Zuber and Mons

[joerookery]

"After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War," by Echevarria

I have read Tony's book and thought it was well researched. He certainly touches what I consider to be the correct basis. Zuber takes a swipe at Tony in his book on the Ardennes. In the introduction on page 7 He says "He also said that prewar German training was poor. In the last paragraph, he concluded that young officers, motivated by reckless spirit of the offensive launched unprepared attacks. This is a completely orthodox conclusion. The War College professor saw no need to describe how the German regulations prescribed that the infantry attack was to be conducted at company and battalion level or how the troops are actually trained." Having read the regulations, I thought it was pretty clear to me but maybe Zuber has something there that I have not given him credit for.

I thought Zuber's approach was entirely wrong. Unless he has changed positions, Tony was a Lieut. Col. and writer in SSI and was not what I would call a War College professor, at least not when I was teaching there. But yet he seems to dislike Tony's position -- "in a study of German military thinkers before the first world war a professor of strategy at the U.S. Army War College concluded that while high-level military theorists understood the lethality of modern warfare, the troop leaders just didn't get it." I think Tony took a much broader view than the "company commander" limitation of troop leadership.

So if he did not like this then I would question whether he took a broad view and ask again if he made any changes in the new book?

[Paul Hederer]

I looked through "The Mons Myth," today. I'm confining my comments to Zuber's treatment of the Germans--not specifically of Mons or the British.

First impression--I don't see what all the hoopla is about. I Think Zuber generalises a bit, taking examples from one, or a few units, and making sweeping statments about German effectiveness. For example, he sings the praises of the German "combined arms team" (a jarring modern term) but cooperation between artillery and infantry was, and remained, a problem in the German Army--especially during this phase of the war.

He provides a pretty solid explanation of tactical ideas and procedures from the German perspective. The material used in the first 60 pages looks pretty familiar, many of the articles I mentioned covering the topic of German infantry tactics he's used--which will be valuable to non-German speakers--the material extracted from the regulations will be a valuable reference as well.

I think he has a higher opinion of German tactical prowess than the German had of themselves. He's a bit harsh in his judgements, especially of von Kuhl.

Read with a blind eye to the sometimes rather odd commentary, and watering down his black and white declarations, a valuable book for describing German tactical doctrine and techniques (especially in English)--read the conclusions with caution.

Paul

[Jerrymurland]

Where is the Mons Machine gun thread - Increasing senile dementia has prevented me from finding it!!

Jerry

[ulsterlad2]

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...howtopic=105402

check here Jerry

[squirrel]

Paul Hederer post 227 -

Reading Ralph Whitehead's book and comparing the decriptions of the German Army and it's fighting effectiveness compared to Zuber's descriptions I find it difficult to believe that they are both writing about the same Army.

[joerookery]

Arrrrgggghhhhh I received this this morning from Barnes & Noble's. Why the American editions are so slow I have no idea. Maybe he was making some changes? -- just a joke.

Dear Joe Robinson ,

We want to give you an update about the pre-ordered item(s) listed below. Unfortunately, we just got word that the release date for this item(s) has been changed. We expect to ship the item(s) soon and will email you when it is ready to leave our warehouse. If we cannot acquire the item(s) within 30 days, we will notify you by email.

This part of your order has been delayed:

QTY TITLE

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

1 The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle

[Ken S.]

Amazon.ca also doesn't have it available yet. I'm wondering if it would be more expedient simply to order it from the UK. In total, the order would come to £20.01 which I believe will be less than the $34.61 I would have to pay through Amazon.ca. I've ordered a few things through Amazon.co.uk and generally it takes about a week to arrive, but if customs gets their hands on it then I'll end up paying $40 to $45 for it.

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

Paul Hederer post 227 -

Reading Ralph Whitehead's book and comparing the decriptions of the German Army and it's fighting effectiveness compared to Zuber's descriptions I find it difficult to believe that they are both writing about the same Army.

Hello Squirrel,

I have not had the opportunity to read Zuber's book but I am interested in your comment. Could you expand upon your thoughts and findings after looking at both? I would be interested in seeing what you have to say, thanks.

Ralph

[squirrel]

Ralph,

pm sent.

[Jerrymurland]

Ken

Just look on ABE books UK and You'll find several copies for less than £15.

Jerry

[joerookery]

Well now they canceled it -- used books from England sound better all the time.

Shipping Method: Expedited Delivery

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The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle

Terence Zuber

Hardcover

1

Removed

Canceled on:

April 5, 2010

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Gift Message: No

$0.00

$0.00

You

[Ken S.]

Yes, now it's "temporarily" unavailable at Amazon.ca. Ordered from Amazon.co.uk in the end as could have been done long ago. So it goes.

[Mick D]

Read mine last week, whilst I'm happy to take any new information, including opinions , I was a bit annoyed by the repetition of the same underlying points.

Mick

[cdr]

I’ve finished reading The Mons Myth, A reassement of the battle by Terence Zuber.

It was interesting to say the least. If you are like me not an expert in the training methods of the Imperial German army, the relevant chapters in the book are informative. You can but conclude that Germany took its preparation for war extremely serious “ forty years of training...”.The juxtaposition of British and German sources might lead to a better understanding of the events on the battlefield.

HOWEVER

Certain oddities do appear on a second lecture. Once again the Belgian and British armies are added to prove the inferiority of German numbers. It is a fact that the German invasion of Belgium is the sole reason for the presence of the small Belgian army on the allied side. Furthermore the presence of the British army on the Continent if Belgium was not invaded,

is debatable.

As I’m interested in the Belgian army I will focus on that part of the book.

Mr. Zuber seems to have used only two publications (p.276) on the operations of the Belgian army. Other information on the Belgian army comes from “ Weltkrieg” a German publication. Both dating from the warperiod itself. For a reason that is unclear to me he calls these Official history I and II. This is odd when you consider the existence of “ État-major général de l'Armée (red.): Les opérations de l'armée belge pendant la Campagne de 1914-1918. Bruxelles: Ministère de la défense nationale, 1928.” I would call this an official history if ever there was one.

- Liege : According to mr. Zuber , were the German troops on peace time strenght only. (600 in a battalion, 1800 in a Regiment). According to “Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, Reichsarchiv Berlin 1925” 34 infantry brigade under Generalmajor von Kraewel lost 30 officers and 1150 men at Liege (and temporarily lost two regimental flags). Now the numbers mr. Zuber gives are a lot lower (p.278) 212 casualties in total. I do not know why there is this difference. His numbers do seem to be low when it suits him (eg Belgian casualties for the war). He also (although he frequently talks about them in his book) gives no numbers for jäger battalion 7 . A quick reference search gave me the following data for this unit: Major Donalies, bat. Commander kia before Liege, hauptmann von Rolshausen, commander 1e comp. Kia before Liege, hauptmann von Arnim, commander 2e comp. kia before Liege; hauptmann von Kortzfleisch, commander 3e comp. Kia before Liege. Now such losses under the senior officers of a unit seem to indicate extremely heavy losses to me.

- Orsmael – Gussenhoven the description of this encounter corresponds largely to Belgian sources. Unfortunately mr. Zuber deemed it unnecessary to check Belgian sources. These put 5 cavalry platoons of the 3e lancers in this location (between 20 and 30 in each platoon) (about 29 kia). Mr Zuber puts 4 squadrons there. There is also no mention of the execution of civilians after the battle.

- The description of Haelen is more or less correct (although no MG with the cyclists , only a (1) light Hotchkiss or Lewis present). Why has the name of Otto von Garnier , commander 2 German cavalry division, changed to Greiner ?

In short, this book suffers from some sloppy research and an uncritical approach to part of its sources. Could do a lot better.

Carl

[Paul Hederer]

Dear Carl,

I believe Zuber is referring to the German official history, "Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918," volumes 1 and 2 in his work where you mention Weltkrieg I and II as the sources. I checked his reference for chapter 3, footnote 4, and information and page number he gives checks with volume 1 of "Der Weltkrieg."

I couldn't agree with you more on the sources, and mentioned this in relation to the sections on German tactics in my review at Amazon.

Best Regards,

Paul

[cdr]

Paul

Thanks for the reply

Another thing. Some German sources I've read talk about the use of regimental flags on the field. eg death of oberst Friedrich Wilhelm Prinz zur Lippe-Detmold, commander Ir74 near Liege

: "befahl der Prinz dem neben ihm befindlichen Fahnenträger des I. Bataillons, die Fahne zu schwenken " .

This struck me as odd, especially if you see this in connection with modern tactical procedures as described by Zuber.

any thoughts ?

Carl

[Robert Dunlop]

Carl, there is a similar example in Ralph's book. During an attack, at least one of the flags had to be buried to avoid capture. It was retrieved after the war.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Carl,

Robert's answered your question on the use fo flags.

Your confusion on Weltkrieg I and II is easily understood. Unless I'm missing it, I don't see a full citation given.

Paul

[cdr]

Thanks all

I was actually looking to find out if the use of flags was still covered in regulations

Paul

maybe you can help with this. Since when are there "Handbuch der Truppenfuher" is use by German soldiers. Belgian forces used a french translation of one of these and I would like to find out which one they copied.

Carl

[Robert Dunlop]

I was actually looking to find out if the use of flags was still covered in regulations.

Carl, not that I have read but I will keep an eye open for this.

Robert

[joerookery]

Okay after a long series of vacations, graduations, cruises and who knows what else I have finally finished the book. It is far better than his book on the Ardennes. However, it was a very difficult read and the author entirely lost credibility after the important first 67 pages of the book. My interest is the doctrine and training and then from a case study perspective seeing how this was applied. He does not make a clear distinction that there are manuals for the different branches and they were not combined under one super manual like the current U.S. Army. Zuber makes the leap from what Clausewitz calls war on paper to real war. In book one of Clausewitz, there are some very short chapters that would have done the author well to ingest. Especially Chapter 7. He goes from doctrine and a good explanation of the existing infantry doctrine to his giant leap that execution of the doctrine was well done because of the doctrine itself, battle drills, and troop leading procedures.

“At the tactical level to German army showed what 40 years of hard and serious work could accomplish. The mission was the most difficult imaginable: hasty attack on a very strong defensive position. The German army executed this mission superbly. The Germans fought a combined arms battle. Tactical cavalry reconnaissance and security were good. In spite of some great terrain difficulties, artillery support was usually decisive… the infantry showed its mastery of fire and movement are repeatedly crossing open ground…”

This comes from his evaluation of Mons. It directly contradicts his analysis of doctrine on page 45 where he says “The infantry attack on a deployed enemy was the baseline tactic of all German attacks.” “In an attack on a deployed enemy, the attacker had the time to conduct careful reconnaissance patrols led by infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineer officers, while the main body was still advancing. “ Perhaps trying to view this through the lens of the battalion, brigade or division operations officer he might find the reconnaissance to be somewhat lacking. Perhaps okay for a company commander but less acceptable to the headquarters above.

The Imperial German machine had a serious series of debates and disagreements on the baseline documents themselves as well as any endeavor to do a combined arms synchronized attack. There were many reasons for these disagreements, many are laid out in the Handbook of Imperial Germany and some have been discussed here. Given the technology of 1914 synchronization was incredibly difficult. Synchronization works best–best but not well–when there is great communication. Radio contact between artillery batteries, forward observers, cavalry patrols and infantry regiments left something to be desired and makes synchronizing these diverse elements difficult. Add in a tablespoon of friction and we get the confusion that we all are studying. Once again however, the author has this incredible bias that is so very pro-German that it is like the little boy who cried Wolf. I am sure that some of his claims have a lot of merit. I am not from Great Britain and don’t have the emotional attachment to this engagement but you really get tired of his one-sided view of execution. Why are German officers who make statements in regimental histories great experts as opposed to their opponents?

One key thing I can say to explain his view is that he is very very anti-Kuhl. I don’t necessarily agree with him entirely but his rejection of the German First Army Corps leadership certainly explains some of his findings. It does not necessarily square with the recent book by Herwig but at least he can draw his conclusions in part from his view on the operational movement. Unless I missed something entirely he did not reference the 1929 book by Kuhl entitled “Movements and Supply of the German First Army during August and September 1914”. This might have been useful.

Back to the doctrine. Gone are the horrible premise problems of the Ardennes’s book.

He does not reject operational and strategic warfare as a premise of this book. In addition, he discusses both the 1889 doctrinal manual as well as the 1906 manual. However, he does nothing to address the 1895 and in 1909 cavalry documents–to say nothing of the artillery, etc. etc. Maybe he read some of the comments made previously. I really do not think he did a bad job of this. I think he has done a service in laying out in English prose how the system was supposed to work. His view however, is still encapsulated from the viewpoint of a company commander. He focuses repeatedly on troop leading procedures and battle drills. He does not do justice to the execution as spelled out by Clausewitz.

There is a dearth of books explaining Imperial German doctrine and training in the English language. One can always get a hold of the 1915 Balck but Zuber has definitely stirred the waters. I would buy the book for the first 67 pages understanding that it is an infantry focus. I would take things from his analysis of the battles without putting too much credence in his conclusions–I am sure there are a lot of good nuggets to be mined. You do have to get over his one sidedness and it is not easy. It certainly will make you research.

[Ken S.]

Paul

Thanks for the reply

Another thing. Some German sources I've read talk about the use of regimental flags on the field. eg death of oberst Friedrich Wilhelm Prinz zur Lippe-Detmold, commander Ir74 near Liege

: "befahl der Prinz dem neben ihm befindlichen Fahnenträger des I. Bataillons, die Fahne zu schwenken " .

This struck me as odd, especially if you see this in connection with modern tactical procedures as described by Zuber.

any thoughts ?

Carl

The newsletter for the veterans organization of Garde-Grenadier Regiment Nr. 4 has an interesting article about German flags that were lost/captured during the war. For example:

"Die Fahne des Fues-Batls. des 3. Garde-Rgts. z. F., die nach dem Kriege bei Aufraeumung des Schlachtfeldes der Marneschlacht am 20. Januar 1920 bei St. Leonard gefunden worden ist. Ein unbekannter deutscher Soldat hatte das Fahnentuch um seinen Koerper gewickelt in der Hoffnung, es vor dem Feinde verborgen halten zu koennen."

and

"Am 9. 10. 1914 verbrannte die Fahne des II. Batls. Landwehr-Regts. Nr. 18 in Bakalarzewo in einem von Granaten in Brand geschossenen Hause, in dem sie aufbewahrt wurde. Alle Versuche, die sofort in Flammen stehende Fahne aus dem Hause herauszuholen, misslangen Man rettete nur die Metallteile."

[cdr]

Thank you Ken for the info

Could your first sample be the same as that one mentioned by Robert ?

Carl

[Ken S.]

I can't say for certain, but it doesn't sound like it. In the case of the 3. Garde-Regt. z. F. it sounds as though whoever buried him wasn't aware of the flag being on his person.

[Robert Dunlop]

No, not the same example. Interesting though.

Robert