The Somme

[phil andrade]

It is the bewildering array of contradictory reports that Poincare had to countenance that intrigues me : leaving aside the actual numbers, and their precise categories of killed or missing. The relative sobriety of Petain's return is striking : one might have supposed that, eager to divert more resources to his battle, he would have made the most of the losses....or was he keen to enhance the view that he had things under control, and could be trusted to husband resources properly, and not squander them in prodigal tactics ?

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

Robert, it seems to me that throughout the period of Verdun, we had a distinct split in the military and, the French set up being as heavily politicised as it was, that split is reflected and distorted among the politicians. There is the faction which demands that Britain open up a second front to take pressure off the French. This should be a purely British operation. This view is led by Petain. There is Joffre's view. He has a twofold campaign in mind. He also wants to take pressure off Verdun but he is also taking a much wider strategic view of the war as a whole. He wishes to salvage as much as possible of the Chantilly agreement and therefore sees that the Somme should be a shared action. The Somme is not just to be a means of diverting German defences but also a new front in conjunction with renewed fighting on the Eastern front. He has a much more aggressive view of the purpose of the Somme. I suspect also that he shared the President's fear of what would be the effect of Britain appearing to save France. France was determined to be and to be seen to be the senior partner on the Western Front. That perception might well have suffered if British forces were deemed to have rescued France. The casualty figures simply reinforce for me the extent to which confusion reigned in the French command. There were several sets of figures, gathered for different purposes and they were not collated at this stage.

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning All,

As you say Robert; the fact that Roques berates Joffre, the CIC, for reducing the number of companies per battalion without consulting him (or by implication therefore, the government) illustrates a level of political interference in operational matters that we must always bear in mind when considering the actions of the army commanders.

I find you friend Marc's comment, that the French thought the British government had more power over the military interesting; no doubt influenced from the outset, when pressure was brought to bear on French, by the French, via that route, at and around the time of the first Battle of the Marne. I am less certain that the British government interfered on the "smaller detail" ,as illustrated by the Roques example. The relevant influences of both governments on military matters is perhaps scope for another thread ?

[truthergw]

Hi Steve. The French citizen army had always been closely controlled by the government of the day. That was one of the results of decades of general conscription. As well as a healthy suspicion of the high command and fear of a military coup, who served and for how long was a continuing burning question. This was closely bound to the organisation of the army, size of units etc. The other side of the coin is the numerous serving soldiers of all ranks who were elected members of the Chamber of Deputies and indeed, Senators. The approach to Kitchener would appear to the French to be the correct manner of dealing with a request. He was Minister of War and it made perfect sense for their MoW to approach ours on behalf of his CiC. Proper channels must be used in a formal request. I am frankly puzzled by Marc's statement and I'd like to hear his reasoning.

[Robert Dunlop]

I don't think we should try to interpret the rationale behind the views of modern French commentators. Marc was merely making an observation, based on his (extensive) reading of French sources. It would seem, not surprisingly, that French commentators have as much difficulty in getting to grips with British material as we have difficulty getting to grips with French material. Part of the purpose of this thread was to address the latter. We can't help with the former, at least not in this thread.

Robert

[phil andrade]

What I find disconcerting - in a positive sense - about this thread is the extent to which it has made me realise that, for all my pretensions to the contrary, I still feel very outside my "comfort zone" when strayng from the British perception of the Great War.

Phil (PJA)

[Matt Dixon]

A post has been deleted from this thread, as it strayed into the boundaries of "respect for your fellow member". Forums like this one are a sanctuary for debate and discussion, and on occasions posters will not agree with comments made. This is fine, provided such disagreements are discussed and debated in a civilised manner.

Please remember that differences of opinion happen, but please be mindful of how these differences of opinion are discussed on open Forum. Name calling and inflamtory remarks are unhelpful and unappreciated.

Thanks.

[Robert Dunlop]

The next instalment:

"Saturday 27 May.

Maurice Surcouf was in the House today. He was one of the two or three main instigators of today's secret committee*. And he is Foch’s Staff Officer... sycophants of generals are bad for democracies.

Generals Micheler and Fayolle have been appointed by Foch to prepare for the [somme] offensive, in case the French forces actually take part. Micheler has written to Dubost[2], asking for an opportunity to talk with him; but the Army cannot afford another mistake.

Millevoye[3] came to talk to me again about trench mortars and the Archer gun in particular, for which he asked if new evaluations [could be carried out] at Bourges[4].

Sunday 28 May.

During Sunday, Roques pursuaded Joffre to accept a Council of War meeting with just Haig and Foch, leaving out Pétain and Franchet d'Esperey. Joffre said he did not want to upset Pétain. On the other hand, Pénelon gave me an update about Joffre having signed a protocol with Douglas Haig, whereby the British will begin their attack preparations around the 20th. The protocol did not say whether the British will be attacking on their own.

After lunch, we left for St. Menehould by car with General Humbert. He left us at St. Menehould to go to Nettancourt, and we then took General Anthoine with us. He is the commander of 10th Corps.

I wanted to go see the battery of 120mm guns where Albert Brangier, a servant at the Elysée [Palace], is one of the artillerymen. He came home on leave recently and said that no leader ever visits the area where he is stationed and that there was no shelter where he is.

Passing through Vienne la ville[6], which was deserted and ruined, and through St. Thomas[-en-Argonne][7], we reached some winding communication trenches, which were covered over with wood, accompanied by the sound of shelling. General Hennocque, who was one of my former classmates from Bar-le-Duc[8], and General Cabeau led us forward.

We arrived at a ravine through which flowed a trickle of water. A few huts for the gunners were clustered on one slope. Albert Brangier’s battery was quite close. He and his comrades were busy digging shelters. I suspect this work had been ordered because of my visit; in any case it was long overdue.

I shook hands with this brave man and chatted with him for a moment; the other gunners were very surprised to see me in their midst. The battery is located northwest of the village of Vienne-le-Chateau[9], which has been completely destroyed. We returned through the Brienne valley after visiting a 240mm battery cleverly camouflaged under painted canvas. We passed close by Vienne-le-Chateau, crossed the grassland on foot, and went to General Cabeau’s command post in a small ravine south of Vienne-le-Château. There, in a nice house made of logs and planks, with a piano from Vienna-la-Ville, a table clock and music, we had tea, champagne and excellent cakes baked by a baker who had been called up.

We returned to Sainte Menehould by train."

*There were several "comités secrets" during the war (beginning in 1916?). Each meeting was referred to by the date on which it took place, e.g. "Le comité secret du 13 Février 1917" or "Le comité secret du 25 Août 1916" etc... M.Surcouf may have been a 'Député à la Chambre', which is why he could be an instigator of such a meeting. This would have been in addition to being one of Foch's Staff Officer (many 'Deputés' were former active officers, and some were high rank reserve officers too, who had been serving for some time in various staff positions and had connections with generals). - additional information from Marc.

[1] Approximately 40 miles SW of Verdun.

[2] Antonin Dubost (6 April 1842, L'Arbresle - 16 April 1921, Paris) was a French journalist, State Councillor and Senator. He served as President of the French Senate from 1906 to 1920. He was a member of the Democratic Republican Alliance.

[3] Lucien Millevoye (1 August 1850 – 25 March 1918) was a French journalist and right-wing politician. From 1898 until his death in 1918 Millevoye served as the deputy for Paris.

[4] Bourges is a commune in central France on the Yèvre river. It was a major arms manufacturing centre during the war (http://www.encyclopedie-bourges.com/guerre14-18.htm).

[5] Marcel Sembat was a left-wing French politician and minister.

[6] In the Argonne, about 40 km east of Verdun.

[7] 2km from Vienne la ville.

[8] Perhaps the Bar-de-Luc Lycée, which is now named after Poincaré.

[9] About 40 km east of Verdun.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Excellent, truly excellent stuff, Robert : thank you.

This gives the layman like myself the reassurance that he's actually learning from a primal source, rather than absorbing the commentaries of Horne, Ousby etc.

Striking words.... in case the French forces actually take part ,and... whether the British will be attacking on their own.

This might be cited as an argument that Verdun really was working Falkenhayn's magic.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

I find it disturbing that already there is evidence that Foch and his staff are being viewed negatively. I think there was little doubt that Roques was a disappointment to the military. It was hoped he would represent their point of view in the Chamber in a much more robust manner than he did. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see the long train being laid that would eventually see Joffre and Foch removed from their posts. Something that is apparent, again and again in these memoirs is the benefits and also the drawbacks of a close connection between a democratic government and its army. The democratic process allowed soldier/deputies of any rank to seriously challenge the policy and decisions of the High Command. An excellent illustration of democracy in action but it is possible to see this as detrimental to the proper conduct of a war. I believe it was Spiers who talked of democracy showing signs of strain when at war and France is a very good example of that.

[Robert Dunlop]

"Wednesday 31 May.

I travelled with Briand and Roques to Saleux, near Amiens, by train. We met Joffre, Castelnau, and Douglas Haig.

Castelnau read a memorandum setting out the need for a combined Franco-British offensive to disengage Verdun. As Joffre did not want Pétain to be present, I gave my account, with the agreement of Briand and Roques, of Pétain’s demands about artillery. Joffre complained that Pétain makes his requests known to everyone else but him. I replied firmly straightaway that Petain did not make any complaint. It was only natural that he updated me when I met him on Sunday. Joffre said, as usual, that he is in sole charge. I replied that he is solely accountable to the government, which is solely accountable to the chambers [of parliament].

I demanded that we get to the bottom of things: does Pétain have or does he not have the artillery that he wants? Joffre and Castelnau affirmed that they have sent him everything he needs, even the latest equipment. I still have the impression that we are keeping batteries for the planned offensive and I urged Roques to ensure that Pétain lacks nothing.

We then examined the conditions for British cooperation. I spelt out clearly to General Douglas Haig the possibility that French troops would not be available to support him. Haig said that he will continue preparing in any case for [an attack around] July 1, but asked that Joffre confirm the date at least two or three weeks in advance.

Foch remained very quiet, which is so unlike him. I asked him what his feelings were, whereupon Briand noted that some officers from Foch's entourage, notably Meunier-Surcouf and Tardieu, who are also Deputies [i.e. equivalent to Members of Parliament] had told him about Foch's very unfavourable comments about the offensive. Briand ended by saying that, in his opinion, the offensive should wait until next year when it would be possible to throw everything behind it. Castelnau jumped into the air: "What a manoeuvre, so simple to carry out! You just take away the enemy! They are still there, however, and will not leave us alone until next year." I pointed out that General Pétain had asked for an offensive somewhere else to relieve the pressure on Verdun. "I don’t know where: I don’t know what’s happening in Verdun”. After much discussion, Foch, when pressed by Roques, finally acknowledged that it might be useful, even necessary, to attack this year at some [other] place on the front. He felt, however, that the offensive should not aim for a break through, but to relieve Verdun. Despite this apparent agreement, I felt that there were still real differences in opinion. Joffre wants the French to be involved in the offensive. He hopes, without making this explicit, that the offensive may have strategic results. Foch believes that Joffre has prepared for the offensive with too few resources and that it is no longer possible to strengthen the attack. Foch, like Pétain, would like the offensive to be exclusively British, whether to relieve pressure or to breakthrough."

Robert

[phil andrade]

Joffre wants the French to be involved in the offensive. He hopes, without making this explicit, that the offensive may have strategic results. Robert

Why would Joffre be reluctant to make his hopes for strategic success "explicit" ?

These hopes would have been explicit at Chantilly, surely.

Apparently, a seismic shift had occurred in French strategic thinking :a vindication, of sorts, for Falkenhayn's concept.

Phil (PJA)

[SteveMarsdin]

Thanks Robert for the excellent translations. I've only just discovered that Poincare's memoires can be downloaded in full from the French (governmental) site: www.gallica.bnf.fr* and am following your thread with interest. He doesn't give much detail on the meetings with Nivelle on 28 May, were they just routine ?

* an excellent virtual library site for many French works, if anyone hasn't used it

[Robert Dunlop]

Why would Joffre be reluctant to make his hopes for strategic success "explicit" ?

Phil, the extracts illustrate how pressure was building on Joffre. In the midst of a meeting where he was quizzed about keeping equipment back from Pétain, Joffre probably felt that it was inappropriate to raise the issue of his strategic aims. I would not interpret this information beyond the context of the specific meeting. Also, it was not Joffre's style to get into public debates. Faced with the direction of the meeting, and the telling-off, I can imagine Joffre going into his silent mode.

There is still a month to go before the start of the Somme offensive.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...am following your thread with interest.

Steve, great. Please feel free to chip in with additional comments and insights.

Poincaré varies in the amount of detail from meetings. I don't get the impression that meetings with Nivelle were routine.

Robert

[narnie]

read this with great interest. My great uncle was killed a verdun. I had never heard of the place until I started research in to my familt tree and found that my nan had verdon, yes not verdun as her middle name. It was how my family said it. He died on 18/07/1916.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you, narnie. Very interesting to hear of your personal connection to this battle.

There is some more information to come.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

"Saturday 3rd June

Colonel Rousset [1] and Monsieur Berthelot [2] believe it is essential to educate the public and the troops at Verdun about what the Allies are planning to do next, because everyone is accusing the British of dragging their feet. I reassured my interlocutors that I can disclose the joint plans to them without causing any problems. But I pointed out to them that it would be dangerous to make this information public because Germany would soon learn what is coming and be on the alert.

Dubost [3] saw General Michel today. He told me that Micheler does not believe that the Anglo-French offensive will take the pressure off Verdun. The Germans, according to him, have enough men in the Somme area to resist the attack. The general would prefer a diversion in Woëvre. Many strategists; many opinions."

[1] Colonel Rousset was the author of ‘Histoire générale de la guerre Franco-Allemande 1870/71’ and had been a professor in the l'École supérieure de guerre. During the war, he worked as the military critic for La Liberté.

[2] ?Philippe Berthelot (1866 - 1934), French diplomat and brother of the famous chemist Marcellin Berthelot who died in 1907.

[3] Antonin Dubost (1842 – 1921) was a French cleric and politician. He was President of the Senate from 1906 to 1920.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

"Sunday 4 June

Left Paris via the gare du Nord station at 7.30 am, with General Roques.

At Compiègne we found General Micheler and we travelled up in the car together. He is convinced that General Nivelle could not only hold Verdun on the defensive, but could mount successful offensives there. He fears that the Anglo-French or exclusively British offensive will not force the Germans to withdraw troops from Verdun, given the number of men they have there.

Micheler is not in favor of reducing the number of companies per battalion. But General Roques, after further consideration of the question, shares the same view as Joffre and Pétain, and believes this is a good move.

Had lunch on the train to Beaucourt.

General Foch, who sat at my table with Roques, expounded the need for a Franco-British operation as a diversion for the battle of Verdun.

General Fayolle, who must support the right flank of the British army, says he will be ready by July 1. He seems very loyal and very committed."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the last installment:

"Wednesday 7 June

General Roques shared some important notes about Verdun with me. The full story of events is now completed for December [1915]. The note concludes that the encirclement of the fortifed region would only be feasible by driving in the flanks, i.e. by driving in the neighbouring armies. Given that this will not be possible, the Fortified Region of Verdun will have to defend this front at all costs.

Saturday 10 June

I received a letter written by General Nollet, who is currently near Verdun. He writes that the French and Germans are being worn down terribly in the battle. How far will this attrition go?

Sunday 11 June

Briand, who returned last night from England, gave me a brief account of his journey. He found the British Cabinet to be quite stubborn about the Salonika affair. On May 17, the Defense Committee had made a reasoned decision that was clearly unfavorable to any offensive in the Balkans. The only thing that Briand got was an agreement that the question would be revisited. It is obvious that the British will not let themselves be convinced and that Briand had mistaken his wishes for reality. On the other hand, as far as the offensive in France is concerned, the British seem resolved to go ahead and have made positive commitments. After all, this is the most important issue.

Friday 23 June

At Verdun, we have lost ground and prisoners yet again. Do we have to face up to the fact that moral has declined or that our troops are exhausted? I implored Roques to find out. He questioned G.Q.G. and Pétain, and I am happily reassured on these issues. But Roque told me that it is time for the Anglo-French offensive to get underway "to make inroads [into the German defenses on the Somme front. NB - in the original, Poincaré quotes Roques as saying « faire ponction »".

I wish to acknowledge my grateful thanks to Marc, who was kind enough to review my translations and pick up on some of the subtle nuances (such as the meaning of « faire ponction » for example) that escaped me. This help was invaluable, not least because Poincaré was a lawyer

Robert

[phil andrade]

Here is the last installment:

"The note concludes that the encirclement of the fortifed region would only be feasible by driving in the flanks, i.e. by driving in the neighbouring armies. Given that this will not be possible, the Fortified Region of Verdun will have to defend this front at all costs.

Robert

Forgive me being a bit thick, Robert, but I am wondering how to interpret the implications of that statement.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

A good question, Phil. Basically, it is a long-winded way of saying that the Fortified Region of Verdun (a military district, not just Verdun forts) could only be taken frontally. Had the RFV been susceptible to encirclement then the French would have had to maintain additional resources in the neighbouring armies. The defense of the RFV would have been much broader than the district per se. Conversely, there may have been pressure to take men away from the neighbouring armies to help the RFV. Roques was saying 'no', the RFV would have to defend itself. The burden could not be shared and there was no question of giving up the RFV.

Robert