Aubers Ridge, 1915

[ianjonesncl]

The Gunners at the Gun end would have no idea they were firing duds, the only people who could possibly have an indication would be the observers.

Where a number of rounds are being fired by a number of guns it is difficult to determine duds as particulary with higher calibre shells the act of striking the ground throws up a certain amount of debris, so it is not apparent that it has not exploded, particulary as the other rounds going off are producing noise.

However during the adjustment of targets where observation of a single round, section of guns or a battery, it is possible to determine if there are 'blinds'. At this stage the observer is observing every fall of shot, consequently if there are a number of rounds that fail to detonate there is the indication that a bad lot of ammunition is being used.

However, I would suggest by the time the observers start adjusting the battle plan is already in execution. It would take a while for reports to be collated fom different units, and to understand that this was a wider scale problem, and not a bad lot. Given those two factors it would be too late to affect the current battle situation.

[Robert Dunlop]

The British learned less soundly. The results of the bombardment suggested that there was both a close relationship between shells fired and ground gained, and particular merit in concentrating the shelling –in time and space – to achieve surprise and achieve moral paralysis. However, the British were often to attack behind a less concentrated bombardment than at Neuve Chapelle, and as often they forfeited surprise by extending it over several days.

Holmes' analysis should be treated with significant caution, IMHO. The reason that the British attacked behind 'less concentrated bombardment' was not because they had not learned (forgive the double negative). It was because they did not have the guns and ammunition! Had these been available in greater numbers/quantities, then the British would have used them. Aubers Ridge suggested that, given the stronger German defences, preparatory bombardments could not be sudden. Wire could not be cut as quickly as occurred at Neuve Chapelle.

It was also clear that a plan based on the logic of the Aldershot Tattoo, with a strict time schedule that could be varied only by the corps commander, failed to meet the demands of trench warfare, for promising opportunities passed all too quickly and primitive communications made the passage of formal orders a slow business, enabling the defender to repair his failure quicker than the attacker could reinforce his success.

Plans with strict timetables formed the basis of success on Vimy Ridge, Messines, Cambrai, Amiens, etc, etc. There were other problems that caused the breakdown and failure of Aubers Ridge.

Robert

[PhilB]

The reason that the British attacked behind 'less concentrated bombardment' was not because they had not learned (forgive the double negative). It was because they did not have the guns and ammunition! Had these been available in greater numbers/quantities, then the British would have used them.Robert

Were the British justified in believing that success was possible despite the paucity of artillery support?

[Robert Dunlop]

As much as they were concerned that the attack might fail. Only with hindsight do we know that Aubers Ridge failed. The Bavarians might have collapsed completely, enabling the lodgements to be expanded, and... Don't judge the military planning of the time by the knowledge that you have now. Even the most successful British attacks were associated with plans in case of complete or partial failure, just in case...

And who predicted that Neuve Chapelle would be as successful as it was on day one? Rawlinson didn't, and the opportunity was lost.

If you had given the British commanders the option of more artillery and more ammunition, then they would have taken it every time. Could they wait until the option was available? Clearly not. So the question needs to be posed at a different level, IMHO. Rather than suggest that the commanders were somehow unrealistic in their belief in the possibility of success, we should seek to understand the level of pressure that overrode the first choice of action; we should affirm what was done to maximise success; and we should hate war.

Robert

[Desmond7]

Cyril Falls has this information which may be of use:-

The task of the 8th Division was to break through the enemy's lines in the neighbourhood of Rouges Bancs, south of the Des Layes stream, and gain a position, from the old line in the neighbourhood of La Cordonnerie Farm, through Fromelles and Le Clercq.

It was to attack with the 24th Brigade on the right and the 25th on the left, the dividing line being the Sailly - Fromelles road.

The 25th Brigade was to attack with the 2nd Rifle Brigade on the right and the 1st Royal Irish Rifles on the left. The task of these battalions was the capture of the front system of trenches, and of the road behind them running from Rouges Bancs towards Fromelles.

Thereafter the other battalions were to pass through to a second objective, some 500 yards beyond, astride the Fromelles road. Subsequently an attack, in which the 23rd Brigade was to be employed was to be made on Fromelles.

It is difficult to believe that it was ever seriously hoped to capture the Aubers Ridge, now far better defended than at the time of Neuve Chapelle, after a wire-cutting bombardment lasting a quarter of an hour.

In this connection it may be noted that the total number of 18-pounders on the IV Corps' front was 72, while the 13-pounders, of which there were 42, could hardly be considered adequate weapons to prepare an attack upon a fortified position.

With heavy howitzers the British were, for those days, fairly well equipped, but a mere quarter-of-an-hour's bombardment by such inadequate weight of artillery meant that almost inevitably there would be great sections of wire uncut.

Two mines were to be exploded in the enemy's front line at the hour of the assault, which, it was hoped, would do much to demoralize the defence.

[squirrel]

From the OH - guns available:

Neuve Chapelle 530 all types - one gun per 4 yards of frontage attacked.

Aubers Ridge 1296 all types - one gun per 3 yards of frontage attacked.

At Neuve Chapelle, there was one main enemy front line but at Aubers Ridge there was a thicker belt of wire, a series of trenches and a support line further in the rear thus diluting the effect of the bombardment.

The shorter bombardment for Aubers Ridge suggests a lack of ammunition availability as surely effective wire cutting and suppresion of the defenders could not be expected to have been achieved.

Among the rreasons for the failure of the attack at Aubers Ridge was the retaliation of the German artillery on the British front lines and forming up trenches making any movement, forward or back, after the attacks had commenced virtually impossible.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Des. There are numerous similar analyses. I have no problem presenting reasons why the attack failed. But this is very different from trying to understand the thinking before the battle. Cyril Falls does not help us there. I am trying to move the perspective away from regarding the British commanders as blind fools, incapable of learning, who did not appreciate that failure might have been an option. The situation was much more complex than this. How enormous was the pressure to do something in response to the French? Why was it not possible to say no? Why did it take Sir John French to do something that was so taboo in order to get more shells? For how long did the problems behind the lack of guns and ammunition stymie the efforts of the British Army? Aubers Ridge was a symptom of some really serious, systemic problems. I don't want to deify the efforts of the British commanders, but I am trying to push towards a deeper understanding of this problem.

Robert

[SiegeGunner]

The Gunners at the Gun end would have no idea they were firing duds, the only people who could possibly have an indication would be the observers.

And, of course, the Germans - whose unit reports on the battle do not mention British shells failing to explode.

[truthergw]

Aubers Ridge took place because the French demanded that it do so. The tactics were left to the British but the strategy was firmly in the hands of the Fernch CiC. Talk of whether it was a good idea or whether the attack was justified is meaningless. If the attacks were not going to take place then the BEF might as well have gone home. As stated, all the guns and ammunition available were used and the operation planned and executed as best it could. Aubers was seen as a failure and called off very quickly.

[ianjonesncl]

And, of course, the Germans - whose unit reports on the battle do not mention British shells failing to explode.

Good point - the unexploded ordnance would be a bit of a give away !

[Jack Sheldon]

... to the annoyance of the French, who thought that the British efforts were pathetic. Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre, Tome III p 105 quotes Foch as follows: 'The [9 May 15] attack of Tenth Army [i.e against Vimy Ridge and down to the Scarpe] was supposed to benefit from an attack to the north carried out by the British First Army, but this operation, which was preceded by a completely inadequate artillery bombardment, stalled almost immediately on the 9th, then petered out and was not resumed until the 16th. This failure, followed by inaction from the period 10th - 15th, allowed the Germans to concentrate against Tenth Army all the forces which had arrived newly in the area ...'

Jack

[squirrel]

Siegegunner post 27 "Considering all these preparations and this concentration of forces, however, the attack ended in dismal failure. The offensive broke down not because the troops failed, they fought bravely , but because the British command, intimidated by the German artillery fire, lacked the resolve to fully commit their available reserves and thus - just as General Buller did at Tugela - threw back into jeopardy the success they had already achieved and shamefully abandoned those of their comrades who had broken into our lines to a not uncertain fate."

My post 32 "Among the rreasons for the failure of the attack at Aubers Ridge was the retaliation of the German artillery on the British front lines and forming up trenches making any movement, forward or back, after the attacks had commenced virtually impossible".

This seems to indicate that what artillery there was available to the British, while it gave the German front line a battering, it was not effective enough to deal with the wire and failed to suppress the German artillery.

[PhilB]

Here`s what the LLT says:-

This battle was an unmitigated disaster for the British army. No ground was won and no tactical advantage gained. It is very doubtful if it had the slightest positive effect on assisting the main French attack fifteen miles to the south.

The main operational factors affecting the outcome were:

•Intelligence about the newly-strengthened German positions was not available or given sufficient attention

•No surprise was achieved

•The duration and weight of the British bombardment was wholly insufficient to break the German wire and breastwork defences, or to destroy or suppress the front-line machine-guns

•German artillery and free movement of reserves were insufficiently suppressed

•Trench layout, traffic flows and organisation behind the British front line did not allow for easy movement of reinforcements and casualties

•British artillery equipment and ammunition were in poor condition: the first through over-use, the second through faulty manufacture

•It soon became impossible to tell precisely where British troops were; accurate close-support artillery fire was impossible

And the lessons learned by Haig:-

The conclusions I have arrived at are:

1. The defences in our front are so carefully and so strongly made, and mutual support with machine-guns is so complete, that in order to demolish them a long methodical bombardment will be necessary by heavy artillery (guns and howitzers) before Infantry are sent forward to attack.

2. To destroy enemy's 'material', 60-pounder guns will be tried, as well as the 15-inch, 9.2-inch and 6-inch siege howitzers. Accurate observations of each shot will be arranged so as to make sure of flattening out the enemy's 'strong points' of support, before the Infantry is launched.

(Haig, Private papers, 11 May 1915)

As the detailed planning was Haig`s, are we to assume that he was given an impossible task by French?

Did any of hese lessons bear fruit at Festubert?

[Robert Dunlop]

The main operational factors affecting the outcome were:

I haven't studied the intelligence analyses for this battle so cannot comment on the first factor in the list.

No surprise was achieved at Vimy and Messines ridges in 1917. These are just two examples where 'surprise' was not a factor in achieving success.

The duration and weight of the British bombardment has already been commented on. Inadequate wire-cutting was very significant. Destruction of front-line machine-guns was not the way to go; suppression did not require a long bombardment.

The lack of effect on German artillery and movement of reserves related to inadequate British artillery support.

Trench layout, traffic flows and organisation would not have been a significant issue if the German artillery and machine gunners had been suppressed.

The poor condition of british artillery equipment and ammunition were at the heart of the inadequate duration and weight of bombardment.

Adjustable accurate close-support artillery fire was rarely a feature in WW1. Successful attacks were typically associated with adequate creeping barrages that infantry could stay close to. Heavy barrages that moved according to schedule created the equivalent of 'accurate' close-support artillery fire, but not because observers could adjust the fire.

Basically, the failures stemmed from the artillery and ammunition problems.

As the detailed planning was Haig`s, are we to assume that he was given an impossible task by French?

Did any of hese lessons bear fruit at Festubert?

Haig did not create the detail in the plans. He was responsible for coordinating the detailed planning. He could not have known, ahead of time, that the task was impossible. In the absence of improved guns and ammunition, there is no way that any lessons could be adequately applied at Festubert. The duration of preparatory bombardment was increased. Other tactics were introduced to try and make up for the artillery problems, without effect. Inadequate means to apply lessons should not be taken to mean that lessons were not learned (or were not known beforehand).

Robert

[SiegeGunner]

•The duration and weight of the British bombardment was wholly insufficient to break the German wire and breastwork defences

"Taking advantage of the surprise occasioned by the mine explosion, and having destroyed our breastworks and wire with exceptionally heavy artillery fire ..." 6BRD report to AOK6

[Tom A McCluskey]

“Basically, the failures stemmed from the artillery and ammunition problems”

Robert,

I feel that this is a very narrow pigeonhole in which to assign the reasons for failure at Aubers Ridge. Though, that is not to say that issues concerning artillery were not play a significant part in why the battle was a failure. But to totally ignore the part played by the operational and strategic commanders in this is to miss out on the fundamental cause of failure, not the effect. That is to say, I think you are dealing with the 'second event' and not 'the event' in causality.

Strategic & Operational Commanders' Knowledge of the Ammunition Situation

Before the equipment and ammunition are considered, a very real failing lies with the operational commander: Sir John French. That is if certain reported facts are to be believed. Have a look at this extract from Hankey’s book, The Supreme Command; it asserts that prior to the battle concerning gun ammunition, French stated ‘the ammunition will be all right’. The Supreme Command 1914-1918, by Lord Hankey. Volume 1, The End of the Liberal Government, Pages 311 to 312:

Early in April, Asquith reconstituted the existing Cabinet Committee into a special Munitions Committee presided over by Lloyd George, for, though the Prime Minister sometimes poked fun at the impetuosity of his colleague, he recognized his tremendous energy and capacity and was only too glad to harness him to this essential national work. This committee was destined a few weeks later to develop into the Ministry of Munitions. Nevertheless Kitchener viewed these developments with concern, and during the last half of March and throughout April the friction between him and Lloyd George was steadily increasing.

April 16th. Long talk with Balfour, who told me Kitchener had wanted to resign over the Lloyd George Armaments Committee and believed there was a cabal to get rid of him and Grey. All rot I think. Terrible row at the Cabinet between Lloyd George and Kitchener.

It required all Asquith’s dexterity to avoid an open breach between his warring colleagues.

Meanwhile reports were coming through from France to Members of Parliament, the Press and the general public about the feeling in the Army on the subject and on April 20th Asquith made his oft referred to speech at Newcastle in which he made the much criticized statement denying the truth of reports and operations of our Army and our Allies were being crippled, or at any rate hampered, by the Government’s failure to provide the necessary ammunition. For this he was violently attacked for years, but with characteristic loyalty to colleagues it was not until the war was over that on June 2, 1919, he let it be known that the statement had been made on the basis of a letter received from Kitchener, who, at his request, had sent for French in order to ascertain from him the true position. At the time, however, and not unnaturally, the statement caused resentment at GHQ and probably had a great deal to do with the initiation a few weeks later from GHQ of a Press attack on the Government. In this matter the attitude of the Commander-in-Chief is hard to defend. French had never complained to the War Council that his offensive plans were impossible owing to a lack of ammunition. When in January the Council had suggested that the ammunition available was insufficient to enable him to carry through his ambitious plan for a winter campaign along the coast of Flanders, he had come to London and insisted that this was not the case. Lack of ammunition had not deterred him at Neuve Chapelle on March 10th. But on March 16th he reported that a cessation of the forward movement was necessitated by the fatigue of the troops ‘and above all by want of ammunition’. On March 19th Kitchener obtained authority from the War Council to quote it in commenting adversely on the very high expenditure of gun ammunition in that battle. In May new plans were concerted with Joffre for a great Anglo-French offensive. ‘The ammunition will be all right’, French told Kitchener on May 2nd*. Yet the failure of the British attacks on Aubers Ridge on May 9th and on Festubert on May 15th were again attributed to a lack of heavy guns, to ammunition defective both in quality and quantity, to fuses that failed to function properly, and to lack of high explosives. The Cabinet were really making tremendous efforts to wrestle with a desperately difficult problem, and GHQ were quite aware of this from what I myself and, no doubt, others had told them. Instead of making the best of a situation for which they themselves were in some degree, at any rate, responsible owing to their continued attacks, GHQ adopted the dangerous expedient of stimulating public opinion on the subject.**

*Arthur, III, p. 237.

** vide World Crisis 1915, p. 312.

Here’s another article associated with this matter, from H. H. Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley, Selected and Edited by Michael and Eleanor Brock, The Newcastle Speech: ‘The people on the spot think that my visit has done good’ (Letter 402), pages 558-9:

Asquith travelled to Newcastle armed with the following assurance from Kitchener:

14 April. I have had a talk with French. He told me I could let you know that with the present supply of ammunition he will have as much as his troops will be able to use on the next forward movement.

On the basis of this note he told the munition workers:

I do not believe that any army ... has ever either entered upon a campaign or been maintained during a campaign with better or more adequate equipment. I saw a statement the other day that the operations ... of our army ... were being crippled, or at any rate hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. There is not a word of truth in that statement.

Thus Asquith transformed an assurance about ammunition supply in a forthcoming operation into one which referred not only to that but to recent operations such as the Neuve Chapelle attack. It was perhaps the most extraordinary, and the most damaging, blunder of his wartime premiership.

A few weeks later, in the discussions preceding the formation of the coalition, Asquith blamed Kitchener for accepting French’s assurance and passing it on.* French certainly gave it. His claim after the war that he had not done so, and had been misunderstood by Kitchener, must be dismissed. He wrote to Kitchener on 2 May: ‘The ammunition will be all right.’** What he said should have been suspected, if only because it ran counter to so many of his other statements. He had told Kitchener that the Neuve Chapelle offensive had been mounted with the absolute minimum of artillery support (Letter 366). For weeks he had been stressing the need for ‘munitions ... always more munitions’ in every interview he gave. Kitchener and Asquith ought to have remembered how strongly Joffre was pressing the British to attack.

French had pinned great hopes on the offensive planned at Aubers Ridge; he would be tempted to slur over the difficulties of mounting it. *** Apart from this, it is surprising that Asquith had not heard about the B.E.F.’s shortage of shells from officers on leave who had first hand experience of it. He had made a statement which no one who knew the Western Front could believe. Twenty-five years later Harold MacMillan was talking to Dalton about the fall of Chambelain’s Government. ‘It is like 1915,’ MacMillan said,

when old Asquith told Parliament that there were plenty of shells; and soldier M.P.s came back from the front and said ‘That’s a bloody lie: we only had three shells a day at Festubert.’****

Most of the London press was soon in full cry. Here was the Prime Minister making a statement about the supply of shells which was at variance with everything his colleagues were saying. Asquith could now be depicted, not only as failing to co-ordinate the country’s war effort, but as ignorant of the most crucial facts about war production.*****

*See Charles Petrie, Austen Chambelain (1939-40), ii.22-3. On this occasion, as in his speech, Asquith gave an exaggerated account of the assurance given him.

**G. Arthur, Kitchener (1920), iii. 236

*** See French to Mrs Winifred Bennet, 8 May: ‘I am just on the eve of commencing what I believe will grow into one of the greatest battle in the history of the World’ (French MSS Imperial War Museum).

**** J.P. Mackintosh (ed.), British Prime Ministers of the 20th Century, i (1977), 263: from Dalton’s diary, 16 May 1940.

*****Despite much speculation Asquith refused to divulge who had reassured him about ammunition supply. He persuaded Lord Hugh Cecil to withdraw a parliamentary question (The Times, 24 June) and dealt summarily with the two questions asked (Parl. Deb. 1xxii. 608, 1452). For the rumours see Cynthia Asquith, Diaries, 1915-1918 (1968), pp. 44 and 47-8

Kitchener influenced events too, as can be seen from this article from The Little Field-Marshall by Richard Holmes, pages 285-86:

Although the fighting at Ypres, which rumbled on throughout May, caused Sir John considerable concern, his main preoccupation was with the First Army’s offensive. For dangerous though the German attack on Ypres was, far more perilous consequences would be likely to result from the failure of an Allied offensive. On 31 March French had breakfasted with Kitchener, and had been left in no doubt as to the Secretary of State’s opinion:

He told me that he considered Joffre and I were ‘on our trial’ – that if we showed within the next month or 5 weeks that we really could make ‘substantial advances’ and ‘break the German Line’ he would – so far as he was concerned – always back us up with all the troops he could send. But if we failed it would be essential that the government should look for some other theatre of operations ... I told him that he had put the matter very fairly and I was content to accept what he said.*

This left Sir John writhing on the horns of a dilemma. If he failed to launch an unsuccessful attack, he risked sending the troops and ammunition which, he believed, should be sent to the Western Front, being despatched elsewhere. There was also the question of his own position. Sir John was well aware that there were many who regarded his performance with less than satisfaction, and his personal staff were not slow to suggest – probably without foundation – that Kitchener himself coveted the command in France.**

Sir John undoubtedly thought that a successful attack was indeed possible, provided he had adequate ammunition available. On 4 April GHQ issued a memorandum on the tactical lessons of Neuve Chapelle, a document which laid great emphasis on thorough preparation and the accurate registration of enemy positions by the artillery.*** On 14 April French and Kitchener had a lengthy discussion on ammunition, and Sir John was somewhat reassured by the conversation. Nevertheless, the imperative need to launch an offensive, and the risks involved in failing to do so, bulked so large in French’s mind that he was already well on the way to convincing himself that Haig’s men would attack in cooperation with the French, whatever the state of ammunition supply. On 2 May Sir John assured Kitchener that ‘the ammunition will be all right’, a declaration which Kitchener passed on to the Prime Minister.****

Learning the lessons of Neuve Chapelle was a game that two could play, an on 9 May First Army assaulted a much stronger German position than that into which it had bitten so deeply two months before. The Battle of Aubers Ridge cost the British 11,500 officers and men – much to Sir John’s anguish for a negligible gain. Both French and Haig speedily realised that a short, relatively heavy bombardment, was no answer to the problems posed by well-sited defensive positions. Sir John wrote:

They’ve dug themselves in the entrenchments so deeply and so well that our shrapnel can’t get at them, and owing to the bungling and want of foresight at our fine War Office we only have a very insufficient quantity of ‘High Explosive’ ... it’s simple murder to send infantry against these powerfully fortified entrenchments until they’ve been heavily hammered.*****

*French Diary 31 March 1915

**Some senior French officials also believed this: see the account of a conversation between Northcliffe and Tardieu in Valentine Williams to Brinsley Fitzgerald, 6 April 1915, II, p. 13.

***Edmonds, Military Operations, 1915, II, p. 41.

****Kitchener to Asquith, 14 April 1915, in Bod. Lib., MSS Asquith 14.

*****French to Winifred Bennet, 1 and 11 May 1915, French papers.

So I am afraid that at the operational level the cause of the fault lies with Sir John French (that is if Kitchener and Asquith are to be believed). He had a responsibility to report his equipment and ammunition situation accurately. This he signally failed to do.

The infantry assault was preceded by a continuous bombardment which lasted forty minutes. It is interesting to compare this preparation with the days and weeks of bombardment which preceded later in the later and more successful assaults in the war. The Allies had not yet learnt the lessons that where the enemy’s defences consisted of entrenched positions, nothing short of absolute destruction could break them. Wauchope Volume 1, 1st Bn The Black Watch, page 35.

Aye

Tom McC

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi All,

German Defences & the Breach Caused by the 8th Division at Aubers Ridge

Here is quite a good description of the German Defences from History of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 1910-1933 by Colonel H H Story M.C., Chapter 7:

But the Germans, having learnt their lesson at Neuve Chapelle, had turned it to good account by increasing their garrison opposite the British and by strengthening their defences. They had widened their parapets to measure fifteen to twenty feet across and raised the height to six or seven feet, thus making them proof against the shell of all but the heaviest British calibre. They had erected wire in the excavations in front of the parapets which was not visible from the British trenches, and had widened the existing wire entanglements. They had built emplacements for machine-guns every twenty yards or so and disposed them so that these weapons were able to sweep the front with grazing effect, firing through steel-rail loopholes. Support trenches, two hundred to three hundred yards in rear of the front, had been similarly treated. Finally, communications were improved by the provision of Up and Down communication trenches in every Regimental sector to facilitate movement. The problem of breaking through the enemy positions had therefore changed in character and now required heavy high-explosive shell to breach them.

These altered conditions were not fully known to the British, and consequently the weight of metal per yard of front to be used by the artillery to demolish the German defences was little, if any, greater than that used at the initial stage of Neuve Chapelle. Nor more artillery was available, mainly because of the fighting then in progress at Ypres where the Germans had all but broken through the Allied defences after employing asphyxiating chlorine gas contrary to the rules of war. The bombardment opened at 5 a.m. on 9th of May. Almost immediately reports were received that shells were falling short. This was afterwards found to be due partly to wear and tear of the guns and partly to inferior ammunition, but it meant that much of the effect of the bombardment was lost. The shelling intensified during the last ten minutes and the foremost infantrymen moved out of the breastworks to the prepared jumping-off places in No Mans Land. As they did so, enemy bayonets appeared immediately above their parapets.

This next bit explains how slight and insecure the British hold on the German lines (in front of the 8th Division) was:

5.40 a.m.

At 5.40 a.m. the guns lifted and the leading troops of the three assaulting battalions rose and rushed towards the German defences.

The 24th Brigade was brought almost to a standstill. The Germans stood up and fired machine-guns and fired machine-guns and rifles from the top of the parapet, firing particularly from both flanks of the advance. No further progress could be made.

On the front of the 25th Brigade the wire had been well cut and the assaulting troops crossed No Mans Land at a rapid pace. The 2nd Rifle Brigade and 1st Royal Irish Rifles reached and entered the German breastworks and, despite heavy casualties, pressed on to the first objective, the bend of the Fromelles Road, two hundred yards beyond. Their supporting companies, following closely, also reached the German trenches. The Germans then turned their attention to containing the men who had penetrated their lines and swept No Mans Land with fire to prevent further supports from reaching them. Counter-attacked in flank and even in rear the 2nd Rifle Brigade and 1st Royal Irish Rifles , who had reached the outskirts of Rouges Bancs, were finally driven back to German front line with heavy casualties.

On the explosion of two mines at 5.40 a.m., the leading companies of the 1/13th London (Kensington) Regiment occupied the craters and the supporting companies pushed through to Delangre Farm passing the German third trench.

23rd Brigade. 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles

By 6.30 a.m. the companies of the 2nd Scottish Rifles were deployed on a 125-yard front lying behind dummy trenches with Battalion Headquarters and the Dressing Station in Cellar Farm, when orders were received to move up to the old front-line trench about two hundred yards ahead. The country was quite flat and open. The Adjutant took the message forward to Company Commanders and the men got up and began to move forward. Immediately German machine-guns somewhere very close on the left traversed along the line and men fell. The Commanding Officer (Lieut.-Colonel Vandeleur), together with his Headquarters, were on the left so that he, the Adjutant (Captain R. C. Money) and most of Battalion Headquarters were shot down at once. Major Carter-Campbell, who had returned from hospital in the night before, assumed command and the advance continued. German artillery then searched the vacated positions with methodical precision. By the time the 2nd Scottish Rifles reached the front line the 2nd Rifle Brigade had been isolated by enemy fire, but the leading men of the Regiment crossed over the parapet and some succeeded in reaching the first German trench under fire. The rest of the battalion was held back on receipt of a Brigade order to stand-fast and to hold the British front-line trench for the time being. Shortly afterwards the battalion bombers were sent across to assist the 2nd Lincolns who were occupying part of a German trench. They soon exhausted their bombs and sent back for more. Three machine-guns were also sent across under command of 2nd Lieut. E. H. Orton. He was killed taking them over No Mans Land. At dusk the battalion was withdrawn to its assembly position.

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, I was referring to the tactical failures. Earlier in this thread I had pointed to the need to investigate the higher level issues, which you have labelled as strategic and operational. So no disagreement.

Robert

[SiegeGunner]

AOK6 provided 'the support of several Saxon artillery batteries'. As there was scarcely time to move artillery, I expect this involved the Saxons 'shooting across' from a neighbouring sector, as also happened at Fromelles in 1916.

Determining why the British lost the battle may require complex and far-reaching analysis, but it seems to me that the reasons the Germans won it are fairly simple - their artillery smashed up the British assembly positions, making it difficult if not impossible to bring forward any support, and laid down a close-in barrage to prevent reinforcement from the British front line, thereby confining the troops in the lodgements inside the German positions to numbers that could be handled by the existing German trench garrison.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you, Mick. Your interpretation of the Saxon artillery is almost certainly correct. The relatively narrow width of the attack meant that the Germans could bring concentric fire to bear on the British. This magnified the effects of the German artillery.

I will chase up on the issue of the British intelligence analyses.

Robert

[Tom A McCluskey]

Mick & Akey,

Please find below the account of the 2nd Battalion the Rifle Brigade at Aubers Ridge. For Mick, I wonder how well this account meshes with the German account you have. For Akey, although this attack is in the 8th Division area (1 Division & Meerut Division in action too), it covers many of the tactical issues. It appears to be a detailed account. I will try and post some points about the artillery tomorrow (worn equipment, etc.).

From: The History of the Rifle Brigade in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 1, August 1914 to December 1916, pages 96-106

The Aubers Ridge (which was the name given to the higher ground Aubers-Fromelles-Herlies- the Pommereaus-Le Plouich — that rises above the main ridge between Armentières and La Bassée flanking the Lys River to the south-east) was most readily accessible from the British front line at two places—the new position at Neuve Chapelle and the point of junction with the Rouges Bancs-Sailly Sur la Lys road, where the trenches ran forward east of Picantin. Neuve Chapelle had been tried. It remained to attack from the north. Accordingly the Army Commander assigned to Sir Henry Rawlinson’s IV Corps the task of breaking through at Rouges Bancs, and capturing Fromelles, Le Plouich and Aubers. The Indian Corps was to attack from the south near Neuve Chapelle. These converging attacks would meet at La Cliqueterie Farm on the top of the ridge at Herlies. Speed was the essence of the operation. As soon as the front line had been broken on the IV Corps front, “an advanced guard, including some mounted troops will at once be pushed forward with the object of gaining a footing on the Fromelles-Aubers Ridge.”*

*IV Corps Operation Order.

The IV Corps plan was large and simple. The 8th Division would make the breach in the neighbourhood of Rouges Bancs, capture Fromelles on the left (with a flank thrown back to La Cordonnerie Farm) and the Deleval Farm-Aubers road on the right. The 7th Division would go through the “gap” and capture Leclerq Farm (on the Aubers-Fromelles road), Aubers and Le Plouich (south of the road), finding touch with the Indians at the point selected by the Army Commander. The exact locality of the 8th Division breach was laid down. It was to be “where the Fromelles road* passes through the hostile breastwork.” It was to include also a small salient some eight hundred yards west of the road know as Point 372.

*The road Sailly Sur la Lys-Rouge Bancs-Fromelles.

It was with these plans of the 8th Division that this history is concerned; and the plans of the 8th Division, within the limits prescribed by IV Corps, were as follows. The enemy’s wire was known to be thick and his defences to be strong. The artillery therefore would concentrate upon making a thorough breach along a short strip at the front. The troops would hurry through it whilst the artillery lifted to selected targets. Some would go forward. Others would work right and left in the rear of the enemy line, enveloping both his flanks, and thus widening the breach. From the moment of zero every one was to begin moving like a piece of machinery. A strip of trench extending about two hundred yards on either side of the Fromelles road was selected for the main breach. But there were to be tow subsidiary breaches. Point 372 was to be reduced by artillery fire; and, to the east of the road on the extreme left of the attack, a series of mines that had been tunnelled under the German front-line system were to be fired at zero.

The rôle [sic] of the infantry was subdivided into the right and left attacks, so called in relation to the Fromelles road which was the inter-brigade boundary inclusive to the right brigade. The right attack was to be carried out by the 24th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. R. S. Oxley) with engineers, mountain guns, trench mortars and cyclists attached; the left by the 25th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Lowry Cole) with similar attached troops. The bombardment would begin at 5 a.m. By 5.15 the wire would be cut. After 5.10 the artillery and trench mortars would open on the German trenches and continue bombarding until 5.40, except at point 372* where the bombardment would continue until 5.50 a.m. The infantry would assault the Rouges Bancs position and the craters at 5.40 a.m. Point 372 would be attacked at 5.50. Thereafter the attack would be in four stages. The capture of the Rouges Bancs road was the first stage. The second was to secure the line Rue Delaval-Delaval Farm-La Biette-Les Clochers—with flanks thrown back on the left and right to the old front line. The third stage on the right was to reach the line of the Rue Delaval-Aubers road, up to a point five hundred yards short of that village, and hold a front facing south-west towards Trivelet and the Rue d’Enfer: on the left a line was to be reached, from the farm three hundred south of La Biette-Hayem cross-roads to the Rue des Turcs. At the end of this stage the 7th Division, which throughout the operation was to advance in rear of the 8th, would pass through and attack Leclercq Farm and Aubers. The fourth stage was the attack of the 25th Brigade on Blondel Farm and Fromelles, with the 23rd Brigade (Brig.-Gen. R. J. Pinney) in support.

*In addition to the general bombardment, two 18 pdrs. were specially detailed to engage this from the British front line.

The 24th Brigade plan for the right attack was to assault with the 2nd Bn. East Lancashire Regt. on a two-hundred-yard front* giving them for an objective the road between Delaporte Farm and the junction with the Fromelles-Sailly road. Immediately behind the East Lancashires, the 1st Bn. Sherwood Foresters were to cross the German front line, incline to the right and capture the continuation of the Delaporte Farm road from the elbow two hundred yards west of the Delaporte Farm, as far as the elbow two hundred and fifty yards north of the Delaval Farm. This would bring the Sherwood Foresters immediately in rear of the enemy defences at Point 372. The 1st Bn. Worcestershire Regt. would move forward in rear and come up behind the East Lancashires. The 2nd Bn Northamptonshire Regt. Would attack Point 372 at 5.50 a.m. and the 2nd Bn. Black Watch [this should be 5th Bn; the 2nd were in the Meerut Division] would occupy the German trenches and remain in Brigade reserve. As no part of this plan was subsequently realized the further details are unimportant. The 25th Brigade orders for the left attack were that the Second Battalion the Rifle Brigade, the 1st Bn. Royal Irish Rifles, and the 13th Bn. London Regt. (Kensington) should attack simultaneously—the Second Battalion and the Royal Irish Rifles together on a two-hundred yards front** through the gap in the German defences, the 13th London Regt. a few hundred yards to the left at the mine crater. The Rifle Brigade were to push forward to the road at Rouges Bancs, which would bring them on the left and slightly in advance of the 2nd Bn. East Lancashire Regt. The Royal Irish Rifles were to make for the same road and to bomb to the left towards the 13th Bn. London Regt. The 13th Bn. London Regt. having occupied the mine crater were to push on as far as a line level with the objective of the Second Battalion and to bomb inwards towards the Royal Irish Rifles, and outwards to the track running back to the front line from Rue des Turcs. The 2nd Bn. Royal Berkshire Regt. were in support of the Second Battalion; 2nd Bn. Lincolnshire Regt. to the Royal Irish Rifles. The 1st Bn. London Regt. was in Brigade reserve. These movements were to take ten minutes from the time when the attack started. In the ensuing fifteen minutes the Royal Berkshires were to pass through the Second Battalion and advance beyond La Biette. The Lincolns were to pass through the Royal Irish Rifles and get a footing on the road triangle north-west of Hayem . The Rifle Brigade, having reformed, were to move in support of the Royal Berkshires, sending forward a party to hold and fortify La Biette, whilst the Royal Irish Rifles supported the Lincolns, and the 13th Bn. London Regt. formed a defensive flank facing east. In the third and fourth phases of the attack the Royal Berkshires were to take Blondel Farm, a group of buildings close to Fromelles station; while the Second Battalion, coming up on the left, advanced and captured Fromelles. The remaining units were to consolidate the ground gained.

* This was dictated by the extent of the wire-cutting bombardment on the German defences.

**This, as in the case of the 24th Brigade, was dictated by the size of the gap to be cut in the wire.

Preparations for the battle began on April 14th and continued until May 7th. All officers were familiarized with the assembly places and their lines of advance. At the last moment Captain J. E. V. Isaac, D.S.O., contrived to rejoin the Battalion from the General Staff in order to take part in the action. There was special training of machine-gun sections and bombers. Wire cutting by hand was practised. Blocking parties were formed and trained and, so that there might be no misunderstanding as to the positions reached by the infantry, they were issued with distinguishing flags. The capture of Deleval Farm was to be notified to the Royal Flying Corps by laying out a ground strip (the first employment of contact patrol). The capture of Leclercq and Blondel Farms was to be signalled daylight fireworks. Indeed everything was planned with such nicety that there was danger of losing sight of the fact that the success of the operation depended on passing a large body of troops through one narrow defile and that the existence even of that narrow passage was contingent upon the effect of fifteen minutes’ shell-fire upon a well-wired position.

The Second Battalion Attack

On May 9th, after a postponement from the previous day, the bombardment began at 5 a.m. As if to herald a day of disappointment a number of “shorts” caused severe casualties in the advanced sap where “B” and “D” Companies of the Second Battalion were assembled to lead the attack. At 5.40 a.m., undismayed by this unlooked-for misadventure, “B” and “D” Companies (Captain P. A. Kennedy and Captain C. A. Werner) swept across to the German trench taking it in their stride, and pushed on to the Battalion objective, followed by “A” and “C” Companies (Captain S. A. Sherston and Captain A. K. Hargreaves) who occupied and consolidated the German trench. Battalion Headquarters crossed immediately in rear of the support companies. But the enemy machine-gun fire was terrific and heavy casualties were at once experienced. The Battalion machine guns were unable to get across; Battalion Headquarters was dispersed in the passage; and the bombing and blocking parties, so carefully organized beforehand, were at once broken up and could not be reassembled. Nevertheless the task which had been set to the Second Battalion had been performed swiftly and well; and they were just enjoying the pleasant afterglow of success—when they suddenly realized that, except for a handful of the Royal Irish Rifles, they were entirely alone; and it dawned upon them that their predicament was unenviable in the highest degree. Where were the turning movements to right and left that were to enlarge the gap? Where was the advanced guard “including some mounted troops” that was to press on as soon as the first objective was secured? The Rifle Brigade were on the first objective. Where were the East Lancashires on the right, and the Sherwood Foresters beyond them? They were lying out in No-man’s-Land; and most of them would never stand again.

The success of the attack on the Aubers Ridge was dependent on the perfect co-ordination of a highly involved plan. In that respect it is not unlike the famous French attack on the famous Chemin des Dames in 1917. It needed to work like machinery. On the extreme right of the attack* the 2nd Bn. Northamptonshire Regt. advanced against Point 372 from their place of assembly in the orchard near the foot of the Rue Petillon. They advanced on a two-company front. The right company found the wire cut but was caught by enfilade machine-gun fire and reduced to one officer and forty men, who effected a lodgement in the German front line. On the front of the left company the wire was uncut, and that company was wiped out. The supporting company was held up in No-Man’s-Land, unable to move. And the reserve company could not get beyond the orchard.

*At 5.50 a.m.—ten minutes after the battle had begun elsewhere.

The main attack, on the right of the Sailly-Fromelles road was even less fortunate. The leading companies of the East Lancashires, who were assembled in a trench on the south side of the road, at an angle to the line of their attack, sought to neutralize this disadvantage by creeping out at 5.30, during the bombardment of the German front line in readiness to charge when the guns lifted. Despite the bombardment they were at once met by heavy fire from the enemy front line and thrown into disorder. At 5.40, when the bombardment lifted, there was such a hurricane of machine-gun fire that the East Lancashires withered away and no further advance could be made from the Sailly road. But speed was the essence of the operation. From the moment of zero every one was to move forward in obedience to the time-table. There was to be “a continuous forward movement of fresh troops.” Whilst the East Lancashires’ attack was being smashed on their own parapet, the Sherwood Foresters, the Worcestershires and the Black Watch were all coming forward from behind. The trenches became congested; movement became wellnigh impossible; and then the enemy’s counter-bombardment descended to add to the confusion. Half an hour after the attack began, the Sherwood Foresters were launched at the supposed breach on the right of the East Lancashires. The assaulting companies got within forty yards of the enemy line and could get no farther. Then it was discovered that “the wire on this front was sunk, and was only cut in one place about a yard wide.”* By 7 a.m. the 24th Brigade, in a state of hopeless confusion, was endeavouring to reorganize, and the attack was at a standstill.

*8th Division report on the operation.

On the left, except for the successful advance of the Rifle Brigade the tale of misfortune was continued. The Royal Irish Rifles, barring a few who succeeded in reaching the German line with the Second Battalion, had disappeared completely in the tempest of machine-gun fire that greeted both battalions as they left their trenches. Probably the fire was more severe on the left than on the right. The leading platoons of the 13th Bn. London Regt. flung themselves into the crater before the enemy had recovered from his surprise. The remainder of the battalion was unable to move a yard, owing to the severity of the fire that broke out immediately after that feat had been accomplished. The Royal Berkshires who, according to the plan should have gone through the Second Battalion on the Rouges Bancs road were unable to get across No-Man’s-Land. Most of this battalion crawled into a disused fire trench in front of the British breastwork. Some however made a shift with such cover as they could find in the open. The remaining troops of the 25th Brigade were herded together in the front line and assembly-sap in an advanced state of disorganization; and were so found by the Brigadier when he arrived at 6.20 a.m.—forty minutes after the attack began. In these circumstances he ordered up his Brigade reserve (two companies of the 2nd Bn. Lincolnshire Regt.) and dispatched them in support of the 13th Bn. London Regt. with orders to bomb towards the Second Battalion and join up with the latter. Almost immediately afterwards a further stroke of misfortune befell the attackers. In some mysterious manner, which has never been explained, an order to retire circulated among the troops out in front.* It does not seem to have reached the Second Battalion, nor is there any record of it in their diaries, but from all directions men began retiring towards the original line. With conspicuous gallantry General Lowry Cole sprang upon the parapet and succeeded in restoring order. The action cost him his life, for he was mortally wounded.

*8th Division account of the operation.

This fatality put Colonel Stephens of the Second Battalion in command of the 25th Brigade. But Colonel Stephens was forward in the captured trench, and it was some hours before he could be informed, and some hours later before he could leave his battalion in order to take over. Major S. FitzG. Cox of the 2nd Bn. Lincolnshire Regt. carried on in his absence, and during this time the two companies of the Lincolns under Captain B. J. Thruston succeeded in reaching the enemy’s line, some distance to the left of the Second Battalion, where they made good about two hundred yards of the trench. Shortly afterwards the artillery reopened fire upon selected targets; and Major Cox rallied the remaining two companies of the Lincolns which then tried in vain to advance. The machine-gun fire was as heavy as before.

Meanwhile the two companies (“B” and “D”) of the Rifle Brigade on the Battalion objective found themselves in a veritable death-trap. From either flank and from the rear, they were subjected to a withering fire. One by one the company officers were killed and wounded, until by 8 a.m. there was none left, and the men, weary of being taken in reverse, began to fall back from the road upon the captured trench, astride the Rouges Bancs-Sailly road, which had been consolidated, from a point fifty yards west of the road, to a point two hundred yards beyond it to the east. The situation at 8 a.m. along the 8th Division was as follows. On the right, except for the handful of Northamptons gallantly holding out at Point 372, the operation had been a total failure. On the left the Second Battalion with a few Royal Irish Rifles held two hundred and fifty yards of the German front line. A couple of hundred yards farther to the left Captain Thruston’s detachment of the 2nd Bn. Lincolnshire Regt. held another strip of German front line. And the 13th Bn. London Regt. still held their crater, and were trying to work forward from it. In between these units the enemy was actively holding out, and was bringing so much heavy fire to bear on No-man’s-land that reinforcement was not practicable. A further bombardment was ordered on the right; and the 24th Brigade was told to attack again at 9 a.m. The bombardment was carried out, but at its conclusion, General Oxley declared that it was impossible to make a further attack on the right. His brigade was too disorganized.

Meanwhile the Riflemen were still at work, converting the trench, and building blocks on either flanks. This work had been attended by considerable difficulty, for they were constantly bombed from the flanks and could make no effective reply, owing to the shortage of bombs and the disorganization of the bombers. The reinforcements from the front enabled the defence to be more securely prepared; and the bombing attacks from the flanks more easily repelled. At noon, 2nd-Lieutenant W. E. Gray, the Battalion machine-gun officer, started from the assembly-sap with fifty reinforcements, all but twenty of whom were shot down crossing No-man’s-land. A machine gun had been captured with the trench. 2nd-Lieutenant Gray was able to set this working—a valuable addition to the defences. Just at about that time Colonel Stephens was told of the death of the Brigadier, and his own succession of the Brigade. But for the moment the important thing was to hold the trench; and he remained with the Battalion. At 7.50 p.m. the enemy counter-attacked again. He was easily beaten back, 2nd-Lieutenant Gray’s improvised machine gun contributing powerfully to the result.

At 8.30 p.m. all was quiet. Colonel Stephens then left the captured trench and returned to advanced Brigade Headquarters in the old British front line, to take command of the Brigade. There he was met by the Brigade-Major Captain J. C. Dill with Colonel Hastings Andersons (G.S.O.1. 8th Division). A consultation took place. In view of the failure of the attack at all other points the question was whether to continue to hold the captured trench, or withdraw under cover of darkness. Colonel Hastings Anderson’s information was that the 7th Division would attack next morning. On that assumption it was vitally important to hold what had been taken. Colonel Stephens therefore determined to reinforce the trench with every available man, and to proceed himself to the 7th Division Headquarters in order to arrange for fresh troops to take over as early as possible. He succeeded in organizing a party of some seventy Riflemen with two machineguns, and two bombing parties from the Royal Berkshires. This detachment he sent forward under Captain C. J. Newport, Royal Irish Rifles, who then took command of the trench—for all the senior officers of the Rifle Brigade had been killed. This done, the Acting Brigadier hurried to 7th Division where he was given two companies of the 2nd Bn. Queen’s (Royal West Surrey) Regt. (22nd Infantry Brigade) to relieve his miscellaneous force in the captured trench. All this took some hours. The night was already advanced when they reached the 7th Division. By the time the Queen’s were ready to move off under Colonel Stephens’ leadership it was long past midnight; and far away in the front line the last ill turn of fortune was to be played.

The Counter-attack

The enemy had no intention of giving up his trench without a further struggle. It was not as though a complete sector had been taken from him. He was secure in his original front line on either side of a trifling breach. Under cover of darkness he could attack frontally from Rouges Bancs and, at the same time, he could bomb in from both flanks. Satisfied by his experiences earlier in the day that he had a formidable adversary to encounter, who could not be dealt with by an haphazard or half-hearted approach, he took time to organize a carefully planned minor operation involving three converging and simultaneous attacks. About two hours after midnight, when the senses of the defenders must inevitably have been dulled by fatigue—most of them had been fighting since daylight on the previous morning—a strong force of German infantry suddenly charged the trench from the front, and at the same moment heavy bombing broke out on either flank. The frontal attack was met with machine-gun and rifle fire, and brought to a standstill. But the bombs of the defenders gave out; the blocks at either end of the trench were carried by the enemy; and the flanks were driven in. A fierce hand-to-hand struggle raged up and down the trench, the severity of which may be gauged from a letter written by a Roman Catholic Priest serving in the ranks of the German Army.*

“After two hours’ fighting,” he writes, “the enemy was beaten back. You can scarcely have an idea of the work this represented. How these Englishmen had in twelve hours dug themselves in! The hundred fellows who were in our trenches had brought with them an enormous amount of ammunition, a machine gun and one they had captured from us ... almost every single man of them had to be put out of action with hand grenades. They were heroes all, brave and true to the end, until death ... men of the ‘active English Rifles Brigade.’ ...”

By three in the morning it was over. A few remnants of the Battalion had escaped and made their way back. Fifty were overpowered and taken prisoner. Thirty wounded were picked up next day by the enemy. The remainder of the garrison were dead. And Colonel Stephens arrived with the Queen’s to relieve his battalion, to find that he had no battalion left to relieve. Not one company officer remained. Captain Isaac, who had rejoined for the battle, was missing, together with four other officers. The others were all killed or wounded.** Captain R. C. J. Chichester-Constable, the adjutant, who had been lamed early in the day, and 2nd-Lieutenant Gray, with less than two hundred men, were all that remained. Seventy-seven N.C.O.’s and Riflemen were officially reported killed, three hundred and forty wounded, and two hundred and twelve missing. But of the missing, the greater number were missing forever. It is estimated that less than a hundred were taken prisoners, and of these some thirty were wounded. The remainder were killed ...

*He was killed in action subsequently, and the letter was found on his body and forwarded to Intelligence by whom it was given to a British War Correspondent, Mr. Valentine Williams, subsequently an officer in the Irish Guards.

**The Battalion went into action with twenty-one company officers. Nine were killed, seven wounded and five missing. All the missing were subsequently discovered to have been killed or to have died of wounds.

...The 8th Division reporting on the disaster ascribed it to the strength of the strength of the enemy’s works. Such was the protection afforded by the bomb-proof shelters, impervious to all but the heaviest shells, that, from the moment when the artillery fire ceased, the enemy’s parapets were lined with rifles, and his machine guns opened fire. Even during the bombardment fire had been kept up from the German strong points—an indication of their formidable nature. And new and thicker wire entanglements had been built, on which “the greater part of the guns allotted were of too small a calibre to make an impression in the time allotted.”

Aye

Tom McC

[SiegeGunner]

For Mick, I wonder how well this account meshes with the German account you have.

Some of it is a bit difficult to follow, Tom, as the Germans had their own names for trenches, strongpoints (mostly based on farm buildings) and other landmarks, and I am not familiar with all the names used by the British. As far as I can tell the account coincides very well with the German accounts.

[phil andrade]

Reading the German accounts leaves me with the feeling that, rather than focus on British shortcomings, we ought to attribute the failure of this attack to the skill, resolve and bravery of the defending Germans.

phil

[PhilB]

That implies a shortcoming in the British of one or more of those characteristics. It seems unlikely that the attacking British battalions were lacking in resolution or bravery, so at what level/s should we look for lack of skill?

[squirrel]

Too extensive to quote in detail here but the book, 1915 campaign in France, the battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos, by Lt Col A Kearsey,available from N & MP is a good reference to the planning and outcome of the battles.