Fisher's Invasion Plan

[SiegeGunner]

Admiral Bacon, who was an enthusiast for amphibious operations and large-scale naval enterprises, also wrote a biography of Fisher - after the war, so with the benefit of hindsight on operations both mounted and mooted. Does anyone have a copy? It would be interesting to see what he had to say about Fisher's Baltic scheme.

[bob lembke]

Fisher has been described as "eccentric" (amongst other adjectives !) but he was First Sea Lord, German Intelligence would no doubt be atuned to his thoughts and ideas - might this "planning" have just been a ruse to convince Germany to keep more of her "ersatz" troop strength ("100 divisions +") at home, just in case, when perhaps it could of been more decisively used elsewhere ?

Steve;

The forces available in Germany, such as every regiment's Ersatz=Bataillon, were organized, but sending them to the front would have seriously disrupted the functioning of the German Army, preparation of recruits, management of convalecents, etc. So they really were not free to be sent to the front. But in the homeland, operating on interior lines, having close access to supply, in the case of an invasion, they would have been able troops. But they were not being "kept" from the front.

The campaign in East Prussia in the opening weeks of the war is instructive. Almost the entire active army was sent against France to strike a decisive blow before the Russians could mobilize. But the Russians moved more quickly than anticipated, and I think that there only was one first-rate army corps in the East. Scratch units were organized, some third-rate Landsturm units were activated, and these forces, operating on interior lines, on very familiar terrain, absolutely destroyed the two invading armies. One Russian army commander walked into the woods and blew his brains out. Three second-rate (reserve) army corps, including my grand-father's, were rushed east to attempt to foil the invasion, but the forces on the site had the job done before they were able to arrive.

The one active army corps on the site, commanded by an ethnic Frenchman, I believe, exercising the extreme command flexibility in the German Army which I have posted about several times, distained the thought of going to the defense defense and loss of Prussian territory, and, ignoring orders to drop back to a defensive line along a river to join the other German forces, put in motion his own invasion of Russia, going against one of the Russian armies. The German commander in the East, panicked by his one first-line force marching off the map, had a nervous breakdown, and Hindenburg had to be rushed out of retirement, paired with Colonel Ludendorff as his chief of staff, and rushed to the east to take over from the shattered commander. This is another example of the combat effectiveness of these third-rate units, organized into combat units in a matter of days.

The Landsturm formations in Germany, which themselves could have been aggregated into about 75 divisions, were considered too old for combat service outside of Germany, but had all had at least two or three years' active service, and then about 15-20 years in the reserves, with some additional training, and in a defensive action, with dense transport resources to spare their creaking legs, they would have formed a formidable force, even if partially armed with old-pattern, even single-shot German rifles, or Russian rifles, and quite thin in artillery. These men were also not being diverted from the front, they were generally not physically fit for front-line duty, but did work like guarding the lines of communication and guarding POWs.

I have seen analysis that in the opening days of the war the Allies in the West were totally surprised by the effectiveness of the German Reserve (second-rate) formations, and may not have even thought that they were going to be sent to the front. This is supposedly why many thought that they would have been victorious in a matter of weeks.

So none of these forces, Ersatz and Landsturm potentially totalling over 100 divisions, were being kept from the front.

As for the forces on the Western Front, they would have had the option of a major attack on the thinned British lines, or sending sizable formations of first-rate troops back to Germany, realizing that the British must have stripped their lines.

Again, in three weeks the Germans could have organized 100-150 divisions in Germany, perhaps 25-30 of them being first-rate troops, without seriously stripping the front. With the advantages of fighting for the homeland, on interior lines, with supplies close at hand, and the numerical advantage of the defense, and the British saddled by the uncertainties of convoluted supply routes, amphibious landings, etc., the proposition of such a landing is really bejond the realm of possibility. The major ports had large formations of naval infantry and Marines, and German sailors, even dock workers, were trained in infantry tactics for possible landings, and they would not have handed over the dock facilities undamaged or not thought of scuttling ships in the right places.

Bob

[bob lembke]

I think that "Egypt"'s post is quite convincing, the old duck really intended to do it. This illustrates the faults of "star-quallity" leadership, allowing adoration and political connections to overwhelm any sensible staff work. The construction of 612 vessels for this whacky proposal, including capital ships, is astonishing.

I am presently finishing reading a classic 400 page work on the structure and resources of the Imperial Army re: 1914-1918, "Cron". That is why I have a lot of these figures at my fingertips. I have not given any sources, but will do so happily on request. A lot of my figures are from Cron, who published in 1937, while a lot of his sources were destroyed during WW II.

But a lot of the information on german strength, formations, location, etc. could be easily deduced from freely published and publicly sold pre-war German materials, such as the 1914 p/w Rangliste, over 1500 pages of detailed information, published by the tens of thousands of copies, (I have 35 editions on my shelves) which must have been available and possessed by British MI. Astonishing that such an idea could have advanced any distance at all. Did Fisher bother at all with Army staff input?

The pairing of Fisher and Churchill is classic. I have the conceit of the notion that both my father (at Gallipoli) and my grand-father (at Belgium with his 16.5" howitzers), had a tiny role in bringing Churchill down.

Bob

[michaeldr]

The publishing of Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon's biography of Fisher prompted a deal of correspondence in The Naval Review and there are several references to the Baltic project. The most detailed of these is in the writing of Lord Sydenham [sir George Sydenham Clarke, 1st Baron Sydenham of Combe (1848-1933)] The following is taken from his writing in TNR

on 20th September, 1911, he reaffirmed this opinion:

Personally I am confident of Peace. I happen to know in a curious way that the Germans are in a blue funk of the British Navy . . . N.B.-There's a lovely spot only 90 miles from Berlin.

… … …

his Baltic project - "My strategic plan" - had taken possession of his mind, and with characteristic energy he set about building an Armada of 612 vessels largely unsuited to the requirements of the War. The 56 destroyers were of course a good asset; but the Furious and her sisters which, as he wrote, "were built for Berlin" were not what the Navy needed at this critical juncture, and the concentration of our building yards upon the "Armada" was a national misfortune.

Sir R. Bacon considers that this scheme, which for months hung darkly over our naval policy offered "no insuperable difficulty," and he gives a sketch chart which might stagger even an amateur student of naval war. I think it is now generally admitted that this "plan" would have involved a disaster of the first magnitude if attempted before the destruction of the formidable High Seas Fleet, even if the huge Russian forces demanded had ever been available. To place the Fleet and a host of transports beyond the narrow and easily mined Channels of the Belts would have been madness. The plan was to "Sow the North Sea with mines on such a huge scale that naval operations in it became utterly impossible; so you nip into the Baltic with the British Fleet."

If the Battle of Jutland had been fought in the Baltic, what would have been the position of the Grand Fleet on the following day cut off from its distant bases by the Belts ?

Lord Fisher has stated that

"Mr. Churchill was behind no one in his enthusiasm for the Baltic project . . . and both he and Mr. Lloyd George magnificently responded to the idea of constructing a great Armada."

There is no doubt that the Cabinet accepted this astonishing project; but Mr. Churchill now says that he put a most pertinent enquiry about it to Lord Fisher, and ''He would never face this pretty obvious question."

The Baltic scheme, as I have pointed out, had captured Lord Fisher's imagination before September, 1911, and in the autumn of 1914, Sir Julian Corbett must have been asked to find some historic parallel. A precedent was discovered in the Seven Years' War, when the Russians occupied Kolberg on the Pomeranian Coast and Frederick the Great was impelled-as on other occasions-to contemplate suicide. Frederick, however, had no fleet, and the conditions were absolutely different in every respect from those of 1914. The suggested parallel was derisory. Nevertheless, the " Baltic Plan " seems to have loomed disastrously over all our naval operations until 14th May, 1915, when

"The War Council made it clear that the great projects in Northern waters which I had in view …. were at an end."

Yet, as late as 11th July, 1917, Lord Fisher, in a letter to the Prime Minister, proposed to undertake "on a large scale, with an immense Armada of specially built craft, an operation that threatens the German Fleet's existence."

Whether there was ever any real prospect that the "Baltic Plan" would be acted upon I do not know; but the fiasco at the Dardanelles made it obviously impossible, as Lord Fisher realised. The fact that for months the mind of the chief naval adviser of the Government was absorbed by this hopeless scheme, which, being a military plan, should never have been considered at the Admiralty unless powerfully urged by the military authorities, must have tended to prejudice the conduct of the world-wide naval operations then needing the most earnest and concentrated attention.

The Naval Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Aug. 1930, pages 503-506

see http://www.naval-review.org/

[Gibbo]

According to pp. 50-51 of British Strategy and Politics 1914-1918 by Paul Guinn, the plan was that once the RN had broken into the Baltic and defeated the German fleet, it should land a Russian [Guinn's emphasis] army in Pomerania. 'British troops would be employed in operations designed to prevent the Germans ships from escaping through the Kiel Canal into the North Sea.' His conclusion is that 'These actions could scarcely lead to less than apocalyptice results, though to which od the contenders benefit it is not easy to say.'

Guinn says that the sources available are 'few' and 'scattered.' His footnote for the relevant passage sources the following;

Adm. Sir R. H. Bacon, The Life of John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe, p. 188 [Jellicoe opposed the operation].

Adm. Sir Edward E. Bradford, Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson, pp. 239-42. [Wilson was a holder of the VC and a former 1st Sea Lord who had an advisory job at the Admiralty].

Maj.-Gen. Sir C. E. Callwell, Experiences of a Dug-Out, 1914-1918, pp. 119-22. [Callwell was Director of Military Operations].

Winston Churchill, World Crisis, vol. ii, pp. 479-86 and 'Lord Fisher and his Biographer in Great Contemporaries, pp. 277-78.

Arthur J. Marder, ed., Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, vol. iii, pp. 42-47, 121-22, 259-60 and Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond, pp. 134-45, 138-40 [presumably a misprint but this is how the reference is printed].

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, Memories, p. 55 and Records, pp. 217-24.

Cabinet papers from the start of 1915 onwards are available for free download from the National Archives website but I can't find any by Fisher or with Baltic in the title for the relevant period. There is one, titled 'Suggestions as to the Military Position by Lloyd George, that mentions proposals by Fisher for operations 'in the direction of Denmark upon the north coast of Germany. Lloyd George thought this 'very hazardous' but said that he would 'rather not criticise this plan' but 'put forward another alternative', namely operations against Austria or Turkey. The file reference is in CAB 24/1 and is numbered G2.

Here is a link to the advanced search for documents online at the NA.

[PhilB]

According to pp. 50-51 of British Strategy and Politics 1914-1918 by Paul Guinn, the plan was that once the RN had broken into the Baltic and defeated the German fleet, it should land a Russian army in Pomerania.

Fisher`s plan seems to assume an initial defeat of the HSF. If this is taken as having been accomplished, does the plan become workable?

[mbloy]

Fischer was a firm believer of the decisive battle concept. That's why the Royal Navy was a big ship, big gun navy, rather than a navy comprised of a larger number of smaller vessels better suited to keeping open the sea lanes for mercantile trade between the dominions and colonies (the life-blood of the empire). Any move into the Baltic would have had to eliminated the threat posed by the HSF first, otherwise it would simply have been ruinous.

Similarly, any advance along the Belgium Coast would also have depended on a military breakthrough futher inland in Flanders.

Both operations combined would presumably have then lead to a war winning rout (in the minds of its supporters).

From what I understand of the Baltic proposal, the task of conducting the operational planning was delegated to Tug Wilson - so I will now try to see what's available from his side.

mb

[bob lembke]

In order for the naval part of "Plan B" (for Baltic) to work, Fisher would have to have brought the greater part of the capital ships of the RN into the Baltic. I do not think that the HDF would have engaged them, not in big ship action. Remember that, from reports from the Danish shore, from the Zeppelins, the Germans would have a much better idea of where the Brits were than vis versa. While someone mentioned the impossible idea of closing off the North Sea to naval forces with mines, the entrance to the straits could easily be blocked with mines. The HSF would rule the North Sea, as long as the RN was in the Baltic, and even the RN could not fight their way back out, emerging one by one, having crossed the T on themselves, even without a dense mine barrage. The Germans could bend the Danes to be helpful. Therefore the only hope for the RN in the Baltic was the Russians. A slender reed.

I don't know if Fisher was dreaming of army corps after army corps of superb 6' 2" Siberian Marines proudly goose-stepping onto their transports, but the reality of what they would find would have been quite different. The Brits and the Russians, between them, would only have enough transport between them (in the Baltic) to transport a few divisions at a time. Any ports would have been wrecked or blocked before capture. Especially a year or two into the war, the quality of the remaining Russian troops was not top-noch by any measure. While the Germans, as per my posts, could have assembled 75 or more divisions of Ersatz-quality troops, without even resorting to troop movements from the Fronts. Landing a few divisions at a time would have been abserd. I can't recall a single time that Russians were able to succeed against German troops in WW I at even odds, never mind attacking German troops at unfavorable odds of 20 to 1, with the sea at their back.

But it not very likely that the Russians would have been foolish enough to board the ships.

The likely outcome of Plan B would have been the loss of the RN capital ship fleet without much loss to the HSF. Then Britain would be up the creek without a paddle. What sort of mischief would the HSF and the German Army, between them, been able to cook up with the RN capital ships bottled up in the Baltic and running out of fuel? Concerts in Hyde Park? Wurst appreciation cultural events?

Egypt is right, Plan B would demonstrate the "decisive battle concept".

Bob

[Gibbo]

Julian Corbett says on p. 314 of vol. iii of Naval Operations, the British Official History of the war at sea, that the potential Baltic operation was to be carried out by the special fleet constructed by Fisher referred to several times earlier in this thread. It would not use the Grand Fleet.

[bob lembke]

Julian Corbett says on p. 314 of vol. iii of Naval Operations, the British Official History of the war at sea, that the potential Baltic operation was to be carried out by the special fleet constructed by Fisher referred to several times earlier in this thread. It would not use the Grand Fleet.

Well, if that is the case, the plan is even more nonsensical, as I cannot see why two or threee dreadnaught squadrons of the HSF, supported by light forces, and submarines, would not emerge from Kiel and, guided by Zeppelins and land-based aircraft, decisively destroy this invasion fleet. Were the waters of the Baltic too confined to allow more than one or two dreadnaughts to manuver at one time? So the plan is even more hopeless than a "Plan B" as I envisioned it, with the bulk of the RN crowded in the Baltic, but it would not lead to the Allies actually losing the war. The plan, if it had a hope of succeeding, would require the invasion "Armada" to operate in the Baltic for weeks, transporting all those blue-eyed Siberian Marines. I cannot see how the HSF, over such a span of time, could not defeat this force in detail or en mass. Likewise, the plan seems to envision that a British landing force could take and hold Kiel for an extended period of time. I think that my calculations show that the purely local forces in the catchment area of IX Armeekorps and the local Marine garrisons and naval depots could put together probably two army corps of Ersatz-quality from the purely local forces, Ersatz battalions, Landwehr, Landsturm, naval infantry, and Marines. The deputy Generalkommando (HQ staff) of IX Armeekorps was on hand for command responsibilities.

I am currently writing about this area, how my grand-father was stationed there in the 1890s, at the Artillerie=Depot Rendsburg, and how the ambitious and very energetic lieutenant formed a second family with a local Danish woman (my father being one of the products), and how his wife, annoyed, poisoned him with Deadly Nightshade. As a result I am partially Danish.

Well, this Baltic project seems to have been several different flavors of silly. But what form of higher-level decision-making would allow such a plan to progress to the point that 612 purpose-designed vessels were constructed? Where were the "red-tabs"?

Bob

[truthergw]

Just looking at the map and with no specialised knowledge, common sense suggests that a landing on Germany's Baltic coast would have special hazards. With the facts and figures that Bob has supplied, it seems to verge on the suicidal. Now Fisher and the other members of the Supreme Command were not imbeciles. The plan's continued existence implies that there was thought to be some chance of success. Is there any available summary of the plan? I feel that there is an important gap in our knowledge here, something that Fisher knew that is not apparent. 

[mbloy]

But what form of higher-level decision-making would allow such a plan to progress to the point that 612 purpose-designed vessels were constructed? Where were the "red-tabs"?

Bob

Well Bob, it seems that Fisher's Baltic Plans were pretty well advanced until the decision to go ahead with the Dardanelles operation was taken. According to Fisher's 'Memories' published after the war...

"On May 14th, 1915, the War Council made it clear to me that the great projects in Northern waters which I had in view in laying down the Armada of new vessels were at an end, and the further drain on our naval resources foreshadowed that evening convinced me that I could no longer countenance the Dardanelles operations, and the next day I resigned”.

(Fisher) Meeting of War Council, January 8th 1915.

As a matter of record, the 'Armada' consisted of the following vessels:

5 Battle Cruisers of 33 knots speed of light draught.

2 Light Cruisers.

5 Flotilla Leaders.

56 Destroyers.

64 Submarines.

37 Monitors.

24 River Light Gunboats.

19 Whaling Steamers.

24 Submarine Destroyers.

50 Seagoing Patrol Boats.

200 Motor Barges, oil engines.

90 Smaller Barges.

36 Sloops.

____

612 Total.

mb

[PhilB]

I feel that there is an important gap in our knowledge here, something that Fisher knew that is not apparent. 

I too can`t see that Fisher would be so set on a scheme of such expense that, at first glance, seems so unpromising. But what could possibly be the "missing link"?

[truthergw]

I had a skim through the Supreme Command stuff I have but the only little clue I have turned up so far is why the 1917 landing was not undertaken. It is described as a division to be landed to cut off German forces from the coast. It would take place when the Ypres advance had passed Roulers. In other words, a pincer movement against the occupied Channel ports. YpresIII never reached Roulers and so the other jaw of the pincers was never required. 

[Gibbo]

Most of the 612 ships turned out to be useful for other purposes, such as the invasion of Gallipoli, shore bombardment, river gunboats in Mesopotamia or convoy escort. The ones that did appear to be white elephants were the 'large light cruisers', of which 3 were completed. They were really light battle cruisers but were called something else because the Cabinet had banned the construction of more capital ships. They were fast but lightly armoured even by the standards of British battle cruisers, and had relatively few guns: Courageous and Glorious each carried 4 15 inch guns and Furious was designed to be armed with 2 18 inch guns. However, even these ships proved to be of value when they were later converted into aircraft carriers.

The big problem with analysing this plan is that there appears to be little in existence. Fisher seems to have kept the concept in his head rather than on paper and it did not get far enough into the planning process for any detailed plans to need to be drawn up.

[bob lembke]

Just looked at a map of the Kiel Canal. The entrances are not to the open sea, but well up rivers/bays that could be defended. On the Kiel side ships approaching the mouth of the canal (to block it with block-ships) would have to travel the last several miles through a stretch of the Bay of Kiel that was about 1.5 miles from shore to shore. Clearly too wide (and probably too deep) to block with block-ships, and the site had to be fortified and armed, any ships trying to force their way thru would be under direct fire at ranges of 800-900 yards or less from both sides for several miles. I don't know if it was mined, but there must have been other delights such as batteries of fixed torpedo tubes, etc. The defense of this canal entrance was of critical strategic importance to the German Empire, I can't imagine that it was largely undefended. The physical layout re: an effort to block the canal mouth makes forcing the Gallipoli Straits look like a walk in the park.

If the canal mouth could not be blocked, I cannot see what would prevent significant assets of the HSF from emerging and really battering this "Armada". The Germans would have the advantage of 24/7 reconnaisance, Zeppelins hovering over the Armada constantly. Jutland showed that the British battle cruisers of the day were quite fragile, certainly to 2-3 squadrons of dreadnaughts.

But the bottom line was the impossibility of bringing up enough troops quickly enough to maintain a bridgehead against the potential land forces that could be assembled from the local forces that I have detailed, even if there were an infinite supply of Siberian giants standing to at St. Petersburg. How many tankers was Fisher planning to bring? Or was he hoping to sieze the Romanian oilfields on his way to Berlin?

Summary: "This boat won't float!"

Bob

[bob lembke]

I had a skim through the Supreme Command stuff I have but the only little clue I have turned up so far is why the 1917 landing was not undertaken. It is described as a division to be landed to cut off German forces from the coast. It would take place when the Ypres advance had passed Roulers. In other words, a pincer movement against the occupied Channel ports. YpresIII never reached Roulers and so the other jaw of the pincers was never required. 

The Strandfest attack which spoiled this plan (as well as the failure to advance far enough inland) was a little gem of a combined arms operation. I think that three enormous floating landing docks/jetties had been built, so the intent was obvious. In the attack the one bridge to the bridgehead was bombed and shelled, the two battalions on the bridgehead heavily shelled and attacked by ground-attack aircraft, and then the bridgehead was stormed by German Marines led by 30 of my beloved flame-thrower teams. The bridgehead just collapsed, 1300 prisoners, one burned guy swam across over out of captivity.

Bob

[bob lembke]

Most of the 612 ships turned out to be useful for other purposes, such as the invasion of Gallipoli, shore bombardment, river gunboats in Mesopotamia or convoy escort. The ones that did appear to be white elephants were the 'large light cruisers', of which 3 were completed. They were really light battle cruisers but were called something else because the Cabinet had banned the construction of more capital ships. They were fast but lightly armoured even by the standards of British battle cruisers, and had relatively few guns: Courageous and Glorious each carried 4 15 inch guns and Furious was designed to be armed with 2 18 inch guns. However, even these ships proved to be of value when they were later converted into aircraft carriers.

From this description of these "large light cruisers" they could not stand up to dreadnaughts or even battle cruisers on a bet. The naval side would have been absolutely dependent on blocking the Kiel Canal. Unless the Germans had forgotten to fortify the entrance over the preceding 20 years, an attacking force made up from the listed vessels could not reach the entrance, and the plan would fail right there.

The big problem with analysing this plan is that there appears to be little in existence. Fisher seems to have kept the concept in his head rather than on paper and it did not get far enough into the planning process for any detailed plans to need to be drawn up.

That someone could have "kept the concept in his head" and still get 612 vessels built to carry out a whacky plan is utterly astonishing. With our interesting thread here it seems apparent that Fisher had good reason to not put this down on paper for discussion and evaluation. What did he have against the British Empire? Apres moi le deluge.

Bob

[SteveMarsdin]

Good afternoon Bob,

I think Fisher was FSL only in the early years of the war, you suggested in one of your early posts that the homeland forces might have been sufficiently weakened by late 1918, for it to have stood a chance. I find it hard to believe that the homeland strength in depth existed right up to the near-end of the war, given the fighting on various fronts, blockade etc. Do you have any figures of the breakdown of homeland units etc. as the war progressed ?

Like other posters, I am still looking for a logical explanation as to why Fisher persisted with the "idea" - maybe if the homeland strength was kept so high right up to the near-end, it was a "bluff" that perhaps had some results ? As Gibbo has said most of the specially built ships were used elsewhere; their building did use some of the British industrial capacity but none/little of the army/potential army manpower ?

[bob lembke]

Steve;

I was out in the field and tried to respond on my blankberry but the transmission failed. Will try to respond now.

Good afternoon Bob,

I think Fisher was FSL only in the early years of the war, you suggested in one of your early posts that the homeland forces might have been sufficiently weakened by late 1918, for it to have stood a chance. I find it hard to believe that the homeland strength in depth existed right up to the near-end of the war, given the fighting on various fronts, blockade etc. Do you have any figures of the breakdown of homeland units etc. as the war progressed ?

FSL? Well, Russia had collapsed in 1917, and even signed a treaty with Germany, so clearly investigating how the plan would have worked in late 1918 is an abstract hypothetical. But late in 1918 everything in Germany was finally falling apart. Some sort of dramatic effort would have been very foolish for the UK, presenting a chance to "snatch defeat from the jaws of victory", as someone said.

Actually, for a good while, the homeland forces actually increased. While some of the Landsturm and Landwehr units left at home in 1914 began to be utilized, as the size of the active army increased, more Ersatz battalions were raised to support new active regiments, and some Reserve regiments also started to establish their own Reserve Ersatz battalions, a new development. Additionally, the War Ministry, in January 1915, ordered that all active infantry regiments also organize a second Ersatz battalion at home, although later in the war the growing shortage of manpower forced the Army to start disbanding the second battalions. So for a while, perhaps a year, you can roughly double my figures. Additionally, every active Jaeger battalion established an Ersatz section of two companies in the home garrison,and these were also doubled for a while. Another figure. Eventually 834 Landsturm Infantry battalions were formed, many being used in the lines of communication, but few at the front itself.

Additionally, The 110 active cavalry regiments left 101 Ersatz squadrons behind in Germany, and later new Reserve Ersatz squadrons were formed for the 33 Reserve cavalry regiments, leaving over 130 Ersatz cavalry squadrons in Germany. (These began to be disbanded in late 1916 as less cavalry was being maintained. But the Germans needed a lot of cavalry in Russia.) Likewise, there were over 100 field artillery battalions with two batteries each, and more were later established. Also, the 25 heavy (foot) artillery regiments each left behind an Ersatz battalion, almost all with SIX batteries each, not two. There even was an Ersatz battalion with two batteries of the formidable 16.5" howitzers and the 12" mortars.

So, in 1915 and 1916, there were even more Ersatz battalions in Germany to form temporary divisions in case of an invasion, and would have had considerable formations of field and heavy artillery and cavalry to fill out the units. It even seems that they could have formed about 75 divisions or more of Ersatz battalions without even using the 2nd infantry Ersatz battalions established for active infantry regiments, which could have continued the Ersatz functions even during an invasion. This would be without using Landwehr, Landsturm units in Germany, or active units shuttled in from the other fronts. In total, for much of the war, using other types of units as well, Germany could temporarily form and mass about 125 divisions in Germany for a month or two without badly stripping the fronts or totally disrupting Ersatz activity for the infantry, the arm which had the most need of that activity.

Like other posters, I am still looking for a logical explanation as to why Fisher persisted with the "idea" - maybe if the homeland strength was kept so high right up to the near-end, it was a "bluff" that perhaps had some results ? As Gibbo has said most of the specially built ships were used elsewhere; their building did use some of the British industrial capacity but none/little of the army/potential army manpower ?

Again, I must stress that the Ersatz formations had to be maintained in Germany in order to allow the proper functioning of the German Army. But they certainly would be used if there was an invasion. As there was no chance that Fisher could bring and supply 100 divisions or more of UK, Russian, or Martian troops, the ground component of Fisher's Plan B was completely unworkable, as well as the naval part, unless anyone maintains that those five odd, under-gunned, barely armored "large light cruisers" could defeat the HSF.

It does not look like there was a logical explaination of why Fisher persisted with this odd and unworkable idea.

Most of the above is from Cron, Imperial German Army 1914-1918, about pp. 260-70, which by coincidence I am just reading. More available in English translation than in German.

Bob

[per ardua per mare per terram]

From this description of these "large light cruisers" they could not stand up to dreadnaughts or even battle cruisers on a bet.

It is surprising that this point has not been addressed by those who seem to think the plan had a chance of success. There are numerous other questions such as: the supposed philosophy behund the ships was that big guns and speed reduced the armour required. So if they are sent in constrained waters like the Belts, how would their speed come into play? If the purpose of the idea was to attack Berlin, how would these vessels give fire support? Their range was not sufficient!

[PhilB]

Was it feasible to think that the HSF could be prevented from emerging into the Baltic? What combination might Fisher have had in mind for that job? I`m assuming that the GF could be expected to prevent the HSF from approaching from North Sea ports.

[truthergw]

Before the war, von Moltke the Younger thought there was a danger of invasion by the British in Danish Jutland or Schleswig Holstein. He stationed IX Reserve Corps ( 20,000 men) in S-H to guard against it. So the German CiC thought it possible and took steps to counteract it. 

[per ardua per mare per terram]

An invasion of Denmark (with a consequent violation of Danish neutrality) is a completely different undertaking than an attack of Germany's Baltic coast as it would be possible to approach from the North Sea. Even so, it would probably have involved British forces approaching periously close to German sea bases. Again British Destroyers of 1914-1916 would have been operating at or beyond their range of endurance. It is one thing to conduct a raid on Heligoland Bight, it is another for small vessels to support capital units in a large campaign far from their bases. One of Jellicoe's concerns at Jutland the Grand Fleet's destroyers were operating to their limits. The Harwich Force were unable to be deployed effectively in support on that occasion.

As I mentioned in post #11, Lloyd George noted that there were ideas around to do this. It would have been just as poor an idea as the forces would have been forced through a bottleneck.

Edited 4 December , 2009 by per ardua per mare per terram

[per ardua per mare per terram]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Dec 4 2009, 10:06 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Was it feasible to think that the HSF could be prevented from emerging into the Baltic? What combination might Fisher have had in mind for that job? I`m assuming that the GF could be expected to prevent the HSF from approaching from North Sea ports.

No one appears to have a credible idea on how this would be achieved. If you read a few pages either side of the extract that you posted earlier it gives many of the objections to the plan. One is that if the Royal Navy sowed the Baltic with mines to prevent the HSF coming out, their own ships would have been threatened by these same mines.