Aubers Ridge, 1915

[Pete1052]

And he's going to be disappointed to learn that Pete was actually a nine-mile sniper.

I was an Airborne-qualified Redleg.

[IanA]

You're a partridge now??

[truthergw]

I was an Airborne-qualified Redleg.

Is that an anagram for ledger? You were one of those accountants that get parachuted in from head office? How brave. Some of those hotels in provincial towns can be hell on earth!

[Pete1052]

All it takes for a thread to go all to hell is for a few Pictish guys to become involved.

[SiegeGunner]

My friend Google tells me that a 'Redleg' was a poor white man living on one of various Caribbean islands.

[truthergw]

All it takes for a thread to go all to hell is for a few Pictish guys to become involved.

I'd post something in pictish but we haven't got round to an alphabet yet.

[Steven Broomfield]

No worries, Mr R. I've got the scrolls.

[IanA]

I've got the scrolls.

I believe that's treatable nowadays.

[Pete1052]

I already knew Pete was in the artillery. I am also glad he views the thread as his experience and expertise will be most appreciated in the coming weeks.

Before the Great War infantry, artillery and cavalry had fought together for centuries on many a battlefield, but it was only during the First World War that what we now call the "Combined-Arms Team" began to be developed. Under the combined-arms concept, commanding officers design operational plans that ensure that each of the combat arms has coordinated its fighting in ways that are mutually supporting of the other branches. Combined arms is mainly doctrine on how to fight but there's also an element of command emphasis involved in making it work. It seems to me that Aubers Ridge in 1915 was fairly early in the learning curve of the development of combined-arms techniques. The following is from one of my messages in a recent thread:

It wasn't until World War II when man-portable radios became widely available that artillery firing in the indirect fire mode became truly devastating. In that war forward observers with radios up with the infantry and armor (or in the U.S. Army flying in L-4 Piper Cub light planes) could call for nearly instantaneous concentrations of artillery fire on the enemy. That's what my Dad's 105mm battery did to the Germans in 1945 and what I was ready to do in the event the Soviets had crossed the East-West German border in '78-'81.

During the Great War most artillery fire plans were preconceived scripts written days or weeks before they were fired. It was difficult to change those fire plans midstream to accomodate changing circumstances during the battle because of the limitations they then had with wire communications. Hand-held radios changed all that 25 years later.

[PMHart]

Pete (H),

Indeed. However, there are areas in which the infantry and artillery could and should have done better.

Aye

Tom McC

Hi Tom,

No offence I hope, all I meant was that concepts like suppression were a couple of years down the road. The artillery didn't have the shells, the concepts, the communications, or indeed the trained gunners and practical expertise to operate in an efficient manner or to liaise properly with the infantry. I've been working as you know on Gallipoli and that drives home the backwardness of the army as it struggled to expand massively and at the same time develop modern concepts of warfare...

Hope you lads had a good night on Saturday - wish I could have been there...

Cheers,

Pete

[Robert Dunlop]

Several accounts cited earlier in the thread have shown that attacking units were surprised to find that some of the German wire was below general ground level, which suggests to me that the German front line had only been surveyed from the air, from where such features would probably not be apparent. Similarly with quotes about the difficulty of identifying the locations of German machine-gun positions within the breastworks. Both suggest a lack of close-in night-time patrols in advance of the attacks.

Mick, these are very important points. You have put your finger on an issue that is very rarely discussed when analysing the failures of 1915. The deficiencies highlighted above are in stark contrast to the preparations for the Battle of Picklem Ridge (31st July, 1917) for example. In the latter, the British built up a reasonably comprehensive picture of what lay behind the German wire. The picture was not perfect but, in II Corps at least, it included detailed diagrams and descriptions of key German strongpoints, maps with details of terrain features, etc. This was the work of the Intelligence Officers operating within armies, corps and divisions.

James Beach has drawn attention to this in his excellent thesis 'British Intelligence and the German Army 1914-1918':

"Later in the war Charteris told American intelligence officers that when he deployed to France with a Corps staff in 1914 '... his intelligence section consisted of a little tin box with a key to it, in which to keep important papers; only he had no important papers to put into it'. Charteris' empty box was soon augmented by human resources, and in the subsequent years, from Army to Battalion level, the number of intelligence officers multiplied. ...this growth was most noticeable between 1916 and 1917. At the higher level the concept in 1916 was that Armies were the focus for any meaningflul analysis and that from Corps level downwards intelligence officers were concerned only with the collection of frontline intelligence. This led to a perception that, unlike the operations staff, intelligence work was more demanding at the higher echelons. However from 1917 onwards the permanent establishment of Intelligence Corps officers with Armies and Corps suggests an increase in the status of intelligence work at these levels. Another key development was the upgrading of Corps Staff Officers (Intelligence) from General Staff Officer Grade 3 (GSO3) to General Staff Officer Grade 2 (GSO2). Apparently a direct result of Charteris' lobbying, this change greatly increased the status of intelligence work at this increasingly important level of operational command.

Below this level there were fewer intelligence resources but 1917 still marked a watershed in their development."

Third Ypres saw the coming of age, by comparison with Aubers, of these resources.

Robert

[PhilB]

Mick, these are very important points. You have put your finger on an issue that is very rarely discussed when analysing the failures of 1915. The deficiencies highlighted above are in stark contrast to the preparations for the Battle of Picklem Ridge (31st July, 1917) for example. Robert

Were the "close-in night-time patrols" actually carried out preceding the assault or, as SG suggests, not?

[SiegeGunner]

The German records mention various kinds of activity that led them to suspect an attack was in preparation, but patrols close to their breastworks were not among them. The experience of Sotheby, in the southern sector, shows that it was possible to lie up in holes and hollows close to the German rampart and return safely under cover of darkness, so presumably a patrol could have done likewise.

[Pete1052]

Regarding the development of Combined Arms operational techniques, in his 1992 article "The Secret of Future Victories" General Paul F. Gorman, U.S. Army (Retired) wrote the following:

In 1971, Lieutenant General W.E. DePuy, in a lecture at Fort Benning, took issue with the standard formulation of the mission of infantry pointing out that in World War II, per his recollection, what an infantry company really accomplished on any given day was not to 'close with and destroy the enemy,' but rather to move its artillery forward observer to the next hill. His views were not well received by his audience, but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique.

[Steven Broomfield]

Have to hand it to the thread-starter. 12 pages of rows and recriminations, and dear old Akey appears not to have even visited the Forum since starting this thread.

Classic troll, by the look of it

[markivee]

6th Bavarian Reserve Division to AOK6 - Report on the action at Fromelles (Aubers Ridge), 9 May 1915:

Mick,

is there any mention of 2nd Lt Gray's actions with the machine gun in the 6BRD reports / diaries that you know of ?

Regards

Mark.

[SiegeGunner]

Where was he, Mark, and, briefly, what do British reports say he did with his machine gun?

[markivee]

Where was he, Mark, and, briefly, what do British reports say he did with his machine gun?

He was with the 2nd RB - he led 50 men over no-mans land, he and about 15 men got through to the German trenches, they then captured a German machine gun position, he "got working" the machine gun and used it to clear the trench. He was variously either the last officer or the last man to leave the trenches. His actions won him the MC.

Mark.

[SiegeGunner]

Obviously no mentions by name, Mark, and nothing that I can find about the British attackers 'turning' a German MG. This paragraph, from the after-action report of RIR16, describes the re-taking of the last part of the occupied German trenches to be recaptured:

"The crew of a British machine gun that was brought forward to within 50m of our trenches were shot down to prevent the gun from being brought into action. The troops who had initially broken in were first halted and then systematically driven back and annihilated. Those who took to their heels over the parapet were shot down by our men. As the enemy artillery was still firing on our front line trench and the strongpoint, a small number of British troops were trapped and left behind inside our lines. Contact was eventually established with our men at the eastern end of the trench and the last remnants of the enemy force were then overwhelmed by concerted pressure from east and west. By 6.00pm there were no enemy troops in the trench."

[markivee]

Thank you for looking Mick,

That doesnt sound like the same "action" - they did go and fetch their own MG after the German one ran out of ammunition, but they definitely used it - and got away alive afterwards.

Mark.

[SiegeGunner]

"At 10.30am I received a report that an armoured car had driven down the road from Cordonnerie Farm and unloaded a machine-gun, which had been taken into the enclave held by the enemy."

Report of 2nd Bn, RIR21

"The battle then raged along the whole line, and in ferocious fighting at close quarters, one by one, the British were shot down, killed in hand-to-hand combat, or driven back. By the time night fell the British troops were almost completely cut off. Under cover of darkness, the surviving enemy troops then huddled together in groups and tried to break out to the rear towards their own trenches, but they ran into the fire of the trench garrison as they streamed back and were virtually annihilated. By about 8.30pm the whole trench was back in our hands with the exception of a 50 metre stretch astride the Rouges Bancs-Tommybrücke road, where the enemy held out doggedly until 3.00am when 4/RIR16 (Divisional Reserve, Oberleutnant Gebhard) stormed their position and forced them into submission."

Report of 6BRD to AOK6

[markivee]

"At 10.30am I received a report that an armoured car had driven down the road from Cordonnerie Farm and unloaded a machine-gun, which had been taken into the enclave held by the enemy."

Report of 2nd Bn, RIR21

"The battle then raged along the whole line, and in ferocious fighting at close quarters, one by one, the British were shot down, killed in hand-to-hand combat, or driven back. By the time night fell the British troops were almost completely cut off. Under cover of darkness, the surviving enemy troops then huddled together in groups and tried to break out to the rear towards their own trenches, but they ran into the fire of the trench garrison as they streamed back and were virtually annihilated. By about 8.30pm the whole trench was back in our hands with the exception of a 50 metre stretch astride the Rouges Bancs-Tommybrücke road, where the enemy held out doggedly until 3.00am when 4/RIR16 (Divisional Reserve, Oberleutnant Gebhard) stormed their position and forced them into submission."

Report of 6BRD to AOK6

oo this sounds a likely candidate ... 8.30pm to 3.00am ... wow 5.5hrs is a long time to hold out against the enemy in such a small area, is the "Rouge- bancs-Tommybrucke road" area around the area where the Cobbers memorial is now ?

Thanks Mick

Mark.

[SiegeGunner]

More or less, Mark - the Cobbers memorial is just off that road. Remember that the timings 8.30pm to 3.00am are in German time, so that's 7.30pm to 2.00am British time, which is 6.5 hours by my reckoning .

[markivee]

More or less, Mark - the Cobbers memorial is just off that road. Remember that the timings 8.30pm to 3.00am are in German time, so that's 7.30pm to 2.00am British time, which is 6.5 hours by my reckoning .

ahhh I carried the one and never put it down again...

[Derek Black]

On 30/07/2010 at 14:19, phil andrade said:

I was shocked to read that he saw Germans throwing petrol bombs at the British wounded, and that those members of his battalion who got into the enemy trenches were stripped of their equipment and then shot and thrown over the parapet.

 

On 30/07/2010 at 19:05, SiegeGunner said:

I am sceptical about Sotheby's account. Stripping prisoners of their equipment, killing them and bundling their bodies out over the breastwork seems implausible - and in any case how would Sotheby observe it from his place of refuge in NML, where he was presumably keeping his head down? Throwing bodies (even the bodies of men killed in 'fair' combat) out onto the glacis in front of the breastwork would be pointless because someone would then have to go out and retrieve them later when the machine-gunners at their loopholes started to complain about the smell and the flies.

Sotheby's account is backed up by the diary of a Black Watch Sgt.

May 9th.
"The whole regiment fixed bayonets, "A" and "B" companies on the right, and the remainder of "C" and "D" companies on the left, and word passed that we were to wait for our Colonel's command. At the given word the pipers mounted the parapet, immediately followed by the first line, and we gave them a hearty cheer as they disappeared over the parpapet. We watched their advance. The Germans kept up an awful fire, and men began to drop, but still the remainder kept on until finally a good many disappeared into the German trench. Such a charge I never before saw in my life. Up went the second line, leaving two platoons (seven and eight) to accompany the C.O., and all headquarters to the trench. Very soon we began to see that all was not well with our men in the German trench, who were getting bombed out. Some who were stripped of their equipment had to make a dash back to safety, only to be shot down by Maxim gun fire. Lieut. Wallace was seen to be evicted from the German trench and then riddled with bullets. No. 7 and 8 Platoons were next, the only ones left besides headquarters, and we were ordered to man the parapet, and just as we were ready to go to a almost certain death, the order "Nobody to advance until further orders" was sent along. Thus my luck was in again. The Germans then started firing on our wounded, and it was heart rending to see some of them killed, who would have stood a chance had it been dark. Some too, who lay between the lines, were also killed by shell fire from both sides."