The Somme

[phil andrade]

Did anyone in the British High Command, or in the government, ever express the view that the French were unwise in their determination to hold their ground at Verdun ? I know that after the war, Churchill likened the proper way of conducting the battle there to catching a cricket ball.... a little "give", and the ball is caught : a rigid and unyielding posture of the hands results in the ball being dropped, or, if retained, a good deal of unecessary pain being suffered. This was written with the benefit of a decade or more of hindsight, but it might be that some perceived things that way at the time. After all, if the Germans were anxious that the French should deploy a prodigal defence at Verdun, that might be cited as a very good reason for not doing so. The French protests that a postponemment of the Somme offensive would ruin the French army - or even obliterate it - might be countered with a response questioning the necessity of upholding such a costly defense.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Whatever others may have felt, the instructions from the Secretary of State for War to General Haig were absolutely clear:

'Instructions for General Sir D. Haig, G.C.B., K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O.

Commanding the Expeditionary Force in France.

1. His Majesty's Government consider that the mission of the British Expeditionary Force in France, to the chief command of which you have recently been appointed, is to support and co-operate with the French and Belgian Armies against our common enemies. The special task laid upon you is to assist the French and Belgian Governments in driving the German Armies from French and Belgian territory, and eventually to restore the neutrality of Belgium, on behalf of which, as guaranteed by Treaty, Belgium appealed to the French and to ourselves at the commencement of hostilities.

Kitchener.

The War Office.

28th December 1915.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Joffre perceived a greater concern about the attitude of British politicians. Rather than picking up an attitude that would later suggest that the French should abandon Verdun, Joffre was picking up a very different vibe. In January 1916:

'General Butler, Assistant Chief of Staff, and General Davidson, Chief of the Operations Branch, considered that the wearing down of the German strategic reserves could be realized only by two or three preliminary attacks... provided that the French should undertake the larger share in the preparatory offensives.

On February 5th I received an explanation of this attitude of our British friends, whose loyal desire to do their full part was never for a moment in question. General Davidson, in speaking with Colonel des Vallières, Chief of the French Mission, confidentially revealed to what an extent English politics interfered with the conduct of military affairs. "The British Army," he said, "is ready to do its full share, but we cannot cope with the politicians, who, after the Germans, are our worst enemies. If next spring [1916] we start out alone in a wearing-down operation, we risk losing from 50,000 to 60,000 men. When the British Government learns of these losses, it will declare that the sacrifices for 1916 have been quite sufficient. Our politicians are willing that Great Britain should carry on this war, but only on condition that the people, upon whom they depend for their living, do not have to bear too much of the burden."

General Haig, who had offered me his collaboration and that of the British Army without any restrictions, now found himself hampered by this attitude of the British politicians. He told me that General Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had disclosed this situation to him when visiting him at Saint-Omer during the closing days of January, 1916.'

Whatever concern this potential for political interference may have raised in Joffre's mind at the time, it did not linger. The issue was transformed as described previously:

'...this difficulty [that the British politicians might restrict the BEF's operations in 1916] quickly disappeared, though, unfortunately, at our cost; for the battle of Verdun which began on February 21st now intervened...'

This suggests that, if anything, the consensus was to provide more military help to France, not encourage the French to abandon yet more territory. This was Joffre's view of course but it is with his views that we are most interested.

Robert

[truthergw]

Here are a couple of quotes from B.H. Liddell Hart's, " Foch: Man of Orleans". A penguin edition of 1937 vintage.

" Henceforth, crisis would follow crisis during four dreadful months, and although each would be survived, the greater part of the French Army would be drawn through the German mincing machine".

" Joffre's first reaction was to ask Haig to hasten the relief of the Tenth Army in order to provide himself with reserves for a counter attack."

" The second reaction of Verdun on Joffre's 1916 plan was to make him put forward the provisional date of the main Franco-British offensive and abandon the idea of preparatory attacks".

All of the above selected from page 224 of the first volume.

[phil andrade]

Thank you very much, Robert.

The more I learn about Joffre from these posts, the more I appreciate his skill. He was keeping "all the balls in the air"...if he appears duplicitous, one has to acknowledge that it was because he had to be. It's surprising how much the British politicians are villified : those of the French come across as more conspiratorial. Indeed, there seems to have been a fragility in the French political structure which rendered the nation vulnerable. The spectre of changing governments and instability must have amplified the effects of Verdun.

Joffre's real assessment of that battle is what pre-occupies me. It's tempting to imagine that he saw Petain as excessively voracious in his demands. Apparently, even some of Petain's subordinates admitted that he was prone to exagerrating the strain of the battle, with an eye to diverting more resources to the sector.

One thing has been made very clear to me : AJP Taylor's assertion that the Verdun fighitng had become less threatening to France in June must be dismissed.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

All French senior generals were involved in politics to some degree. It was how a senior officer rose after a certain point in his career. He needed a political benefactor. This was different to Britain where senior British commanders were in a position to dispense patronage. The nearest equivalent was when DLG became involved. Until then, 'the frocks' and the army had kept each other at arms length with very few exceptions. Henry Wilson being one.

[Steven Broomfield]

Did anyone in the British High Command, or in the government, ever express the view that the French were unwise in their determination to hold their ground at Verdun ? I know that after the war, Churchill likened the proper way of conducting the battle there to catching a cricket ball.... a little "give", and the ball is caught : a rigid and unyielding posture of the hands results in the ball being dropped, or, if retained, a good deal of unecessary pain being suffered. This was written with the benefit of a decade or more of hindsight, but it might be that some perceived things that way at the time. After all, if the Germans were anxious that the French should deploy a prodigal defence at Verdun, that might be cited as a very good reason for not doing so. The French protests that a postponemment of the Somme offensive would ruin the French army - or even obliterate it - might be countered with a response questioning the necessity of upholding such a costly defense.

Phil (PJA)

Phil, to be fair, do you really think that anyone, in 1916, was going to say it was a good idea to let the Huns have a bit more of France? The gts of their coal-mining industry had been taken; Paris was still not too far from danger; Rheims had Germans camping more or less on the outskirts; and the Channel coast was subject to unwanted vistors a few miles away.

It really beggars belief to think that anyone is going to suggest that the French give up Verdun.

And then what? Retreat to somewhere else and give that up when the Germans come calling? It was a war for survival - the more you retreat, the more you lose and the less credibility you have with your population, your army and yor allies.

Be reasonable: you've neatly ignored the points I and Peter Hart made about the inevitability of, and impossibility of stopping, the Somme Offensive once the button had been pushed - please don't come up with another tack for why the Somme was not a good idea. An equally specious one, I might say.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Thanks to Robert for the quotes from Pierrefeu and Joffre as part of his ongoing references to the French point of view on the influence of Verdun on the Somme. And to Steve and Pete for drawing attention to the fact that in preparations for a battle on the scale of the Somme, events reach a tipping point from which, perforce, they take on something akin to a self-perpetuating momentum of their own. Over and above this, the aborting of such an operation at such a late stage would leave the army involved vulnerable to any enemy initiative due to a combination of the logistical chaos which would ensue behind their lines and the fact that other areas of their front were denuded of guns and other infrastructure which had been concentrated to the now abandoned attack zone.

In tandem with Robert's French sources, I'd like to pencil in further the situation as seen by the British C-in-C through quotes from Haig's Diaries and other papers. To bring the whole together, I've added the excerpts from Haig's Diary from 25 and 26 May quoted by me earlier in this thread. Most of the material I'll post here does not appear in either the Blake 1952 edition of Haig's Diaries & Correspondence or the Sheffield & Bourne edition of 2006 - and I'll indicate when they do. The rest, so far as I am aware, are previously unpublished. What emerges is remarkably consistent with the French sources in terms of what the issues on the table were - though inevitably the emphasis on what is important of course varies from time to time in the contrasting French and British viewpoints. The two key dates on which the French emphasis on the need to relieve pressure at Verdun are documented as having decisively shifted Haig's thinking in respect of launching the Somme offensive by 1 July are 26 May, when Haig meets with Joffre at Beauquesne, and 31 May when Haig meets with the French political and military leadership aboard a railway carriage near Amiens. As will be seen, despite daily reports of fluctuating French fortunes at Verdun before and after these key dates, and Haig's reactions to these in real-time, Haig is nonetheless being briefed by the French Prime Minister as to the urgency of the Somme being launched to relieve pressure on Verdun as late as 26 June. Given the decisions already taken at the meetings of 26 and 31 May, and the exposed situation of the entire BEF due to the advanced preparations on a huge scale, the die was irrevokably cast by 26 June for the launch of the Somme by 1 July. And, as will be shown, Verdun continued to be an influence urged upon the British C-in-C by the French after that date.

In April, Haig reveals his awareness of French public opinion on the perceived inaction of British forces in France whilst Verdun grinds on:

Monday 17 April 1916

[.....] I had received several letters from Frenchmen at the time of the main attacks at Verdun, asking what the British Army was doing, these letters I passed to des Valliers who has arranged to keep the French public informed of the great help which the British have rendered and are rendering in France. [.....]

A few days later, Haig's Diary records Colonel des Valliers, the French liaison officer at GHQ, as making clear French military opinion at GQG in regard to the necessity of British action to relieve Verdun:

Sunday 22 April 1916

[....] Colonel des Vallieres reported to me on his return from Chantilly. He said that he found some of the Officers there a little nervous about Verdun. They had lost 120,000 killed, wounded and missing. The enemy was now attacking small sections of the front after a severe bombardment. The French thought their losses were now about equal to those of the enemy. Though hitherto, they calculated the enemy has lost two or three times as much as the French! How long this fight would continue they did not of course know, but General Castelnau was apparently of the opinion that the British should now attack in order to take off the pressure from the French at Verdun. He (des Vallieres) had accordingly been commissioned to find out what troops, guns and ammunition would be available for an attack on 1st or 15th May and 1st June. I told him that such information would not be of much assistance to French GHQ! that if the French were in a critical position, I was prepared to attack with every available man and gun, and the attack would start three weeks (about) after I had been notified of the urgency of the situation. On the other hand, I held that it would be the height of folly to start an attack before we had collected our maximum resources for this summer and were as strong as possible. To make a premature attack is to risk the success of this year’s campaign! [.....]

On 2 May, Haig reveals his sensitivity to French domestic politics and the importance of maintaining the confidence of the French C-in-C, Joffre, whom he had to work with in a strategically junior role, when a request for an audience with him comes from Georges Clemenceau, French Chef du Comite Militaire du Senat:

Tuesday 2 May 1916

[....] Message from our military Attache in Paris stated that M. Clemenceau wished to see me today at Montreuil. As M.C. is an enemy of the President of the Republic, and a severe critic of Joffre, I thought it best to let the latter know of the proposed interview before I actually received Clemenceau. So I sent a reply that I was away from GHQ and so could not see him today, but would gladly see him on a later occasion. [....]

Haig's initial wariness of Clemenceau evaporated when the two met for the first time on 4 May, and discovered a mutual rapport and friendship which would endure and be of particular value to the unity of the Allied cause after Clemenceau became French Prime Minister in November 1917. In a letter to his wife of December 1918, Haig would refer to an inscribed photograph of himself which he had presented to Clemenceau. This was not only, as Haig mischievously wrote to his wife, a token in recognition of Clemenceau's friendship and supportive role during the trying times of the German offensives of 1918, but also because "he hates Lloyd George!" Clemenceau, 'The Tiger', whose premiership would galvanise a war-weary France into continuing the struggle to victory, would go on to refer to Haig as "the greatest general in the world." What Haig's meeting with Clemenceau in May 1916 also left him with, however, was a further example of Robert's observation earlier in this thread that "There was no single 'French' view". Clemenceau also raised the issue of there being an element of opinion in France who favoured a policy of appeasement, whom a serious military setback would encourage to press for terms with Germany. This possibility, always a remote one, nevertheless had a disproportionate influence upon many French and British contemporaries (who were, of course, not blessed with the benefit of hindsight on events still unfolding!) The reality of the influence of exaggerated estimates of the extent of defeatism in France on British strategy in the preceding year of 1915 have been examined by Rhodri Williams, in Lord Kitchener and the Battle of Loos: French Politics and British Strategy in the Summer of 1915, in War, Strategy, and International Politics, Essays in Honour of Michael Howard (1992). Clemenceau's observations on similar themes in early May 1916 left Haig with plenty to mull over, although he maintained his readiness to attack earlier than he would ideally wish to should the French insist that events at Verdun compelled it:

Thursday, May 4 [reproduced in Blake, p. 141]

[.....] I left for HQ 1st Army at Aire where I meet M. Clemenceau by appointment at 4.30pm. He is the "Chief du Comite Militaire du Senat" and in that capacity is visiting the French front. We discussed the whole situation for over an hour. He is evidently well informed of what is going on in most of the theatres of war. His object in coming to see me was to get me to exercise a restraining hand on Gen. Joffre, and prevent any offensive on a large scale from being made until all is ready, and we are at our maximum strength. We cannot expect that Russia will be able to do much towards the defeat of Germany, so we must rely on ourselves (British and French). "If we attack and fail," said M. Clemenceau, "then there will be a number of people in France who will say that the time has arrived to make terms." The French Govt. would certainly go out and M. Caillaux would be the only alternative to M. Briand. He is of the opinion that there is nothing to be lost by delaying; the French people are in good heart, but if there was a failure, after a big effort, it is difficult to say what the result on their feelings might be. Quick changes are apt to take place in their modes of thought. It is M. Briand and the present Govt. who are urging Joffre to act soon. I assured him that I have no intention of taking part prematurely in a great battle, but, of course, I was making ready to attack to support the French in case anything of the nature of a catastrophe were to happen at Verdun. But such a situation seems most unlikely to arise now. My Divisions, I told him, want much careful training before we could attack with hope of success. He asked me, was I under Joffre's orders? I said, "Certainly not." At the same time it must be realised that there can only be one man responsible for the plans. These Joffre and his Staff worked out for France, and I did my best to co-operate with them; but I was responsible for the method of employment of the British forces, so that if anything unfortunate happened, I am responsible and must bear the blame, not Gen. Joffre. Clemenceau assured me that he had only one objective, to serve his Country and help the Allies to win. He is 75 years old, he told me, but is wonderfully active, and spent two hours in the Front trenches today. I found him most interesting and we parted quite friends, for, as the Proverb says, "Friends are discovered, not made". I suggested that he should see Joffre. But he said, the latter would not see him, as he [C] had criticised him [J] in the Press. [....]

Haig confirms his regard for Clemenceau in a letter to his wife of the same day:

Cassell, Thursday Evening 4 May 1916

My Darling Doris,

I got here in time for Dinner tonight after spending a day with the troops training, and an hour with M. Clemenceau at General Monro’s headquarters. I rather liked Clemenceau. He was most frank, and spoke most freely to me. But I’ll put the most important points of our talk in the Diary.

Fondest love from your very loving husband, Douglas

I return to Montreuil on Saturday.

Three days later, Haig's diary records his having reiterated in a letter to Joffre his position as it then stood and as already set out to Clemenceau:

Sunday 7 May 1916

[....] After lunch I drafted a reply with the help of CGS to a letter from General Joffre saying that if military situation required, I hope to be able to make an attack on a considerable scale (25 Divns) three weeks after receipt of notice that such an attack is necessary. On the other hand, in my opinion attacks on the Western Front should be delayed until my Divisions are fully trained, and the full numbers of men and unlimited ammunition available. [...]

Inserted into the typescript Diary at this point are tables of projections for BEF ‘Artillery, Stock of Ammunition and Daily Output’ for 1 March, 1 May and 1 June 1916, and ‘Rifles and Machine Guns' for 1 March, 1 May and 1 June 1916, which clearly demonstrate the reality of the BEF ideally requiring more preparation time logistically, let alone for training.

Haig's letter to Joffre, setting out this position is reproduced below:

Letter to Joffre from DH dated 8 May 1916

My dear General,

With reference to your letter No. 18276, dated 27th April, 1916, my arrangements are being made so that I may be able to attack three weeks after hearing from you, if the military situation should necessitate it.

As I have explained in previous letters the force I can employ will depend on the date of the offensive; the longer the attack is deferred the larger will be the British force available and the better they will be prepared in all respects. For this reason I have come to the conclusion that only military necessity would justify me in launching an offensive next month. I shall be far better prepared to push an attack to a successful conclusion at the end of July, or beginning of August, than I can be in June, and, as the situation is now developing, it appears that the Allied cause, as a whole, will benefit more by retarding our offensive than by hastening it unless some unexpected and improbable change in the situation should occur; such as a transfer of several German divisions from this theatre to Russia. It is of supreme importance that our great offensive, when launched, should attain decisive results that I feel sure you will agree with me in the advisability of waiting a few weeks in order to make success more certain. We are justified in expecting suitable weather in August and September and probably through the greater part of October. Believe me to be, yours very truly, D. Haig, General.

Just to underline the point about the folly of studying history backwards with the benefit of hindsight, Haig's diary entry for the same day as the final draught of his letter to Joffre was written reveals his frustration with the opaqueness of the international strategic situation as it then stood when viewed on the basis of what was currently known at GHQ:

Monday 8 May 1916

[....] We cannot make out what is happening on the Russian Front! During the cold of winter, when military operations were difficult, the Germans retained considerable reserves opposite the Russians, now, when fine weather is at hand, and attacks by the Russians are more probable, all the German reserves have been brought to France. Have the Russians also been weakening their front in order to use their troops against the Turks? or do the Germans mean to fall back in the East when the Russians advance?

Comdt. Gemeau reported considerable attacks on Verdun front both on the West and East of River. Artillery fire very severe. Infantry attacks were made in great force, but moral of troops not so good as at beginning of operations. Enemy only succeeded in taking small area of ground. [...]

Less than a week later, however, the French were upping the ante so far as insisting that pressure on the French army at Verdun needed to be relieved by the BEF sooner rather than later. This began the process which led to Haig's decision when he met with Joffre on 26 May that the British must march to the aid of the French by 1 July. Advance warning was given in a letter from General Yarde-Buller, of the British mission at French GQG at Chantilly, to Haig's Chief of Staff, General Launcelot Kiggell:

Letter from General Yarde-Buller (British Mission at GQG Chantilly) to Kiggell, dated 14 May 1916

My dear General,

I came up to GHQ on Thursday in hopes of seeing Sir Douglas and yourself and was very sorry to miss you, so I write to let you know that from recent conversations which I have had here I think that, should the French be too hard pressed at VERDUN, they will urge on Sir Douglas the necessity of making an offensive to relieve the pressure from that place; the French are of opinion that the Germans will continue the operations there; they do not anticipate any serious movement in the RHEIMS region, about which there have been rumours lately. General Joffre is writing to Sir Douglas about the offensive and I am told will probably sign the letter today. Very sincerely yours, H. Yarde-Buller.

And sure enough, Joffre's letter was not far behind:

Letter from Joffre to Haig dated 14 May 1916

[.....] Ce’est en consideration de ces avantages que, seules, depuis bientot trios mois, les Forces Francois supportent la loured poussee allemande enterprise a VERDUN contre notre front commun, et cela sans faire appel a l’intervention des Puissances Alliees, telle qu’elle est explicitement prevue dans le pacte de CHANTILLY. J’apprecie donc, comme vouse-meme, l’interet qui s’attache a l’ajournement aussi prolonge que possible de nos operations offensives. [....] D’autre part, la lute acharnee et continue qui se poursuit a VERDUN, use quotidiennement nos resources; elle absorbe une partie importante de nos disponibilities, et de ce fait, elle impose progressivement a notre participation a l’offensive commune d’inevitables et serieusses reductions. En consequence, j’estime que, dans la situation actuelle, nous ne devons pas differer au-dela des premiers jours de Juillet la date de notre offensive, et je vous demande de vous rallier a cette determination. Je me reserve, comme il a ete convenu, de faire appel a votre concours avant la date que je viens d’envisager, si les ciscumstances m’en imposaient la necessite, etant bien entendu que je vous aviserais en temps utile du moment ou votre action devrait commencer a s’exercer. Agreez, mon cher General, l’expression de mes sentiements les plus cordiaux. – J. Joffre.

Haig's diary entry on receiving Joffre's letter reveals his taking on board, as he was bound to, the assessment of the French C-in-C and his generals on the spot of the ongoing effect of Verdun on the French army:

Monday 15th May 1916

[....] Colonel des Vallieres brought me a letter from General Joffre in reply to mine of last week in which I urged the advantage of postponing the attack until my troops were fully trained, and ammunition, guns etc. had been received in ample quantities. General Joffre agrees, but thinks the attack cannot be delayed beyond beginning of July. The continuance of the German attacks at Verdun are causing the French considerable loss and the Commanders on the spot are anxious for something to be done to relieve the pressure. [....] Alan Fletcher and Davidson* returned from Paris. The latter thought the French GQG a little anxious about Verdun. [*Alan Fletcher, Haig's senior ADC, and General John 'Tavish' Davidson, BGGS (Operations), GHQ]

In the meantime, anxious to buy the time to build up the BEF's own training and material, Haig is also being importuned by Joffre to supply the hard-pressed French with more Lewis guns:

16 May 1916

[....] Letter received from General Joffre asking for more Lewis guns. I have already handed over 380 to the French. I replied that we would do our utmost to meet his request, but as I did not know what numbers I am to receive from England, I could not fix a date or number of guns available. [....]

On 22 May Haig is briefed by Commandant A M E Gemeau, a French liaison officer attached to GHQ, who tells him, inter alia, that the German attacks at Verdun continue, and although the French are holding their own, and even offering some small scale retaliation, it is at a cost:

Monday 22 May 1916

[....] I saw Commandant Gemeau this morning regarding a letter received from General Joffre dated 16th May, but it only came last night. In the letter he explained the changes he proposed to make in the French troops on the right of the Belgians. [......] Gemeau also told me that the Germans are still attacking at Verdun but that the French were doing well, though suffering casualties. Here and there they were taking the offensive on a small scale. [....]

Haig's French liaison officers tell a similar story the following day:

Tuesday 23 May 1916

[....] Gemeau and General des Vallieres came to see me. The latter is arranging for Boesinghe to be placed in our hands. The news from Verdun is good today, the French are now attacking here and there. [....]

On 24 May Haig received another letter from Joffre, once again underlining the seriousness of the continued fighting at Verdun and its impact on the planned Somme attack. It is likely that it was this which finally decided him, ahead of their meeting on 26 May, on the necessity of launching the Somme by 1 July according to Joffre's requirements:

Wednesday 24 May [Reproduced in Blake, p. 143]

[....] General des Vallieres brought me a letter from General Joffre in which the latter stated that owing to the hard fighting at Verdun he has not the number of Divisions available for a combined attack which he had hoped. The minimum number would be 22, or possibly 26, depending on the fighting at Verdun. Des Valliers also stated that owing to the great losses of the French at Verdun, which would soon reach 200,000 General Joffre was of opinion that the offensive cannot be delayed beyond the beginning of July. Their losses at Verdun must be considered with the increase of the British. Also that the French would prefer to lose their casualties in an offensive attack rather than to melt away while sitting still. I pointed out my fears of a possible attack by the enemy against Arras, and that I thought an attack to regain the craters on the ridge west of Vimy, must oblige the enemy to employ some of his reserves against the British.

Haig was well aware of the importance of the upcoming meeting with Joffre, and expressed this in a letter to his wife:

Wed. 24 May 16

My Darling Doris,

{....] Joffre & Castelnau come to see me here on Friday and stay to lunch at midday. We have big decisions to make on that day. So think of me..... [....]

Best love, my Darling, from your always Very loving husband, Douglas

As has been discussed, Haig's key meeting with Joffre was scheduled for 26 May. Pasted into the typescript diary for 24 May are several detailed tables giving estimates of BEF strengths in divisions, guns and ammunition, machine guns, trench mortars and ammunition, gas and smoke, grenades for dates of 1 June, 15 June, 1 July, 15 July, 1 August, 15 August. Tables all date stamped 24 May – 2 days before the meeting with Joffre which agrees to 1 July for the Somme launch. The veracity of GHQ's projections is attested to by a letter to Haig from the Adjutant General, General Sir George Fowke, dated 25 May:

Letter to Haig from the Adjutant General [Fowke] dated 25 May 1916:

[...] The present strength in Infantry for 48 Divisions is 621,717. assuming that the new Divisions coming out in the future will be up to strength, we shall have on the 1st July 52 Divisions, including the 61st, 40th, Naval and 4th Australian Divisions, with a total Infantry strength of 684,700, ie 10,000 under establishment. A memorandum on Recruiting which has been obtained from the War Office [dated 22 May] is attached for your information. It shows that the rate of recruiting at home has improved considerably since the 1st April. This, however, will not make itself felt in this country until about the 1st August onwards. The actual numbers sent out depend to a great extent on the rate at which men can be trained. At the present time I understand the training lasts four months, but this will probably have to be increased owing to the class of recruit now coming in taking longer to train than those obtained earlier in the year. Delay is also being caused from bad weather interfering in the rate at which recruits can be passed through the musketry course through want of sufficient range accommodation. From the 1st August onwards it is anticipated that the rate at which reinforcements will be sent out will improve considerably.

Haig's diary for 25 May, as we have seen earlier in this thread, has him meeting with Wully Robertson and setting out his conclusions that, based on what the French have been telling him, and despite the BEF ideally requiring more preparation time, he will accede to French requirements to march earlier:

Thursday 25 May [Reproduced in both Blake, p. 144, & Sheffield & Bourne, p. 187]

The CIGS [Robertson] arrived from England at 8pm. After dinner, we discussed whether the British Army should comply with the French Generalissimo's request to attack in the month of July, or wait till August 15th when we would be much stronger.

I had gone fully into the various aspects of the question and what might be the results if we did not support the French. I came to the conclusion that we must march to the support of the French. Robertson entirely agreed, and took my notes away to study.

Later that evening, in a letter to his wife, Haig alluded to a clash of personalities between Robertson and Castelnau which might impinge upon the following day's meeting with Joffre:

Thursday 25 May 1916

My Darling Doris,

[....] Joffre and Castelnau come here at 11 o’clock tomorrow. I don’t think Castelnau is a friend of the British. I get on all right with him but Robertson dislikes him and I think the feeling is mutual between them!! Fondest love from your always very loving husband, Douglas.

So, Haig has made his decision, supported by Wully Robertson (the evolution of whose own impressions of the seriousness of Verdun I have outlined in an earlier post on this thread), on the necessity of complying with Joffre ahead of their meeting the following day. This is reiterated at the beginning of his diary entry for 26 May, which both Blake and Sheffield & Bourne omit from their editions:

Friday 26 May 1916 [Partially reproduced in both Blake, pp. 144-145, & Sheffield & Bourne, p. 188]

Glass rose slightly, a fine morning and day.

Sir William Robertson called about 10am. He is in full agreement with the views I expressed last night that the British Army must support the French when they ask us to attack and help them.

About 11 am General Joffre arrived. He was accompanied by General de Castelnau and Colonel Renouard (head of 3rd Bureau) as well as some of his personal staff. I brought General Joffre at once into my writing room and we sat at a table in the middle of the room thus:

With Colonel Renouard at my writing table near the window.

General Joffre explained the general situation. How the moment was most favourable for the Russians to take the offensive as the Germans and Austrians had both withdrawn troops from Russia. Consequently, the Russians intended to attack on the 15th June. The Italians stated that they had suffered considerably and had asked the Allies for help. The French had supported for three months alone the whole weight of the German attacks at Verdun. Their losses had been heavy. By the end of the month, they would reach 200,000. If this went on, the French Army would be ruined. He, therefore, was of the opinion that the 1st July was the latest date for the combined offensive of the British and French. I said that, before fixing the date, I would like to indicate the state of preparedness of the British Army on certain dates and compare its condition. I took 1st July and 15th July, and 1st and 15th August. The moment I mentioned August 15th, Joffre at once got very excited and shouted that "The French Army would cease to exist if we did nothing till then." The rest of us looked on at this outburst of excitement, and then I pointed out that, in spite of the 15th August being the most favourable date for the British Army to take action, yet, in view of what he had said regarding the unfortunate condition of the French Army, I was prepared to commence operations on the 1st July or thereabouts. This calmed the old man, but I saw that he had come to the meeting prepared to combat a refusal on my part, and was prepared to be very nasty. Castelnau, on the other hand, was most anxious to put Joffre straight. Finally, I asked them, once the date was fixed, not to postpone it at the last moment as had happened three times last year with Foch! We agreed on having three weeks' notice of the exact date of the attack. Robertson raised the question of bringing troops from Salonika, but that point was not pressed, as Joffre said the matter was before his Government. We then went to lunch about 12.30. Altogether fifteen of us. A very friendly gathering. We had coffee after lunch in my writing-room, and Joffre enjoyed himself so much that it was 2.30 pm before he went. So the meeting was a great success and the Frenchmen all went away thoroughly delighted at the way I had met their proposals, and also with my entertainment of them. They are, indeed, difficult Allies to deal with! But there is no doubt that the nearest way to the hearts of many of them, including that of the "Generalissimo", is down their throats, and some 1840 brandy had a surprisingly soothing effect on both him and Castelnau!

Pasted into the typescript version of Haig's Diary is his copy of the French minutes of the 26 May meeting, dated 27 May, which Jack has posted extracts from in English translation in post # 43. The minutes are headed:

Resume de l’ entretien du 26 Mai a BEAUQUESNE entre Generaux ROBERTSON et HAIG pour l’Armee Britannique et, pour l’ Armee Francaise, le General JOFFRE, Commandant en Chef, assiste du General de CATELNAU. - Le 27 Mai 1916

Also pasted into Haig's Diary are three photographs of himself with the participants of the meeting on the steps of Beausquesne, each annotated on the reverse in Haig's hand. He was clearly aware of the historic implications of the agreement reached at Beauquesne on 26 May 1916.

In the accompanying note when the sent the pages from his Diary covering the 26 May meeting home to his wife, Haig confirmed the cordial conclusion to the discussion:

28 May 16

My Darling Doris,

Very many thanks for your fine long letter of yesterday – so full of most interesting news.

It was kind of you to think of me in the Conference on Friday – and you will see from the enclosed how satisfactorily everything went off. – I think it will be best not to copy out anything regarding plans from either of the enclosed. It is so important to keep these secret. Fondest love from Your always very loving husband, Douglas.

Unsurprisingly, Verdun continues to feature in Haig's Diary:

Monday 29 May 1916

[....] I saw General des Vallieres before his departure for Chantilly. We discussed the merits of the step by step attack of the Germans at Verdun. He said that it was within a little of being successful a fortnight ago, and that the situation was then quite serious. [.....]

The entry for 30 May refers to reports of German coverage of Verdun. Haig also expresses his perplexion at contradictory French estimates of their losses at Verdun (as well as remarking at the over-inflated figure for German losses!). With the benefit of hindsight, of course, we know that Joffre's figure, given at the 26 May meeting, of French losses approaching 200,000 by the end of May, is far more accurate than the figure given to Haig by other French sources on 30 May of 148,000 given that the total French losses at Verdun is now generally accepted to have been around 377,000, with German losses in the region of 337,000. [And before he starts, I have no intention of debating his interminable casualty permutations, or any other irrelvant tangents, with the usual suspect!]

Tuesday 30th May 1916

[....] Reports from Berlin state that up to 20th inst enemy expended 7 1/2 million rounds at Verdun. The great ammunition dump created on the Eastern Front for von Hindenburg’s operations has been heavily drawn on. Enemy losses up to 20th May at Verdun 450,000 (this seems excessive). Reports further state that the Verdun operations will be continued at all costs. The French estimate their own losses incurred at Verdun during 3 months fighting at:

French 148,000

German 300,000 to 350,000

(compare the French figures given by Joffre on 26th when his object was to urge us to attack!)

To complete units, the French have incorporated 36,000 of the 1916 class in the ranks. [...]

It was brought home to Haig by the French political and military leadership the following day just how seriously they continued to regard their ongoing losses at Verdun. This was the second of the key meetings of May 1916 (the first being at Beauquesne on 26 May), and took place on board the French Presidential railway carriage at Salieux Station, some 2 1/2 miles south-west of Amiens. Haig recorded what transpired at the meeting three times, firstly in a letter to Wully Robertson. In this, Haig notes, inter alia, that he hopes he 'did good' in taking up Robertson's bete noire of troops garrisoned in Salonika who were needed on the Western Front:

Letter from Haig to Robertson dated 31 May 1916

My Dear Robertson,

I attended a Conference today in the President’s railway carriage near Amiens. There were present Poincare, Briand & War Minister Roques, Joffre, Castelnau, Foch and myself.

The object of the meeting was to make sure that the soldiers were united in their views. Foch seems to have spoken unguardedly to such an extent that the Deputies in Paris stated that he was opposed to any offensive this year! Foch was reproved by Briand and ate humble pie!

The President had been to Verdun yesterday – the 3 generals there (Petain, Nivelle & another) told him that unless some diversion were made to draw off the German reserves Verdun must fall. Joffre felt that the position was safe till the end of June.

This shows the vital necessity for the British forces being ready to intervene at an early date.

I took the opportunity of insisting on the necessity for bringing as many troops as possible from Salonika. This is the decisive point & we must press the enemy whilst his Divisions are tired and below war establishment. Who can tell what the enemy may do to revive them in the winter if left alone in the summer & autumn.

I found Briand & Poincare quite ready to discuss the advantages of bringing some of the Salonika garrisons to France, so I hope I did good. In haste, yrs very truly, D. Haig.

Haig followed up his letter to Robertson with a Memorandum on the 31 May meeting with the French. Haig’s Memorandum to Robertson, dated 1 June 1916, repeats in its points 1 & 2 the description of the meeting on Poincare’s train in his letter of 31 May, in particular Poincare’s visit to Verdun where the French generals there told him that it would fall without an early action to draw off pressure from that part of the front. Haig continues on point 3:

Haig's Memorandum to Robertson, dated 1 June:

3. Under these circumstances and in view of the authority given in your letters No. 01/14/54, of the 9th and 10th April, and of the agreement arrived at on the 27th [sic – 26th] May, at a conference held at BEAUQUESNE, when you were present, I am preparing to take part in offensive operations with the French, with the object of relieving the pressure on VERDUN.

4. It was further stated at the conference yesterday that, owing to the continuation of the offensive by the enemy against VERDUN, the number of divisions which the French would have available for offensive operations were diminishing in number, and that “one ought to foresee the case in which the English Army must alone undertake the offensive.”

5. In these circumstances, I beg strongly to recommend that every available division be brought to France (from SALONIKA) with a view to supporting the forthcoming operations which I propose to carry out on the lines stated in paragraph 4 of my letter No. O.A.D. 679, dated the 4th April, and which are likely to be of a prolonged nature.

6. With reference to paragraph 4 above, I should add that General Joffre assured me that the greatest efforts would be made to support the British attack with every available French division and gun.

Finally, in his Diary for 31 May, Haig recorded his impressions of his meeting with the French political and military leadership, with particular emphasis on the French insistence that operations be undertaken to draw off pressure from Verdun. Note, also, how Joffre arranges to meet up with Haig in advance to sound him out on his continued adherance to their agreement of 26 May. Of interest, too, is Haig's disparaging impression of Foch, in marked contrast to the way he would view him by the spring of 1918. Also of interest is Haig's pointing out that British casualties in 1916 prior to the launch of the Somme were, though comparatively speaking, small (as Castelnau points out), not non-existent. This Diary entry also includes one of Haig's most forceful articulations of the 'Westerner' point of view. Perhaps most crucially of all in the context of this thread, however, is Haig's statement that "General Joffre, who alone knew the situation fully (at Verdun, and in Russia, Italy, etc.) had asked me to be ready by beginning of July. I had arranged to comply with his request." This is in line with Haig's instructions from the British government on his strategic subordination to the French quoted by Robert earlier in this thread, and with Haig's own stated recognition of the French C-in-C as Allied strategic Generalissimo:

Wednesday, 31 May [Reproduced in Blake, pp. 145-146]

[....] I left my motor at 7.45am - arrived at Dury (2 1/2 miles south of Amiens) at 10 o'clock. Conference of Generals Joffre, Castelnau and myself met at General Foch's HQ. The latter has recovered from his motor accident and seemed fairly well, but aged since last I saw him. Joffre explained that the Minister wished to have the views of the Generals and hoped I would support him in the matter of making an early attack to extricate the French at Verdun. I, of course, replied in the affirmative.

We then left for Salieux Station (about 2 1/2 miles west of Dury); I motored with Joffre. The President [Poincare] M. Briand [Prime Minister] and General Roques [Minister of War] came by train from Paris. They arrived at 11.30 and we at once assembled in the Presidential railway carriage - seven in all. [The Diary contains Haig's sketch of the seating arrangements].

General Castelnau read over the Memorandum of which I received a copy last night. I took exception to a para which said that "British Army had not been attacked" and pointed out that our losses in killed and wounded since December amounted to 83,000 - and 653 mines had been sprung during that time. Castelnau explained that para meant English had not been attacked like the French at Verdun. The main discussion arose over the necessity for making an attack at an early date. Poincare said that he had just returned from Verdun where he had seen the senior Generals - Petain, Nivelle and another General. They told him "Verdun sera prise" and that operations must be undertaken without delay to withdraw pressure from that part. He asked my views. I told him that I had visited London in February when fighting at Verdun began, and had got the approval of the Govt. to make arrangements and suport the French in case of necessity. That, on my return to France, I had written a letter to CIGS [Robertson] and got the approval of Government confirmed by letter.

I had therefore foreseen the possibility of the present situation arising, and was preparing for it. The only question was, when is the most favourable date for attacking. General Joffre, who alone knew the situation fully (at Verdun and in Russia, Italy, etc.) had asked me to be ready by beginning of July. I had arranged to comply with his request.

We then discussed the paragraph which stated that we must foresee the probability of the French Reserves diminishing etc. The slow output of French heavy guns was pointed out and the need for supplying Verdun with everything necessary was recognised, and I said that in view of the possibility of the British having to attack alone*, it was most desireably to bring to France the Divisions which the Allies held at Salonika. I pointed out that this theatre was the decisive point and that we ought to have every available Division here ready to strike in at the decisive** moment. "Concentration of effort" could alone lead to decisive success. Briand enlarged on the possibility of the Servians making a separate peace, if they were not led forward to the attack against the Bulgarians. I said that would be preferable to our lacking the necessary superiority to exploit any success gained here. Beat the Germans here, and we can then make what terms we like!

Foch came in for a reprimand from M. Briand because he had stated to the politicians that he was against the offensive this year. His excuses seemed very lame, he ate humble pie and I thought he looked untrustworthy and a schemer. He had evidently spoken very freely to Clemenceau recently. Briand also compared Petain to a motor engine in that he went tap tap tapping out all kinds of opinions to parliamentarians who went to Verdun expressly to get facts with which to fight the Government. "The Generals," he said, "must be united." From what was said I formed the opinion that Petain had the "wind up." [....] [* & ** are Haig's underlinings.]

In a note written to his wife following his meeting on the Presidential train, Haig confirms the sincerity of his desire to support the French to the utmost of his ability:

Wed 31 May 16

My Darling Doris,

I left early this morning for the meeting with Joffre & the President. It went off very well, and I have just got back and found your letter of y’day.

You are quite right in what you say that we must support the French at the present time to our utmost power.

Mr Hughes the Australian Premier is here – so I must run to Dinner. Fondest love from Your very loving husband, Douglas.

In a letter to his wife dated 2 June, Haig corrects an exaggerated impression which she has picked up about the prevalance of French defeatism - a theme I alluded to earlier in this post, and which affected, amongst others amongst British decision-makers, Kitchener:

Friday 2 June 16

My Darling Doris,

Yours of y’day rec’d. I don’t think what you say about “France being inclined towards a separate peace” is quite right. I believe the Army & the Govt. are determined to go on for another year, but there are some of the weaklings about Paris & in the South away from the war who wd of course welcome peace.

The Germans are attacking the Canadians SE & E of Ypres, but I am satisfied we’ll do all right. Indeed I am glad that the Enemy shd attack there now before we thin our line there. Best love from your very loving husband, Douglas. I enclose a friendly letter from Esher which may please you!

Three days after the meeting aboard the Presidential train, Haig's Diary records that Joffre was moving the goalposts then agreed upon due to the situation at Verdun. Once again, Haig does his utmost to comply with French requirements:

Saturday 3rd June 1916

[...] General de Vallieres brought me a letter which he had received (addressed to him) from General Joffre. The attacks against Verdun are continuing very fiercely. He wishes the British Infantry attack to be ready to take place on 1st July, not the bombardment to begin then. He assures me that the notice to begin about 1st July has been given, and asks how much notice we want for completion of our assembly trenches for registering our Artillery etc. I said 12 days, but will put my wishes in writing. [...]

In a Memorandum to Joffre the following day, Haig wrote:

Memorandum from Haig to Joffre dated 4 June 1916:

My Dear General, With reference to the last paragraph of the ‘Resume’ of the proceedings of the Conference held at BEAUQUESNE on the 26th May, I beg to inform you that

1.

(a] in regard to the first point mentioned, I am making the necessary arrangements with a view to being ready to launch my infantry attacks on or after 1st July.

(b] in regard to the second point mentioned (“preavis”), it will be necessary for me to have twelve days’ notice of the date, viz., 1st of July or later, on which your infantry will be prepared to advance north and south of the SOMME, in order to enable me to complete my final preparations for a simultaneous attack.

2.

With reference to your letter No. 8970, of the 14th April, 1916, and subsequent correspondence and discussions, I understand that the continued efforts which have been, and are still being, forced on you at VERDUN have necessitated a considerable reduction in the force which you will be able to employ in direct co-operation with me, with consequent modifications in the scope of the operations to be undertaken by your Armies. I have not, however, received any definite statement as to what these modifications will amount to. [.....]

On 7 June, Haig travelled to London for meetings with the CIGS and members of the War Cabinet, including Lloyd George, then Minister of Munitions. Joffre and the French Prime Minister, Briand, were also in London for meetings with the British War Cabinet at the same time. Haig'a Diary for 9 June records a series of meetings at Downing Street attended by all three. This makes it explicitly clear that the object of the BEF in France is "to help France". In particular, "the offensive which the British Army in France is about to undertake [is] to relieve pressure on Verdun." Moreover, "it is to be a battle of 'duree prolongee'." What also comes across is the focus of Haig on the Western Front theatre, whilst the French continue to prevaricate over Wully Robertson's old bugbear, the troops stationed in Salonika - though Haig clearly gets the impression that Joffre is paying lip-service to political requirements on this. Essentially, whilst importuning the British to relieve pressure on Verdun, the French were simultaneously holding out for their Salonikan project in the Balkans. Haig and Robertson, backed by the British Government, held that Britain could not do both, and that the decisive point of concentration must be the Western Front in France. Also worthy of note is the meticulous Haig's dismay at the way politicians routinely disposed of matters of 'far-reaching magnitude' in a manner he describes as 'chancy.':

Friday, 9 June [Reproduced fully in Blake, pp. 148-149, & partially in Sheffield & Bourne, p. 189]

[....] The Prime Minister welcomed M. Briand in an opening address. M. Briand replied. Then our Premier asked if the French were quite in agreement with what British Armies were doing on the Western Front to help France. Joffre replied saying Western Front could not be dealt apart from the other Fronts, and then went straight into the whole Salonika question. He displayed some heat so that the Prime Minister turned off the discussion onto Greece. M. Gambon produced a telegram which was practically an ultimatum to Greece asking for the dismissal of Govt., demobilisation of Army, etc. This was quickly approved after some amendments made on the initiative of Mr Balfour. Notably rejecting proposal to call on King of Greece to dismiss his present Government which is Germanophil. I was surprised at the 'chancy' way business of such far-reaching magnitude was disposed of.

About 1.15 we adjourned for lunch. We all lunched at Downing Street except the secretaries and lesser lights. I sat between Mr Balfour and Lord Crewe. About 2.30pm M. Briand and party left for Buckingham Palace.

We (of the British party) then formed ourselves into a Committee and discussed the line of action to be adopted after lunch. It was agreed that although no arguments were likely to influence Briand, still it was very necessary to set out the arguments why the British Government refused to comply with the French in their plan of action.

At 3.15pm Committee reassembled. Mr Balfour made a most excellent speech indicating the British point of view. Need for every available man and round of ammunition in France, etc, shortage of shipping, etc. Lord Curzon followed giving details of the shipping required for an offensive in Balkans. General Robertson came next dealing with sundry military details. Briand and Joffre replied. They had really no arguments. Lloyd George, M. Gambon, Sir E. Grey continued the discussion, and then about 6pm Asquith made a most excellent speech putting our case clearly to the French. He has been most patient as the French had tried to make out that the British Government had at one time favoured the Salonika project. Asquith from documents showed that the contrary had been the case; Briand was immovable, so at 6.30 the meeting broke up.

A few of us stayed to assist in drafting a note to be handed to Briand tonight, showing the main reasons of disagreement by the British. I saw Joffre for a few minutes. I could see that he was upset at the firmness of the British Cabinet and he told me that if Briand returned to Paris with the negative answer which the British Government had just given, in meant the "craqument" of M. Briand and his Government. I was confirmed in my opinion that Joffre really disliked the idea of an offensive from Salonika as a military proposition, and agreed solely for political reasons. I remained with the PM and Grey and Hankey who were drafting the report and gave them some notes on the nature of the offensive which the British Army in France is about to undertake to relieve the pressure on Verdun. It is to be a battle of "duree pronlongee" and Joffre hadurged me to be ready to carry out frequent reliefs of the Divisions engaged. Sound policy, therefore, required that all our resources in men and ammunition should be sent to the decisive points, viz, France and not wasted against the Bulgars in the Balkans, or any other secondary objective. [....]

The next day, whilst still in Britain, Haig received a telegram from Kiggell, his Chief of Staff at GHQ, stating that the French, in the person of Castelnau, were once again agitating to advance the agreed schedule for the Somme launch:

Telegram from CGS France to General Haig, 10.VI.16 (12.15am)

Castelnau has just sent des Villieres here to say that the former is anxious about todays developments and hopes that we can hasten preparations. It is doubtful if Joffre would confirm this and would suggest the advisability of seeing him on the subject before he leaves London. If the time for preparation is shortened, some curtailment of programme would certainly be necessitated.

Haig responded to Kiggell's telegram by return:

Telegram from Haig to CGS France, 10 June 1916, (9.30am)

I spoke to General Joffre yesterday re Verdun. He said fighting was severe there but expressed no wish for change of date of our attack. As regards Castelnau’s request we must do all in our power to do as they wish and hasten preparations. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the object of our attack is to relieve pressure on Verdun. A carelessly organised and hurried development of attack seems unlikely to have the desired result.

Later that day, Haig summed up the once again changing situation in his Diary:

Saturday 10th June (Silvermere Marina, Deal)

A telegram from Kiggell of last night stated that de Villieres on behalf of Castelnau wished us to hasten our preparations so that our attack might take place earlier. He suggested that I should see Joffre on the subject. I thought it unnecessary to see Joffre because I had spoken to the latter only yesterday afternoon (5.30pm) regarding the situation at Verdun and he had said nothing as regards altering the date of the attack. I therefore saw General Davidson and told him to telephone to General Kiggell to that effect, and to add that we must hasten our preparations as much as possible, but since our attack had as its objective to draw off German reserves from attacking Verdun, it must be made in full strength and be continued for some time to produce definite results. A hastily prepared attack without an adequate supply of ammunition must assuredly fail in its object. [.....] Nothing that we can do can be in time to oblige the enemy to weaken their present efforts. We can speed up our attack a little, but not to such an extent as will affect the Verdun situation during what is evidently going to be the critical period. The best course seems to be to reinforce Verdun directly with French troops from the Somme. In my opinion it would be very short sighted policy for the French to ask us to start our attack before all is quite ready merely in order to save the losses at Verdun during a few days.

Three days later, back at GHQ in France, Verdun was continuing to occupy Haig's attention:

Tuesday 13th June 1916

[....] Intelligence Branch reports German 7th Corps have been located at Verdun. Nothing of importance as regards train movements reported. [.....] General des Vallieres reported that the situation at Verdun is serious. Not only men, but the Generals and Staffs are getting tired out and jumpy. General Joffre is anxious that our infantry attack should be launched on 25th June (Sunday); that would mean that our bombardment should begin on 20th. I said that of course I would do all in my power to support the French Army but our attack even on 25th would be too late to check any vigorous attacks by new enemy troops at Verdun. These must already be in place and ready to attack. A letter was accordingly despatched to Joffre stating that we would attack on the date requested, but pointing out that 3 or 4 extra days would be a great advantage to enable us to complete our preparations. I gather that the French 20th Corps on our right cannot be fully ready by 25th inst. There is a serious political crisis again taking place in Paris, and will be at its height on 16th! A scapegoat for Verdun is wanted! [....]

That same day Haig sent a Memorandum to Joffre confirming that he was once more prepared to adjust the British schedule based upon French assurances that the situation at Verdun required it:

Memorandum from Haig to Joffre dated 13 June 1916:

My dear General, I understand, from verbal communications which have been made to me by the French mission at my Headquarters, that it may be necessary to relieve the pressure on your forces at VERDUN, and that you wish the preparations for the British attack to be so accelerated that the Infantry assaults can be launched on the 25th instant.

I have issued orders that these preparations are to be pushed on with all speed and that everything should be ready to commence the bombardment on the 20th instant, if the weather is suitable, with a view to launching the attack on the 25th.

I also understand that I shall hear from you on the 16th instant whether or not it may then be desirable to postpone the attack for a few days. Such a postponement to the extent of three or four days may be useful in the completion of my arrangements, but I trust that no lengthy delay will be involved, as I shall, by that date, have already concentrated all my artillery.

I presume that the French troops on my right will conform and be ready to carry out their attacks simultaneously with the British, even should these Infantry attacks have to be launched as early as the 25th. Believe me to be, Yours very truly, D. Haig.

Three days later, Haig is recording, with extraordinary tolerance, a request from Joffre that the British now adjust their schedule yet again, this time back to the originally agreed 1 July, based upon their latest perceptions of the need at Verdun:

Thursday 16th June 1916

[....] Commandant Gemeau reported that the situation at Verdun is now much more satisfactory. A few days ago after the last German attack some of the French troops became disheartened and said that “they had enough of it”. Several Commanders and Staff Officers were also disheartened and felt worn out with continuous fighting. Had the enemy continued his pressure, the capture of Verdun seemed certain. The French Higher Command however at once took prompt action. A certain number of the disaffected were at once shot. Their number included several officers who were shot in front of their troops. Staff and other Officers were changed, fresh troops brought up and more trenches dug. Dull and wet weather also prevented the enemy’s artillery from being so active during these critical days.

The result of these strong measures is that the situation at Verdun is now better, the French troops are in better heart and with the return also of sunshine, the spirits of our Allies at Chantilly have undergone a great change for the better.

This evening a telephone message from General Joffre requested me postpone my attack until the 29th inst. or even till 1st July. I replied that I agreed to postponement till 29th June but not a day later – many guns had been withdrawn from the rest of our front and on the way to the 4th Army. Also owing to the lack of heavy ammunition (8 inch & 9.2) we are collecting that also from the other Armies. Any further change now will cause a disorder in our rear communications as well as give the enemy a chance of profiting by the thinness of our lines from north of Arras to our left flank. [....]

On the 24 June, Haig wrote to his wife expressing a measure of exasperation with the prevaricating French which he was careful not to make too much of in his attempts to work in unity with his Gallic allies:

Saturday 24 June 16

[....] The French are now pressing me to delay our attack, having for the past fortnight, as you know, been pressing me to advance our preparations! Their 20th Corps they say is not ready! But you will get all this from the Diary. [....]

Two days later, with just four days to go to the now irrevokable commitment to 1 July, Haig records yet another perception of the situation at Verdun, this time from Briand, the French Prime Minister:

Monday 26th June 1916

[.....] I gathered from M. Briand last night that his Govt. is again anxious regarding Verdun, and when I told him that Foch had been anxious to postpone the date of the attack, he said “that would be very wrong, Verdun must on no account be allowed to fall into the enemy’s hands.” [....] Des Vallieries reported no further attacks at Verdun. He also brought me copy of a telegram which General Joffre had sent to Italy urging Gen. Cadorna to attack the Austrians* at once with “toutes ses resources en homes et en munitions pour fixer l’enemi et le batter.” [.....]

This extended post exhausts, in one fell swoop, the primary source material which I currently have to hand on Haig's perceptions of the influence of Verdun on the need for the Somme being launched when it was. I hope some of the previously unpublished material in particular will have been of interest.

George

* 'Austrians' was mistyped by Lady Haig in the original typed transcription of the Diary as: 'General Joffre had sent to Italy urging Gen. Cadorna to attack the Australians'! Strewth, mate - that's gonna start a thunder down under!

[phil andrade]

George,

You will, I hope, permit me to thank you for this excellent tour de force.

Here I lie, roughed up and chastened, but with a much greater degree of knowledge about this topic.

Interesting, informative, and comprehensive...you must have worked hard : thanks.

Phil - usual suspect - (PJA)

[truthergw]

Well George, what can I say! Go have a lie down! I have read the post through but it will require a careful re-reading to absorb all of the content especially the fresh material.

[SteveMarsdin]

I do hope this thread is given "classic" status for all the wealth of information that has been kindly provided by the contributors

[phil andrade]

The great success which we achieved on the south side of the river, where for the first three days of the battle the surprise had been complete, proved conclusively, according to Colonel Renouard, that we should have won a great victory had we been able to employ thirty divisions instead of ten. In his opinion it would have led to a complete break-through, and after that, what would the loss of Verdun have mattered!

Steven,

The passage above stands as testimony that there were Frenchmen who were willing to countenance the loss of Verdun if it released resources to enhance success elsewhere.

Churchill's cricket ball catch analogy - and here I confess that I've just learnt this - was made at the time, when he wrote in August 1916, for the London Magazine :

The French.....suffered more than the defence need suffer by their valiant retention of particular positions. Meeting an attack is like catching a cricket ball. Shock is dissipated by drawing back the hands....

The point you make, endorsed and enhanced by Peter Hart, is not ignored by me. I'm thoroughly convinced. And where have I argued that the Somme was not a good idea ?

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

Well you may all praise George for his recent posting but he has been a very naughty boy! He is meant to be working on his thesis or his groundbreaking biography of Haig. I am very cross with him indeed!

Peter the Water Carrier

[Steven Broomfield]

I do hope this thread is given "classic" status for all the wealth of information that has been kindly provided by the contributors

I'd agree with that.

[truthergw]

The great success which we achieved on the south side of the river, where for the first three days of the battle the surprise had been complete, proved conclusively, according to Colonel Renouard, that we should have won a great victory had we been able to employ thirty divisions instead of ten. In his opinion it would have led to a complete break-through, and after that, what would the loss of Verdun have mattered!

Steven,

The passage above stands as testimony that there were Frenchmen who were willing to countenance the loss of Verdun if it released resources to enhance success elsewhere.

Churchill's cricket ball catch analogy - and here I confess that I've just learnt this - was made at the time, when he wrote in August 1916, for the London Magazine :

The French.....suffered more than the defence need suffer by their valiant retention of particular positions. Meeting an attack is like catching a cricket ball. Shock is dissipated by drawing back the hands....

The point you make, endorsed and enhanced by Peter Hart, is not ignored by me. I'm thoroughly convinced. And where have I argued that the Somme was not a good idea ?

Phil (PJA)

And this brings us back to the fact that the CiC in a democracy is subject to political control. Joffre is credited with preferring if need be to have abandoned Verdun. He had already stripped out much of its artillery to strengthen his line. The government however were fearful of the political impact of losing Verdun, a historic symbol of great significance. Joffre knew that losing Verdun was not an option or at least that doing so would inevitably cost him his job. The fact that he had already stripped the city of some of its defences was used in the subsequent criticisms which ' promoted' him to marshal and handed over the command to Nivelle.

[Robert Dunlop]

... what would the loss of Verdun have mattered!

The passage above stands as testimony that there were Frenchmen who were willing to countenance the loss of Verdun if it released resources to enhance success elsewhere.

Phil, I would be cautious about making this interpretation with respect to Renouard. As Chief of Staff, he had been tasked with organising the Somme counter-offensive. His plans were continually being thwarted by the demands of Verdun. I am going to post some more on this. It was not Renouard's role to override the requests from Pétain, so his comment may well have reflected a high level of frustration, rather than a balanced military view.

Robert

[phil andrade]

It really beggars belief to think that anyone is going to suggest that the French give up Verdun.

Point taken, Robert...although I think we must be cautious about accepting such statments as this one, too....especially if, as Tom tells us, Joffre is credited with preferring if need be to have abandoned Verdun.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Many thanks to Peter and George for their excellent posts.

George has touched on two issues that I want to expand further. One is the complex network of communications, both formal and informal, that existed between the various players. Given the patchwork of views and opinions, which were changing all the time, it is not surprising that an author can select a quote/s that support a narrow view.

The second issue was the growing crisis within the French political context, which inevitably spilled over onto Joffre.

Back to Joffre's memoirs, going back to the start of the Verdun battle:

'At 10 o'clock on the morning of February 21st we learned at Chantilly that the attack on Verdun had commenced. The violence of the attack made it evident early in the engagement that new reserves would have to be despatched.

On the other hand, it continued to be altogether likely that the assault which the Germans were directing upon Verdun would not be the sole effort that they should make, and that other attacks, more or less violent, might shortly be expected on other parts of the front. ...I decided on the afternoon of the 22nd to ask General Haig for his assistance. As he was not in a position to disengage Verdun by an immediate attack, he could come to our aid only be relieving our Tenth Army as quickly as possible, thus supplying us with new resources. The replies [from Haig and Robertson] came immediately, and they were what I wanted - indeed, what I might expect, from two such loyal soldiers.

On the evening of the 23rd the news coming from Verdun was so alarming that I sent Colonel Claudel, my assistant chief of staff, to make a personal examination of the situation. Early on the afternoon of the next day he telephoned that the German attack had slowed down and it looked as though we would be able to hold out and even make a counter-attack.'

This illustrates how difficult it was for Joffre to know exactly what was happening in real-time at Verdun. He was very dependent on the observations of others. The next section illustrates this again:

'But the situation suddenly changed [after Claudel's review]. A furious attack was delivered against the Bois des Fosses, Louvemont and hill 344; the Bois des Fosses appeared to have been taken, Ornes was evacuated, and the enemy seemed to have progressed along the Côtes des Meuse. There was no doubt that conditions were serious... Nevertheless, the information which General de Langle had sent caused me considerable anxiety. Indeed, its very vagueness, the rapidity with which the situation was continuing to change, made it my duty to anticipate the worst and prepare to meet it as quickly as possibly.

As soon as this decision [to deploy more troops to the left bank of the Meuse] was taken in principle, the next thing to do was to execute it rapidly. At 11 pm I... informed General Pétain that he was to take command of all the forces on the left bank of the Meuse and all others that would arrive in this region...

During that night of February 24/25, 1916, I wished more than at any other time in my life that I had the gift of omnipresence. I felt that decisions I was taking at Chantilly, far from the scene of the action, based upon uncertain information and predicated upon such conceptions as I could form of a constantly changing situation, ran the risk of being nullified before they could be transmitted to those who were to execute them. For this reason, I would have liked to have been at Verdun.

On the other hand, my duty unquestionably was to remain at my headquarters. Here I could best fulfil my role of sending reserves to the battle, supervising the rest of the front and ensuring the collaboration of our Allies. However, realising that useful decisions, if they were to be taken in time, could only be taken on the spot, I requested General de Castelnau to proceed to Verdun and there represent me...'

George has referred to de Castelnau and his interactions with Haig.

'The intelligence and resolution which General de Castelnau displayed in carrying out this mission are a matter of history. After examining the situation with the commanders of the sectors, de Castelnau considered there was still time to halt the German attack on the right bank of the Meuse. He, therefore, proposed to place General Pétain in command of the whole of the Fortified Region of Verdun...

I replied approving all of these decisions; and indeed I was extremely pleased to learn that the real situation at Verdun was not as desparate as it had been represented...

Therefore, when General de Castelnau returned from Verdun on the 29th of February, in making his report he felt himself justified in expressing the hope that Verdun was for the moment safe.

On March 6th the Germans made a new effort against the Mort-Homme and the Bois des Corbeaux... These attacks led the Commander of the Second Army [Pétain, who reported directly to GHQ] to make repeated requests for reinforcements, to all of which I acceded. Towards the end of March, little by little, thanks to the uninterrupted arrival of reserves, the Second Army found itself in greater strength than the forces opposed to it, and I thought the moment had arrived for exploiting this advantage. It was most essential for us to take and keep the initiative.'

This is an example of how Joffre wanted to use the counter-attack as the means of regaining the initiative, not just soaking up German pressure. Second Army's Commander never counter-attacked:

'With each new threat of attack he sent me new requests for troops. This went on to such an extent that at the end of March I had at my disposal only one fresh army corps, the IX.

Towards the beginning of April, this attitude of General Pétain brought about a certain amount of disagreement between us. He was perfectly aware of the general situation along the front... and I repeatedly urged upon General Pétain the need of striking back, pointing out to him that if we never recovered, little by little, the ground we lost, we would be faced with a very difficult situation.

But Pétain's demands became more and more pressing[, requesting] that the troops sent to him should be taken from amongst those which had not yet fought at Verdun [and] under various pretexts he also delayed returning to me the units withdrawn from the front, in order that he might add them to those which he kept at his own disposal...'

Joffre went on, rightly, to praise many of Pétain's qualities, recognising the role he played in preventing the fall of Verdun.

'On the other hand, the very great qualities of this most eminent leader were affected by a condition of mind which caused him to place an exaggerated importance upon the events happening at Verdun. My determination, on the contrary, was to keep ever in view the possibility of reversing the situation by an Allied action on the Somme...'

To overcome this growing problem in relationship, Joffre elevated Pétain to command of the 'Centre Group of Armies' on May 2nd. Joffre then requested a written appraisal of the Verdun situation. Pétain:

'...started out by saying that thanks to the new German system of making their attacks with a small amount of infantry and a large number of guns, we were slowly but surely becoming used up, and he advanced the theory that if the Allies did not soon intervene we would finish by being beaten.

He asserted that France's part in the Coalition's effort for 1916 should be considered as having been fulfilled by the resistance she had made in front of Verdun, and that nothing more should be asked of her. No reason, therefore, existed for trying to economize on the forces sent to the Second Army, for, in his opinion, the best way to relieve Verdun was to have the British start an intervention as quickly as possible.'

Not surprisingly, Joffre agreed with Pétain on the latter point. He did not, however, agree that French reserves should be fed into Verdun. Joffre wanted Pétain to squeeze the most out of the existing reserves in the Verdun area, reducing the need for frequent rotation. The disagreements between the two escalated as a result. Now the political dimension came more into play:

'At this time most singular rumours were current, in governmental spheres and amongst the public, as to the relations existing between the various general officers. This gossip assumed such proportions that General Roques, on May 12th, went to Verdun to see Pétain. He came back fully reassured... I, nevertheless, had the feeling that I would like to give the commanders of groups of armies an opportunity to lay before me their opinions; therefore, on May 17th, I brought them together at Chalons...

During the meeting... although Pétain continued to express his doubts as to the advisability of our projected attack on the Somme, he was willing to agree with me - and Franchet d'Esperey, commanding the Eastern Group of Armies, was of the same opinion - that a general offensive undertaken by all the Allied forces would be the best method of disengaging Verdun.'

Therefore, when Pétain requested more reinforcements on May 20th, Joffre turned him down. For a short while, the French went onto the offensive, with General Mangin playing a prominent role. Joffre felt that this eased off the German pressure but Pétain:

'...represented to me that the consumption of our forces on the Verdun front, instead of being one division every other day, as we had formerly calculated, now reached the figure of two divisions every three days. He likewise complained of his inferiority in artillery.

[Then] on June 1st the Germans resumed their attacks with fury on the right bank, from the Bois Nawé to Damloup. During this exceptionally heavy fighting, General Pétain reported to me that he had need of four new divisions. The fort at Vaux fell on June 6th and on the 8th the struggle was renewed with fresh violence, the Bavarian I Corps penetrating our trenches between Thiaumont Farm and the Bois de la Caillette.

I had been obliged to leave my headquarters on the evening of June 8th, for the purpose of accompanying the Prime Minister to London [see George's post above] ...it was thus General de Castelnau who received the report giving the details of the attack on the 8th. When I returned from London I learned that this news had produced considerable emotion at GQG [French GHQ], where no little excitment prevailed. De Castelnau had telephoned to British GHQ asking that preparations for the British attack should be pushed forward...

For Pétain had once more scared everybody. Having only a limited confidence in the length of time that Verdun could resist, he had even gone so far as to telephone de Castelnau that the place could not hold out longer than eight days and that a retreat to the left bank of the Meuse would have to be immediately envisaged, if the artillery on the right bank was to be saved. I found de Castelnau deeply impressed by what had taken place and by his conversations with Pétain.

The latter, more and more disturbed by the turn the battle had taken, renewed on June 11th the efforts he had already made... to induce me to fix an early date for the British offensive. He depicted the situation in very dark colours... I thereupon decided to send General de Castelnau to Verdun the next morning so as to obtain his judgement on the situation.

De Castelnau returned to GQG during the night of June 13th/14th, bringing a most favourable impression of the condition of affairs at Verdun. ...he was of the opinion that Verdun could hold out long enough to permit our offensive on the Somme to take place at the time agreed upon.

However, before even receiving Pétain's letter, I had on June 11th sent instructions to General de Vallières, Chief of the French Mission at British GHQ, directing him to represent to General Haig that the strained situation at Verdun rendered it most desirable that all arrangements should be made for an infantry attack to take place on June 25th.

Finally, I decided to make an appeal to the heroic defenders of Verdun, showing them the importance of the role the Second Army had played up to this time and which it must continue to play until our ends were accomplished.'

There follows a 'backs to the wall' type General Order that was issued by Joffre, which I won't transcribe at this time. It was indicative, however, of the concern that Joffre was feeling.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Resuming with Joffre's memoirs:

'Many indications now suggested that the enemy's attacks against Verdun would soon begin to slacken. Between June 8th and 20th no fresh unit was identified along this front.

This was the situation when the Germans recommenced their attacks on the fortress. On June 21st and 22nd, they tried in vain to gain ground at hill 304 and Mort-Homme on the left bank; on the right bank, during the night of the 22nd, they obtained a footing between the Bois de Fumin and Le Chenois, and on the 23rd Bavarian troops seized the fort at Thiaumont; some of the enemy's troops even succeeded in reaching the works at Froide Terre; Fleury fell under the assaults of the German Alpine corps.

During the course of this attack, towards 3 pm, Pétain telephoned... to de Castelnau that the situation looked serious... On the other hand,... General Nivelle sent me reassuring reports. During the evening, General Pétain phoned again; this time he looked upon the situation more calmly...

The fighting went on during the whole of that night and on the day of the 24th, but the Germans [were] driven back by our counter-attacks...'

Now a very interesting political intervention:

'At 12.30 pm I received from the Minister of War a most singular telephonic message. In it he urged me to make sure that nothing delayed the British attack, and he called my attention to the responsibility I was assuming; moreover, he informed me that he was going to Verdun the next day to learn for himself what was going on. Exactly two hours later the Prime Minister passed through Chantilly [location of GQG]. I went to the station to pay him my respects and took advantage of the occasion to express my astonishment at the communications I had just received. M. Briand apprised me that the sending of this message was due to the President of the Republic, who, during a meeting of the Cabinet, had shown himself deeply disturbed by the news of the attack of June 23rd. ...I took the occasion to represent to the Minister of Munitions how extremely embarassing it was to have the Government interfere in the conduct of operations. M. Albert Thomas felt as I did...

Nevertheless, it was impossible for me to understand the emotion caused in Paris by the events of June 23rd, unless it was that direct communication was going on between the Government and the staff at Bar-le-Duc [Pétain's HQ]. I already had my suspicions, but these were confirmed on the 25th by M. Combes, who lunched with me at GQG.

On the 26th I saw General Roques on his way back from Verdun. We had an explanation with regard to the famous message of the 24th, after which he confided to me the impressions received during the course of his visit. This reflected some anxiety in regard to General Pétain. The latter had declared to the Minister that he lacked one-fourth the heavy artillery he considered he ought to have.

This conversation made me fear that Pétain had once more allowed himself to be much too impressed by the enemy, and I took measures again to prescribe that he was to continue a vigorous resistance...

On July 1st the Franco-British attack, which had been postponed for two days by bad weather, at last began...'

It is not clear how long Pétain had been communicating behind Joffre's back. This will require analysis of the memoirs of some French politicians.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Reading Robert's and George's posts carefully - and it's taken me the best part of an hour to re -read George's chronicle - it really hits home how dangerous, fragile and volatile the French political scene was in those days...no wonder the impact of Verdun was so huge !

Haig makes interesting allusions to reports from Verdun. In June, he refers to what is "evidently going to be the critical period" on the 10th, and on the 16th refers to the execution of "several officers" in front of their troops...presumably Heduin and Millaud (?).

The degree of liaision and candour between Joffre and Haig seems very healthy....the bond of professional soldiers united in their distrust of politicians.

Phil (PJA)

[salesie]

Reading Robert's and George's posts carefully - and it's taken me the best part of an hour to re -read George's chronicle - it really hits home how dangerous, fragile and volatile the French political scene was in those days...no wonder the impact of Verdun was so huge !

Haig makes interesting allusions to reports from Verdun. In June, he refers to what is "evidently going to be the critical period" on the 10th, and on the 16th refers to the execution of "several officers" in front of their troops...presumably Heduin and Millaud (?).

The degree of liaision and candour between Joffre and Haig seems very healthy....the bond of professional soldiers united in their distrust of politicians.

Phil (PJA)

This thread is indeed a "classic", and the major contributors are to be congratulated.

What strikes me about the political element is how grateful we should be that in a democracy the professional soldiers are accountable to civil authority (who in turn are accountable to an electorate). The Kaiserreich being a prime example of the disastrous consequences of omnipotent military authority.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

This conversation made me fear that Pétain had once more allowed himself to be much too impressed by the enemy, and I took measures again to prescribe that he was to continue a vigorous resistance...

Robert

If ever there was a comment pregnant with the most damning implications !

How much might we attribute French pressure on the British to unleash the Somme offensive to the personality of Petain ?

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, we should be very cautious about making such an assertion. It is not uncommon for people to be blamed for events that are beyond someone's control. If anything, it was Verdun that was to blame. Verdun illustrates all too well what happens when an enemy takes the initiative in battle. I have suggested Renouard's comment was fueled by the frustration of not having the freedom to counter-attack as he wished. Joffre's comments can be interpreted in the same light. No matter who had direct responsibility for defending Verdun, excepting the case where Joffre went there and personally controlled the battle, would have come in for the same stick, I would suggest.

There was, IMHO, a deeper significance to the Pétain situation. Political storm clouds were gathering over Joffre. He did not have much longer in post. Pétain was operating in this political context, somewhat akin to the situation where Field Marshal French had come under a cloud and efforts had to be made behind his back by the higher authorities to understand and deal with the concerns. The problems were different with Joffre but the process was analagous. We can see how Joffre was becoming aware of this. It is a situation that can exacerbate the seeking of a scapegoat.

Finally, we only have one side of the story.

There is no question that Verdun was of major significance, militarily and politically. We now have a much clearer view of the relationship between Verdun and the Somme. To such an extent, in fact, where it is important to sit the need to relieve the pressure on Verdun (and Joffre perhaps) alongside the other aims of the Somme.

There is still more to be uncovered, however.

Robert

[truthergw]

This is not a post from a military history. It is a description of Clemenceau's burial and may give some hint of how important Verdun seemed to France even some years after the war had ended.

" He was not embalmed. Beside him in his simple pine coffin lay the ironshod walkingstick with which he had tramped through the trenches, some faded flowers from No Man's Land, and a handful of earth from Verdun. "

Read more: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,738182-4,00.html#ixzz10vAIVUEH

[George Armstrong Custer]

Interesting link, Tom. That certainly makes the concept of 'sacred French soil' something more than mere rhetoric - particularly soil from the place which became synonymous to the French with never surrendering to the invader.

George