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Remembered Today:

Aubers Ridge, 1915


AKEY

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For the German view on that, Phil, see the last para of post #27.

Lack of resolve on the part of Higher Command. That might have been the conclusion from the German point of view (and knowing what they did) but did the information available to the British justify such a conclusion? Or was it a reasonable conclusion for them to make on the evidence available?

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Mick,

In The Royal Irish Rifles in the Great War by Cyril Falls (1925), pages 31-33, it states that a heavy German counter-attack was repulsed at 1950hrs. Please find below an account of the action:

The task of the 8th Division was to break through the enemy’s lines in the neighbourhood of Rouges Bancs, south of the Des Layes stream, and gain a position, from the old line in the neighbourhood of La Cordonnerie Farm, through Fromelles and Le Clercq. It was to attack with the 24th Brigade on the right and the 25th on the left, the dividing line being the Sailly—Fromelles road. The 25th Brigade was to attack with the 2nd Rifle Brigade on the right and the 1st Royal Irish Rifles on the left. The task of these battalions was the capture of the front system of trenches, and of the road behind them running from the Rouges Bancs towards Fromelles. Thereafter the other battalions were to pass through to a second objective, some 500 yards beyond, astride the Fromelles road. Subsequently an attack, in which the 23rd Brigade was to be employed was to be made in Fromelles.

It is difficult to beluieve that it was ever seriously hoped to capture the Aubers Ridge, now far better defended than at the time of Neuve Chapelle, after a wire-cutting bombardment lasting a quarter of an hour. In this connection it may be noted that the total number of 18-pounders on the IV Corps’ front was 72, while the 13-pounders, of which there were 42, could hardly be considered adequate weapons to prepare an attack upon a fortified position. With heavy howitzers the British were, for those days, fairly well equipped, but a mere quarter-of-an-hour’s bombardment by such inadequate weight of artillery meant that almost inevitably there would be great sections of wire uncut. Two mines were to be exploded in the enemy’s front line at the hour of the assault, which, it was hoped, would do much to demoralize the defence.

At 2 a.m. on May 9th the Brigade was formed up, the Battalion at La Cordonnerie Farm. At 5 a.m. the first bombardment opened. The wire, at any rate of the front line, appeared fairly well cut upon the immediate front, and German retaliation was not at first heavy. At 5.40 a.m., the hour of the assault, “C” and “D” Companies advanced in lines of platoons at thirty paces. Despite considerable fire from the left flank the men went forward with irresistible rush, broke through the enemy’s battered front-line trenches, and at one point reached the Fromelles road, just where it turns sharply southward toward that village. Unfortunately the 13th London, attached to the brigade, which had the task of covering the Riflemen’s left flank, was unable to advance beyond the mine-craters in the German front line. As a result, directly the artillery fire lifted, German machine guns came into action on the left flank in great numbers. “C” and “D” Companies, following the leading mass in similar formation, met with frightful losses, and made practically no headway. Two platoons, one on the right under the Commanding Officer, one on the left under the Regimental Sergeant Major, advanced obliquely to check the crossfire, but both were beaten back with heavy casualties.

The men of the leading companies who had reached the Fromelles road were speedily reduced to a handful. There were Germans not only on their left flank, but between them and the 2nd Rifle Brigade, which had got most of its objective. From the double flanking fire men were dropping at every moment. But they had a task to fulfil, to hold their ground till the battalions for the second objective passed through. With magnificent determination, the little remnant clung to its position. The hour came, but no supports appeared. Though they did not know it, the 2nd Lincolnshire and 2nd Royal Berkshire found themselves unable to get forward through that storm of fire, few even reaching the German front-line trench. They waited half an hour beyond the appointed time; then decided to fall back to the German front line, as no effective reply could be made to the enemy’s fire, and another half-hour would have seen the whole party destroyed. At 7 a.m. what was left of them did so, placing themselves under Lieut.-Colonel Stephens, commanding the Rifle Brigade, which had withdrawn to the same line. And there all day long the held their ground.

Meanwhile their Brigadier had come up to the breastworks, to find the whole attack at a standstill. All forward movement had ceased soon after 6 a.m. The ground between the lines was swept by fire. The British line was choked with men in great confusion, successive lines of the supporting battalions having come up with rear lines of lines of those in the lead, which had failed to advance. He ordered forward two companies of the Lincolnshire to support the Rifle Brigade. Almost immediately afterwards, in checking a retirement (in which he was successful), he was mortally wounded.

At 2 p.m. an attempt to sap out along the dyke bordering the Sailly—Fromelles road proved unsuccessful; nor could any further aid be given to Colonel Stephens, who with 200 men, which included perhaps 50 of the Royal Irish Rifles, fought it out all that afternoon. At 7.50 p.m. a heavy German counter-attack was repulsed, captured machine guns being used with great effect. It was hoped to cling on all night, as fresh attacks were to be launched in the morning, but it might not be. The final counter-attack came upon the front and both flanks. The machine guns fought to the last, causing heavy losses to the Germans, but at 3 a.m. on the 10th they were driven out and withdrew to the British breastwork. Later that morning the remains of the Battalion withdrew to billets at Bac St. Maur.

The party from the German lines had been brought in by the Regimental Sergeant-Major, there being no more officers left. In fact, of the 23 who went into action, every officer was hit, over two-thirds being killed or missing [the Commanding Officer was killed in action]… Of the other ranks, 44 were reported killed, 207 wounded, and 203 missing; almost all of those in the last category being either killed or wounded. The total casualties were thus 477 out of about 600 who had gone into the attack; a far heavier proportion than at Neuve Chapelle, when the Battalion had been up to strength, with far less to show for it.

This was, in fact, a far worse action to look back upon than that other. A success such as that gained by the Battalion on the first day at Neuve Chapelle, however heavy the losses. Leaves some inspiration of victory to counterbalance the shock which the survivors experience. But a butchery such as Fromelles, where men are mown down and nothing is won, has no such brighter side. It was a memory entirely evil.

The bravery displayed had been of the very highest standard, and no expressions that can be applied to it would appear other than weak. To hold the position meant almost certain death, and the position had been held for half an hour after the time fixed for the arrival of supports. The splendid devotion of the officers is only too apparent. Neuve Chapelle had not brought the 1st Battalion to the state of the 2nd, when a new one had to be created, with transport and employed as practically the sole basis, but it had not long to wait before it met that fate. It was now no more than a shadow, to be built up anew by new officers. The lessons in the superiority of defence over offence were dearly learned in those early days, for their cost was something which could never be replaced.

Reference the German assumption that the British let an opportunity go. To me, it is clear (from both articles that I have posted) that it was an impossible undertaking to reinforce the British lodgement without sufficient firepower to: destroy, neutralize, suppress, and demoralize the Germans. What is also apparent, unlike the Somme, German machine-gun fire in No Man's land - not their artillery - are the stopping factor that prevented progress across this ground. That said, I appreciate that the German artillery was hitting the British communication trenches (as were some of the British rounds).

I hope this is of interest.

Aye

Tom McC

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That implies a shortcoming in the British of one or more of those characteristics. It seems unlikely that the attacking British battalions were lacking in resolution or bravery, so at what level/s should we look for lack of skill?

This brings to mind a statement written by Falkenhayn, which, I must admit, I can only recollect reading somewhere, so I refer to it with some diffidence.

IIRC he summarised the British attacks at Aubers and elsewhere in May 1915 as displaying tactical rigidity, and concluded that he felt the British gave them little to fear. He was flattering about the bravery of the British soldiers, but somewhat disdainful of their skill.

This seems rather dismissive, especially given the performance of the BEF at 1st Ypres...but, then again, Tommy Atkins had always been more renowned as a defensive fighter than he had been as an attacker.

I hope that this statement of Falkenhayn's can be authenticated.

Phil (PJA)

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At Aubers Ridge, I believe that skill would be lacking at all levels. The BEF had not envisioned this type of warfare and so were not trained for it. Unforeseen casualty levels meant many raw and inexperienced troops being led by officers and NCOs who must have been improvising tactics as situations arose. It takes training and practice to develop a skill and at this stage of the war, not nearly enough of the BEF at any level had acquired it. I doubt if there was much skill on the German side either but it is easier to defend a trench than attack one, especially when you have the far superior artillery support.

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Don't forget also that many of the 8th Division battalions had taken severe casualties at Neuve Chapelle. The 2nd Northamptons were rebuilt between March and May 1915 both in terms of officers and men. Whilst many men had been hardened to battle by the experience of Neuve Chapelle, the majority of the Northamptons, and crucially the officers, were about to get their real first experience of warfare.

As has been stated above, "D" Company with a path through the wire made it into the German trenches. "A" Company caught in the killing ground with no path through the wire was butchered. The only real effect that they could have (and one of the few reasons for sending a single battalion in on that side of the stream), was that while the machine guns at the Sugar Loaf were mowing down the Northamptons ahead of them, they were not firing down the length of No Man's Land from enfilade.

Steve.

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Thanks, Mick...at least my allusion to the renowned defensive prowess of Tommy Atkins is vindicated.:hypocrite:

As for my reference to Falkenhayn's unflattering assessment of British tactical skill, I've found a history magazine article about the disastrous batles of 1915, which includes this passage :

Falkenhayn expressed the view that "the English troops, in spite of undeniable bravery and endurance on the part of the men, have proved so clumsy in action that they offer no prospect of accomplishing anything decisive against the German army in the immediate future."

The trouble is....the author was none other than the Doyen of Donkeyites, Alan Clark : Oh Dear !

This causes me to doubt both provenance and accuracy.

The myth dies hard though, doesn't it ? And of all the exemplars, none fits the bill better than the Aubers Ridge failure.

Phil (PJA)

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I would be very cautious about interpreting the failure as due to lack of skill and experience. There were many examples, both before and after Aubers Ridge, where successful infantry attacks were delivered by 'inexperienced' troops. Aubers Ridge did not involve complex manoeuvres by the infantry once the attack got underway. Superbly trained troops would still have been cut down by unsuppressed machine gunners, especially when they came up against uncut wire. Superbly trained troops would still have run out of ammunition had they achieved a lodgement in the German lines that could not be reinforced.

Conversely, if the German artillery and machine guns had been effectively suppressed then the chaos in the British front lines and communication trenches would have been far less (there would have been less damage to the trenches and far fewer casualties). Reinforcements could have been pushed forward and resupply achieved. Furthermore, a strong defensive barrage would have disrupted or prevented the German counter-attacks.

The subsequent problems, however, would have been significant. A successful attack would have created a relatively small salient, which would have been very vulnerable to increasing German artillery fire as their defensive capability was subsequently reinforced. The need for reinforcements would have achieved the French objective.

Robert

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Terraine wrote that the ratio of officer casualties at Aubers was unusually high, suggesting that all was not well with morale.

Phil

Aplogies to you all, Pals, I have been utterly wrong here.

I must read these sources and check, rather than attempt to cite them from memory.

What Terraine actually wrote in his biography of Haig, on page 148, was :

The "Battle" of Aubers Ridge on May 9th was stopped in its tracks in one day, with a loss in the three attacking divisions of 145 officers and 9,400 men,

Indeed, far from being an unusually high ratio of officers to men, this is an extremely low proportion... I wonder if the figure is correct.

Maybe it's a "transpositional error", and should be 415 instead of 145, or perhaps it alludes only to those officers posted as killed.

It was in a footnote on the following page, refering to the Festubert casualties of 710 officers and 15,938 men in the fighting of May 15th -25th, that Terraine wrote:

But note the much higher proportion of officers, indicating that all was not well with morale.

That Festubert ratio was normal for the BEF on the Western Front.

It would appear that I got the place, dates and numbers wrong:..but I would question that officer figure for Aubers that Terraine cited .

Editing here : just glancing at Tom's post, there is evidence to support my contention that Terraine's figure is wrong...the battalion experience described by Cyril Falls chronicles casualties of 23 officers and 454 men.

Phil (PJA)

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O.H, P. 39; says, first reports from 3 divisions engaged gave casualties as 145 officers and 9,400 men. Later figures totalled 458 officers and 11,161 men.

Add,

On browsing further, it was interesting to see the O.H.'s summary. Aubers Ridge was a failure because it did not achieve its intended effect. No German reserves were drawn from the French sector to the British. The attack was held with the forces on the ground.

The causes of the failure are ascribed to;

Hard work by the Germans after Neuve Chapelle to greatly strengthen their defences, mainly barricades and clever siting of M.G.s in the defences.

Inadequate artillery work, insufficient heavy guns with bad ammunition and badly handled.

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6BRD's report, dated 29 May 1915, gives the defending division's casualties as 13 officers and 630 NCOs and men, of whom 264 were killed. 180 of the dead came from the 9th and 10th companies of RIR16, which took the brunt of the attack (including 48 men killed by the mine explosions).

Mick

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Thanks, Mick...those German casualty figures are striking : they indicate the enormous disparity in the numbers between unsuccessful attackers and victorious defenders. OTOH, the preponderant burden of loss was sustained by a very small number of defenders, and it's significant that the proportion of killed among these German casualties approached forty five per cent of the total killed, wounded or missing....a very lethal experience indeed for the men who had to face the brunt of the attack. I suppose the mine blast was an important factor here. It seems that more than one third of all the men in the 8th and 10th companies of RIR16 were killed. The utter defeat of the British in this battle must not be allowed to obscure the fatal ordeal endured by a forlorn band of resolute defenders.

Phil (PJA)

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O.H, P. 39; says, first reports from 3 divisions engaged gave casualties as 145 officers and 9,400 men. Later figures totalled 458 officers and 11,161 men.

Thanks, Tom...this lends weight to my suggestion that the report of 145 officer casualties was an error of transposition : 451 as opposed to 145 ? It's surprising that Terraine did not challenge the figure.

Phil (PJA)

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Neuve-Chapelle; Aubers Ridge; Festubert...they're all one battle, really, aren't they ? Barely five miles separate the three. Having covered the ground myself, I should have been more aware of this...yet it's too easy to "compartmentalise" the fighting of the Great War into episodes that are seen as distinct battles.

Another thing that is worthy of reflection and emphasis is the terrible toll of April and May 1915....very close to one hundred thousand battle casualties for the BEF on the Western Front ; compare this with the fifty five thousand that were suffered when the army was fighting for its very survival in October and November 1914. Loos, the Somme, Arras and Passchendaele stand as the symbolic names for British martyrdom....2nd Ypres and Artois are - to a degree - overlooked. When we remember the frightful casualties at Gallipoli that were suffered at the same time, the record of those two months must have been truly dreadful.

I would be interested to see how the casualties suffered by the BEF in those two months compare in relative terms i.e. as a proportion of total establishment, with those of July 1916, or March-April 1918, months that are more commonly associated with extreme loss.

Editing again : For Pity's sake, Loos is barely ten miles from Festubert ! How much British blood was shed along those ten miles, in ten months, in 1915 ? The French commemorate the ten months of Verdun in 1916 as the ultimate in concentration of the killing fields. No wonder the British sector in Artois is called "The Forgotten Front".

Phil (PJA)

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Rather than suggest that the commanders were somehow unrealistic in their belief in the possibility of success, we should seek to understand the level of pressure that overrode the first choice of action; we should affirm what was done to maximise success; and we should hate war.

Robert

Militarily, Aubers Ridge was a disaster. More than a whole division of regular troops lost for no perceivable gain and at little cost to the enemy. Are we to assume then that this was necessary and unavoidable?

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In hindsight, this debacle is bound to appear futile, which implies that it was unecessary, and no doubt it could have been avoided.

This is easy to see - and to say - now. But if we try to imagine the immense pressure that was being put on the British to do something to assist the French who were engaged in the most terrific fighting around Arras, then we might better appreciate why the attack was made where and when it was.

Phil (PJA)

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Are we to assume then that this was necessary and unavoidable?
I don't feel competent to say. What I am interested to understand is why it was deemed necessary and unavoidable at the time.

The incident was tragic. A military "success" would not have made it less tragic, IMHO. War demands a terrible toll in human lives and suffering.

Robert

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Militarily, Aubers Ridge was a disaster. More than a whole division of regular troops lost for no perceivable gain and at little cost to the enemy. Are we to assume then that this was necessary and unavoidable?

Militarily, Aubers Ridge was not a success, it achieved little or nothing. It was not, however, a disaster. A disaster would have meant that the BEF was not capable of holding their front and forced to withdraw. In fact, the line held while a part of the BEF was moved a few miles south to Festubert and a more powerful attack was made. It is a fact that going to war will cause casualties and therefore those incurred at this action were unavoidable. The necessity is a political decision and not one which the military need concern themselves with.

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A severe repulse with catastrophic casualties in a few hours : forgive me for quibbling, Tom, but that , to my mind, is disastrous.

Editing...I do take your point, though : might it be fair to describe it as a disaster in purely tactical terms ?

Phil (PJA)

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And so to Aubers Ridge Mk II - Festubert. A larger attack, this time losing some 16000 men (a division and a half)for an advance of about 1km. Was it any more successful strategically than Aubers?

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Hi All,

This excerpt is for Akey. It finishes off the piece mentioned by Tom from the British Official History, Military Operations France & Belgium 1915 Volume 2, page 41. Apologies for the repetition of the initial piece but it places the whole article in context and illustrates how many issues there were with the artillery.

The failure at Aubers Ridge was in fact due to three causes:

(1) first, the strength of the German defences and the clever concealment of machine-guns in them;

(2) secondly, the lack on the British side of sufficient shells of large calibre to deal with such defences; and

(3) thirdly, the inferior quality of much of the ammunition supplied and the difficulty of ranging, so that the British gunners were unable to hit their targets and the German counter-batteries and machine-guns were not silenced. Many of the fuzes, in particular those of the 15-inch howitzer, were defective owing to lack of competent inspection in the factories, and consequently the shells failed to burst on striking the sodden ground. According to British aeroplane reports the registration before the battle was useless; for the changed atmospheric conditions and the previous wear of the guns resulted in many of the shells falling short. As a general result, the brief 40-minute bombardment, though it raised a curtain of dust and smoke immediately above the enemys front line, did no appreciable damage, and merely gave the enemy the warning to stand-to to meet an assault which he was expecting.*

* Germans shouted to the 2nd Brigade that they had been expecting an attack for 24 hours. The blowing down of a factory chimney in the Rue de Bois on the 8th, because it obstructed the fire of the wire-cutting guns, may have aroused suspicion. From the various sources it appears that the Germans received information of an impending attack about the 3rd May; but as it did not take place, they relaxed their vigilance until it was aroused again on the 8th.

Hope this is of use.

Aye

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A severe repulse with catastrophic casualties in a few hours : forgive me for quibbling, Tom, but that , to my mind, is disastrous.

Editing...I do take your point, though : might it be fair to describe it as a disaster in purely tactical terms ?

Phil (PJA)

High casualties are tragic but have no military significance beyond their effect on the outcome of the operation. The attack was a failure but not because of the casualties sustained. The attack failed because the BEF did not have the resources or the ability to employ them in a manner to gain success. The German lines were far too strong to be breached with the tactics and resources available to the BEF at that time. That remained true for 2 years and more. The commanders on the day, saw that the assault was not going to succeed and so brought it to a halt. Words like disastrous carry too much emotional baggage to be useful if we are trying to make a military analysis. I would categorise Aubers Ridge as a severe check. It did not cause a withdrawal, it did not render the BEF liable to attack, indeed, it was followed within 6 days by a battle lasting 10 days, a couple of miles to the west.

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Mick,

Thank you for the example as it highlights that as well as a lack of destruction and shock action, the attack would fail to be a surprise too.

Aye

Tom McC

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"High casualties are tragic but have no military significance beyond their effect on the outcome of the operation."

Yes they do, Tom. They have a significant effect on morale and thus fighting power. That is without mentioning the obvious reduction in combat power - of regular infantrymen.

Aye

Tom McC

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