Blocking the Channel

[centurion]

On August the 2nd Sir Edward Grey informed the French ambassador

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French Coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power"

Was there any evidence to provide anticipation that the German fleet might be considering such a move?

[per ardua per mare per terram]

It was a basic anticipation of the use of sea power. Gray, Churchill et al had read their Julian Stafford Corbett, Alfred Thayer Mahan and other such works.

Edited 20 December , 2009 by per ardua per mare per terram

[Ron Clifton]

Hello centurion

It was a guarantee which enabled the French to concentrate their fleet mainly in the Mediterranean, where its presence would of course add to the security of British interests in the Middle East, and reduce the need to station British ships there. The French could use Toulon as their base, whereas the British bases at Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria were placed where they gave ships a lower radius of action (generally speaking).

Ron

[centurion]

Thanks Ron

The reason I asked is that this is a promise made public before Britain entered the war. Whilst I can see the advantages of the French concentrating in the Med I wondered if the need to make the statement before the British ultimatum suggests that a more immediate threat was being countered

[truthergw]

Not an answer to the question but the guarantee was used a couple of days later as one of the reasons why we would have to declare war.

[Ron Clifton]

Centurion

There is a volume (XI, I think) in the official series British Documents on the Origins of the War which contains the Foreign Office telegrams and minutes between the assassination at Sarajevo and the declaration of war. One of the points which emerges is that Britain was anxious to send strong signals to Germany that Britain was prepared to enter a general European conflict if it felt its own wider interests were threatened. The assumption that the original casus belli, even after it escalated to include France and Russia, would not draw Britain in could not be taken for granted.

In this way it was hoped that Germany would have second thoughts about letting the Balkan problem spread. It seems to have worked to some extent, in that the German ambassador in London was sure that Britain was not bluffing, but the "war parties" in Berlin and Vienna did not agree, with the tragic consequences we all know.

The tricky problem facing Britain was that Asquith could not even count on the support of his own cabinet, let alone the House of Commons, to a commitment to war.

Ron