are ready i will be all ears. Anyway, why did they not tackle German battlecruisers coming out on a daily basis as suggested in the earlier post in 1918, considering the mission these vessels were employed at the time and the grief it was causing England, what were they worried about? The world's greatest navy had been reduced to a reactionary fleet. Our friend Winnie had a pretty fair idea and as a man there at the time.

If the naval authorities decide that no aggressive naval action on a great scale is possible, and that the fleet can only "keep the ring," it then follows that the battle fleets and cruiser forces maintained in commission should be strictly limited to what is necessary for that restricted role: and the surplus materiel, stores, and expert personnel should be released for other purposes. The guns and ammunition should go to the front. The officers and expert ratings should go to the Tanks or to the air, where they are greatly needed.

July 7, 1917.

W. S. C.

And keeping with this threat, the worry for the GF in relation to raids on convoy's and the east coast was news of the Mackensen Class, as it was simply put, they will have 4 ships that we will have no answer to.

Merely waiting for you to give us your version of the April, 1918 response of the GF. I hope you won't keep us waiting too long!

With respect to your post #61, what were the co-ordinates of Point "H"?

[MikB]

Hey Simon and MikB,

You have really tossed me a curly one this time.

R.A. Burt has Iron Duke range as 8.100nm at 12kts, and Conways has her at 7.780nm at 10 knots. Your Wiki mates have 14.000nm at 10 knots, and that's further than New Zealand to England. Pretty handy that.

I am confused, and not quite sure who to go with. Wiki or Conways???

And whats this "It looks to me that the point you're so agressively trying to make is that German ships were better than British, really they won, and history's judgement is biased and wrong." I didn't say any of that, they are your words. Please refrain from personal abuse and please don't try to put words in my mouth.

My contention would be that you started it. And the language you used in earlier posts and continue to use ("your Wiki mates"... as if I had any acquaintance with them) appears intended to provoke.

On the point of the Wikipedia entry, I have to say I suspect a nmi/km confusion in their base data - I don't recall ever hearing of a fossil-fuelled RN ship with an endurance that long. With the distribution of British bases around the world's oceans, it wouldn't have been necessary in any case. Irrespective of the endurance of individual ships, the RN had effective free range of the oceans at that time, and the cruiser warfare practiced by isolated German units, however locally and temporarily successful it might have appeared, always ended in much the same manner.

Regards,

MikB

[Signals]

Merely waiting for you to give us your version of the April, 1918 response of the GF. I hope you won't keep us waiting too long!

With respect to your post #61, what were the co-ordinates of Point "H"?

If you have no idea where Position H is, what can i say, as a hint, you can read all the war diaries of the German Batlecruisers and see what they were doing at this time, ADM 137-2073 is where you will find it from the British side and other designated positions. I get the distinctive idea you don't know what happened in April 1918, i would guess they sailed to Position H in a mad rush to bring the HSF to action.

Got me beat why the German battlecruisers were going out to Dogger Bank so often, protecting the minesweepers so the U-Boats could continue to get out, why the GF did not sail and force the issue with their numbers, thus closing the routes of the U-Boats, but as Churchill said, they were only good for keeping a distant ring, i guess can't risk the big ships, loose to many of them and they would have to switch from sorely needed merchant ship construction to warship construction, now that would hurt. There was a time when the GF was interested in having a battle at Dogger Bank, but that was before Jutland.

[AlanCurragh]

There seems to be a lot of aggression in this thread - can I please ask for a bit of civility and respect for each others opinions here?

Thanks

Alan

[TeeCeeCee]

R. A. Burt is a respected author on British battleships. I am not interested in your opinion of what he might or might not have used. The point, which you have missed, is that the German ships were as equally long ranged as the British. Iron Duke 8100 nautical miles at 12 knots, König 8000 nautical miles at 12 knots. The contention that the German ships were designed for only short range is simply incorrect. I cannot make it any plainer.

Vic, you rubbish the 'theory' that German ships had more cramped living conditions than comparable British ships. I didn't respond earlier as I couldn't think of where, or when I'd read it... it may have been 18yrs ago?... so I left it as these aren't my facts, I didn't research it out, I just read it in books as I wasn't alive when these things were built. So if I know something about them, it has come from a book of some sort.

J Roberts 'Battlecruisers' p114. He compares British and German BCs and (papaphrased) that the germans BCs had thicker armour, over more area of the ship. They were able to do this due to the weight savings possible from their use of [direct quote] "small-tube boilers and the use of lighter calibre, but higher velocity guns, and the fact that german designs were more compact making greater use of the space at the expense of habitability and convienience. (This is not a point of detail: habitability was of considerable importance to the British who expected their ships to be able to serve in all climates from the tropics to the North Sea without excessive strain on the general health or wellbeing of the crew)."

Now it's your turn. Provide us with proof that this fact is wrong. Cherry-picking 1 ship from each fleet as a representative isn't sound practice.

[ionia]

Merely waiting for you to give us your version of the April, 1918 response of the GF. I hope you won't keep us waiting too long!

With respect to your post #61, what were the co-ordinates of Point "H"?

If you have no idea where Position H is, what can i say, as a hint, you can read all the war diaries of the German Batlecruisers and see what they were doing at this time, ADM 137-2073 is where you will find it from the British side and other designated positions. I get the distinctive idea you don't know what happened in April 1918, i would guess they sailed to Position H in a mad rush to bring the HSF to action.

Got me beat why the German battlecruisers were going out to Dogger Bank so often, protecting the minesweepers so the U-Boats could continue to get out, why the GF did not sail and force the issue with their numbers, thus closing the routes of the U-Boats, but as Churchill said, they were only good for keeping a distant ring, i guess can't risk the big ships, loose to many of them and they would have to switch from sorely needed merchant ship construction to warship construction, now that would hurt. There was a time when the GF was interested in having a battle at Dogger Bank, but that was before Jutland.

If you know where Point "H" was (which I doubt), plot it on a 1918 mine chart of the North Sea and perhaps your question will be answered.

[Signals]

If you read the War Diaries of the German Battlecruisers for these times, which i assume you have,(i doubt), then you will find your answer. Not doing the work for you old chum, can also give you the page numbers form the ADM ref i mentioned earlier. (And i do have all these documents with the maps).

[Gary Charles]

The original thread I replied to was about pre-dreadnoughts verus dreadnought cruisers. I mentioned that pre-dreadnoughts, Slava and Tsarevitch, had engaged some dreadnoughts, König and Kronprinz. I also pointed out that the German ships had a range equal to those of other navies, and that it is a myth that they were less habitable. It was here that some people lost the thread. They went off and attempted to shoot the messenger, who brought news they didn't want to hear about the equal capabilities of the German ships. They confused km with nm and presented their answer as fact. Then they abused the messenger.

Back to the thread. There is another case of pre-dreadnoughts protecting a convoy of sorts, consisting of a minelayer and aircraft tenders, easy targets for a battlecruiser. On May 10, 1915 the battlecruiser Goeben attacked a convoy of Russian ships, protected by 5 pre-dreadnought battleships. The German's aim was to prevent the Russians attacking the Bosporus, which they did, and the Russians aim was to beat off the dreadnought, which they did. Although just a brief action, it is extremely interesting from both the point of view of the technical abilities of the ships, and the judgement and decisions of those involved. The main thing is both commanders wanted to fight, a pre-requisite for any action. Perhaps you can draw some reasonable conclusions for the main subject of this thread from an actual engagment.

[Signals]

On May 10, 1915 the battlecruiser Goeben attacked a convoy of Russian ships, protected by 5 pre-dreadnought battleships.

You have supplied 2 very good examples Victory, had this situation eventuated in the Atlantic it would be hard to see the Germans risking hits from even a pre-dreadnought, their Battlecruisers proved they could take punishment, but that kind of distance from base would be risky.

I have also studied the Slava duels with the German dreadnoughts in 1915 & 1917, she certainly was no pushover in 1915, again showing the risks involved in even taking on these old girls.

[bill24chev]

I have been following this thread with interest but think that the “ I’ll show you mine if you show me yours” a little bit pre-teen

.

The fact is that the Grand Fleet spent most of the was swinging at anchor at Scappa and Rosythe.

Another fact is the German navy, post Jutland, decided to carry out a counter blockade of GB using submarines and not attempt to break the RN blockade by a decisive fleet action. This led to near anarchyon the home front and ultimate defeat on the Western Front where the war was won or lost.

Jutland showed up the flaws in RN systems and ship losses were greater for the RN. However, many of the RN problems such as poor quality shells and dangerous ammunition handling were rectified fairly quickly. Also many German ships suffered severe damage and casualties. The horrific injuries caused by naval gunfire would have been seen by the crews of the German ships, especially in Hopper’s Battle Cruises. This would have had a psychological effect on the remaining crews. By comparison most RN casualties were in the lost Battle Cruisers ,Heavy Cruisers and Destroyers and would not have been seen by the majority of RN seamen.

German capital ships had better internal design and the Battle Cruisers had thicker armour which improved survivability at the cost of cramped conditions for the crews. Crew comfort was not a high priority if operations were of short duration in the North Sea or Eastern Atlantic. The RN’s need to be capable of fighting in any part of the globe made crew comfort a factor . An unfit crew would be at a severe disadvantage.

The range of the capital ships and cruisers is unimportant, it is the range of the smaller Destroyers that limits a fleet's radius of operations. The well-established British logistics system with coal and other requirements available around the globe meant that The RN could go anywhere with its smaller ships. The High seas fleet would need either a fleet train of colliers and supply ships or colliers available from neutral sources.

I believe that the German failure to break the British blockade and the reliance on un-restricted submarine warfare witch lead to US involvement were more important than the various fleet/squadron engagements although it appears that the U-boat decision was taken after the review of what happened at Jutland.

[MikB]

The range of the capital ships and cruisers is unimportant, it is the range of the smaller Destroyers that limits a fleet's radius of operations.

Most of what you said is fair enough, but I don't agree with the above. Many of the early distant-water actions were fought without destroyer support on either side - as, for that matter, were some in WW2.

To return to the original subject of German plans for BC raids on convoys; quite apart from the acceptability of risk of action damage, seaborne refuelling of the ships would present at that time potentially insuperable problems. I don't even know if there was any proven capability to do so. Many German BCs had endurances in the 4000 nmi range and were at least partially coal-fired. Fuelling was one of the major constraints on WW2 raiding operations such as 'Berlin' and Prinz Eugen's attempt to retrieve something from the wreckage of 'Rhine', and those later ships had at least 50% greater endurance than the WW1 BCs.

My guess would be that the range of capital ships was a major factor in the non-occurrence of these proposed raids, perhaps secondary only to damage risk.

Regards,

MikB

Regards,

MikB