'Monty' and his views of Great War Generals

[keithmroberts]

Michael was too fast for me.

A couple of years ago I obtained a service record and war diary for a friend whose uncle had been awarded the MM. Unusually the diary happened to record the names of about four men who were awarded that medal following a trench raid in 1916. The awards were made by Plumer in person a couple of days after the raid when the unit had returned from the front line. Surely the men in that unit would appreciate the visit and the interest demonstrated by the Army commander.

Keith

[truthergw]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Sep 11 2009, 02:08 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

But Tennyson didn`t fight at Balaklave nor Shakespeare at Agincourt! Sassoon & Owen did fight on the Western Front.

Granted, Phil. My point is that they wrote poetry after being hospitalised from shell shock. Whatever else this poetry might be, it is hardly an objective description of conditions on the Western Front nor can it be taken as representative of the average soldier's viewpoint.

[PhilB]

Of course, the opinion of no one man could be taken as representative. I`m not sure Sassoon was suffering from "shellshock", just that it was a convenient diagnosis, and Owen was recovered enough to be sent back in action whilst still writing the same stuff. However, that`s just two people`s opinions. If they are considered to represent one end of the Lions/Donkeys poetic spectrum, in the interests of balance, who might represent the other end, or the middle?

[salesie]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Sep 12 2009, 11:16 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Of course, the opinion of no one man could be taken as representative. I`m not sure Sassoon was suffering from "shellshock", just that it was a convenient diagnosis, and Owen was recovered enough to be sent back in action whilst still writing the same stuff. However, that`s just two people`s opinions. If they are considered to represent one end of the Lions/Donkeys poetic spectrum, in the interests of balance, who might represent the other end, or the middle?

You're probably right about Sassoon, Phil - his “diagnosis” was almost certainly a convenient compromise for both parties (after Graves' intervention) to overcome the public hoo-ha caused by his "In defiance of military authority" statement in 1917, which was not in fact an attack on the generals but on the politicians, as was his later call for veterans to march on Parliament and bayonet their leaders.

Owen met Sassoon while both "recovered" at Craiglockhart hospital, and Sassoon "tutored" Owen for a few months - it is commonly accepted that Sassoon had a profound effect on Owen's poetry in this period, indeed I believe there are original manuscripts of Owen's work showing Sassoon's editing notes and suggestions. Was this a meeting of the like-minded, or the shaping of one mind by another? Either way, Owen did not write the "same stuff" post-Craiglockhart as he had done before. And both returned to the front, with Owen being tragically killed just one week before the Armistice, and Sassoon entering a rather wild post-war period, never again reaching any great literary standing with his post-war writing.

You ask, who might represent the other end, or the middle, of the Lions/Donkey poetic spectrum? As I said earlier, such poetry is not too difficult to find if one really wants to, but I will post one here as an example.

A Listening Post was written by Robert Earnest Vernede, a pre-war published author and poet (unlike Owen), who joined up in September 1914 when five years over-age, and was obviously someone who would never have dreamt of becoming a soldier at any point in his life. Vernede initially joined the Public Schools Battalion as a private soldier, but was later commissioned into the Rifle Brigade. He wrote this poem just two weeks before being killed in action whilst leading his platoon in an attack on Havrincourt Wood, April 9th 1917. Vernede had been wounded on the Somme, but returned to the front after recovering from his wounds, despite being offered a safe post by a friend at the War Office. Sassoon directly attacked Vernede's poetry at the time for not being of the right stuff (probably because of Vernede's pre-war repute) - it seems that Sassoon had no time for those with a different mindset to himself.

Though this poem is more questioning than his earlier war poetry (as was the work of many war poets, 1916 and the Somme being the watershed for a "move away from jingoism" in the war poetry), it clearly does not question his reasons for being there. Nor does it, in my opinion, simply highlight the irony of man's perceived superiority over beast - it seems to me that he is simply highlighting a universal truth; that in order to have greater awareness of our world than animals do, we sometimes have a price to pay.

Anyhow, read the poem and make your own mind up.

Cheers-salesie.

A Listening Post.

“The sun’s a red ball in the oak

And all the grass is grey with dew,

Awhile ago a blackbird spoke –

He didn’t know the world’s askew.

And yonder rifleman and I

Wait here behind the misty trees

To shoot the first man that goes by,

Our rifles ready on our knees.

How could he know that if we fail

The world may lie in chains for years

And England be a bygone tale

And right be wrong, and laughter tears?

Strange that this bird sits there and sings

While we must only sit and plan –

Who are so much the higher things –

The murder of our fellow man.

But maybe God will cause to be –

Who brought forth sweetness from the strong –

Out of our discords harmony

Sweeter than that bird’s song.”

Robert Earnest Vernede 1917.

[PhilB]

Thanks for that, Salesie. Vernede seems to be portraying a "Good War" in the WW2 sense, one that had to be fought against an evil power.

[salesie]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Sep 12 2009, 01:08 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Thanks for that, Salesie. Vernede seems to be portraying a "Good War" in the WW2 sense, one that had to be fought against an evil power.

Vernede certainly saw this as a "just war" that needed fighting, but I think his reasoning in this poem is deeper than that, Phil - after all, it is a modern concept drawn with huge lashings of hindsight that sees WW2 as a good war, a clear good versus evil conflict, in contrast to WW1 being seen as a not-so-good war in the modern public mindset.

When Vernede says in the third stanza, "The world may lie in chains for years" etc. it is clear he still believes, after all he's been through, that it is a just war and needs fighting, but in the fourth stanza when he says, "The murder of our fellow man", he seems to be putting, in a human sense, the "evil enemy" on a par with his own side. These two observations would seem to negate each other, but when considered with the first stanza's the Blackbird "spoke" but "didn’t know the world’s askew", then I think he is contemplating the irony of mankind's greater understanding carrying a hefty price. In other words, mankind may be trapped by its own heightened intellect - trapped by the universal truth that we don't get owt for nowt.

And then, in the fifth stanza, he says "But maybe God will cause to be - I think the "maybe" is significant, I think this shows his faith in God is waning, think it shows he is on the road to believing that mankind's destiny lies in its own hands? But who knows, the author is unfortunately not around to ask, and I may simply be putting my own modern spin on things?

But enough of my pointless meandering, back to my main point, Owen and Sassoon's poetry is not a reliable guide in judging the BEF's morale.

Cheers-salesie.

[jay]

Just to get more or less back on topic and away from the bad poets of WW1 ( and by saying bad I do not mean good ).

At least 20 years ago I saw a documentry which had Monty and a lot of other generals in it. The way I remember it Monty or one of the others said that "After WW1 all the generals on both side should have been taken out and shot". That sure sounds like something Monty would say. Does anyone out there remember seeing that, was it Monty and if not who? I remember being shocked that someone that far up the ladder was saying a thing like that and it stuck with me.

It would have improved the generalship in WW2 I'll bet.

[phil andrade]

Just to get more or less back on topic and away from the bad poets of WW1 ( and by saying bad I do not mean good ).

At least 20 years ago I saw a documentry which had Monty and a lot of other generals in it. The way I remember it Monty or one of the others said that "After WW1 all the generals on both side should have been taken out and shot". That sure sounds like something Monty would say. Does anyone out there remember seeing that, was it Monty and if not who? I remember being shocked that someone that far up the ladder was saying a thing like that and it stuck with me.

It would have improved the generalship in WW2 I'll bet.

Monty died in 1976, IIRC. This documentary was probably screened ( originally) in the 1960s, when it was fashionable to denigrate the High Command 1914-1918.

Monty fought his most celebrated battle at El Alamein in a manner very redolent of those fought by the BEF in 1917 and 1918. He enjoyed advantages that were not afforded to his Great War counterparts.

Actually, there was a Montgomery in high command in the Great War : he commanded - I think, but am not sure - one of the British armies on the Western Front in 1918...what, if any, was his relationship with Bernard Law Montgomery ?

Phil.

[Petroc]

Something that occurred to me with regard to pre-poets discussions, and in relation to Monty's use of the media to present himself as (my own quote) 'the soldiers' general'. We all know of the British and Commonwealth Armies' 'learning curve' throughout the Great War, which ultimately resulted in a fine all-arms fighting force of what was at the the time the probable epitomy of the perfect army. But remember that the 'learning curve' was not limited to tactics, strategy and arms; it encompassed uniforms, equipment, medicine, intelligence reports, so on and so forth. And it must have also included use of the media. Haig's early distrust of newspaper reporters and photographers was not simply based upon his own backward stupidity but rather upon a natural assumption, backed up by the much-maligned Staff at GHQ, that AT THAT TIME unsolicited reports might be dangerous to civilian morale and would, inevitably, have been fed back to the troops overseas on the Western Front with possibly un-military consequences; as the conflict wore on, however, journalists were increasingly (though not universally, and certainly not without restrictions) allowed to report items of news from a sub-propaganda point of view. If one accepts this view then Montgomery's manipulation and usage of the media was in part based upon command experience, in part based upon an appreciation and utilisation of a mode of mass communication open to him but not his predeccessors, and part on ego; but what really now intrigues me is what Monty wopuld have done if he had held Douggie's command in WW1!!!???

Andy

[phil andrade]

Here are some of Monty's summations of some the principal commanders 1914-1918:

Joffre - " He was tough and brutal. He would not give in, no matter what the suffering. He was also stupid [that word again!]. He won the battle of the Marne by pure luck....In a life which has seen much fighting I have learnt that what is strategically desirable must be tactically possible with the resources at one's disposal. Joffre did not seem to understand this fundamental truth."

Haig - "..was unimaginative. Maybe he was competent according to his lights, but these were dim."

Foch - "...because of his theory of tactics, must bear much responsibility for the carnage of the war, although his handling of the reserves and the counter-offensive in 1918 indicate that latterly he had begun to see the light."

Brusilov - "...was one of the few exceptional fighting commanders whose ability shone out in the gloom of the military misconduct of most of the 1914/18 war...He was a man of humour and humanity, qualites which contributed to his military ability...He always made a careful study of ground, built up an efficient staff, and studied the ways of his enemy. He was, in fact, a good professional soldier."

Falkenhayn - "...he proved himself to be a good fighting general in the field. He was the only prominent strategist on either side to urge that it would be wise to aim ultimately for something less than total victory."

These renditions are from Monty's A History Of Warfare. There were several others I might have cited, but I reckon that we can ascribe to him a breathtaking conceit, and much condescension, in his treatment of soldiers who contended with much more daunting tasks than he ever had to undertake.

Phil

[Petroc]

Thanks for those quotes, Phil, if they reveal nothing other than Montgomery's own percepetions (whenever they were articulated and for whatever reason) they do at least reflect something of that strange phenomenon that began to develop in the inter-war period and beyond with regard to the Western Front Great War Generals; the quotes give credence to the abilities and foresight of Falkenhayn and Brusilov, yet paint Haig and Foch in a less than perfect light. Yet both Falkenhayn and Brusilov were defeated and, despite some terrible setbacks in individual campaigns, Foch and Haig won the War. And, no matter what one's views are on the rights or wrongs of human conflict are, the one indisputable fact is that a 'good' General, commander, king, or whatever you feel fit to call him, is a victorious one

[Robert Dunlop]

Haig - "..was unimaginative."

The film 'A Bridge Too Far' was replayed just recently. Operation Market Garden was certainly imaginative...

Robert

[salesie]

Thanks for those quotes, Phil, if they reveal nothing other than Montgomery's own percepetions (whenever they were articulated and for whatever reason) they do at least reflect something of that strange phenomenon that began to develop in the inter-war period and beyond with regard to the Western Front Great War Generals; the quotes give credence to the abilities and foresight of Falkenhayn and Brusilov, yet paint Haig and Foch in a less than perfect light. Yet both Falkenhayn and Brusilov were defeated and, despite some terrible setbacks in individual campaigns, Foch and Haig won the War. And, no matter what one's views are on the rights or wrongs of human conflict are, the one indisputable fact is that a 'good' General, commander, king, or whatever you feel fit to call him, is a victorious one

Must not forget though, that Foch and Haig didn't actually win the war - they were in fact the two principle generals of the winning side; a subtle but important distinction because WW1 was not won by military means in the field alone, there were other, strategic, considerations which played a vital role in final victory. So it is possible that the likes of Falkenhayn and Brusilov were in certain aspects better generals than Foch and Haig.

But I agree that in warfare, winning is everything and second is nothing - and, therefore, Monty's comments should be viewed in this light. I too think it is significant that Monty should denigrate past winning generals i.e. a touch of the green-eyed monster at work, after all, by WW2's end Monty was just another general amongst many on the world stage, he stood in the public opinion shadow of other men, who he also criticised initially but found this to be a public relations disaster, so it is not surprising that he should attempt to re-ignite his own light by also criticising past winners from a past war. Was he operating a perverse form of reflected glory i.e. attempting to put himself above those who in the public’s eye were the war-winning generals of yesteryear?

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

. Was he operating a perverse form of reflected glory i.e. attempting to put himself above those who in the public's eye were the war-winning generals of yesteryear?

Cheers-salesie.

Monty's such a hard figure to assess properly, largely because his conceited conduct makes his views so hard to stomach.....even if he was right.

Phil.

[Petroc]

Salesie,

I appreciate your distinction (though you refer further on to 'winners' of war with regard to the field Commanders) and acknowledge that the Great War was by no means won by Haig et al alone; the naval blockades, the material resources imported from the Commonwealth and the USA, the human resources imported from the latter, etc etc. Nonetheless, it surely has to be an indisputable fact that the most significant part of the conflict was won by the armies that faced the strongest enemy dispositions in a geographical area to which they (the enemy) attached the highest importance; if one accepts this then, as the leaders of those victorious forces, Haig and Foch 'won'

Andy

[PhilB]

And, no matter what one's views are on the rights or wrongs of human conflict are, the one indisputable fact is that a 'good' General, commander, king, or whatever you feel fit to call him, is a victorious one

Robert E Lee a bad general then?

[Petroc]

Phil,

I added quotation marks around the word good for a reason, pertinent to the winning of a war. Note that I acknowledge some of the more painful aspects of both Haig and Foch's campaigns. But no matter how good, bad or indifferent a field commander he was, Lee lost. With all respect, and despite the distant echoes of the American Civil War that reverberated throughout the 14-18 conflict, I think that it is still more relevant discuss the subject in hand with regard to the Second World War, especially since many of the senior commanders in the latter had experience in the First

Andy

[PhilB]

Erwin Rommel a bad general then?

[salesie]

Salesie,

I appreciate your distinction (though you refer further on to 'winners' of war with regard to the field Commanders) and acknowledge that the Great War was by no means won by Haig et al alone; the naval blockades, the material resources imported from the Commonwealth and the USA, the human resources imported from the latter, etc etc. Nonetheless, it surely has to be an indisputable fact that the most significant part of the conflict was won by the armies that faced the strongest enemy dispositions in a geographical area to which they (the enemy) attached the highest importance; if one accepts this then, as the leaders of those victorious forces, Haig and Foch 'won'

Andy

I only accept that Haig and Foch were the two principle generals of the winning side - I do not accept that Haig and Foch won the war. After all, the Kaiser and his petty princelings did not flee from allied armies sweeping into Germany but from their own people. Germany imploded; it collapsed militarily, socially, economically and politically under the sheer weight of the strategic forces brought to bear upon it - the military pressure on the Western Front was an extremely vital part of the allied total-war effort, but not war-winning in itself.

It was not an all-arms war winning victory stemming from an allied military learning curve as many would have us believe, the German generals' learning-curve was equal to that of the Allied generals and thus caused a four-year long stalemate, and this stalemate could only be broken when one side or the other's collective-will and/or ability to wage total-war collapsed. This collapse occurred in Germany in the summer of 1918, as a direct result of the long-term strategic forces brought to bear by the Allies - the Allies, Britain in particular, needed to out-perform Germany in all aspects of total-war, not just in the field, to defeat Germany, which they did at great cost to themselves. Haig and Foch were winning generals, but not war-winners per se.

The same goes for Monty, Eisenhower et al, some twenty-odd years later, they were winners but not war winners per se, but did it at less cost, in human terms, because the Red Army bore the brunt of that particular burden. 'Tis only the popular imagination that sees the generals of both world wars as war-winners in themselves.

I suspect that Monty and Haig have much more in common than either would have been willing to admit.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

I suspect that Monty and Haig have much more in common than either would have been willing to admit.

Cheers-salesie.

Yes, that is an excellent point, salesie !

My own unfavourable comments notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that Monty was a professional soldier of the highest calibre.

His war record 1914-1918 must be acknowledged : he actually fought hand to hand with the enemy, kicking his foe in the balls and taking him prisoner. When he was desperately wounded, he ordered his men to stop trying to resucue him, because one had already been killed trying to do that. His tour of duty as a brigadier major in the staff was distinguished : am I right in identifying him as the officer who commented, in the prelude to the Bazentin attack of July14th 1916,".. if we do not take that ridge I will eat my hat. " ?

And so, if anyone knew whereof he spoke regarding the soldiers of the Great War, Monty did. His obnoxious traits obscure this fact, at least they have for me !

Phil.

[Robert Dunlop]

...am I right in identifying him as the officer who commented, in the prelude to the Bazentin attack of July14th 1916,".. if we do not take that ridge I will eat my hat. " ?

Phil, I don't think so.

Robert

[michaeldr]

To return to the original question here re the veracity of the statement

there is corroboration from Prof Travers in his 'The Killing Ground' which covers this in his chapter on Douglas Haig & GHQ

"The reason that GHQ staff did not visit the front in 1916 and 1917 seems to be partly because Haig had decreed in 1915, as GOC First Army, 'that no staff officer was to go nearer the trenches than a certain line'. This was because of the danger involved for difficult-to-replace staff officers. The order appears to have originated in October 1915 in GHQ under Sir John French who, after three of his divisional generals had been killed, said that such senior officers should not visit the front."

All credit therefore to Plumer who seems to have turned a Nelsonian blind eye to this

I also note that Plumer and Allenby feature (as two of the three empire generals [Monash was the third]) in Mongomery's 'outstanding fighting commanders.'

Michael

[phil andrade]

Phil, I don't think so.

Robert

Forgive my confusion : this was Major- General A A Montgomery, M.G.G.S. Fourth Army, who later styled himself Montgomery -Massingberd ( was he attempting to dissassociate himself from the upstart?).

Phil.

[simonharley]

It's indicative that Monty in his "Memoirs" saw fit to repeat "the story of Sir Douglas Haig's Chief of Staff" (meaning Kiggell) and the legendary line about Passchendaele, "Do you mean to tell me that the soldiers had to fight under such conditions?" Whether he believed it or not is a different matter.

It's also interesting that in his memoirs he claimed to have been appalled by the casualty rates, when according to his biographer Hamilton (and his own words) he wasn't so opposed to them at the time.

There's no question that sans beret Montgomery was one of the most professional soldiers the British army has ever had. Nevertheless, I can't help but feel that he was purposely belittling his predecessors to secure his place in history, just as he belittled his contemporaries. FWIW.

Simon

[Petroc]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Sep 13 2009, 11:54 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Erwin Rommel a bad general then?

Good or bad, Phil, (and I know which of the two I personally subscribe to) Rommel 'lost'.