'B' Coy, 1/7th Worcesters

[Stephen Nulty]

Could anybody shed any light on the location and actions of the 1/7th Worcesters on the above date, please?

I'm researching the death of Pte J Fowler of 'B' Company on that date

Cheers

Stephen Nulty

[Simon_Fielding]

From the redoubtable Stacke:

The concentration for the new attack began with the second week of August. The 4th

Worcestershire moved on August 7th from camp in the woods near De Wippe Cabaret ©, forward

to camp by Bedford Farm ; where final preparations were made.

Further south the Territorial Battalions also were moving. On the first day of the offensive i /7TH

(July 31st) the l/7th and l/8th Worcestershire had moved from Poperinghe to a camp, two miles '

to' the eastward. Then followed several shifts from camp to camp ending on August 15th with *

both Battalions in Reigersburg Camp on the Ypres-Brielen Road. ' /3TH

On that same day, August 15th, the Second-Line Territorial Battalions also came forward

into the Salient. At the end of July the 61st Division had moved (d) up from the Hesdin area 2/ 7 T H

into reserve behind Cassel (e).

There beneath the Duke of York's historic Hill(/) the 2/7th and 2/8th Worcestershire continued <*

training. It was an energetic training, closely supervised by Staff Officers of all grades up to the

(6) Those two companies came under shell-fire next day and lost 1 killed and 3 wounded.

© The Battalion had marched to that camp on August 6th from Crombeke.

(d) Division moved July 25th/26th. 2/7th Worcestershire marched from Vieil Hesdin to Flers on July 24th, and

thence on 26th to Petit Houvin. 2/8th Worcestershire marched from Linzeux by Flers to Petit Houvin on

25th. Both Battalions entrained at Petit Houvin.

(e) 2/7th Worcestershire detrained Esquelbecq July 25th, marched to billets at Zeggars Capel.

2/8th Worcestershire detrained Esquelbecq July 26th, marched to billets at Eringhem,

(/) " The Duke of York marched up a hill with thirty thousand men " etc,

Corps Commander, one of the most remarkable soldiers of the Army, who vividly impressed his

personality on the Territorial officers by causing them to repeat after him in chorus a salutary maxim;

" The natural corollary of delegation of authority is intelligent supervision."

On August 15th training ended and the 61st Division moved forward. The two "Worcestershire

battalions entrained at Esquelbecq and were carried forward to Poperinghe. There they

detrained and marched to camps east of that town.

277-8

Throughout the night of August 16th and until nightfall of the following day (August 17th) (6)

the 4th Worcestershire held the ground they had won, steadily digging in and improving the position

under an intermittent fire. No counter-attack was attempted by the enemy across the marshy

Broembeek, but all around the thunder of battle continued. Beyond the railway embankment the

20th Division had captured Langemarck, but on their right the 11th Division had found progress

more difficult. Still further to the right the 48th (South Midland) Division had also made an

attack.

The attack of the South Midland Territorials had been delivered about two miles south of

Langemarck, from the line of the Steenbeek near the little ruined village of St. Julien. The first

attack was made by the 145th Brigade. The 144th Brigade was in reserve, and the l/7th and

l/8th Worcestershire passed the night before the battle at Reigersburg Camp.

In the darkness before the dawn, the l/7th Worcestershire assembled and moved forward * / 7 T H

across the Yser Canal. The Battalion tramped onwards to Kultur Farm, whence " D " Company

was sent on to support positions at " Regina Cross " and " Alberta." That movement was still

in progress when dawn broke and the battle began; thenceforward the enemy's shell-fire and the

general confusion made everything very uncertain.

The destined r≤ of the Battalion was to support the attack of the 145th Brigade in front,

but definite news as to the progress of that attack was difficult to obtain.

At 11 a.m. came orders for the l/7th Worcestershire to assist the 145th Brigade on the further

side of the Steenbeek. The Battalion advanced in " artillery formation " up the slope. As the

platoons crested the ridge they came under a very heavy fire of shells, both high-explosive and

shrapnel. But the mud smothered many of the heavy shells, the open formation reduced the

target and casualties were astonishingly light ©. " D " Company moved across the river, while

the other companies occupied the Western bank. Bursts of machine-gun fire as the platoons filed

across the stream showed that the enemy's front-line posts had not yet been captured.

In plain fact the attack of the 145th Brigade had failed. The enemy's foremost defences

opposing the 48th Division consisted of a chain of posts in strong concrete block-houses. Of those

little forts the most important were the Maison du Hibou, Hillock Farm, Jew Hill and Border House.

Further back were other supporting posts, Triangle Farm, Vancouver, Springfield and Winnepeg.

Those posts, supporting each other by machine-gun fire, had effectively stopped the attack. In

the 145th Brigade most of the leaders had fallen ; the remainder, scattered and disorganised by the

intermixture of four successive waves, were crowded in the narrow stretch of low ground between

the stream and the German posts.

All day the fight swayed across the open, and by nightfall Border House and Jew Hill had been

captured. Then came orders that a fresh attack on the strongest fort, the Maison du Hibou, was

to be made by a company of the l/7th Worcestershire. " C " Company was selected, and advanced

across the Steenbeek from Regina Cross. The attack was to be made without artillery support.

Relying on the cover of the darkness " C " Company would rush the buildings, covered by fire from

the Lewis-guns of " D " Company.

The bold plan failed. Gallantly led by Captain A. B. Montgomery, " C" Company charged

the fort, but they were met with a hail of fire from front and flank. Captain Montgomery and

Lieut. G. H. Haslewood fell at the head of their men, nearly all the leading wave were shot down (d),

and the attack was stopped dead, while the fire of " D " Company was smothered by the German

~" machine-guns at Hillock Farm. The survivors of " C " Company dug in about 100 yards from the

fort and there held on.

Clearly the Maison du Hibou could not be taken without artillery support. Presently came

orders that a fresh attack would be made after midnight, this time behind a barrage. For the

new attack " B " Company, commanded by Captain W. N. S. Brown, was ordered up to replace " C "

Company. In the darkness and under heavy fire the two companies exchanged positions. Final

arrangements were completed and " B " Company made ready to attack.

(a) Casualties 4th Worcestershire, August 16th—17th. Killed 4 officers (Captain H. J. Paddison, 2/Lt. R. T. Bowden,

2/Lt. V. R. Wordingham, 2/Lt. C. C. U. Newcombe). Wounded 3 officers (Captain H. FitzM. Stacke (Adjt.),

2/Lt. P. J. Bonfield, 2/Lt. N. M. Goodman). The attached Medical Officer, Lt. B. M. Vance, U.S. Army Medical

Service, was also wounded. He was one of a number of U.S. Medical Officers attached to British units, and

was one of the first U.S. officers to be wounded in the War. Other ranks, killed and wounded, 113 (detailed

figures not available).

( After dark on August 17th the 4th Worcestershire were relieved by the 1st R. Dublin Fusiliers.

© Not more than about 15 all told during that advance.

(d) Losses of " C " Company in this attack, besides the two officers, were 7 killed, 37 wounded, 12 missing. Captain

Montgomery was a New Zealander and an excellent officer. He died of his wounds next day.

At 2.30 a.m. August 17th the British guns opened fire, and " B " Company attacked. Aided

./ / T H by "the shell-fire, they actually reached the buildings and fought their way in (a); but at once the

enemy brought up fresh men. A fierce fight with bombs in the darkness went on round the fort,

; a but eventually after Captain Brown and many of his men had been hit ( the survivors were compelled

to fall back ©.

By that time it was clear that the Maison du Hibou was a formidable defensive work

and that the enemy were determined to hold i t ; but it was equally clear that the fort must be

taken. Until it was captured the position of our foremost troops, cramped into some three

hundred yards of low ground with the stream at their back, would be very dangerous. Preparations

were made for a renewed attack.

No action was taken during daylight of August 17th: both sides remained motionless

throughout the day amid continuous gun-fire. After dark the l/8th Worcestershire were brought

up from reserve to relieve the sister Battalion. The relief was practically complete by midnight,

"an extraordinarily good relief," recorded the 1/7th Worcestershire, " taking into consideration

the amount of hostile shelling." No words could have borne better testimony to the good feeling

between the two Battalions (d).

(a) The attack -was most gallantly led by 2/Lieut. H. B. Bate, who was severely wounded. He was awarded the M.C.

(6) Losses of " B " Company were 3 killed and 12 missing, besides 2 officers (Capt. W. N. S. Brown and 2/Lt. H. B.

Bate) and 28 men wounded. '

© Captain A.O.Lloyd shewed great bravery during this operation in reconnoitring the enemy's positions under heavy

fire. He was awarded a bar to his M.C. Other awards included a bar to the M.M. of L/Cpl. A. Breeze, and the

M.M. to T?te. G. T. Bell, Pte. E. G. Kelly and Pte. T. Smith.

(d) Total casualties l/7th Worcestershire 16th/17th August—Killed 2 officers and 21 men. Wounded 6 officers and

118 men. Missing 12.

278-280

[Stephen Nulty]

Simon

Fantastic stuff, many thanks for the prompt reply.

Stephen