Fisher's Invasion Plan

[PhilB]

Andrew Marr said last night that Fisher proposed a landing in Northern Europe, rather than Turkey, as an alternative to the Western Front. He was extremely peeved when the idea was turned down. Was such a landing and invasion (presumably somewhere around Kiel and aiming straight at Berlin) feasible?

[JPAE]

"Pure foolery", according to Richmond.

Phil.

[sotonmate]

PE

I don't usually get involved in "what ifs",so just need to ask what Richmond (forgive me,but who's he ?) thought about the Dardanelles initiative. Does he mention it ?

Sotonmate

[PhilB]

Pure foolery it may have been but, if so, it makes one wonder about the nous of those in charge at that time as Marr described Fisher as one of the brightest. Since we now know that the preferred option - the Gallipoli landings - were an expensive failure, was a European landing so risible?

[truthergw]

A combined op in various places on North Sea or Baltic coast was considered several times and troops were trained for one at one stage. If it was foolery, it had several high level backers throughout the war.

[centurion]

Like many references in Marr's programme this was a gross over simplification. What Fisher was proposing was a major raid, not an invasion. It would have been the same sort of thing that the British pulled off in 1814 when they, amongst other things, briefly occupied Washington DC and set fire to the White House and the Capitol. It was not an alternative to Gallipoli. Fisher had fiddled the naval estimates to enable him to build two light ,shallow draft battle cruisers armed with 18 inch guns for operation in the Baltic (they were called large cruisers!). The German response to such an operation would have been an occupation of Denmark effectively bottling up the force in the Baltic. It was a recipt for disaster and quite rightly rejected. Fisher then threw his toys out of the pram!

[michaeldr]

Phil,

See Naval OPs, Vol.II, by Corbett

there are several refs but is well summed up by a footnote on page 410

"Lord Fisher's plan was to occupy the Baltic in sufficient strength to enable an army to land in Pomerania. He had instituted a vast building programme of 612 ships, including battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, monitors and smaller vessels, a large number of which were especially designed for service in the Baltic. The new (Admiralty) Board did not proceed further with the plan." [mid-May 1915]

A good number of these special craft were completed however, amongst them the 'Beetles' used at Suvla. Other examples were the battle cruisers 'Courageous' & 'Glorious'. Jane's notes that their shallow draught was planned with a view to operations in the Baltic and further notes that their 'abnormal' design caused them to be dubbed the 'Outrageous Class.'

[PhilB]

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6hwb6ov...any&f=false

This indicates that something more than a raid was in mind.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

just need to ask what Richmond (forgive me,but who's he ?)

Presumably Admiral Sir Herbert William Richmond: lecturer on naval history at the Royal Naval War College; assistant director of the operations division of the war staff at the Admiralty 1913 - May 1915 (where he disagreed with plans by Churchill et al); later head of the Royal Naval War College; and naval historian.

Condenced from: H. G. Thursfield, ‘Richmond, Sir Herbert William (1871–1946)’, rev. Marc Brodie, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35743, accessed 12 Nov 2009]

[andiS]

Was this the event for which the proposed sea-wall climbing tanks were proposed? Nice pictures in the Osprey book on the Mk4

[per ardua per mare per terram]

There were several plans for landings in Northern Europe from 1914 onwards. Lloyd George mentioned a plan to invade Sleswig-Holstein (violating Danish neutrality) and advancing into the heart of Germany from there. Any such attack would have made the Dardanelles/ Gallipoli look like a cake walk. The waters of the Baltic (one of Fisher’s favoured routes) were as constrained as the Dardanelles, as were those around Heligoland. Attacks so near to the primary German naval bases are likely to have attracted interference, to say the least from the German High Seas Fleet: not only would there have been torpedo boats and mine layers as in the Dardanelles, but also submarines, destroyers, cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships etc. In addition the planes and airships in the vicinity were superior to the air power available to the Turks. The entire North of Germany had better transport links than anywhere in Turkey, the amount of troops and heavy equipment that could be deployed against a raiding or invasion force made the plan completely ludicrous.

Btw as this was a primarily naval plan proposed by an Admiral of the Fleet, why is it in Soldiers?

[sotonmate]

PAPMPT (if I may call you that)

Thank you for the ref,you ARE well-read ! I feel suitably admonished for not knowing of such a "Grand Fromage"in Naval circles.

Sotonmate

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Was this the event for which the proposed sea-wall climbing tanks were proposed? Nice pictures in the Osprey book on the Mk4

Tanks were barely coming together as a concept by the time Fisher left the Admiraly.

P3 or PAPMPT

[SiegeGunner]

... a "Grand Fromage"in Naval circles.

Richmond, as any fule kno, is not a 'fromage' but a 'saucisson' ...

The trials of tanks climbing the sea-wall were in preparation for the 'Great Landing' planned to take place on the Belgian coast between Nieuport and Ostend. A prototype landing pontoon pushed by two monitors was also built and tested.

[Chris_Baker]

I've seen those images before ...

http://www.1914-1918.net/hush.htm

[centurion]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Nov 12 2009, 11:05 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6hwb6ov...any&f=false

This indicates that something more than a raid was in mind.

Unfortunately nothing shows as I think there is a limilt on how many times a link can access google books.

However as I understand it the army landed was to take Berlin but would not be able to hold it as it would be impossible to supply it An orderly withdrawal to the fleet would be necessary. Thats a raid by any other name albeit a pretty big one.

[Northern Soul]

.........A good number of these special craft were completed however, amongst them the 'Beetles' used at Suvla. Other examples were the battle cruisers 'Courageous' & 'Glorious'. Jane's notes that their shallow draught was planned with a view to operations in the Baltic and further notes that their 'abnormal' design caused them to be dubbed the 'Outrageous Class.'

I think I read years ago that their shallow draft was specifically targeted at securing a forward base in the Frisian Islands from where a subsequent assault on the mainland could be launched. However, this struck me as a bit strange because the Germans would then have known exactly where such an assault would be likely and would have time to fortify the area accordingly.

Andy.

[PhilB]

Unfortunately nothing shows as I think there is a limilt on how many times a link can access google books.

The link still works for me, even the one in your post. As to why this thread's in Soldiers - looks like the poster made a boob.

Fisher's plan seemed bound to bring about a fleet action in the Baltic which he must have foreseen winning. Would a beaten High Seas Fleet have changed the parameters greatly?

One wonders which superannuated old general would be dug up to command the land operations!

[SiegeGunner]

I've seen those images before ...

http://www.1914-1918.net/hush.htm

Chris,

They come from plates between pp192-193 and between pp200-201 in Chapter XI of 'The Concise Story of the Dover Patrol' by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon. The same photographs, and more, also appear in Chapter XI, 'Preparations for a Great Landing', in Volume I of Bacon's 2-volume "The Dover Patrol 1915-1917". I have both books in front of me now. I have scans of both sets of plates, but it is also possible that I saved the 'cropped out' images from Robert's piece on Hush on the LLT. If that is the case, I apologise for the oversight.

The full 'tank versus sea wall' sequence shows the tank successfully mounting the wall. The fold-out design drawing of one of the landing pontoons is about two and a half feet long, so a bit too big to scan!

Mick

[michaeldr]

Straying away from Phil's opening question, but,

based on the OH figure of "a vast building programme of 612 ships, including battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, monitors and smaller vessels, a large number of which were especially designed for service in the Baltic" and taking the battle cruisers as an example; say that they cost the same as others built at this time eg. Repulse & Renown cost £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 each

then how does one man alone get to wield such a large cheque book?

Fisher was First Sea Lord (ie the professional and not the political head of the department) and therefore the comparison with Kitchener is not exact, but did he enjoy a similar degree of prestige and similarly have an authority which went unchecked and unquestioned – an awful lot of money was actually spent here on this scheme

[mbloy]

Don't forget that Fisher was sensitive to the fact that his extraordinarily expensive Battleship navy was not making the sort of significant contribution to the winning of the war that British public had been led to expect, therefore the prestige of the Royal Navy and indeed Fischer's own reputation was at stake. Fisher believed that only by threatening the Baltic coast would Britain pose sufficient a threat to Germany to embolden the Imperial Navy to risk its fleet in a possible decisive encounter. As I understand it his aim was to use certain elements of British Naval power (submarines, monitors and battle-cruisers) to secure temporary control in the Baltic in support of an amphibious landing by the Russian army. I don't think the real intention was to establish a permanent alternative front. The action would however have given the Germans an almighty scare and caused them to reposition troops away from the Western Front, if only for a limited period of time before eventually driving the invaiders back.

Any comments?

Regards,

Michael

[centurion]

Straying away from Phil's opening question, but,

based on the OH figure of "a vast building programme of 612 ships, including battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, monitors and smaller vessels, a large number of which were especially designed for service in the Baltic" and taking the battle cruisers as an example; say that they cost the same as others built at this time eg. Repulse & Renown cost £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 each

then how does one man alone get to wield such a large cheque book?

 

As I said earlier Fisher fiddled the naval estimates, his two battle cruisers built for Baltic operations were not described as battle cruisers when construction was authorised and went way over budget. They actually turned out to be useless. When the 18inch guns were fired damage control teams had to scuttle around fixing the damage caused to the ships themselves. They were only of any value after they were converted to aircraft carriers.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

If any one deserves to be labelled a donkey in WWI, that would be Fisher - if his plans for the Baltic were genuine, which many doubt. If he was seriously proposing or supporting this idea it puts his tactical appreciation as inferior to Winnie the Pooh and his strategical vision would have been right there with Colonel Blimp! It was bonkers rather than brilliant, but then Fisher’s experience of war was outdated and he hardly excelled the last time he’d been in battle. He was supposed to be a gunnery expert and had commanded HMS Excellent and been president of the committee that revised the ‘Gunnery Manual’ releasing a version in 1880. Yet when he was in command of HMS Inflexible her standard of gunnery was so poor that she missed stationary targets (at the Bombardment of Alexandria in 1882), and that was when she was anchored and at machine gun range!

At a time when hand held rifles were being sighted over 2,000 yards the fleet was still practicing (when they did) at shorter ranges. After naval guns had been hitting targets at over 15,000 yards range; fisher only had the idea of increasing practice to 5,000 yards. He advocated the ‘big gun’ capital ship with barely a clue how to use them in action.

In the post bombardment analysis at Alexandria: Captains JA Fisher and AK Wilson found an unexploded British shell in an Egyptian powder magazine, but neither of them used their later influence to ensure that the Navy had shell fit for purpose.

[mbloy]

With the huge benefit of hindsight, Churchill's decision to recall Fisher out of retirement to become First Sea Lord, wasn't that good for either the navy or the country. Unfortunately it seems that he was simply too old for the job and his decision making ability certainly wasn't as astute and as certain as it had been when he was younger.

By the time that the Dardanelles proposal was being debated by the War Council (Jan 1915), Fisher’s original idea for a Baltic escapade had since been modified to a landing in neutral Holland accompanied by aggressive naval activities in the vicinity of Cuxhaven, designed to entice the German High Seas Fleet out to sea for a decisive naval engagement. Clearly his revised plans for a northern seaborne assault were just as ‘donkey’ as his previous notion and fortunately it never went ahead. Unfortunately the Gallipoli landings did (and Fisher wasn’t nearly as opposed to this as he later claimed).

mb

[simonharley]

I was present at the World Ship Society Annual Naval Meeting a couple of years ago when no less a figure than Andrew Lambert was extremely positive about the chances of a sea-borne invasion of North West Germany in 1915.

Simon