British Units Which Surrendered 21 March,1918

[Terry]

While reading R.W.Gould's book 'Epic Actions of the First World War", I came across the following comment in the chapter devoted to the 1/7th Sherwood Foresters:

"When... the German spring offensive swept over the British sector on 21st March,1918 there were a number of British units which offered only token resistance before surrendering, but the 1/7th was not one of them."

Is anyone aware of just what units offered only "token" resistance and then surrendered?

[John_Hartley]

Terry

Not sure I've ever seen a list, but I've seen something somewhere that suggests it would have quite a lot of names on it. The correlation was between battalions that suffered many fatalities (presumed to have fought hard), as opposed to those who had a lot taken prisoner. The suggestion was that many units in the forward zone quickly put their hands up in the face of overwhelming numbers.

A speculative example (which I've just looked up on SDGW and havnt compared it with any other) is the 16th Manchesters. Often portrayed as conducting an heroic defence of Manchester Hill, winning its commander a posthumous VC and being wiped out into the bargain, actually sufffered only 78 fatalities.

John

[Chris_Baker]

I don't know of any units as such that surrendered, but many thousands od individuals and groups did.

[Muerrisch]

Often portrayed as conducting an heroic defence of Manchester Hill, winning its commander a posthumous VC and being wiped out into the bargain, actually sufffered only 78 fatalities.

John

"ONLY" ? In a defensive action? And approximately 160 wounded, using my rule of thumb. Grieving mothers and father, children and lovers. ONLY?

2RWF suffered a similar total over a fortnight in Oct/Nov 1914 defending Armentieres, and considered it their toughest action of the war, and all the men were old sweats, seasoned professionals, many Boer War veterans.

No, I have to intercede. Any unit, assaulted out of the mist by an elite and well-trained enemy, with units falling back all around them, can be forgiven for going into the bag after suffering over 200 casualties, perhaps 50% of their trench strength.

I know nothing of the Manchesters, but I grieve for them, and feel for them.

Remembering

[Desmond7]

One of the first things I read on the Long Long Trail was Chris's article on the defence of Racecourse Redoubt and Edmund De Wind.

My interest in 21 March 1918 comes in because my grandad who enlisted pior to June 1915 - and thus, I assume, would have seen considerable action - was a Lce/cpl in the Royal Irish Rifles (Ulster Division). As you know, the 36th division were among the Fifth Army units who were largely swept aside by the German advance. As has been stated by Chris, numerous units were over-run and many soldiers surrendered. Among them was my grandfather.

While I do not have any more definite details on units surrendering in an 'organised fashion' I too have to admit that on this day the 36th Div. lost a huge number of men as POWs. However, having read about the poor state of the line where they were placed and other factors. I am not entirely surprised.

I have also found a reference to a 'last stand' led by Capt. L.J. Johnston and 'C' Coy. 12th Royal Irish Rifles at Foucard Trench. He and his men were finally forced to surrender when a German tank enfiladed their position. I think he was awarded the Military Cross after the war.12th Royal lrish Rifles lost four officers and 35 men killed or died of wounds on that day. I assume a good proportion came from 'C' coy.

Des

[Chunkeroo]

The 6th SLI were one of the battalions over-run. Their war diary was lost during the attack but I have a copy of a summery written later. All papers were burnt when the Germans were pouring down the St Quentin Road at 10.35am. One officer, 6 runners and 3 signallers were despatched to Bde to warn strong points, (Egypt), which only 1 officer, 2 runners and 1 signaller reached. HQ. Estimated casualties, 20 officers, 540 other ranks actually in the front line at the time of the attack.

Clare

[Terry]

I must admit I was a bit surprised by Gould's statement, as I too felt that while individuals surrendered, I didn't know of organized battalions formally surrendering.

[Jon Miller]

I'm afraid I too was a bit affronted by John's choice of a unit that could be considered to be partial to surrender on 21 March 1918. This is mainly because one of the local men I am researching served with the 16th Manchesters at that time, and was killed on that day. A Second Lieutenant, he is one of the very few men that I have managed to find any momentoes of.

However, there may be something in what John says. This may well be a Great War Myth, and it may not concern the 16th Manchesters, though I think it did come up in conversation when talking about them. The cut of the story was that the battalion put up a great fight to begin with, but were naturally in danger of being overwhelmed. The battalion CO was ready to fight to the last man, and was encouraging the other ranks to follow suit. However, it was said that the rank and file were in no mood for such heroics, and were looking for an opportunity to surrender. This was not an option while the CO remained in charge, so he was killed by a timely piece of very local friendly fire, whereupon all those who desired to surrender were now at liberty to do so.

[John_Hartley]

Jon

There is no need to feel affronted. I choose the 16th Mancs because I know the story (as part of my research into the 17th Bn).

The point is that they are normally portrayed as being "wiped out". This is, clearly, not the case, even taking into account David's calculations with which I would agree is a good rule of thumb.

That comment should not be taken as a slur on the bravery of those men or Elstob. Elstob's "final stand" was with the HQ staff and one company who, I believe suffered the greatest casualties. I have never seen any suggestion that his death was anything but from enemy fire.

John

[Guest Ian Bowbrick]

To put things into context the positions manned by the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers were heavily bombarded with HE and Mustard Gas starting at 0445 hrs. When the Germans struck about an hour or so later they found little resistance and not much of the trenches occupied by the RDF left.

Many a good Irishman died on that day.

[brownag]

There is a reprint of a book I have seen which lists British Officer POWs from 1918. I can't remember its exact title but I think it may have been a Red Cross publication originally.

It lists the POWs by unit, and against their name is the date they were captured. By going through the book you would see some battalions had a great many officers taken prisoner on 21.3.1918. With a bit more digging around and comparing with ODGW and orders of battle etc then you could probably make a good stab at guessing which battalions may have offered token resistance.

It wasn't just in 1918 units surrendered though wasn't there a couple of regular battalions which surrendered in 1914 when they were cut off?

Cheers

Adam

[Jon Miller]

It's ok John, any feeling of affrontery lasted only a couple of seconds - I know you treat all soldiers with the respect they deserve, and it was sheer fluke as to which battalion you picked out.

As I said before, my story could be a myth, and could be associated to any front line battalion on that day - I certainly can't claim any hard facts!

Ian has made a very pertinant point about the barrage, nobody seems to appreciate that many, many men would have been wiped out before the stormtroopers got anywhere near them.

[Desmond7]

Tactics wise - as a storm assault - you've got to give a lot of military credit to the Germans. Yes they may have had mist, poor British defences etc on their side, but they did punch a massive hole ...

Is it right that many 5th Army men formed as association after the war as an 'up yours' gesture to those who criticised them?

And did their pride serve as a 'protest too much' in favour of Gough?

Yeh, I know Lloyd George had denied troop replacements and I know he was Haig's man trusted to do Haig's bidding ... but he was well aware that the Germans were coming yet he retained troops too far foward in positions which they loathed and despite appeals against this by some very experienced officers.

Can a case be made for this?

[Annette Burgoyne]

This is an interesting one. The 1/K.S.L.I. lost many men taken prisioners on the 21st, one could turn around and say that they gave up, but the 1/K.S.L.I. did not just give up. The Battalion hold it's front until the Germans had worked their way up ravines either side of the Division, which were full of mist, the survivors of the front line companies only gave up when attacked from the rear, these in the reserve company fort on.

Annette

[John_Hartley]

I think I've found my original point of reference. Martin Middlebrook, in The Kaiser's Battle, devotes several pages (from around page 320). He offers several pieces of evidence to support his view that some units surrendered "easily" (including one about the 16th Mancs), but the general thrust of his argument is, perhaps, contained in this quote:-

"If one reads only the regimental and battalion histories of British units, the situation presented is of one position after another "fighting to the end", with the utmost bravery and heavy loss of life. This does not fit with the German accounts of premature surrender by the british and the Germans had nothing to gain by exaggerating the ease of their early successes. Nor does it fit in with the reliable fatal casualty figures extracted from the CWGC records."

John

[Desmond7]

John - Did Lyn McDonald do a book on this too?

I think the widespread - as you rightly state - 'fight to the finish' accounts are, in the main, not credible. It was a German field-day ... IMHO they did their intel., got their tactics/organisation right and swept through.

I for one accept the pockets of resistance scenario - and I can totally understand, as I know you do, the collapse of many formations.

Fair? Des

[David_Blanchard]

By a same token as the stand of the Manchesters on the 21st March, there is in fact a very similar situation ( I hesitate to use the word 'Myth') with the stand of the 2nd Devons at the Bois des Buttes on the 27th May- supposedly fighting to almost the last man under Colonel Anderson-Morshead, if you check out SD, I think the number is between 15 and 25 killed

[Ski]

John,

One such unit(or part of a unit), that i also read about in Middlebrook's book that i was quite surprised about was the surrender at "boadicea Redoubt" held by the HQ and at least one Company of the 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. Middlebrook states that "The Redoubt had somehow been missed by the German bombardment...Oberleutnant Prinz..and three Privates who could all speak English, asking if they could approach the redoubt under a white flag and attempt to persuade it's commamder to surrender.....The defenders were told that unless they surrendered heavy artillery would bombard the redoubt.....a few minutes later, there filed out of the redoubt a Lt-Col..three Cpt's, seven subalterns and 241 other men. Forty-one machine-guns and mortars werefound in the redoubt"

Don't get me wrong i am in no position to judge at what point it is "ok" to surrender, because at the the end of the day the CO must have saved many of his mens lives by surendering at that point. But not to put up some kind of resistance seems hard to believe.

Ski

[jim_davies]

Steve Bramley could probably give exact figures, but most of three companies of the 2/5th Lincolns were captured around Noreuil. The battalion lost 49 KIA during the day.

Jim

[BMoorhouse]

There is no simple rule of thumb to apply when looking at the events of the March offensive in deciding which battalions fought and which did not.

The British casualties should be considered against a) the depleted numbers of men in front line battalions at the time, and the numbers of casualties typical in any battle (save 1st July 16 which seems to have incurred considerably heavier than normal casualties - I know there may be other examples but they are relatively rare). In my reading, fatal casualty rates of 50-80 in a battalion attack would be the normal number - suggesting that the fighting would stop after this 'limit' was reached.

To the 78 fatalities suffered by the 16th Manchesters would probably be added another 150 injured, many of whom would have been unfit for action, and many of which would have tried to get back to an aid post. If a battalion suffered more than 200 front line soldier casualties in 1918 it would usually cease to exist as a fighting unit - even without many other members being captured.

One of the problems on the 1918 offensive - that subsequently caused similar problems in WW2 - was the effect that the German tactics had on the morale of the defenders who were often by passed. In March 1918 the defensive tactical emphasis of the BEF changed with the 'outpost - main line of resistance - final line' doctrine being introduced - there had been little training for the infantry in what they were to do if their positions were by-passed. (I would be pleased to hear someone correct me on this), and with a few exceptions there were no locally held reserves to counter attack with.

My assessment is that in the March offensive parts of battalions often held out and were either overrun or simply left - waiting for the Germans to bring up artillery etc to pound them into submission. If by-passed they often they fell back (usually resulting in complete chaos).

The result of this would be tales of soldiers fighting to the bitter end, while soldiers (maybe from the same battalion) later gave up without a fight when they appreciated that they position had become hopeless. Many that fell back lost any unit cohesion - lacked food and, in the mist, often ran into advancing Germans. Many also grouped themselves together into ad hoc fighting formations and carried on the fight.

I think that the March 1918 offensive needs to be looked at in much greater detail than at 'battalion' level.

Brendon.

[BMoorhouse]

I don't know what has happened to my previous post. The character should be a b

Brendon.

[dycer]

Bernard,

Between 21 March and 26 March 1918 the 8th Royal Scots suffered losses of

2 Officers killed(including it's C.O.) and 33 O.R's killed,4 Officers and 133 O.R's were wounded with 45 missing.

Between 10 April and 12 April at Merville(the Village of Paradis) the Battalion suffered a further 174 losses killed,wounded and missing.

Source the 8th Royal Scots in the Eurpoean War 1914-1918.

George

[Annette Burgoyne]

Hi Brendon

I totaly agree with all of your points in your post above.

Annette

[David_Blanchard]

[My assessment is that in the March offensive parts of battalions often held out and were either overrun or simply left - waiting for the Germans to bring up artillery etc to pound them into submission. If by-passed they often they fell back (usually resulting in complete chaos).

The result of this would be tales of soldiers fighting to the bitter end, while soldiers (maybe from the same battalion) later gave up without a fight when they appreciated that they position had become hopeless. Many that fell back lost any unit cohesion - lacked food and, in the mist, often ran into advancing Germans. Many also grouped themselves together into ad hoc fighting formations and carried on the fight.

I think that the March 1918 offensive needs to be looked at in much greater detail than at 'battalion' level.

QUOTE]

In my study of the battle of the Aisne exactly what you have outlined above certainly took place, especially in the context of the 50th and 8th Divisions. Looking at this action at company level, using the 2nd Devons as an example. The Devons were part of the Battle Zone- essentially 2nd line- during the bombardment they had sheltered in a deep underground series of bunkers on the Bois des Buttes. After the initial hurricane bombardment lifted and German troops stormed over the outpost line onto the Battle Zone, one company of the Devons totally disorientated emerged from the underground cavern and surrendered en masse. Another company under Anderson-Morshed, emerged to the south of the Battle Zone later in the morning. This company found that the intial surge of stormtroopers had by passed them. As a result they were able to assume battle positions, linking up with remnants of the 2nd Middlesex and make a stand against German second line infantry and artillery units following up the initial breakthrough. Many were able to stand and fight, unlike their conterparts in the company who had emerged during the initial onslaught.

Interestingly, those units in reserve who were often called upon to stem the tide during this battle suffered the worse effects of the bombardment as they were advancing often in the open. They suffered greater casulaties in terms of dead and wounded, whereas frontline troops who managed to keep their heads down during the barrage were often captured in great numbers still sheltering in their underground bunkers.

[Desmond7]

A little known action

From Orange Green and Khaki by Tom Johnstone

By noon, the redoubts in the forward zone had been cut off and fallen, but certain isolated posts fought on gallantly. Onthe right of the Line of Resistance, 'C' coy. 12th Btn Royal Irish Rifles, resisted strongly throughout the day.

The company commander, Capt. L. J. Johnston, led his men forward to its battle position. On the way, they destroyed a German parol. Ominously, its presence indicated to Johnston that the Germans had broken through into the Battle Zone.

By 1100 the strongpoints held by A and D companies were captured. Johnston's company held its position in Foucard Trench for four hours.

At times the enemy gained entry and were expelled in bitter hand to hand fighting. An attempt to use a flame-thrower against them at miday was scotched n flames.

Shortly afterwards, the fog suddenly lifted and it became obvious to C company what progress the enemy had made. From their positions, Johnston's men could see Germans swarming about Jeanne d'Arc redoubt - which held B coy. and Btn. HQ - about a mile to their rear.

Further to the right, German cavalry could be seen advancing through positions which ought to have been held by 14th Division. Then, astounded, they watched a column of German transport appear, three hundred yards long, moving steadily down the St. Quentin/La Fere Road within easy range.

Undaunted by the realisation that their own position was now perilous, they struck hard at the enemy with Lewis Guns and rifles. In minutes the column of men and horses was a mass of destruction.

The Germans reacted swiftly and attacked the compnay from both flanks. The Company Commander ordered a withdrawal to Lejuene trench 500 yards behind. The enemy followed up fiercely and with great courage,a single German with bayonet fixed charged the position.

This incident clearly demonstrated the offensive spirit of the attacks.

C Coy. was joined by the Btn foward headquarters from Le Pontchu Quarry. Numbering nearly 120 men , it fought on resolutely. In mid-afternoon, a German company appeareed marching along in fours. Fire was held until the last moment. Then concentrated rapid fire annihilated the enemy.

Surrounded, the end for C coy. and for Johnston's men came quickly about 1600 when a tank appeared down the main raod, taking the trench in enfilade with machine gun fire while a battalion attacked their front.

The position was hopeless and Johnston, to save his remaining men, about 100, including many wounded, from useless slaughter, surendered.

His was the most courageous stand that day. After the war, when his exploit became known, Johnston was deservedly awarded the Military Cros.

It must be said that an analysis of the death casulaties shows that the resistance of all other elements of the Btn. was not as resolute as that of 'C' company.

"They surrounded us, the whole battalion was made prisoners, I vividly remember smashing my rifle and throwing the bolt away" - attributed to unpublished papers of CSM Samuel McKeever

Total killed and died of wounds of 12th Rifles were four officer and 35 men. Many of these must have been suffered by the gallant 'C' coy.

The war diary of 12th Rifles gives the Btn. loses on March 21 as 22 oficers and 566 other ranks 'missing' - I do not know how many more 'straggled' in after this period.

I think this gives a balanced view of the suces of the German attack and also illustrates how certain elements of a battalion could, indeed, fight on until the situation was impossible.

If anyone else has any accounts of this action, maps, pictures etc. I would love to seethem

Des