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Remembered Today:

Fisher's Invasion Plan


PhilB

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Intriguing - what did Andrew Lambert have to say about the prospect of an entanglement with a neutral country? As in order to achieve a successful seaborne invasion of North-West Germany, surely either Holland or Denmark would have had to be involved. Where would the troops and supplies have come from and how would the mine menace have been overcome? Not saying it wouldn't have been possible, only that there would have been a huge number of practical difficulties and that it would certainly have been a risky strategy without first having secured a victory over the German High Seas Fleet. I'd be interested in learning what Jellicoe thought of the proposal!

mb

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Simon,

Who is Andrew Lambert and on what basis is he extremely positive? What were the objectives of such an invasion and what resourcing did he allocate to it? These are complex operations requiring significant logistics and resourcing. Does Lambert suggest how the British could have sustained such an invasion through to the achievement of its objective and maintained forces on the Western Front in 1915?

These "what ifs" are rather pointless discussions as we are simply working on postulation and making a host of assumptions, that may or may not have occurred had the "what if" event actually taken place. Simply time wasters that achieve nothing of substance. I am sure if the Gallipoli Campaign had not proceeded there would be people arguing it would have succeeded had it been attempted, all based on incorrect, broad brush assumptions.

Cheers

Chris

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Take a look at the amber coast, the Heligoland Bight, Friesland and the Jade roadsteads on a chart. Possibility of bottling up the HSF ? Impossible to retain the element of surprise in approach and being very shallow, rather easy to defensively mine. Lots of old U-boats arranged in an arc, acting as floating sentry boxes. And they tended to bring their torpedoes with them.

Small scale destroyer probes into these waters 1917/18 proved nasty, costly little affairs, justifying earlier Admiralty aversion. Any invasion fleet would have been shredded before it reached the coast. None in Admiralty would have backed such an expensive venture when capital ships were at risk, something Fisher knew full well when he first proposed the idea (even his inner circle baulked at the prospect). I suggest the Machiavellian Fisher's motivations in presenting this concept at this specific juncture, must be analysed more roundly...

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Simon,

Who is Andrew Lambert and on what basis is he extremely positive? What were the objectives of such an invasion and what resourcing did he allocate to it? These are complex operations requiring significant logistics and resourcing. Does Lambert suggest how the British could have sustained such an invasion through to the achievement of its objective and maintained forces on the Western Front in 1915?

These "what ifs" are rather pointless discussions as we are simply working on postulation and making a host of assumptions, that may or may not have occurred had the "what if" event actually taken place. Simply time wasters that achieve nothing of substance. I am sure if the Gallipoli Campaign had not proceeded there would be people arguing it would have succeeded had it been attempted, all based on incorrect, broad brush assumptions.

Cheers

Chris

Andrew Lambert is probably the most high-profile naval historian Britain has at the moment. His Wikipedia page says it all. I don't agree with everything he's ever written but he's not the kind of guy to be ignored lightly. If memory serves his argument went like this: the number of troops the Germans had in North-West Germany was extremely small, but was increased after 1916, leaving a window of opportunity which the navy would help utilize. I didn't take notes as it was a talk about wider British Naval Strategy, 1914-1916.

I'm assuming that you're working on the assumption that Lambert doesn't know what he's talking about. He's readily contactable at King's College, London if you wish to satisfy your curiosity.

Simon

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Simon,

Thank you for that. Much appreciated.

I'm not saying he doesn't know what he's talking about. But to say the Germans had few troops there in 1915, implies the Germans would not have reacted to an invasion with substantially more troops once the landing was made. The Turks had very few troops opposing the initial Gallipoli landings and those at Suvla in August, yet the Allies made little headway. Again, it is alright to suggest an invasion but what were the objectives of the operation, how many resources would be allocated to the mission and how was it it to be sustained? These are the guts of the issue.

He may well be a distinguished naval historian but what is his expertise regarding land operations? An amphibious landing is a joint operation, but once the troops are ashore it becomes a military (army) operation. My experience with many military historians is that while they have a very detailed knowledge of their sources, they often demonstrate a lack of detailed knowledge of the subject or profession they are writing about. That is, the mechanics of military operations, how they are planned, the functions of various forces, the logistics required to support them and how armies actually work in the field. Nearly all of them ignore the friction and fog of war, which always occur in operations, both naval and military. Even the best of them need to be challenged as most are not practitioners in the profession which they write about; they are observers, many of them having no practical experience in either military or naval operations.

Take Gallipoli for example. Most historians, including some of our most distinguished, show they have no idea of the role of a covering force with regard to the Anzac landing or of an intermediate objective in regard to Helles. Yet they feel quite comfortable criticising both the 3rd Brigade's objective at Anzac and Achi Baba as an objective at Helles, when in fact they are actually demonstrating their ignorance. We read criticism the 3rd Brigade was given such a wide objective to defend and hold, when, in fact, it was quite usual for covering forces to be given such a wide frontage and covering forces do not defend or hold any ground, they act as a screen and disrupt and delay as long as they can. Some historians have made the criticism that nothing could be seen from Achi Baba, so why make it the objective on the first day. They fail to understand that it was an intermediate objective and that in military operations forces move in bounds, from one secure objective to another; Achi Baba was to be the first bound upon which the force consolidated before advancing further. This is a sound military practice and Achi Baba was the only suitable ground on which to place the first bound or intermediate objective.

I am not over-awed by any historian, no matter how famous or distinguished he or she may be.

I would be interested in the details of Lambert's assertion. Did he provide any information on where the landing was to be made, what its strategic objective was, what forces were to be allocated to the task and an indication of the logistics required to sustain such an operation through to a successful conclusion? Did he indicate what the German reaction was likely to be and whether or not such a redeployment of troops would have a decisive effect on the the Western Front? Given the Turks blunted the Gallipoli landings on the first day, does Lambert say why the British landings in NW Europe in 1915 would have been more successful?

Regards

Chris

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I'm assuming that you're working on the assumption that Lambert doesn't know what he's talking about.

He doesn't seem to be talking about it very much, Simon. Do you have any references/links to articles etc by Lambert developing this idea? I can't find any.

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If memory serves his argument went like this: the number of troops the Germans had in North-West Germany was extremely small, but was increased after 1916, leaving a window of opportunity which the navy would help utilize.

I'm assuming that you're working on the assumption that Lambert doesn't know what he's talking about. He's readily contactable at King's College, London if you wish to satisfy your curiosity.

The number of troops available in the sector was only one of the factors to be considered. The defences in the area were considerable and included wireless fitted trawlers, as reported by the crews who took part in the Cuxhaven Raid. So even before the German army adopted the idea, their navy had defence in depth. They had machine guns available in large numbers, both aboard ships, which could be landed, and as anti aircraft defence. Therefore the initial responses would have included considerable firepower. Even if eliminated (no mean feat in itself) the Germany navy and support staff could have organised a devastating local defence for their home soil. Did Lambert mention the railway network in the area and how quickly the number of troops could have been supplemented? This was a feature missing in Gallipoli, yet the Turks put up fierce resistance. If his comment ignored the High Seas Fleet completely, as seems to follow from what has been posted, maybe he hadn’t thought the idea through fully.

I’m working on the basis of the original documents I’ve read and the responses of senior officers of the time including Tyrwhitt, Oliver and Richmond as well as contemporary historians naval like Corbett. Trying to close the debate down by saying in effect: this bloke, who has a good Wiki page, said this might have worked and that is the end of it; if you don’t like it talk to him, seems a bit of a narrow use of a discussion forum.

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I've tried getting in touch with Lambert, and haven't heard anything back from him. I am fully aware of what one would have to examine in order to judge the German response to a British invasion/raid. I just think it eminently reasonable to assume, in light of his past record and position as a naval historian of note at one of the few academic departments devoted to military and history, that Lambert would have done some research on the matter.

As to use of the discussion forum, I presented an alternative view and made it clear that there was little background to it, a fact I am trying to remedy. In light of the further debate it has provoked I see no reason why it would be called "narrow use".

Simon

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I just think it eminently reasonable to assume, in light of his past record and position as a naval historian of note at one of the few academic departments devoted to military and history, that Lambert would have done some research on the matter.

Simon,

Thank you for chasing up Lambert on this matter.

It certainly is a reasonable assumption. I accept your opinion that he is a distinguished naval historian, I know nothing of his work and have little knowledge of naval history or the mechanics of naval operations. Nonetheless, there are enough histories written by"eminent" historians that are flawed in their arguments. These fellows are not infallible and some have deliberately distorted the facts to suit their own prejudices or to make a pre-conceived case. I am not suggesting Lambert is in this group.

We are not attacking him or you. All we are doing is enquiring about the basis on which he made his claim and asking his lines of thought on issues that are pertinent in coming to his conclusion.

Good to have you back in the discussion.

Regards

Chris

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One essential requirement for the success of Fisher's Baltic plan was the blocking of the Kiel Canal and this was going to be difficult to achieve. Unless the Canal was blocked the HSF would have the advantage of interior lines.

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Having a long-standing interest in the extremely detailed preparatory studies and plans made by Tyrwhitt and Admiral Bacon for an amphibious landing at Westende/Middelkerke and operations against Ostend and Zeebrugge - the former going as far as the building of a huge landing pontoon and the training of troops, the latter being modified beyond all recognition by Keyes, I shall be very interested indeed to discover what kind of operation Lambert envisaged for the North West German coast.

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Anyone still interested in this thread, may like to know that Bacon's book on the Dover Patrol is available to view and download in PDF format from the Internet Archive - see link below

http://www.archive.org/details/doverpatrol01bacogoog

Chapter XI deals with Bacon's plans for a 'Great Landing'. It never became a reality, principally due to Douglas Haig's significant precondition - the success of the Passchendaele Offensive.

Regards,

mb

PS Bacon's Westende/Middelkerke plan was not the same as what Fisher had in mind, so are we in danger of being off topic?

If so then we need to start a new thread in order to continue.

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PS Bacon's Westende/Middelkerke plan was not the same as what Fisher had in mind, so are we in danger of being off topic?

Not as far as I'm concerned, and it was me that mentioned it. Bacon's surveys, preparatory studies and plans were the nearest anyone actually got to an amphibious landing in enemy territory, so they give some indication, on a smaller scale, of the problems Fisher's plan would likely have encountered.

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OK then - Sticking with Bacon's small-scale landing on the Belgium coast (definately not he same thing as a seaward invasion of Germany). He proposed using 3 assault points a mile or so apart, just down the coast from Ostend. Each landing point was to be spearheaded by a brace of monitors equipped with a with an improvised pontoon landing stage lashed between them, and protuding a considerable distance ahead of them. Approx.4,500 men, 3 tanks and a small assortment of field artillery were allocated in support of each of the 3 assault elements who would be reliant on the pontoon jetties in order to get ashore. Assuming at least one set of monitors would have fallen foul of sea-mines or shore batteries even before getting near to the vicinity of the designated landing point, plus a huge risk of a technical malfunction effecting one or other of the remain two monitor combinations, the optimism that Bacon expresses in his book does seem to me to be somewhat overstated and unjustified. I certainly would not have rated his chances of success as highly as he did. I certainly give Bacon credit for wanting to take the fight to the enemy, but feel that the difficulties associated with an amphibious landing of the sort he describes were not sufficiently comprehended. Maybe I'm wrong and perhaps others on the forum might feel differently - obviously there's no right answer to this one, all we are doing is expressing our opinions about an event that never in fact happened.

mb

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I wasn't meaning that we should discuss it as such, but merely to note the formidable difficulties/obstacles that even such small-scale enterprises would entail. Tyrwhitt's plan to attack the lock gates at Zeebrugge likewise stands as a model for the difficulties that would have been encountered in an attempt to block the western exit from the Kiel Canal.

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Sorry Mick, my misunderstanding.

Anyway there's a nice article about Operation Hush - the invasion of the Belgium Coast to be found found on the Long Trail website.

As you say difficulties involved with any amphibious landing are invariably formidable, and not helped by fact that in this particular case, the German MarinesKorps Flandern were there ready and waiting.

mb

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Ah Simon,

You should know by now how intolerant these revisionist armchair generals can be. Still, we would agree its always amusing when they dip their toes into matters maritime.

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Similarly bath tub admirals can be rather blinkered and can fall flat on their faces, especially when commenting on land warfare. As my reading encompasses land, sea and air war and isn’t confined to the minute portion of human history that is WWI my reading has encompassed many historians. I have read the works of supposed eminent historians who quote meaningless references and others where I’ve read the primary sources’ they have ignored or misinterpreted. So I don’t bow down and worship when a historian speaks. In this case we have a remark supposedly by a historian, who doesn’t appear to have published his theory. It is therefore reasonable to question what may need to be considered for the operation to have been a success.

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In the meantime, has Andrew Lambert replied to the e-mail. I'm very keen to hear what he has to say in light of the comment posted above.

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Is it revisionist to comment on the many and various amphibious landing schemes that were seriously being um'd and ahr'd about by the Imperial War Council itself? Fortunately there are numerous contemporary accounts and post-war memoirs providing a great deal of insight into these ambitious proposals (as well as revealing a great deal about the menality and limitations of the men then in charge at the Admiralty). I must confess that I don't quite understand the target or purpose of Clio's attack as I believe it's fairly evident that nobody was discussing pointless what-if's or mindlessly playing at being admirals and generals here. Haven't the contributors to this thread simply been commenting on actual wartime proposals all of which had advanced well into the planning stage before their eventual flaws became exposed?.

In the case of the Baltic invasion plan, the difficulties of forcing an entry into the Baltic and occupying it in such strength as to enable a large scale landing of British & Russian soldiers on the Pomeranian Coast were seemingly being underestimated by the senior figures in charge (at least during the initial stages). However, I'm not convinced that Fisher would ever have actually given the Baltic landing proposal the final green light, even if Churchill was keen on it. Clearly naval staff officers (Richmond amougnst them) knew well enough what it would have meant in terms of likely losses.

I had been waiting for Simon to perhaps be in a position to provide us with a little more enlightenment on Lambert's actual reasons for thinking that the Baltic invasion plan might just have been feasible, but unfortunately, up until now, this hasn't been forthcoming (may one of his reasons be that the Pomeranian coastline was somewhat lacking in coastal artillery?). However, even if this was the case, the waters of the Baltic certainly wouldn't have been lacking in enemy mines or torpedoes and once ashore the invading army would soon have discovered just how difficult it would have been for them to be resupplied (and how quick and easy it could have been for the Germans to move up troops and material of their own in order to repel the Allies attack).

The less ambitious plan for a landing on the Belgian coast and a move on Ostend could possibly (with luck) have succeeded, had things gone differently with the Passchendaele Offensive.

Unfortunately one other of these quirky War Council proposals for landings facilitated by the navy did eventually make it past the planning stage. Sadly the Gallipoli landings really did expose the limitations of ill-conceived and inadequately resourced seaborne invasion attempts. Or am I dipping my toes into hot water enough already?

Hopefully this thread still has enough momentum to keep it going a little longer.

mb

mb

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Please don’t get me wrong. Its’ not a matter of what you say ( if you want to parade your inadequate knowledge of the maritime war – well that’s up to you) rather it’s the way in which you express your views. You see to me, it is all too reminiscent of that nasty 'little englander' ideological bludgeoning which passes for reasoned discourse on other forums within this site.

'...Similarly bath tub admirals can be rather blinkered and can fall flat on their faces, especially when commenting on land warfare. As my reading encompasses land, sea and air war and isn’t confined'[/i]

As for you royal, I dont think those people who run this site (who know my identity) would question either my capacity, or my authority to comment on matters per mare or per terreum .

I say it again. You armchair generals are just so funny.

Sadly your salient lack of knowledge of matters maritime (admit it, you had not even heard of Lambert before this thread) greatly curtails any personal interest in your observations.

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It would seem that some people are rather touchy about legitimate speculation as to the possible success of Fisher's invasion plan. No one here is claimimg to be an 'armchair general' or a 'bath tub admiral', but merely offering any wisdom they might have on plans that were actually put forward at the time. If any one posts anything that is incorrect, then surely the point of these threads is for those inaccuracies to be politely corrected by those that are better informed. It's why forums exist.

Anyway, back to the thread!

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As for you royal, I dont think those people who run this site (who know my identity) would question either my capacity, or my authority to comment on matters per mare or per terreum

I say it again. You armchair generals are just so funny..

Clio,

I would think 35 years service as a professional soldier, which included war service and later commanding and planning at the operational level in the joint services arena, is hardly the stuff of armchair generalship. Hence my concerns about the views of some historians who have never been practitioners or actually experienced operational service, but who are the real "armchair generals and bathtub admirals" when it comes to dissecting what should and could have happened.

Having been involved in planning a proposed amphibious operation on a rather smaller scale, it confirmed in my mind admirals are not always aware of the difficulties of actually getting and establishing the troops ashore and sustaining them in the subsequent land operation. It is not a simple matter of dropping them on the beach, nor are invasions simply maritime operations as you seem believe. They are complex joint operations that require the skills of naval, army and air commanders and planners to ensure the reason for putting the troops ashore in the first place is achieved successfully.

What is this capacity and authority you have Clio? I can only assume from your comments above you have considerable naval and military experience? Royal Marines perhaps?

As you are a self professed authority on all matters maritime and military, what is your view of the subject under discussion? Could the invasion have succeeded? By this I am not questioning the ability of the navy to get the troops ashore, but the success of the subsequent land operations in achieving the strategic objective for which the invasion would be made.

Cheers

Chris

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'...As you are a self professed authority on all matters maritime and military...

No not self-professed. Never that. I am happy to let my previous posts stand or fall by virtue of their content (but the clues are all there for anyone with the skill to assemble them). Rather I was defending myself against royal.

I have no requirement whatsoever to justify my standing to the likes of you and your hectoring, bullying kind, Crunchy. I just wish you would stand back and look at the domineering tone you adopt in some of your posts - a view taken by others who have contacted me privately, let me assure you. In my view you regularly succeed only in killing any real attempt at debate before it gets going, though this trait is legion on planet baker. Clumsy bludgeoning is not quite on the same level as reasoned examination of the strengths and weaknesses of a given case. Your contributions are sometimes priceless but the manner in which you often deliver them, is quite deplorable.

The strength of fora like this is their democratisation of debate. Their weakness is that they reduce the erudite to the same level as the ranting, flag-draped, bombastic blimp - just one reason why several academics of international repute refuse to touch this site with a barge pole.

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Thank you for your comment Clio.

If my posts have come across as such to you, and others, please accept my sincere apologies. They were never meant to be hectoring or bullying. I accept I can be direct in stating a position or asking a question, and if that is taken as hectoring and bullying then I humbly apologise to all who have felt that way. I assure you bullying is not in my character and it was never my intent. I regret very much that I have given such an impression I know the written form can be misinterpreted and particularly in fora such as this I shall take your words on board and be more careful in future.

Again, please accept my sincere apologies.

Regards

Chris

PS I have no idea what planet baker is.

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