Trench Warfare

[bobshaw]

Can anyone please clarify a niggling question regarding the formation of the troops in an attack.

Reading several War Diaries and accounts the only standard I can see is that Company "A" on the left and Company "D" on the right, these were followed by Company "C" and in some cases Company "B" which was the reserve.

Was this a standard proceedure throughout the war?

What I am trying to clarify is that the war diary I have states that the attack was in two waves.

The regiment I am interested in reports that on 1st October 1916 the troops gathered in the assembly and support trenches, "Coys A & D in the forward trench and Coys C & B in the rear trench, being some 800 yards in front of their objective (a section of the German 3rd line) was over fairly flat and open ground, with a frontage of 300 yards.

The attack was to take place in two waves at 3:15 p.m.

"A" Company on the left "D" Company on the right in the forward trench . "C" Company on the left and "B" on the right formed up in a second trench dug 50 yds in rear of the other. "A" and "D" Company advanced in two waves under our own Barrage which lifted off the objective at 3.19 p.m. "C" Company advancing in support in one wave. "B" Company remaining in reserve."

Would this mean that Platoons 1 & 2 of both "A" & "D" Companies (about 125 men) were the first wave followed by Platoons 3 & 4 of both "A" & "D" Companies (about 125 men) as the second wave, with "C" Company (some 125 men) in support?

or

Would Company "A" be the first wave followed by Company "B" as the second wave?

I am not sure if this wants answering, but I assume that the Platoons would have gone out together.

Regards.

Bob

[Ron Clifton]

Hello Bob

Tactics varied during the war, and according to whether a battalion had to find its own reserve (as when attacking alone) or whether the reserve was provided by another unit (as when part of a brigade or divisional attack scheme).

If a battalion was attacking alone, it normally assigned two companies to the assault, attacking side by side an and each with two platoons in first wave and two in second wave, with a third company attacking as a single wave with all platoons in line (as it would have to cover double the frontage of the first two) and the fourth company in reserve.

If a battalion was p[art of a larger attack, with another unit providing its reserve, the support would normally be of two companies, in two waves similar to those of the two assaulting companies. Sometimes the two assaulting waves each consisted of a whole company, depending on the objectives assigned and the expected time which they would take, so in those cases the four companies followed one another in column.

There was certainly no rule that A, B, C and D Companies would automatically take particulart roles. These would be assigned by the battalion CO in the light of where the companies happened to be at the time, and their preparedness for the attack. Companies usually rotated between trench-holding, support and reserve on a fairly regular basis (every week to ten days or so) and the freshest troops would normally be chosen to come up and lead the attack.

Within companies, platoons were normally also arranged with two sections in front and two behind. In the pamphlet "Training of Platoons for Offensive Action" issued in Feb 1917, it was definitely laid down that the platoon was to be regarded as the basic unit for an attack.

Ron

[truthergw]

Local attacks involving a battalion, were tailored closely to their objective and so not at all standard. Companies, platoons and even sections would have specific objectives. Where to go and what to do when they got there. No general prescription could fulfill that requirement.

[Robert Dunlop]

To facilitate operational planning, it was not uncommon for Staff Officers to list Division A to be followed by Division B, or equivalent. This generic approach made it easy to specify the pattern for the attack without detailing who A and B would be. The same principle carried down, to some extent, to lower levels of planning. By the time a plan reached a battalion or company commander, it was usually clear which specific resources would be available. As Tom said, all manner of factors went into determining who would lead, etc.

Robert

[bobshaw]

Hello Bob

Tactics varied during the war, and according to whether a battalion had to find its own reserve (as when attacking alone) or whether the reserve was provided by another unit (as when part of a brigade or divisional attack scheme).

If a battalion was attacking alone, it normally assigned two companies to the assault, attacking side by side an and each with two platoons in first wave and two in second wave, with a third company attacking as a single wave with all platoons in line (as it would have to cover double the frontage of the first two) and the fourth company in reserve.

If a battalion was p[art of a larger attack, with another unit providing its reserve, the support would normally be of two companies, in two waves similar to those of the two assaulting companies. Sometimes the two assaulting waves each consisted of a whole company, depending on the objectives assigned and the expected time which they would take, so in those cases the four companies followed one another in column.

There was certainly no rule that A, B, C and D Companies would automatically take particulart roles. These would be assigned by the battalion CO in the light of where the companies happened to be at the time, and their preparedness for the attack. Companies usually rotated between trench-holding, support and reserve on a fairly regular basis (every week to ten days or so) and the freshest troops would normally be chosen to come up and lead the attack.

Within companies, platoons were normally also arranged with two sections in front and two behind. In the pamphlet "Training of Platoons for Offensive Action" issued in Feb 1917, it was definitely laid down that the platoon was to be regarded as the basic unit for an attack.

Ron

Hi Ron,

Thank you for the prompt reply and explanation, it was not quite as cut and dried as I thought.

I can only summise that the entry I am looking at : "A" and "D" Company advanced in two waves must have been Platoons 1 & 2 in the first wave and Platoons 3 & 4 in the second wave.

You mention the pamphlet "Training of Platoons for Offensive Action" issued in Feb 1917, would the tactics have been the same 1916 the time I am looking at?

One of the reasons I wanted clarification is that my grandfather was in "A" Company 4th Platoon, he was critically wounded during the attack, if my assumtions are correct then it might be possible to narrow it down to fairly narrow corrider as to where his platton might have been, no guarantee, as you say other circumstances could have influenced the situation, also considering the distance to cover was about 800 yards did they go in a straight line?

Thanks again, I feel a bit better now it has been explained.

Regards............Bob

[bobshaw]

Local attacks involving a battalion, were tailored closely to their objective and so not at all standard. Companies, platoons and even sections would have specific objectives. Where to go and what to do when they got there. No general prescription could fulfill that requirement.

Hi Tom,

Thanks for your reply, together with Ron, Robert and yourself I think I have a better understanding of the formations used in trench warfare.

Regards............Bob

[bobshaw]

To facilitate operational planning, it was not uncommon for Staff Officers to list Division A to be followed by Division B, or equivalent. This generic approach made it easy to specify the pattern for the attack without detailing who A and B would be. The same principle carried down, to some extent, to lower levels of planning. By the time a plan reached a battalion or company commander, it was usually clear which specific resources would be available. As Tom said, all manner of factors went into determining who would lead, etc.

Robert

Hi Robert,

I have also replied to Ron and Tom thanking them also for their help in explaining the troop formations.

Thank you all.

Regards..................Bob

[geraint]

Some battalions also seemed to formulate a specific speciality within their companies. 4th RWF was a frontline infantry pioneer battalion, and according to its diaries and history Coys A and C tended to be trench consolidators and diggers, whereas Coys B and D were given the aggresive/defensive role in protecting them. Historically the men in A and C were miners and colliers, whilst the men in the other two came from a more rural background. I'm sure that other battalions had a similar natural speciality within their companies as well.

[Ron Clifton]

Hello again Bob

Geraint's example is from a pioneer battalion which is a special case, but it is quite likely that "normal" battalions, as he suggests, tended to have companies with a degree of specialisation. After all, "A" Companies were, in effect, successors to the Grenadier Companies of 18th cewntury regiments.

The same point about specialisation might apply to platoons within a company so I'm afraid that you cannot assume that 4th Platoon was always in the "second wave".

The Feb 1917 pamphlet reflected lessons learned during the battles of 1916, and in particular the constitution of each platoon into four sections with distinct roles: riflemen, Lewis gunners, bombers and rifle-bombers. I don't think these roles had developed on a general basis before the end of 1916 although no doubt some battalions were developing along these lines.

Ron

[bobshaw]

Hello again Bob

Geraint's example is from a pioneer battalion which is a special case, but it is quite likely that "normal" battalions, as he suggests, tended to have companies with a degree of specialisation. After all, "A" Companies were, in effect, successors to the Grenadier Companies of 18th cewntury regiments.

The same point about specialisation might apply to platoons within a company so I'm afraid that you cannot assume that 4th Platoon was always in the "second wave".

The Feb 1917 pamphlet reflected lessons learned during the battles of 1916, and in particular the constitution of each platoon into four sections with distinct roles: riflemen, Lewis gunners, bombers and rifle-bombers. I don't think these roles had developed on a general basis before the end of 1916 although no doubt some battalions were developing along these lines.

Ron

Hi Ron,

Thanks for putting me straight - maybe it was a bit too much to think the 4th Platoon was in a certain position, nothing really lost as I know my grandfather was in a certain area with a frontage of 300 yards.

Really appreciate you chaps keeping us on the straight and narrow.

Kind regards..............Bob

[bobshaw]

Some battalions also seemed to formulate a specific speciality within their companies. 4th RWF was a frontline infantry pioneer battalion, and according to its diaries and history Coys A and C tended to be trench consolidators and diggers, whereas Coys B and D were given the aggresive/defensive role in protecting them. Historically the men in A and C were miners and colliers, whilst the men in the other two came from a more rural background. I'm sure that other battalions had a similar natural speciality within their companies as well.

Hi Geraint,

Your explanation makes sense for a speciality Company/Regiment and no doubt this would reflect in other Regiments, so as I said to Ron it may have been a bit presumptious to think the No.4 Platoon would be where I thought it could have been. My grandfather was an House Painter - not sure if this would come under any speciality, unless he was to spruce up the trench. Seriously I think he was just a rifleman.

Another thank you for taking the time to pass on your knowledge, it is all helping to formulate a better picture of where he was.

Regards...............Bob

[truthergw]

A couple of points here with reference to companies having a specialty, or not. A standard brigade consisted of 4 battalions. In a brigade or greater attack, it was common to put two battalions in front and two behind. A specific battalion then, could have a slightly different role. Sometimes there were 3 battalions up and one in reserve. Again, this would alter the tasks allotted to each battalion. As was noted earlier in the thread, training manuals were printed and schools held to train officers and NCOs in the latest ideas. Every battle was analysed and lessons drawn as to what had worked, what had gone wrong. These lessons were the subject of the next training pamphlet. Best practice varied and improved as the war went on. A company advancing in the 100 days would have had markedly different training to a company advancing in the Battle of the Marne in 1914. To sum up, there was no rule to say which unit did what except in a very general way, a current guide, rather than a rule.

[dycer]

Another point to bear in mind is Battalion composition as the War evolved.

E.g.Some of the early T.F. Battalions went to the Front with an eight Company composition but this was reduced in early 1915 to a four Company one.Late 1914/early 1915 War Diary entries will,therefore,reflect the 8 Company composition.

In early 1918 Infantry Battalions, that were not disbanded, were reduced to a three Company composition.

War Diary entries from mid 1915 to early 1918,in original 8 Company composition Battalions, will record their 4 Company organisation.

1918 War Diary entries will record their 3 Company constitution.

George

[bobshaw]

Another point to bear in mind is Battalion composition as the War evolved.

E.g.Some of the early T.F. Battalions went to the Front with an eight Company composition but this was reduced in early 1915 to a four Company one.Late 1914/early 1915 War Diary entries will,therefore,reflect the 8 Company composition.

In early 1918 Infantry Battalions, that were not disbanded, were reduced to a three Company composition.

War Diary entries from mid 1915 to early 1918,in original 8 Company composition Battalions, will record their 4 Company organisation.

1918 War Diary entries will record their 3 Company constitution.

George

Hi George,

I more than appreciate the help I have had from the forum, I think you have all given me a fairly good grounding on Trench Warfare, and that you cannot assume things just because someone was in a particular Company or Platoon. Suffice that I will have to settle for the fact I know where the battle took place and that two Companies were involved in the attack, their objective a frontage of 300 yards.

Many thanks to every one.

Bob

[Ron Clifton]

George

The Regular Army battalions had an eight-company composition until 1913. TF battalions, and Regular battalions in India, retained eight companies at the outbreak of war, but I think they all adopted the four-company organisation on entering an operational theatre.

I think the reduction to a three-company organisation only applied to divisional pioneer battalions (e.g. 4/RWF as mentioned by geraint) and that, for the rest of the infantry, they kept four companies to a battalion but reduced from four to three the number of battalions in a brigade.

Disbandment of 141 battalions in France at this time also suggests that remaining battalions were kept up to their former strength.

Ron

[dycer]

Ron,

From the History of the 8th Royal Scots(TF).

Organisation

Battalion proceeded overseas 4th November 1914,with 8 Companies.

Made into 4 Companies in February 1915.

Reduced to 3 Companies in February 1918.

Became Pioneer Battalion,27th July 1915.

Returned to Haddington,30th April 1919.

From their War Diary.

22nd February 1918-Army have issued instructions that Pioneer Bn: are to be reduced to a 3 Coy basis, one coy being taken from each Bn: to form a new pioneer Bn.Div: has instructed us to have this carried out.

23rd February 1918-The above order regarding Pioneer Bn has been cancelled,but Pioneer Bn will be reconstructed on a 3 coy basis,one coy being absorbed by the other three coys.Instructions have been received to have this done as soon as possible.

25th February 1918-The Bn: in accordance with orders have been reorganised on a 3 Coy basis today.B Coy has been absorbed amongst the other three Coys.

You will note from the History that the Battalion had been in operations three months,as an 8 Company one, before reduction to 4 Companies.

I agree,though,that its Pioneer Battalion designation may not be an accurate reflection of what happened within other Infantry Battalions in February 1918.

George

[Ron Clifton]

Thanks George

I thought there might have been some delay between TF battalions arriving in France and actually reorganising into four companies. Your example confirms it.

Ron

[KennethB]

If I can add a secondary question in, what would be the average frontage a Company / Battalion would hold? (As I've learned, there are no firm rules and there is alway exceptions) I've grown up with Hollywood images of soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder, which I'm sure is artistic(?) latitude. Just looking for an idea to help visualize as I research.

Ken

[squirrel]

Thanks George

I thought there might have been some delay between TF battalions arriving in France and actually reorganising into four companies. Your example confirms it.

Ron

The battalions with 47th (2nd London) Division changed to the 4 Company organisation after arriving in France in March 1915.

[geraint]

If I can add a secondary question in, what would be the average frontage a Company / Battalion would hold? (As I've learned, there are no firm rules and there is alway exceptions) I've grown up with Hollywood images of soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder, which I'm sure is artistic(?) latitude. Just looking for an idea to help visualize as I research.

Ken

Hi Ken

I'm under the impression that defensively in a 'hot' stretch of the line, the ideal figure was a yard per man per battalion. If a 4 coy battalion held the line - two on the line and two resting - it indicates one man per two yards. If a company was on full strength of 250-320 men = then you can work out the frontage in yards ideally held by a company.

In attack, I understand thjat at Mametz Wood the attacking battalions held an approximate 400yard line each, each battalion attacking in company waves. A similar sort of frontage!

[KennethB]

geraint,

Thanks, that helps!!

Ken

[psturtivant]

Can anyone please clarify a niggling question regarding the formation of the troops in an attack.

Reading several War Diaries and accounts the only standard I can see is that Company "A" on the left and Company "D" on the right, these were followed by Company "C" and in some cases Company "B" which was the reserve.

Was this a standard proceedure throughout the war?[sNIP]

Regards.

Bob

My first post on this forum, and I am conscious that I may be disagreeing with what others may have already posted, but the fact is that as the Great War progressed, the tactics employed by infantry evolved significanltly - not least during the battle of the Somme, to the extent that whereas in 1914 you could see close resemblances to the battle drills of Napoleonic times, by 1918 they were very much closer to the kind employed during, and since WW2 - although the layout of "2 up and 2 in reserve" still hasn't changed much (save that in my 30 years of Regular Army infantry officering, Battalions had but 3 Companies, and Companies had but 3 Platoons, so would normally form up for Deliberate Attack, on known enemy positions, "2 up and 1 in Reserve", whereas for an "Advance to Contact", where opposition is thought likely, but enemy positions not known, you would go with a single sub-unit leading, and 2 back)

I doubt anyone could summarise all the changes in a single post - in essence by War's end, the squad of 8 to 10 men led by an NCO had become the smallest maneouvre unit in battle, whereas at on day 1 of the Somme, it would not be wrong to say that a Rifle Company would have fitted that bill.

To get a better understanding of what I mean, try and get hold of "Battle Tactics of the Western Front" by Paddy Griffiths.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Battle-Tactics-Western-Front-British/dp/0300066635

It's a relatively short and very readable book, which covers the evolution in detail, from Somme to Armistice, answering the question (which led me to read it 15 years ago) "If WW1 was all about long lines of men marching slowly into the machine gun fire - where did Blitzkrieg spring from, a generation later?", and brings the somewhat surprising realisation that in many ways, my Gt Gt Grandfather's generation of for-the-duration soldiers invented and mastered what nowadays the Army calls "All-Arms Warfare", only for their Regular Army successors to drop that particular ball in the years of peace that followed.

[Ron Clifton]

Hello psturtivant, and wel;come to the Forum!

I doubt that you will find many of us "old sweats" disagreeing with you when you say that tactics evolved during the war. Flexibility was always the key, and we learned from past mistakes. The Germans at First Ypres (and indeed as early as Mons and le Cateau) had not yet learned that it is inadvisable to advance shoulder to shoulder against trained and experienced riflemen, backed with machine guns, and suffered heavy casualties in consequence, especially among their young student volunteers.

The British Army had been training to advance in extended order - five yards between each man - from before WW1. With a division's frontage in attack being typically about a mile, the density of infantry was about six to seven men per yard of front, but of course there were several waves of men, all in extended order. And by early 1917 it had been definitely laid down that the platoon was to be considered the basic unit of attack. The section was regarded as the unit of fire control from the outset.

Ron

[psturtivant]

[/sNIP]by early 1917 it had been definitely laid down that the platoon was to be considered the basic unit of attack. The section was regarded as the unit of fire control from the outset.

Ron

Unit of fire control is a bit different from manoeuvre unit: think of a section of riflemen, in days when a Battalion had but 2 machine guns, as a single weapon system controlled by a Platoon Commander. Its Corporal would have had relatively little freedom of action: arguably, neither would the Pl Comd.

By 1918 (indeed, in some units and formations, by the end of November 1916), the degree of initiative expected of, and control over use of ground to manoeuvre exercised by NCOs and Junior Officers alike had extended considerably, compared to what was widely expected of them on 1 July 1916 (when as Paddy Griffiths' book demonstrates, a variety of attack formations was employed in different battalions, with those less experienced 'going by the book', while others groped to minimise risk, and maximise effect) , as the realisation was rammed home, that advancing across ground swept by MGs and artillery demanded the use of cover, and of fire-and-manoeuvre in a way that ruled out close control of troops by officers. If memory serves, one of the reasons the Ulster Div were able to get so far into their Day 1 objective, was because they ignored the prescribed kit list, and the prescribed pace of advance, and at H-Hr, carrying only light scales, they ran like Billy-oh for the German trenches, while poor souls like the Accrington Pals followed their orders to the letter and tried to walk onto their objectives, carrying the prescribed scales, and at the 'regulation pace'.

The Regimental character of the British Army (a collection of 'tribes', rather than a single homogenous mass) meant that tactics publications like the 1917 manual were (are still) regarded as guides, rather than regulations, and they were in any case derived from lessons learned by experience in good units, before they were distilled, staffed, published and disseminated centrally through tactics "Schools" in England and France.

In many ways, at Battalion level and below, they were learning new tricks of their trade much, much faster than the General Staff were getting to grips with new tricks of theirs.

[cassiterite]

Hi Ken

I'm under the impression that defensively in a 'hot' stretch of the line, the ideal figure was a yard per man per battalion. If a 4 coy battalion held the line - two on the line and two resting - it indicates one man per two yards. If a company was on full strength of 250-320 men = then you can work out the frontage in yards ideally held by a company.

In attack, I understand thjat at Mametz Wood the attacking battalions held an approximate 400yard line each, each battalion attacking in company waves. A similar sort of frontage!

Hello everyone, my first post, hopefully not my last. I was actually going to post a question regarding the lengths of line held by units when I came across this conversation. I'm doing some background reading/research on my great uncle, Joseph Peter Edwards, 3 Batt The Middlesex Regiment, in the line near St Elois, Ypres, in 1915. From my reading of the battalion war diary it looks to me like the four companies were all forward, with none acting as a reserve. I realise of course that trench warfare was only just starting here and that 'trenches' per se didn't actually exist. I get the impression that most of the line here was breastworks with shallow trenches because of the drainage issue.

Anyhow, for further information, 3rd Middlesex took over from 2nd Kings Own on February 7th and was relieved on February 2nd by the 2nd East Surreys. Back into trenches on the evening of February 12th, relieved on the 15th by the Suffolk Regiment. During the last three days the 3rd Middlesex suffered 156 men missing, one of whom was uncle Joe. I had previously assumed that he had died during a battle; I now realise that this was just the normal state of play for that area.

Pete