The Somme

[Robert Dunlop]

I have taken the liberty of starting this new thread. The issue has arisen in at least two other recent threads so here is the opportunity to bring this into direct focus.

It is usually held that Haig was subjected to significant French pressure to start the Battle of the Somme sooner. This reflected the effects of the Battle of the Verdun and the need to relieve German pressure on that sector.

Robert

[Guest]

This looks like a good place to start. Haig's Depatches

" The General Situation towards the end of May

I. The principle of an offensive campaign during the summer of

1 916 had already been decided on by all the Allies. The various

possible alternatives on the Western front had been studied and discussed

by General Joffre and myself, and we were in complete agreement

as to the front to be attacked by the combined French and

British Armies.* Preparations for our offensive had made considerable

progress ; but as the date on which the attack should begin was

dependent on many doubtful factors, a final decision on that point

was deferred until the general situation should become clearer.

Subject to the necessity of commencing operations before the

summer was too far advanced, and with due regard to the general

situation, I desired to postpone my attack as long as possible. The

British Armies were growing in numbers ^ and the supply of munitions

was steadily increasing. Moreover a very large proportion of

the officers and men under my command were still far from being fully

trained, and the longer the attack could be deferred the more efficient

they would become. On the other hand the Germans were

continuing to press their attacks at Verdun, and both there and on

the Italian front, where the Austrian offensive * was gaining ground,

it was evident that the strain might become too great to be borne

unless timely action were taken to relieve it. Accordingly, while

might then be able to make available.

2. By the end of May the pressure of the enemy on the Italian

front had assumed such serious proportions that the Russian campaign

was opened early in June, and the brilliant successes ^ gained by

our Allies against the Austrians at once caused a movement of German

troops from the Western to the Eastern front. This, however,

did not lessen the pressure on Verdun. The heroic defence of our

French Allies had already gained many weeks of inestimable value

and had caused the enemy very heavy losses ; but the strain continued

to increase. In view, therefore, of the situation in the various

theatres of war, it was eventually agreed between General Joffre and

myself that the combined French and British offensive should not

be postponed beyond the end of June.

The object of that offensive was threefold :

(i) To relieve the pressure on Verdun.

{{{) To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war by stopping

any further transfer of German troops from the Western

front.

(in) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us. "

So the Italian front played a part in the decision too.

Mike

[Guest]

Sir Douglas Haig's despatches (December 1915-April 1919) (1919)

Mike

[phil andrade]

Falkenhayn became something of a Frankenstein with his Verdun offensive, in so far as he created a monster which turned on him.

The Monster, IMHO, was the vastly improved tactical skill of the French army. Far from destroying the French means and will to fight, the Mill on the Meuse tutored the defenders in the most effective deployment of firepower and husbandry of manpower. The noria system exemplified this. Even more so, the dramatic success of the French offensive on the Somme....surely, this was to a large degree the result of the improved methods that Verdun had compelled French gunners and infantry men to adopt. - not to mention the role of the airmen. The very successful integration of arms used by Fayolle in the Somme fighting owes much, I imagine, to the experience gained at Verdun.

How far was this improvement extant prior to the beginning of the Somme attack ? Had the battle established a routine by later June, that rather invalidated the frantic protests of Joffre that the French army might cease to exist if the British did not hurry up and attack in Picardy ? There was a very nasty moment on June 23, when phosgene gas blinded the French counter battery fire, and ten days after the opening of the Somme attack the Germans made their deepest penetration, so I must avoid too complacent a depiction here.

There are some comments made by Haig that suggest that he felt Joffre was exagerrating the peril of Verdun. I will try and find some examples.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

From Haig's War Diaries and Letters, edited Sheffield and Bourne, entry for 26 May 1916 :

General Joffre explained the general situation. The French had supported for three months alone the whole weight of the German attacks at Verdun....If this went on, the French Army would be ruined ! He threrefore was of opinion that 1 July was the latest date for the combined offensive of the British and French.....The moment I mentioned 15 August, Joffre at once got very excited and shouted that " The French Army would cease to exist, if we did nothing till then"! The rest of us looked on at this outburst of excitement.....

Five days later the French President told Haig that Petain and Nivelle reckoned that Verdun would fall, and that the counter offensive on the Somme must go ahead without delay. Yet Foch was being reprimanded by the French Prime Minister for asserting that the Allies should avoid the 1916 offensive.

These are confusing and contradictory episodes. It begs the question as to what was actually happening at Verdun.

Joffre's protest that the French army would be ruined - let alone cease to exist - seems preposterous; the rate of loss suffered at Verdun was modest compared with what had been incurred in Joffre's offensives of May and June, and of September and October, in 1915; it was to be exceeded on the Somme itself.

More to the point : did Haig imply that there was a good deal of hype in Joffre's depiction of Verdun ?

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

More to the point : did Haig imply that there was a good deal of hype in Joffre's depiction of Verdun ?

Not in any 'evidence' you've posted so far. You continue here in your attempt begun on the 'Haig's Despatches' thread to judge the actions of the participants prior to 1 July 1916 by your assessment, with the benefit of hindsight, of what happened in the weeks after that date. Not even your highly selective editing of what Haig wrote in his diary for 26 May 1916 will make the facts fit your misconceptions.

Just for the record, as you might put it, what Haig actually wrote, unlike your edited version, does not implicitly convey that Haig was sanguinely suggesting to Joffre that there was nothing so pressing about Verdun that could not wait for the British going into action on 15 August. On the contrary, he was merely contrasting the improved state of readiness which the British army would be in on various dates between 1 July and 15 August - with the latter being the optimum date for the British. Haig expressly makes clear, however, that in view of Joffre's concerns, inter alia, about the state of the French army at Verdun, he is quite prepared to set the 1 July as the date for commencing the offensive on the Somme. The entry makes it clear that, though Haig found Joffre's manner excitable at times, yet he was impressed by what Joffre set out as the wider strategic requirements, as they then stood in Joffre's eyes, for an offensive by the British beginning no later than 1 July - which requirements explicitly included relieving the wearing down of the French army at Verdun. The meeting ends in cordiality and agreement on these imperatives - lubricated by some vintage brandy. It should also be noted, however, that Haig states that he is aware that the French commander is prepared to be 'very nasty' if the British refuse to comply with French strategic requirements. Further, Haig refers to Joffre as the "Generalissimo" a full two years before Foch was formally installed in that role. This validates the important observation made by John Terraine that, "Beneath all the discussion that later raged about the need for, and the advantages of a Supreme Command, there remains the fact that, in effect, one existed throughout the War (except for a short period in 1917 and early 1918); it was represented by the French Commander-in-Chief; when a Generalissimo was finally appointed, he, too, was a French officer. How could it have been otherwise? The Second World War underlined the dominating role of the senior partner; only equality on land could have given the British strategic independence."

For those interested, here's what Haig actually wrote in his diary for 26 May 1916 about his discussion with Joffre, from which PJA has cut and pasted, from the version already edited down by Sheffield & Bourne, the parts which he thought fitted his case:

"About 11 am General Joffre arrived. He was accompanied by General de Castelnau and Colonel Renouard (head of 3rd Bureau) as well as some of his personal staff. I brought General Joffre at once into my writing-room and we sat at a table in the middle of the room. General Joffre explained the general situation. How the moment was most favourable for the Russians to take the offensive as the Germans and Austrians had both withdrawn troops from Russia. Consequently, the Russians intended to attack on the 15th June. The Italians stated that they had suffered considerably and had asked the Allies for help. The French had supported for three months alone the whole weight of the German attacks at Verdun. Their losses had been heavy. By the end of the month, they would reach 200,000. If this went on, the French Army would be ruined. He, therefore, was of the opinion that the 1st July was the latest date for the combined offensive of the British and French. I said that, before fixing the date, I would like to indicate the state of preparedness of the British Army on certain dates and compare its condition. I took 1st July and 15th July, and 1st and 15th August. The moment I mentioned August 15th, Joffre at once got very excited and shouted that "The French Army would cease to exist if we did nothing till then." The rest of us looked on at this outburst of excitement, and then I pointed out that, in spite of the 15th August being the most favourable date for the British Army to take action, yet, in view of what he had said regarding the unfortunate condition of the French Army, I was prepared to commence operations on the 1st July or thereabouts. This calmed the old man, but I saw that he had come to the meeting prepared to combat a refusal on my part, and was prepared to be very nasty. Castelnau, on the other hand, was most anxious to put Joffre straight. Finally, I asked them, once the date was fixed, not to postpone it at the last moment as had happened three times last year with Foch! We agreed on having three weeks' notice of the exact date of the attack. Robertson raised the question of bringing troops from Salonika, but that point was not pressed, as Joffre said the matter was before his Government. We then went to lunch about 12.30. Altogether fifteen of us. A very friendly gathering. We had coffee after lunch in my writing-room, and Joffre enjoyed himself so much that it was 2.30 pm before he went. So the meeting was a great success and the Frenchmen all went away thoroughly delighted at the way I had met their proposals, and also with my entertainment of them. They are, indeed, difficult Allies to deal with! But there is no doubt that the nearest way to the hearts of many of them, including that of the "Generalissimo", is down their throats, and some 1840 brandy had a surprisingly soothing effect on both him and Castelnau!"

You have, PJA, told us that you want a 'serious' discussion on "how Verdun impinged on the Somme, and visa versa," and that "There are some comments made by Haig that suggest that he felt Joffre was exaggerating the peril of Verdun." But what you have given us is an incredibly simplistic misreading of the situation, coupled with a misrepresentation of Haig's position which purports to be supported by a doctored and out of context extract from his diary. Yet you feel qualified to blow raspberries at those who have produced forceful arguments which you don't like, but which are reasoned and based on accurate and properly sourced quotations.

George

[phil andrade]

Yet you feel qualified to blow raspberries at those who have produced forceful arguments which you don't like, but which are reasoned and based on accurate and properly sourced quotations.

George

Blowing raspberries ..".raspberry tarts" ? When it comes to tarts, we'll stick to custard, or should I say "Custer" ?

No, I don't feel qualified to challenge the heavy weights, let alone blow raspberries.

The essential question that I'm trying to ask is : how dangerous for the Entente was the situation at Verdun in May and June 1916 ?

Did Haig perceive Joffre's protests as excessively "hyped up", or was he aware of a real fragility in the French army that was so profound as to justify the French outburst ?

Verdun itself, for all its notoriety, was not consuming Frecnh lives at anything like the rate of Joffre's own offensives the previous year.

Why was its effect so amplified as to produce this "outburst of excitement" ?

"The unfortunate condition of the French Army" is a very telling phrase.

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

I'll leave it to others to judge the relative historical merits of the last two postings. This however sums up the nature of the 'debate' that Phil would like. On one side a reasoned historian (I never thought I'd have to refer to George as reasoned!) trying to make his case with proper use of sources; on the other an abusive troublemaker whose main objective is to rile George and get him banned from the forum. Contributing nothing; asking endless trite questions; careful not to do any of his own research and almost certainly with nothing new to contribute. Phil's main aim seems to be to needle people who disagree with the shallow populist tosh that he espouses, or rather tries to espouse!

Pete

[phil andrade]

Pete.

For Pete's sake, how can you - a writer and scholar of high repute - allow yourself to post such total , utter "pony" ?

Please, address my question about Verdun and the inordinate effect that its cost - quite moderate compared with previous experience - had on the discussions between the British and French commanders.

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

Right Phil,

Very happy to take you at your word. But first please provide detailed annotated sources (not secondary) and appropriate contextualisation for your previous ludicrous statements/questions:

Foch was being reprimanded by the French Prime Minister for asserting that the Allies should avoid the 1916 offensive.

When you've done that perhaps YOU could do some work and rather than acting like a school teacher setting our homework you could answer your own question:

"It begs the question as to what was actually happening at Verdun."

Why don't you give us your detailed views on what was happening on Verdun at that stage. Perhaps a review of the events of the battle so far, casualty rates and an analysis of the threat posed by the Germans on a weekly basis February through to the closure of the battle. I look forward to your work.

This would allow you to perhaps review for yourself another statement that you made!

Joffre's protest that the French army would be ruined - let alone cease to exist - seems preposterous; the rate of loss suffered at Verdun was modest compared with what had been incurred in Joffre's offensives of May and June, and of September and October, in 1915; it was to be exceeded on the Somme itself.

Finally I would really appreciate a list of all the books/articles/documentary sources that you've read on Verdun and the gestation of the Somme with if I might be so bold to request, your personal insights into their quality. That should keep you busy awhile! Your turn to work, Phil, not ours!

Pete

PS I'm not the Peter Hart who could be described as a scholar of high repute - the only person that description could apply to has sadly recently died. I'm the windsurfer!

[George Armstrong Custer]

I see, PJA, that you choose to ignore the exposure of your distortion of the sources to suit your own purposes and simply attempt to move on as if it hadn't happened by refocusing from Haig with another 'serious' question. Obviously that technique isn't PhilB's sole copyright. You now ask:

Please, address my question about Verdun and the inordinate effect that its cost - quite moderate compared with previous experience - had on the discussions between the British and French commanders.

Yet this is such a specious concern, that your question actually answers itself. It was precisely because of the cost to France of the 'previous experience' of the preceding two years and, inter alia, the political pressure which this was generating, that Joffre was so concerned about the escalating and continuing cost of Verdun. On top of the price France had paid in 1914 and 1915, Joffre, if not you, did not view losses at Verdun which he stated were approaching 200,000 by 26 May, and with no sign of an end, as relatively 'non consuming' of French lives. Verdun didn't happen in a vacuum, and Joffre's view of the "unfortunate state of the French Army" by May 1916 was the culmination of events which began, not with the opening of Verdun in February of that year, but in August 1914.

I'll now give you space to continue your 'serious' discussion - I think my previous post will allow anyone reading this to judge the credibility of the points you are trying to make, and the integrity of the sources which you deploy to support them.

George

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning All,

Thanks to Robert for starting this thread and to the extremely detailed responses to Phil's "mischievous" promptings, I have further increased my knowledge of the events in question. Surely this facility to educate those who are less well read is one of this Forum's main attributes ?

PS. Is there any truth in the rumour that Phil is changing his Forum persona to Major Reno ?

[phil andrade]

Phil's main aim seems to be to needle people who disagree with the shallow populist tosh that he espouses, or rather tries to espouse!

Pete

Blimey ! Talk about protesting too much ! What is this shallow populist tosh that I'm trying to espouse ?

You have asked me to do some work, cite sources etc.

I have some information about French casualties at Verdun which would serve to illustrate my argument that, by comparison with other episodes, the losses - both in the aggregate, and in terms of their monthly rate - were relatively bearable.

George - as you point out, it was the "previous experience" which made these Verdun losses so frightening, especially in a battle of such duration.

As to what was happening at Verdun during May and June 1916, I possess sketchy knowledge. I think that the Nivelle- Mangin team had mounted some pretty vigorous and effective counter attacks; the German pressure on the right bank of the Meuse was intensified. June was the complete calendar month with the highest casualties for the French' : although that figure was surpassed on the Somme in September.

The allusion to Briand reprimanding Foch comes form an entry in The Chronicle of the First World War .

My Verdun reading is confined to Horn, Brown, Ousby, Holstein, Martin, Pericard and Canini. No primary sources, just the usual secondary stuff.

Philpott, of course, I have read.

It will be great if our Paul Hederer can publish somethng ; German perceptions will be invalauble.

Haig's comments about the fragile state of the French Army...how should we interpret them ?

Apart from Verdun, the impact of that huge Russian attack in early June must have been of inestimable importance.

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

Hi Phil,

You must try harder. You really haven't attempted the bulk of your 'homework' at all! Certainly one thing stands out in your following statements:

As to what was happening at Verdun during May and June 1916, I possess sketchy knowledge..... My Verdun reading is confined to Horn, Brown, Ousby, Holstein, Martin, Pericard and Canini. No primary sources, just the usual secondary stuff.

How could anyone claim to have read all these books and yet still have only a sketchy grasp of what was happening at Verdun during May and June? Unless...

Ah, I now also realise why you can't understand George's rebuttals of some of your more fanciful statements! Doh! Having now belatedly grasped what is going on I would like to apologise for being harsh on you in the past and hope I haven't offended you in any way

Windsurfing Pete

[phil andrade]

.

Yet you feel qualified to blow raspberries at those who have produced forceful arguments which you don't like, but which are reasoned and based on accurate and properly sourced quotations.

George

What are these arguments that I "don't like" ? What is the "case" that you imply that I'm trying to state ? What motivates you to write such a load of cobblers' ?

Phil (PJA)

[PMHart]

Phil,

Please get back to your 'homework' (Your analysis of Verdun remember, see posts above - no slacking there - or is only you that can set homework?) And above all calm down!!! Abuse and rudeness to fellow posters surely never solves anything as I have found to my cost and great regret. Let peace and love be your watchwords and you will find that we can then co-exist and perhaps even come to care deeply for you within this great GWF community we all share!

Pete

[phil andrade]

Too hard for me Peter, too hard...so much here...I need, above all, a good narrative of Verdun - surprisingly hard to come by; Horne's book still holds sway.

Pals, please help me.

Phil (PJA)

[CT-Guards]

Great topic, and I have much to add but not with the tone of some of the replies.

[phil andrade]

Please, please...add your contribution, and lift us out of this horrible slough of antagonism.

Phil (PJA)

[CT-Guards]

I'm out of this one, sorry!

[phil andrade]

Trying to brush myself down, and wipe my nose after the beating I've been taking, let me ask : do you reckon that the French Army that engaged the Germans on the Somme in July 1916 was enhanced in combat skill by the lessons of Verdun, to the extent that the battle marked a kind of turning point ?

There is a huge, huge, change in the casualty statistics commencing July 1916, in which the French succeed in inflicting inordinately heavy losses on the Germans, at a cost to themselves which is dramatically reduced.

I would like to hear different views about how far this reflected the efforts of the British, who suffered so much more heavily than the French, and who failed to inflict anything like the same damage.

All this protest by Joffre about the French Army being ruined, and ceasing to exist, is hard to reconcile with the performance of the French on the Somme, and, indeed, at Verdun in the summer and autumn of 1916. Was Haig suspicious, or sceptical, about these remonstrations, or did he really think that the French Army was critically fragile and in need of rescue ?

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Joffre's comments cannot be seen just in the context of Verdun. Let me set the scene further. Here is an appraisal from General Huguet. He was the Chief of the French Military Mission attached to the British Army. Huguet's book "L'intervention militaire britannique en 1914" was translated into English as "Britain and the War: A French Indictment".

Huguet dealt mainly with 1914. He voiced considerable concern at the behaviour of FM French, particularly with regards to the retreat of the BEF and the need for Kitchener to intervene. There is a section on 'Military Co-operation' in 1915:

'There were four examples... during 1915. The first was at Neuve Chapelle...; the second was provoked by the German gas attack of the 22nd April...; the third and fourth, occasioned by the participation in the two big French offensives of the 9th May and 25th September, were named in England, the battle of Festubert and battle of Loos respectively.

(I.) Neuve Chapelle... this was undertaken at the request of the French Command. Losses had seriously increased during the last two days... they had exceeded 12,000 at the close of the battle. The battle... was in itself only a secondary affair; but it influenced subsequent operations... The brilliant success of the opening phase, far from being considered a piece of good fortune, due both to surprise and to the luck of an attack on a little or badly-guarded sector, was, on the contrary, attributed solely to excellent preparation, and General Joffre sent to all the French Staffs a translation of the orders given by General Haig as an example of how things should be done.

(2.) Second Battle of Ypres... The success of Neuve Chapelle, greater even than had been hoped at first, had restored Sir John French's confidence, which went on growing as the reinforcements arrived without a stop from England.

The crisis continued for many days. Attack and counterattack followed one on top of the other, as much on one side as on the other, but little change was apparent in the general situation. From the 28th Sir John French had wished to evacuate a portion [of the salient] by bringing back his men to the line Fortuin-Frezenberg-Hill 60. Foch tried in vain to dissuade him, pointing out the dangers of a retirement which could only bring on him a fresh offensive; assure to the enemy important moral gain, and could only make even more precarious the question of supply, of which the main artery, the Poperinghe-Ypres road, would be henceforward not merely shelled from the front, but also would be enfiladed. But Sir John French had only one idea of cutting his losses and, with this in view, to reduce the numbers of men in the line by shortening the line then held.

For the time being the Ypres area became more calm, but on the 13th May, what Foch had foreseen took place. Sir John French was already asking himself whether he should not evacuate the salient and retire definitely on Ypres; but luckily the enemy infantry, with its hands full at the moment on the Arras front [opened by the French army], did not attack and the bombardment came to an end.

(3.) Battle of Festubert... We have seen that for some time General Joffre had wished to undertake a strong offensive with the X Army, but that it had always been delayed by the lack of reserves. The IX and XX Corps were at last relieved at the beginning of April and the attack was fixed for the first days of May. Sir John French himself had twenty divisions for a front of only 75 kilometres; there was nothing to indicate what was going to happen on the 22nd April [at Ypres]; he agreed, therefore, to join in the operations.

[The British attack failed.] Sir John French, very disappointed at first, had, nevertheless, decided to go on with the attack; but Haig himself, bitterly deceived [by the lack of result], made every effort to dissuade him.

At a conference at Bryas, on the 12th [April] with Generals Joffre and Foch, Sir John French said that the situation with regard to his high explosive shells was a very bad one, and that the check on the 9th was largely due to that. That being the case, General Joffre could only suggest his giving up the offensive, but he asked in return to allow the French to make good their success by relieving some of their divisions.

But Sir John French bluntly refused, declining to hear talk of his extending his front where he considered it so dangerous.

"Then," replied General Joffre, "the British co-operation in the battle is limited to the relief of one French division; it is not much. What will they think of it in England?"

Sir John French was hurt and did not reply... Placed once more, as he had been two months before, between the alternative of relieving the French Corps at Ypres and attacking himself, Sir John French again chose to attack [in what became the follow-up to Festubert at Aubers].

(4.) Battle of Loos... [After the initial success] Sir John French explained [to General Foch, 3 days after the beginning of the battle,] that General Haig could not get on because he was anxious about his right flank; that he himself would soon have no reserves left and that it was important to hasten; and he added that if all the troops were under his command he would push right between Loos and Hulluch, take the German second line, and after that there would be nothing in front of him and the break-through would be effected.

General Foch, although hurt at the attitude of Sir John French which tallied so little with that usually shown by him, did not wish to appear so. He replied that he had already attacked the day before with seven divisions and was going to begin again that day with five; that he certainly approved of Sir John French's intention to try to break through between Loos and Hulluch, but it seemed to him that he would soon find plenty of people there and that to add more would probably only serve to increase the losses without tangible result; that he would nevertheless be happy to help Sir John to resume his attack with bigger forces...

Sir John French accepted with pleasure and sent General Joffre a fresh telegram to tell him all was arranged.

On the 28th the X Army attacked, as General d'Urbal had promised... On the British front, however, nothing happened.

Seeing this inaction on the most important sector of the attack, General Foch thought that success might come if he gave General Haig new reinforcements. On the 29th he returned to Sir John French and spontaneously offered to send him the whole of his IX Corps to take over his right. It was so decided.

On the 29th the British Army made an attack of little importance which gave no result.

In vain did General Joffre and General Foch, very annoyed at the successive delays and excuses which allowed the enemy not only to regain the initiative, but to attack..., do their best to show Sir John French the harm of these long-spaced out attacks; in vain did Sir John try himself to hurry up General Haig; he could not succeed in making him decide to act.

Towards the middle of December Sir John French was relieved of his command... From then on my relations with the British Army ceased...'

Robert

[phil andrade]

In vain did General Joffre and General Foch, very annoyed at the successive delays and excuses which allowed the enemy not only to regain the initiative, but to attack..., do their best to show Sir John French the harm of these long-spaced out attacks; in vain did Sir John try himself to hurry up General Haig; he could not succeed in making him decide to act.

Viewed in this light, Joffre's outburst on May 26 1916 seems more understandable, and, I daresay, more justifiable.

If Frenchmen in the High Command were feeling like that before Verdun, then it's small wonder that Joffre displayed an "outburst of excitement" several months later.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Picking up on this point, I would strongly recommend reading Doughty's book 'Pyrrhic Victory'. Doughty didn't have the same agenda as Huguet so there isn't a catalogue of issues with the BEF. The French perspective, however, is very compelling, as you read about the scale of French involvement in the first two years of the war. It puts the BEF contributions into a whole different light. We had a flavour of this in the discussion about the Battle of Aubers Ridge.

Robert

[PMHart]

I have always felt that the French attitude to the tardy British 'real' involvement in the Great War is very akin to ours to the delayed American participation in the Second World War!

Peter