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Remembered Today:

Importance of Verdun


castman

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During a discussion about Verdun that I enjoyed about a year ago, I learnt something that hadn't previously occurred to me.

Apparently, Falkenhayn was intent on trying a formula that he believed would defeat France through attrition of manpower and morale. This formula entailed the use of massive firepower and limited manpower on small sectors. Verdun was selected becasue of its symbolic importance. It was, however, envisaged by Falkenhayn to be but one episode in a series of attritional battles that could be unleashed at different times and places along the Western Front. In view of this, manpower was held back, and the offensive contained, initially, to one side of the Meuse. The formula depended on the willingness and ability of the Germans to transfer offensives to other sectors, administer sharp local defeats, inflict terrible losses, and cock a thumb at the Entente by demonstrating that German methods would prevail.

This formulaic approach was to be demonstrated at Verdun, a sector that the French were bound to fight hard for. It was, however, the formula rather than the locality that was of paramount significance.

Phil

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I have had a look at the relevant section of Falkenhayn's memoirs. Some doubt has been cast over his published analysis of Germany's 1916 war aims, which explicitly link the Verdun operation to a policy of attrition, rather than breakthrough but, leaving that aside, this is a summary of his arguments regarding attacking on the east bank of the Meuse only:

1. There were only 17 or 18 divisions available for the assault. Nine were needed for the initial attack and others had to be earmarked for relief or subsequent operations. By not committing troops to an attack on the west bank, flexibility was retained.

2. Geography played a large role in the decision:

a. 'The sharp salient formed by the enemy's front north east...of Douaumont offered from the outset encircling

possibilities such as are rarely found in a war of position.'

b. The risk of coming under heavy artillery fire from the west bank as operations on the east progressed was

recognised but, there was a lack of troops and it was doubtful if an operation there against a 'strong, well-constructed

position, occupied by an enemy in superior strength' would have been successful.

c. '...the lie of the land was in no way favourable to operations on the west bank.'

3. If the attack failed on the west bank there was the risk that the vulnerability of the flank on the east bank would become permanent because there were insufficient troops to go on repeating the attack.

4. A western attack might enjoy greater success if it followed an eastern attack, because the French could well be forced to withdraw troops on the west bank to check progress on the east, which would in turn weaken it.

5. There seemed to be a possiblity, even with a relatively modest advance on the east, of effectively outflanking the French lines west of the river. 'This was calculated to make the attack on the west of the river much easier.'

He goes on to say 'The Chief of the General Staff decided for that reason [i.e. 5 above] to let the western attack start later than the main attack.' A cynic would say that this was an example of 'Situating the Appreciation', rather than 'Appreciating' it correctly in advance or, more likely, an ex post facto attempt to justify a major decision reached for other reasons. Falkenhayn's command methods, as exemplified by his decisions regarding the use of the Fourth and Sixth Armies during First Ypres and here again at Verdun, involved huge gambles and relied on the enemy reacting and operations developing in a particular way. He was severely slated for this at the time by other commanders, very noticeably Rupprecht, who dismissed him as a dangerous adventurer. When he was later removed from command, the flawed thinking behind these two operations appeared high up on the 'charge sheet.'

Jack

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Thank you, Jack. You give me more than a pause for thought regarding my perception of Falkenhayn. I certainly had not associated him with " huge gambles". I can't wait for your next book on First Ypres !

Phil

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Jack,

A wonderful phrase "situating the appreciation" !, it is always difficult interpreting (the true value of) memoirs. As Christina said in her initial post, we perhaps need new histories of these generals, reflecting on and analysing all these alternative viewpoints.

Robert,

I appreciate that the siege artillery wasn't much use in a war of movement, I was suggesting that the German preoccupation with the fortress/fortresses in Northern France; a "mindset" as much as anything else, perhaps helped contribute to slowing the enaction of the Schlieffen Plan after their astounding successes of 22 August.

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Phil

Since you come to mention it, all is progressing smoothly, but it will be some time before anything actually appears. Falkenhayn himself admitted post-war that operations on the Allied left flank in late autumn 1914 were a gamble. In his 1919 book General Headquarters 1914 - 1916 and its Critical Decisions p 28, he summarises the German approach in Flanders thus: 'The prize to be won was worth the stake.' Enough said...

Jack

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Steve, I understand but would respectfully submit that the delays in execution of the plan were not due to the issues around fortresses. Zuber's work might suggest this, but one of the problems with his book is that it only concentrates on a few days in the Ardennes and mostly from the German perspective. Leaving aside the fact that the Ardennes was only one piece (bigger than a dot for sure but still only a fraction of the whole line) of what was happening, the French rearguard actions were very significant in slowing the German exploitation, not just in terms of time but also in draining German manpower too. Zuber only hints at this.

Robert

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Thanks Robert,

I wasn't trying to denigrate the French rearguard actions, I was suggesting only that the "preoccupation" was a contribution. I am well aware of Zuber's perspective and try only ever use his work as a "counterpoint" or "counterbalance". Forgive me for concentrating on the Ardennes but forum discussions seldom venture here (and going off-topic), but to emphasise the point you make about Zuber being selective. He headlined his book "Battle of the Ardennes" but only covered that successful weekend over a front that extended south of the actual Ardennes. The French Cemetery at Noyers-Pont-Maugis, near Sedan, displays a narrative board also entitled "The Battle of the Ardennes" and details some of the effective rearguard actions that you highlight.

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I know from previous posts that you understand the French perspective far more than most. So I did not assume that you were denigrating the rearguard actions. It is all about a sense of perspective (and I don't meant that mine is the right one either ;) ). 'Preoccupation' implies a major degree of focus, but the relative numbers involved were far from 'major' in the overall scheme of things. Could the resources that were tied up in 'sieges' have been used elsewhere? More importantly, if they had been used elsewhere would they have made a decisive difference? No, IMHO.

Robert

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Jack - thanks for summarising Falkenhayn's arguments. I have always been doubtful about the value of memoirs written by someone who lost his job but perhaps I'm being cynical. However, it must also be remembered that Falkenhayn was not popular among many of the other Generals and certainly not in the Reichsarchiv, so he got a bad press after the war.

I would agree with Falkenhayn's point 2a but absolutely disagree with his argument in 2b if by that he means that the west bank consisted of a 'strong, well-constructed position, occupied by an enemy in superior strength'. The East Bank was much more heavily fortified than the West Bank. Similarly, I don't agree at all with his statement that '...the lie of the land was in no way favourable to operations on the west bank.' The three ridges on the West Bank are lower and more open than the narrow, steep ridges on the eastern side and the forts were mostly older and weaker (with exceptions, of course).

All the war games concerning Verdun played by the Germans before the war had involved an attack on both sides of the river simultaneously. Falkenhayn's 5th Army commanders in the field protested vehemently against an attack on only one side of the river but he resisted. Interestingly General von Zwehl wrote in his memoirs that he believed that an attack against the more lightly fortified West Bank was more likely to have been successful because the northernmost ridge (Mort-Homme and Hill 304) was not fortified and that the forts on the the next ridge south were weaker than those on the East Bank. Von Zwehl took the view that an attack on the West Bank alone with sufficient troops had the possibility of bringing them to the second ridge, i.e. the ridge with the weaker forts, within a short time and that from there the Germans would have been within sight of Verdun city. The operative words are, of course, 'had the possibility of'

I would agree with Falkenhayn on the fact that geography played a part in the decision. I think that the advantages to the Germans of attacking there are almost always overlooked. The German lines were only about 7 miles north of Verdun city and about 14 miles south of their main Western Front supply line. In 1914 they had captured Luxembourg,Longwy and Briey, all of which had huge coal and iron deposits, coal mines and steel mills in full production and an extensive rail network. At the same time they captured all the main stations on the Luxembourg/Franco-Belgian border - Metz, Longwy, Longuyon, Montmedy, Sedan, Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Etain and scores of 'minor' stations which even today have 500 yard platforms and 8-10 main lines running through them. From the main railway line, which ran through Metz, Longwy and Sedan to Charleville-Mezieres and points north, hundreds and hundreds of spur lines ran south to supply the whole of the Verdun sector. The forests to the north of Verdun offered extensive camouflage for camps, workshops, hospitals, stables, canteens, cafes, cinemas, butchers shops, mineral water plants, sawmills and anything else you might need. There was NOWHERE on the Western Front closer to the German arsenals than Verdun and nowhere that he could supply so easily.

The French, on the other hand, were dependent for reliable supply into their main fortress city on a single narrow gauge railway line with two locomotives and one road which was partly unsurfaced. To make matters worse, they were holding a salient cut by a river with few crossing points. In choosing where to launch an operation to bring the war to an end in 1916, Falkenhayn looked not only for an objective that the French would defend at all costs but one which was close to German lines and which he could supply easily. Verdun was the place that fitted the bill.

Christina

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I have a small popular pamphlet ( 25 pfg) about Verdun and the Somme. Printed Berlin in 1916 and mentioning dates in November. I have not read it carefully but a quick look seems to suggest that Verdun was a road into Germany as well as a road into France. It does not seem to mention attrition. I will take the time to read it over the next couple of days and see if it is worth quoting here.

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Good evening All,

Robert mentioned in his one of his earlier posts that Crown Prince Wilhelm had attacked through the Argonnes/West Bank in the earlier stages of the War and was repulsed. Although I seem to recall General Gouraud been involved, I know little of this battle. How far did he manage to advance down the Argonnes ? and would his repulse have had any bearing on Falkenhayn's reasoning that Jack mentions and Christina comments on ?

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Christina

Of course you are absolutely right to be sceptical of personal memoirs. Caution is always the watchword with historical sources and, as you say, this is all the more so when someone is seeking to justify his actions later. Your interesting points about the accessibility of Verdun for the Germans was clearly a primary factor in the decision to attack there (F stated as much in his Dec 15 memorandum to the Kaiser) and I suspect strongly that the Germans entirely underestimated both the ability of the French to improvise their supply along the Voie Sacree and the extraordinary collective courage of those French formations thrown into holding the line during the early stages of the battle, having been told that they had been placed there to have the honour of dying for La Patrie.

I am quite sure that this error led on to the suggestion that the defence of one bank would have to be weakened to strengthen the other. If I am right it is easy to see this as another example of my earlier point that everything was a gamble dependent on events unfurling precisely as envisaged. To describe this approach as naive is to understate the bankruptcy of F's approach to the offensive. Plans never survive first contact with the enemy, as he should have known.

The fact that his arguments do not stack up for those like you who have an intimate knowledge of the ground simply lends more weight to my overall point.

Jack

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Verdun stands on the main road from Paris to the eastern border of France and the Rhine, so it was both a road into France and a road into Germany.

In 1914 the Germans managed to push down each side of Verdun for a considerable way. On the west side, they managed to push right down through the Argonne forest and well down towards Bar-le-Duc, almost meeting up with the troops pressing down on the east. The fighting in the area at the time is not well known but when ordered to withdraw following the Battle of the Marne, the gap between the two armies was only 14km.

The Verdun forts were fully armed in 1914 and the Falkenhayn chose not to face the guns there. By the end of 1915 the forts were disarmed. I am sure that Falkenhayn would have been fully aware of that and that it was a factor in his reasoning.

Jack - I certainly think that Falkenhayn gambled that the French were too weak to withstand or to supply a major offensive but did he have any choice? He wanted to strike a blow to bring the war to an end before the Allies struck a similar blow in 1916. There was nowhere else he could launch an offensive so easily or with such hopes of success. All the talk of Belfort, lost in the mountains with very poor communications as it was, was a red herring.

From his point of view it probably looked both good and simple: he had multiple strong supply lines and all the resources he needed while the enemy was weak, with few resources and poor supply lines. If he had kept reserves available, so that he had them to throw in when Ft. Douaumont fell and the French were shocked and falling back, he might have brought about the evacuation of Verdun although that would still have left the West Bank in French hands. He certainly underestimated the collective and individual courage of the French troops and I am sure he could never have imagined that they would get supply lines organised as they did. That was an extraordinary feat.

Christina

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...Crown Prince Wilhelm had attacked through the Argonnes/West Bank in the earlier stages of the War and was repulsed.
Christina has detailed how far Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army penetrated. His forces were not repulsed. They were forced to retreat to comply with the new line of defence created on the Aisne. Wilhelm was none too happy with the decision because he knew that the Verdun salient was potentially about to be cut off.

Robert

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Christina has detailed how far Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army penetrated. His forces were not repulsed. They were forced to retreat to comply with the new line of defence created on the Aisne. Wilhelm was none too happy with the decision because he knew that the Verdun salient was potentially about to be cut off.

Robert

John Mosier writes of the September 1914 fighting... " The Fifth and Sixth German Armies had a simple aim : pinch off Verdun and its forts....The resulting battle, properly speaking, should be called First Verdun. But in the aftermath, the French were not anxious to call attention to just how close the Germans had been in those early days in September to pinching off the entire fortified position....The only thing keeping the Germans from pinching off Verdun was the string of forts along the river....and the German infantry attacking Troyon on the eigth was decimated by the French heavy weapons. Troyon was one of the few places where the Germans were massacred as they had been slaughtering the French....the beseiging Germans, who felt themselves to be right on the verge of success, were told to pull back to positions north of Verdun..."

It had come close in September 1914 : a more prudent and economic approach, availed of massive firepower support and husbandry of manpower, augured well eighteen months later.

Phil

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Thank you, Christina, I'd no idea the Germans had penetrated south of Verdun on the west bank in 1914. It is of great interest and an area I must read up on more (so as not to continue making mis-assumptions like the one Robert pointed out !). The amount of knowledge on this Forum continues to impress and I would like to ask 2 more questions ?

1). Phil raises the action at Fort Troyon which stopped the envelopment from the east flank (?). This summer at the village brocante in Jamoigne I got talking to a Frenchman from Verdun. He recommended visiting 2 forts, close to each other, south of Verdun, of similar design: one in ruins and one intact. Unfortunately I've got a memory like a sieve and didn't make a note of the names. Troyon sounds familiar, if this was one fort what would the other be ?

2). Are there any books (English or French) which detail this part of the conflict (around Verdun) in 1914 ? Phil mentions John Mosier.

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Steve, At the risk of spoiling the party, I feel compelled to state that John Mosier's book is not one that I could recommend to get a balanced view of the Great War. It's a terribly distorted account. But, like many such works, it's a very compelling read.

Phil

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As a sidelight on Verdun, I thought this might be of interest. It is from a small pamphlet published in Berlin 1916. It has internal dates of November so was published right at the end of the year. Price 25 pfg in paper covers it is obviously for popular consumption.

Entitled " War Report from The Great Headquarters. No. 21. The Battle for Verdun. The Battle on the Somme. ". Published by German Publishing Institute. Stuttgart & Berlin.

In an opening paragraph, the anonymous author points out that Verdun stands on the road to Germany and the valuable iron ore resources of the Saarland. It describes Verdun as the French sallyport into Germany. The content of the pamphlet is typical of the few I have read. Although printed at the end of the year, the two maps show the situation at Verdun and on the Somme in July. No hint of the German losses but a reasonable estimate of combined casualties for the French and British of 600,000. Certainly no hint in the pamphlet that Verdun was to be a meat grinder. That information presumably being reserved to OHL.

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No hint of the German losses but a reasonable estimate of combined casualties for the French and British of 600,000. Certainly no hint in the pamphlet that Verdun was to be a meat grinder. That information presumably being reserved to OHL.

Thanks, Tom...the estimate of 600,000 Franco British casualties is astonishingly low, considering the propensity of the belligerents to exagerrate enemy losses, and the reality being that the combined Allied totals in the two battles was actually in the order of a million.

Phil

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2). Are there any books (English or French) which detail this part of the conflict (around Verdun) in 1914 ?
Steve, you can get hold of Kronprinz Wilhelm's memoirs in English. There were two books that were translated. 'My War Experiences' is the one that you want. Get a copy that has the original maps. Obviously, as with Zuber's book, it is a one-sided view. I haven't found anything in English that describes the French perspective in great detail.

Nice looking copy here.

Robert

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When I take people to Verdun I always try to get them to go to St Mihiel as well as if the Germans had not managed to cross the river there in 1914 the battle would have been very different. The French would have had a main line railway AND the canal to take up supplies and bring back casualties.

Even if they had come under fire (and probably would not have) even just a train a day or a few barges would have made an enormous difference

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Thanks Robert,

I think I'll buy it.

Christina said that the Germans nearly got as far as Bar-le-Duc on the west bank 1914 offensive. All the maps and diagrams I have don't show the west flank south of Verdun. I can identify the east flank in the Fort Troyon locality (as highlighted most recently by "healdav") but can somebody give me some place names at the most souther extent reached on the west flank so I can better "picture" it ?

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The thing that kept the Germans from pinching off Verdun was the order to withdraw after that Battle of the Marne. In my opinion Troyon would have fallen if the Germans hadn't withdrawn. It wasn't strong enough to hold out for weeks.

There are a number of ruined forts below Verdun but only Troyon and Liouville are open to the public. They are both worth a visit. Steve, I think that the undamaged fort mentioned was probably Genicourt but I can't recommend that you try visiting it. It is not open to the public and these days it is regularly patrolled by both police and the army. If you want to see an undamaged Meuse fort, Jouy and Gironville are both open from time to time although Gironville is in private hands.

These sites will give you some idea about the various forts. Jouy: http://www.commercy.org/telech_Fort_Jouy.pdf

for Gironville: http://www.fortiffsere.fr/verdun/index_fichiers/Page6986.htm

for Liouville: http://fortdeliouville.fr/

and for Troyon: http://pagesperso-orange.fr/jmpicquart/Troyon.htm

On the west flank the Germans reached Vitry-le-Francois and almost reached Revigny, which is a few miles NW of Bar-le-Duc. Their front then turned northeast to the River Aire via Vaubécourt and Beauzée-sur-Aire, then swung back northwest to Clermont-en-Argonne.

Finding any information in English about the fighting east, west and south of Verdun in 1914 is extremely difficult. There is some information to be found in the Michelin Guide to the Marne 1914, part III, La Trouée de Revigny. There are accounts of fighting south of Verdun and towards the Vosges in 1914 in 'Verdun to the Vosges', a recently published facsimile book by Gerald Campbell, the Times correspondent, first published in 1916. I have never found anything in English about the very last battle in the area, at a place called Vaux-Marie, which the Germans won but still had to withdraw. There are lots of cemeteries in the area and it's worth a visit.

Joffre's perspective is to be found in his memoirs but whether they were every translated, I don't know.

I wouldn't both with Mosier's book, which I found anything but compelling.

Christina

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Christina, Joffre's memoirs were translated into English. They were published as a two volume set. It is still possible to get copies second-hand.

Robert

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Robert, that's interesting. However, I wouldn't buy a set just to find out what Joffre thought of the fighting south of the Meuse. Cheaper to obtain them through Inter-Library loan, if possible.

Christina

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