The Somme

[Jack Sheldon]

Sorry, Phil, I do not know. It is not my area of expertise. However, there is clear evidence from Haig's diary that he was, on the eve of the 26 May meeting, personally convinced about the French representations he had received.

Jack

[Steven Broomfield]

As an interested bystander in this, I noted with interest salesie's comment about regarding casualties as a football score: if we lost fewer men than they did, we won, sort of approach.

Surely, however, that neglects any account of the moral effect of casualties? For example, a relatively small loss might be disproportinately dispiriting. I'm thinking of a situation where high expectations were raised (such as Nivelle in 1917). The effect of casualties (massive, in this case, it is true) would be excacerbated by the failure of a master plan, whereas casualties at Verdun might be seen as less dispiriting because it was apparent the enemy were not gaining what they intended. I hope that's moderately understandably expressed, even if my examples might be ill-chosen(!).

So, what I'm driving at is that casulaties figures, in and of themselves, might sometimes be an unreliable yardstick by which to measure. The perfect example, in a way, is the huge losses suffered by the BEF in the 100 ays, yet no-one ever quotes them (as far as I am aware) in dispraging terms, because, after all, we won.

And so, looking back, if it true that the Somme was "The muddy grave of the German Field Army", then a poor British:German loss ratio might actually be acceptable in the longer term.

I'm not trying to gloss over the casualties, but I sometimes feel there is too much emphasis on Salesie's "football scores" and less emphasis on the long-term picture.

[phil andrade]

Like so many school boys of my baby boomer generation, I cut my "Great War teeth" on AJP Taylor's history. He, of course, will be anathema to many forumites. Here is how he sums up the question that we're dealing with...

Maybe the Brusilov offensive helped to take the pressure off Verdun. This was slackening in any case. Falkenhayn viewed the mounting German casualties with dismay. In mid-June he stopped further supplies to the front at Verdun. Thereafter the battle ran down of itself. It is often claimed that the British offensive on the Somme was launched in order to relieve Verdun. This is not true. The attacks at Verdun had stopped before the British offensive started, though the preparations for this offensive may have helped to stop them. The essential motive for the offensive on the Somme was quite other. Haig had come to believe that here was the spot where the war could be won.

This seems a very complacent view of the situation at Verdun in later June, but like many of Taylor's controversial statements, this passage stays in the mind.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

And so, looking back, if it true that the Somme was "The muddy grave of the German Field Army", then a poor British:German loss ratio might actually be acceptable in the longer term.

What was striking about the Somme casualty figures was the inordinate difference between the performance of the French, who inflicted comparable or even greater loss than they themselves suffered, and the British, who, it would seem, lost two to one.

Is the influence of Verdun apparent here in the skill of the French who had learnt their trade in that battle and in the inexperience and unpreparedness of the British, who, by Haig's account, were in need of more heavy guns and more training, and were pressured into complying with Joffre's non negotiable July 1 1916 deadline ?

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

there is clear evidence from Haig's diary that he was, on the eve of the 26 May meeting, personally convinced about the French representations he had received.

Jack

Indeed there is, Jack, and it simultaneously disposes of any idea that Robertson was not in agreement with Haig by 26 May in accepting French assurances on the seriousness of Verdun. You have, of course, already indicated in your post # 43 that Haig arrived at the meeting with Joffre on 26 May already convinced by French representations on the situation at Verdun and other strategic requirements - something which I confirmed in my post # 45. It seems, though, that some people need it spelled out for them and that we're once again having our time needlessly wasted here, but I have half an hour to spare at the moment, so here goes. Haig's diary records him having dined with Robertson on the evening of 25 May, the night before the meeting with Joffre. Haig writes:

"The CIGS [Robertson] arrived from England at 8pm. After dinner, we discussed whether the British Army should comply with the French Generalissimo's request to attack in the month of July, or wait till August 15th when we would be much stronger.

I had gone fully into the various aspects of the question and what might be the results if we did not support the French. I came to the conclusion that we must march to the support of the French. Robertson entirely agreed, and took my notes away to study."

There we have it - far from preparing to argue the toss with Joffre in their meeting the next day, Haig had, characteristically, studied and considered the situation represented to him by the French in depth, and had drawn up detailed notes on the question before arriving at his decision, prior to his meeting with Joffre on the 26th that it was imperative to comply with French requirements. Robertson fully concurred with that decision. What Haig's diary for 25 May also confirms, of course, is my contention that his outlining of the projected states of preparedness of the BEF on various dates between 1 July and 15 August in his meeting with Joffre the following day was not a last ditch attempt to get Joffre to agree to August, but was simply putting on record the situation regarding the BEF's readiness at the same time as emphasising his responsibility for the British army and to its government, before going on to state the decision he had already arrived at - he would march to support the French as required by them.

PJA has already demonstrated his use of sources which do not support his own obtuse ideas by his editing and re-jigging of Haig's diary for 26 May. He has now set a pointless hare running on Robertson by completely ignoring Haig's diary entry of 25 May - even although it appears on the same page of Blake's edition of the diary from which PJA has already quoted a snippet from the entry for 24 May. Despite this, he stamps his feet and accuses others of 'failing to address important aspects' of his posts. For the record, he has alleged that Joffre's concerns over Verdun were 'preposterous', that there was evidence for Haig regarding Joffre's claims as 'exaggerating the peril of Verdun' and that Haig implied that 'there was a good deal of hype in Joffre's depiction of Verdun' and that as a consequence Haig saw Joffre as being along the lines of a 'big girl's blouse.' In other words, according to PJA's earlier posts there was no significant peril to the French at Verdun, and Haig and Robertson were highly sceptical of French protestations to the contrary - so, no real pressure on the British over Verdun, then. All these contentions have been evidentially refuted, however, and we've seen PJA shift his stance on that conclusion as on much else. Perhaps PJA should stick to what he is demonstrably good at - pointing out obvious typos, thereby saving we lesser lights from supposing that Joffre's minute-taker had the gift of clairvoyance....

Speaking of forming evidence-based opinion, it might be worth a brief overview of the evolution of Robertson's thinking on the impact of Verdun on the French. In a letter dated 6 March to Sir Archibald Murray (commanding in Egypt), Robertson notes that, at that date, Joffre was still declining to withdraw troops from Salonika as a consequence of Verdun. However, moving on to disparage the French at Verdun, Robertson concedes that their losses there are 'all to the bad' * :

"I may say that the Verdun business has been magnified unduly by the French. They were caught napping as usual and with few or no trenches, they lost their heads and began to chatter and in general behaved as the French always do. No doubt the Germans tried to see what they could do, but they ought not to have been able to do anything like they did had the French taken reasonable precautions. I should imagine that the German losses are no greater than the French and their's are all to the bad."

By 15 March, in another letter to Murray, Robertson is aware of just how seriously Joffre is taking Verdun by it's impact on the latter's policy on Salonika. This has the knock-on effect of raising Robertson's awareness of the on-going cost of Verdun, which he attempts to address whilst at the same time holding the strategic balance of troop deployment elsewhere level - ie the security of Egypt comes before still-born Salonikan adventures:

"A month ago Joffre was urging me to send six divisions from Egypt to Salonika with a view to taking an offensive in the Balkans, aided by 100,000 Serbians when they were ready. Of course I would do nothing of the kind and I never shall. I am determined on that. Verdun however has brought him to his senses and he now asks me to send no more troops to Salonika but to send all the divisions from Egypt to France, six of them to get there by 15 April. I have no intention of doing this either and I told him so. I told him quite plainly that although I was prepared to take risks I am not going to take any in the East so long as we have 200,000 men at Salonika doing nothing. I told him I would send five from Egypt and no more, for an indefinite period of time. So when we get the five from Egypt we are going to review the Salonika matter again. I am trying to put pressure on him to bring away troops from Salonika by refusing to bring more out of Egypt."

By 18 May 1916, a week before his dinner conversation with Haig on the evening before the latter's meeting with Joffre, Robertson is well aware of the deepening seriousness with which Joffre regards the ongoing struggle at Verdun. Writing to Haig on the 18th May, Robertson notes:

"Joffre told Maurice the other day that before Verdun he had hoped to put 40 divisions into his [somme] offensive, whereas now he looks forward to putting only 25 in, and he added that if fighting continued at Verdun he might in the course of two or three months be able to put no divisions in at all. I do not know how this tallys with your conversations with him."

Well, as we know from what Haig told Robertson after dinner on 25 May, this is exactly the impression which he too was getting from Joffre. More explicitly, as we have seen in earlier posts here, Haig's diary account of his meeting with Joffre on 26 May records that when Joffre misunderstood Haig's purpose in mentioning 15 August, he shouted that "The French army would cease to exist if we did nothing till then." This emotive outburst tallys exactly with the three months till the French would have no divisions to commit to the offensive which Robertson reports Joffre as telling Maurice, Robertson's Director of Military Operations, earlier in May. By 26 May, as we have seen, Haig and Robertson were united in their view of Verdun that "we must march to support the French" sooner rather than later. Robertson further confirms the importance of Verdun on British decision making over the Somme in a letter to Haig dated 29 July 1916, prompted by what he calls some of the political 'Powers that be' in London getting jittery over the ongoing cost of the struggle. Robertson wrote of these politicians that:

"It is thought that the primary object - relief of Verdun - has to some extent been achieved."

Verdun, of course, was only one imperative for launching the Somme. Haig reiterated his and Robertson's view that beating the main body of the German army in the field was inevitably going to be costly. However, the fact is that achieving this was the ultimate objective given to the commanders of the BEF when Britain's politicians declared war on Germany in August 1914. It was something which their French allies insisted upon. Haig's response to Robertson's letter of 29 July was to re-emphasise that the ultimate goal of the 'wearing out battle' remained to be achieved:

"Objective: The war must be continued until Germany is vanquished to such an extent as to be obliged to accept whatever terms the Allies may dictate to her."

George

*What such correspondence also underlines, of course, is that French polemical views of the British, such as that of Huguet quoted by Robert earlier, were not a one way street, and disparagement of the French as "rather difficult people to deal with" is a common lament in the correspondence between members of the British high command. Haig's achievement was to rise above this - despite privately sharing much of the frustration with the French - and to be able to successfully work with and accomodate a succession of French commanders to whom he was always a junior partner. His meeting with Joffre on 26 May 1916 is a good example of this ability in action.

[phil andrade]

George,

Never rush to condemn someone for shifting stance. It might demonstrate humility, a willingness to learn from the expertise of others.

I honestly never entered this thread with a stance. I am intrigued at the statistical record of Verdun and its amplification, both during and after the war : more especially since, despite -or, more probably, because of - the ordeal of the battle, the French performance on the Somme was outstanding. The concomittant cost to the British, who suffered such outrageous loss in July 1916, stands in stark contrast to the relatively cheap exploits of the French.

Thank you for the exposition of what Roberts had thought in early March, less than two weeks after the fall of Ft Douamont

I may say that the Verdun business has been magnified unduly by the French

What a pity that you didn't divulge this earlier.

This has been a mainstay of my posting in this thread....an attempt to discover whether the French were exagerrating, or were perceived to be doing so, when they were reporting their struggle at Verdun.

As for my tendency to point out typos, I must apologise : it's all too clear that I make plenty of my own.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

Never rush to condemn someone for shifting stance. It might demonstrate humility, a willingness to learn from the expertise of others.

It might, if that shifting stance was not done in an unacknowledged and subtle way which implies that it was what you had been saying all along.

As to your seizing on a single out of context sentence from one of the the Robertson quotes, which does not even mean what you seem to think it does, you are once again viewing events with the benefit of hindsight and manipulating contemporary sources to fit with that view. You obviously totally miss the point of my posting a series of quotes from Robertson between March and May which demonstrate his deepening awareness of how serious and apparently unending what had developed at Verdun during that period was being regarded by Joffre.

No offense, but having spent a considerable time evidentially correcting your various misrepresentations and consequent twists and turns in an attempt to sustain the unsustainable, I've had enough. I hope you'll continue to post what you want, as is your right, but I'll be ignoring it from here on in, including any response to this post - as I've already said, life's too short. I look forward to continuing any discussion with other posters, however.

George

[phil andrade]

No offense, but having spent a considerable time evidentially correcting your various misrepresentations and consequent twists and turns in an attempt to sustain the unsustainable, I've had enough. I hope you'll continue to post what you want, as is your right, but I'll be ignoring it from here on in, including any response to this post - as I've already said, life's too short. I look forward to continuing any discussion with other posters, however.

George

That's a shame, George, because I was really beginning to learn such a lot from you.

Robertson's remark in early March is a bit of a bombshell....but of course I can see the evolution through the months, with the crucial caveat that this alluded to how Joffre regarded the Verdun situation. Roberston doesn't seem to endorse Joffre's view...he just cites it, and I think the difference is significant.

Perhaps there was duplicity in Joffre's remonstrations . He was as fixated on his grand Somme offensive as Petain was with the struggle at Verdun. It might be that, privately, he felt a lot more confident about the Verdun battle than his outburst of May 26 suggested.

Phil (PJA)

[salesie]

As an interested bystander in this, I noted with interest salesie's comment about regarding casualties as a football score: if we lost fewer men than they did, we won, sort of approach.

Surely, however, that neglects any account of the moral effect of casualties? For example, a relatively small loss might be disproportinately dispiriting. I'm thinking of a situation where high expectations were raised (such as Nivelle in 1917). The effect of casualties (massive, in this case, it is true) would be excacerbated by the failure of a master plan, whereas casualties at Verdun might be seen as less dispiriting because it was apparent the enemy were not gaining what they intended. I hope that's moderately understandably expressed, even if my examples might be ill-chosen(!).

So, what I'm driving at is that casulaties figures, in and of themselves, might sometimes be an unreliable yardstick by which to measure. The perfect example, in a way, is the huge losses suffered by the BEF in the 100 ays, yet no-one ever quotes them (as far as I am aware) in dispraging terms, because, after all, we won.

And so, looking back, if it true that the Somme was "The muddy grave of the German Field Army", then a poor British:German loss ratio might actually be acceptable in the longer term.

I'm not trying to gloss over the casualties, but I sometimes feel there is too much emphasis on Salesie's "football scores" and less emphasis on the long-term picture.

Not my "football-score" casualty stats, Steven (God forbid).

I use the football analogy in a disparaging way - in fact, I regard casualty stats when used in the way PJA does as complete and utter b*llocks i.e. according to PJA, in the second half of 1916 the French managed to draw 1-1 after a series of 2-1 and 3-1 defeats over the previous "season" and a half - during the same period, July to Dec 1916, the British lost, in "football-score" casualty terms, 2-1 after a series of 2-1 (and worse) defeats, (Loos, Aubers etc.).

PJA sees his "football-scores" as significant/remarkable. Yet, as has been pointed out to him on several previous occasions, this is an extremely narrow focus of highly questionable veracity, not least because he has been shown cast-iron evidence that by early 1916 the German army was calling up conscription classes two years before their time, which casts massive doubt on the veracity of German casualty reporting i.e. they were slaughtering the Entente in almost every battle up to 1916 but running out of men? Also, we have the fact that the French Army endured a massive mutiny just a few months after what PJA regards as their remarkable 1-1 draw - maybe, just maybe, there are other, more important, factors than casualty stats which give a better picture?

I could go on and on about how much "football-score" casualty stats mislead, but I won’t - PJA just ignores any reasoned argument against them and carries-on throwing them in at almost every opportunity. As I said earlier - I'm out of this thread; just wanted to ensure you understand that they're not my bloody stats.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

Not my "football-score" casualty stats, Steven (God forbid).

PJA sees his "football-scores" as significant/remarkable. Yet, as has been pointed out to him on several previous occasions, this is an extremely narrow focus of highly questionable veracity, not least because he has been shown cast-iron evidence that by early 1916 the German army was calling up conscription classes two years before their time, which casts massive doubt on the veracity of German casualty reporting i.e. they were slaughtering the Entente in almost every battle up to 1916 but running out of men? Also, we have the fact that the French Army endured a massive mutiny just a few months after what PJA regards as their remarkable 1-1 draw - maybe, just maybe, there are other, more important, factors than casualty stats which give a better picture?

Cheers-salesie.

The casualty exchange rate is vital as an indicator of how the different armies were performing, especially in positional battles of attrition.

Edit : tomorrow morning I leave for Cornwall, so you'll be spared my attentions for a week. Before I go, please look at bmac's superb array of photographs from the French sector of the Somme, in his thread "Some photos from the French section of the Somme" and ponder on the final comment he makes in post number 9, which apertains to the whole battle. It's gratifying to see that he, too, has reflected on this.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you to George and Jack for building a clearer picture of what happened before the Somme, which is the focus of this thread. The British perspective is much clearer now. Jack has provided additional insights into the French perspective, particularly Joffre's views. I would like to add some more on the French perspectives. I started with Huguet as he illustrated a not uncommon view. As George rightly pointed out, Huguet had a particular axe to grind. His views cannot be regarded as synonymous with Joffre's. Huguet's comments are indicative, however, of the more strident French criticisms of the British.

Another source is Jean de Pierrefeu. He served as what we might call the public relations officer for the French GQG (the equivalent of the British GHQ). In Pierrefeu's introduction to the Battle of the Somme, he wrote:

"While the battle of Verdun dragged on, the Operations Department of GQG, with a perseverance which merits praise, continued with the preparations for the Somme offensive. Colonel Renouard had from the earliest days held that the only way of relieving Verdun was to attack the Germans at some other point on the front. Unhappily, the necessity which General Pétain found for meeting the enemy's attacks with new and fresh troops hindered the plans of GQG. The reserves kept in hand for the coming offensive were slowly absorbed by the battle of Verdun.

GQG tried to put a brake on this proceeding. They made representations to General Pétain to induce him to change his methods. He declined to do so, having certainly good reasons which were justified by success. Further, considerable delays on the part of the English in making their preparations left the Germans free to redouble their efforts before Verdun. It was impossible to risk a weakening of the defence lest Verdun should fall into the enemy's hands before the Somme battle was developed. All the advantages of our resistance, particularly the moral advantages, would have been thrown away, even had we achieved a brilliant victory on the Somme. One may believe that without the energy of General Pétain, who stood firm, demanded divisions, and did not fear, so it is said, to apply to the Government when GQG showed signs of opposing him, we should certainly have lost the fortress. It must be remembered that on July 13th, when the Somme battle had been in progress for nearly two weeks, a desparate effort on the part of the Germans carried them as far as Fort Souville.

But for all that the Operations Department persisted in blaming General Pétain. They complained of his demands and accused him of having disorganized the coming battle on the Somme. The great success which we achieved on the south side of the river, where for the first three days of the battle the surprise had been complete, proved conclusively, according to Colonel Renouard, that we should have won a great victory had we been able to employ thirty divisions instead of ten. In his opinion it would have led to a complete break-through, and after that, what would the loss of Verdun have mattered!

The Chief of the Operations Department never abandoned his scheme, even at the most critical moments when it seemed that all was lost at Verdun. At these times he was submitted to considerable pressure to secure the launching of the offensive at once without waiting for the English, or before they were sufficiently ready. Everywhere it was said that this butchery [at Verdun] could not be indefinitely prolonged. The nervousness of the Press was extreme. What! For three months the Germans had hurled all their forces at us, wearing out our reserves, and our Allies looked on at the massacre without moving! It seemed monstrous. A weaker man could not have withstood this demand. It must be added that pressing requests came from the Second Army, which demanded a diversion on any part of the front for the purpose of its relief.

But Colonel Renouard meant to develop a continued battle and not attempt a diversion which must be short-lived. To achieve this result, it was necessary that the British should have all their material ready; enormous works had to be undertaken and a vast quantity of material concentrated on the front of the attack. Besides, it had been agreed with our Allies that the attack should take place on July 1st; they could not be ready before that date, and to induce them to move earlier would be to risk the success of the enterprise.

Once more credit must be given to General Joffre, whose magnificent impassiveness allowed the Operations Department and its Chief to carry through their schemes to their conclusion.

The Commander-in-Chief had followed all the preparations very closely."

Pierrefeu's comments about the Press illustrate that Huguet was not alone in the tenor of his criticisms. More importantly, it is clear that there were significant military and political pressures to get the Somme counter-offensive underway. There was no single 'French' view, though the seriousness of Verdun and the need for a counter-offensive was a common theme. With regards to the British, however, we see a spectrum of opinion ranging from anger and frustation on the one hand to tolerance and understanding of the relative unpreparedness (for a major battle like the Somme) of the British army on the other.

More to come...

Robert

[phil andrade]

GQG tried to put a brake on this proceeding. They made representations to General Pétain to induce him to change his methods. He declined to do so, having certainly good reasons which were justified by success. Further, considerable delays on the part of the English in making their preparations left the Germans free to redouble their efforts before Verdun. It was impossible to risk a weakening of the defence lest Verdun should fall into the enemy's hands before the Somme battle was developed. All the advantages of our resistance, particularly the moral advantages, would have been thrown away, even had we achieved a brilliant victory on the Somme. One may believe that without the energy of General Pétain, who stood firm, demanded divisions, and did not fear, so it is said, to apply to the Government when GQG showed signs of opposing him, we should certainly have lost the fortress. It must be remembered that on July 13th, when the Somme battle had been in progress for nearly two weeks, a desparate effort on the part of the Germans carried them as far as Fort Souville.

But for all that the Operations Department persisted in blaming General Pétain. They complained of his demands and accused him of having disorganized the coming battle on the Somme. The great success which we achieved on the south side of the river, where for the first three days of the battle the surprise had been complete, proved conclusively, according to Colonel Renouard, that we should have won a great victory had we been able to employ thirty divisions instead of ten. In his opinion it would have led to a complete break-through, and after that, what would the loss of Verdun have mattered!

Thank you Robert.

AJP Taylor's assertion that the battle of Verdun was effectively contained and managed by the French by June is refuted by Pierrefeu.

It still needs to be considered, though, that without the experience of Verdun, and all the lessons that it taught them, the French performance on the Somme might not have been so brilliant.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

The Battle of the Somme was in part, contemporary with Verdun. I doubt if the lessons learned at one battle would have been absorbed in time to affect the other. That requires analysis which then needs to be redacted to a form capable of being included in training sessions, first for trainers then the soldiers. If the lessons of Verdun were being implemented by 1917, I would have thought that quick work.

[phil andrade]

The Battle of the Somme was in part, contemporary with Verdun. I doubt if the lessons learned at one battle would have been absorbed in time to affect the other. That requires analysis which then needs to be redacted to a form capable of being included in training sessions, first for trainers then the soldiers. If the lessons of Verdun were being implemented by 1917, I would have thought that quick work.

Surely that's not so, Tom.

How often do we read about the striking improvements demonsrated by the British on the Somme itself ? By September, the capture of Thiepval by the British, and the success of the Kiwis at Flers, exemplified the better tactics of fire and movement, the deployment of infantry in "blobs", creeping barrage etc . Even by the end of a fortnight's fighting, the capture of part of the Bazentin Ridge is cited as evdence of this improvement.

Verdun must have been an especially harsh school. The fighting compelled the Fench to husband their infantry, and to deploy their artillery so that they could fight "metal with metal".

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

The Somme, like Verdun, was one long battle with lessons being learned on the hoof, as it were. Much of what was learned were survival techniques by the New Army men and their Imperial comrades, doing the fighting. The hard practical knowledge which can only be acquired by fighting and surviving. The experience which had not been shared by a majority of soldiers in the BEF since I Ypres. Hard lessons would also be learned by commanders and their staffs. Lessons where errors cost men life and limb. It would not be practical to try to apply those lessons to a different army or a different battle. Men were trained for a battle before it began, over model trenches and taped layouts etc. Once it started, there was little formal retraining possible. One did not have a daily issue of Tips for the Day from Our Friends at Verdun.

[phil andrade]

Philpott, Bloody Victory, page 149 :

" Storm troops", infitration tactics, combined-arms tactics, heavy support weapons, infantry specialists and small group formations....all were employed by the French army on the Somme in 1916. GQG revised training manuals based on their battlefield experience in 1915 and at Verdun.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Tom and Phil. The 'learning curve' of the French army is a very important topic. Unfortunately, it is not germane to the discussion of French pressure (or otherwise) on the British to start the battle of the Somme. There is a separate thread on the topic of the French learning curve here.

Robert

[truthergw]

Philpott, Bloody Victory, page 149 :

" Storm troops", infitration tactics, combined-arms tactics, heavy support weapons, infantry specialists and small group formations....all were employed by the French army on the Somme in 1916. GQG revised training manuals based on their battlefield experience in 1915 and at Verdun.

Phil (PJA)

The French applying lessons they had learned. Not passed on to the British though, as has been noted and bemoaned by more than one author. However, I take Robert's point and admit that none of that is germane to the subject of the thread.

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, thank you very much for your understanding.

Robert

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon All,

I have been following this thread with great interest and have benefited from reading evidence that I don't have (easy) access to.

I can't add to the detailed memos and reports already quoted but if the crux of the initial point was whether the pressure on the French at Verdun had eased by the 1st of July and, therefore, Haig could have delayed his attack on the Somme, then surely a basic look at the situation at Verdun in the last weeks of June discounts this ? For example: the first use, by the Germans, of Phosgene Gas and it's devastating effects; the German advance to Fleury and beyond; Nivelles' "They shall not pass" order of 23 June; a rough average (from the relevant JMO) of 200 shells per day continuing to fall on Verdun itself...etc...

[phil andrade]

if the crux of the initial point was whether the pressure on the French at Verdun had eased by the 1st of July and, therefore, Haig could have delayed his attack on the Somme, then surely a basic look at the situation at Verdun in the last weeks of June discounts this ?

Thank you for emphasising that, Steve.

It would be satisfying to find out just how bad things were for the French at Verdun in the weeks prior to the Somme. AJP Taylor would have us believe that the situation there had been stabilised...in stressing this, he discredits the view that the Somme was fought to relieve the pressure on the French at Verdun, and pushes the suggestion that Haig was pursuing his wish to win the war on the Somme. The "EE-Aww" school of thought.

Somewhere I've read that Joffre subsequently stated that he was never really all that worried about Verdun.

There appears to have been dissension between Joffre, Foch and Petain about priorities. As to how far Haig and Robertson were aware of this is moot.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Somewhere I've read that Joffre subsequently stated that he was never really all that worried about Verdun.

Joffre, writing in his memoirs:

'...the battle of Verdun which began on February 21st now intervened, and performed with frightful efficiency the attrition which I had so greatly desired to spare our soldiers.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Some further insights into Joffre's views of the battle of Verdun, from his memoirs:

"Since the Germans had now abandoned the passive attitude which they had observed along our whole front during 1915, and were offering us battle at Verdun, I decided that I would make this fact serve my own purposes. Verdun must become the cauldron in which the enemy reserves would be melted, while the decisive action would take place later on the Somme. The year 1916 could and should be the year of our victory.

'In view of the capital importance of the battle which the enemy has started,' I wrote Haig on March 3rd, 'it is indispensable for us to do something more than repulse his attacks. We must crush him [emphasis in the original]. That has become the task of both of us, now that the critical moment has arrived.'

While I was urging the British to intensify their preparations for the battle of the Somme, by assigning to it every available unit (to which I agreed to add my share by sending them 110 heavy guns), I formed the plan of extending the front of attack of Foch's group of armies..."

Early in the German offensive, Joffre was taking a positive view but he was 'urging' Haig to get ready as quickly as possible.

"Unfortunately, our effectives continued to be absorbed by the Verdun battle, no matter what efforts I made to save them; so that on April 26th I was obliged to inform General Foch that, while my intentions had not changed, the resources I was able to place at his disposal had diminished...

On May 20th faced by the furious attacks which the enemy now delivered on both sides of the Meuse, I was forced a second time to warn Foch of a reduction in his forces... On May 22nd, I informed General Haig of the modification which the struggle then going on at Verdun had entailed in my plans for the Somme. 'This battle, which has been raging for three months with unprecedented violence and persistence, has absorbed a large part of our resources in men and material. I am, therefore, obliged to cut down considerably the participation of the French armies in the general Allied offensive.'

While on the one hand, General Pétain continued to ask that the battle of the Somme should be opened, so that the pressure on Verdun might be relieved, General Haig, on his side, soon began to offer excellent arguments for delaying these operations. On May 8th, basing his suggestion on the fact that towards the 15th of August the British Army in France would receive a consignment of some 200 heavy guns, he requested that our offensive should be put off until that date.

I could not share this view. To require the French Army to prolong the gigantic struggle in which it was engaged at Verdun, was to play into the hands of the enemy, since in the end we would finish by being incapable of taking part in the operations on the Somme.'

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

It would be satisfying to find out just how bad things were for the French at Verdun in the weeks prior to the Somme. AJP Taylor would have us believe that the situation there had been stabilised...

This isn't meant flippantly, but never having planned a battle, even on a small scale let alone a rather large one such as the Somme, can I pose a question?

Assuming the planning, logistics, and so on, take a long period, at what point prior to the Somme would it still be feasible for Haig to have been told by the French that, "actually old chap, thanks and all that, but Verdun's OK now, so no need to carry on with the Somme offensive"? My point being that the planning stage takes over and one reaches a point where NOT proceeding actually becomes more difficult than proceeding.

The claims, true or otherwise, that Verdun had all-but quietened down by June are, in reality, possibly a little inconsequential, surely? When the planning for the Somme push started, Verdun was an issue. Whatever happened later was a non-sequitur.

[PMHart]

Absolutely, planning for a major offensive includes an unbelievable amount of logistical preparations. The Somme area was an agricultural province that was almost devoid of a modern road and rail network. This presented a nightmare for the planners. Before they could even begin to move the military pieces into place in the battlefield jigsaw they had to create an infra-structure almost from scratch.

Overall communications were poor but the paucity of the railway network linking Albert to the rest of the French rail network was a particularly severe problem. Only freight trains had anything like the physical capability to move the huge quantities that were required for the offensive in the given timescale. Staff officers calculated that every single day the Fourth Army would need 14 trains to carry ammunition, a further 11 trains for supplies and 6 trains to carry the reinforcements, horses and general stores. This meant that all in all some 31 trains per day were needed just to service the Fourth Army and when the offensive began they reckoned that this might rise to 70 trains. As only two lines served the Albert area and one of those was of an inconveniently non-standard gauge, it was obvious that something drastic would have to be done if this capacity was to be met. It is a testament to the scale and importance of the operations being planned that it was decided without further ado to construct two new standard gauge lines, which would provide a much-increased number of railheads for the battlefront. Further rail spurs and sidings were built to service ammunition and supply depots while stations were expanded and developed with more and longer platforms. Understandably, while this major construction project was going on, light railway systems to extend forward from the railheads were not considered a priority, although the tracks already installed by the French were taken over and extended as appropriate.

The rural character of the area also meant that the road network was not robust enough to withstand the heavy demands that would be placed upon it by millions of marching feet, hooves and wheels. Even the few metalled main roads were not constructed to sufficiently stringent standards and were liable to break up once the surface had been cracked open to expose the chalk rubble that lay below. Side roads were essentially little more than rough tracks and soon became so muddy that they were all but indistinguishable from the neighbouring fields. As a result eforts were made to improve and widen the roads leading directly from the railheads and bridges were strengthened as necessary.

Behind the British lines small country villages and local farms that would have struggled in peacetime to provide sufficient billets for a couple of hundred men were soon swamped. Bivouacs, tents and huts were the obvious answer and imposing camps were soon erected all around the villages and woods. It was recognised that the local water supplies, adequate enough for the existing population, would soon be overwhelmed by demand. Thirsty men also needed water to wash themselves and their uniforms, the thousands of horses seemed to drink their own weight in water on a regular basis. Even the lorry radiators needed plentiful water. As a result new wells had to be dug, pumping equipment installed and miles of piping laid to ensure that proper high-capacity water points were available as near as possible to the front lines

Millions upon millions of tons of ammunition and equipment had to be painstakingly moved forward and placed in dumps.

Overall the effort required from the British Empire to drag this segment of rural French countryside of the Somme valley into the Twentieth Century* was a truly monumental undertaking. Any offensive of this size demanded months of hard, grinding preparation and operations could not be either begun - or abandoned - on a whim.

Pete

*Of course the battle took most of it straight back to a primeval swamp!!