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Remembered Today:

'Monty' and his views of Great War Generals


Petroc

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Dear all,

in the course of revisiting some Great War books that I haven't ploughed through for some time, I'm currently re-reading Philip Warner's 'Passchendaele'. First published in 1987, to me it does seem a bit dated and the author has certainly nailed his colours to the 'incompetent Generals' mast; his prerogative, of course.

However, one of the most irritating aspects of my own copy is the lack of precise historical references made by the author to important comments or facts contained in the text. One that struck me was the statement 'In the Second [World War], Montgomery showed himself frequently in the forward areas because, he used to say, in the First he had never seen anyone above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel anywhere near the Front'.

Would anyone know if this is a true statement? And if so, when, where and how often was it made?

Andy

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A slightly different twist is given by Ronald Lewin in his book 'Montgomery as Military Commander' when he quotes the FM saying

"There was little contact between the generals and the soldiers … … I never once saw the British Commander-in-Chief, neither Haig nor French, and only twice did I see an Army Commander. The higher staff were out of touch with the regimental officers and with the troops."

However, here too there is no citation or ref that I can find. The previous quote from Montgomery, was from his 1958 memoirs and this may be from the same source

Michael

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In his memoirs Monty certainly commented that he never saw French or Haig during the war and 'only twice' did he see an army commander. Certainly when he was Brigade Major of 104 Brigade during 1915-16 he frequently accompanied his brigade coimmander around the trenches. During WW2 it was not so much that he made frequent visits to the front line. Rather he was always keen to show himself to its troops, especially by gathering large groups of them and giving them talks about his intentions so as make each individual soldier feel that he had a part to play in the approaching battle.

Charles M

PS I see that Michael has beaten me to it!

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Thanks, chaps.

Do you think this had as much to do with the changing nature of civilian life in Britian, the number of wartime-enlisted troops in the 39-45 conflict having also been also accompanied by the greater and more free use of mass media (with all its associated propaganda benefits)? And, given their upbringing and training, would Great War Tommies have necessarily been impressed by a rather eccentrically-uniformed General such as Montgomery, whereas their sons and nephews a few decades later rather embraced this kind of character?

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As a certain Lt-Col (Temp) Montgomery (later Viscount Montgomery of Alamein) put it, in a letter to his brother, Donald, after seeing the Canadians assaulting Passchendaele Ridge in 1917, "they were 'magnificent, but they (the Generals) forget that the whole art of war is to gain your objective with as little loss as possible".

Monty criticised WW1 generals on several occasions, but, as far as I know, never actually offered any viable alternatives, in common with the rest of such critics, as to how the first war could/should have been fought in order to "gain your objective with as little loss as possible". Monty did in fact fight a battle of attrition himself; in Normandy, to draw in the German army and allow the Americans to break out on the right flank, so one would assume that he learnt from this battle that "as little loss as possible" can sometimes, depending on the circumstances, equate to substantial losses.

Also, we should not forget that the bulk of the wearing-down of the German army in WW2 was done by the Russians (with attrition rates far higher than any in WW1) - how would Monty's overall casualty count have looked if the armies he commanded had been called upon to carry out this wearing-down themselves, as was the case with Haig et al in WW1?

Monty, great general as he was, did himself no favours by not backing-up his criticisms with rational alternatives as to how the stalemate of the western front could/should have been resolved with less casualties.

Cheers-salesie.

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Hi Salesie,

Interesting comment, and one aspect I'd forgotten about (although my WW2 knowledge is not what it should be); I believe Montgomery had his own contemporary critics during the later conflict with regard to his part in (? forgive me if I'm wrong) Operation Cobra in Normandy and his willingness to sustain (or rather to endure) casualties in the earlier El Alamein battles provided that the greater strategic aims could be acheived. If that was the case, then there can surely be little difference (apart from technological) between the responsibilities of High Command in either conflict

Andy

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Hi Salesie,

Interesting comment, and one aspect I'd forgotten about (although my WW2 knowledge is not what it should be); I believe Montgomery had his own contemporary critics during the later conflict with regard to his part in (? forgive me if I'm wrong) Operation Cobra in Normandy and his willingness to sustain (or rather to endure) casualties in the earlier El Alamein battles provided that the greater strategic aims could be acheived. If that was the case, then there can surely be little difference (apart from technological) between the responsibilities of High Command in either conflict

Andy

Precisely my point, Andy, about the responsibilities of command in both wars - the circumstances, of course, were different, but when events conspired to make them similar then attrition became the order of the day in line with those responsibilities.

Cheers-salesie.

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'Public appearances' surely more to do with ease and rapidity of transport and greater fluidity of fronts. Casualties were comparatively light, but when they became heavy, enemy casualties were much heavier still. Not a classic war of attrition as per WW1 because positions were more mobile. Keeping up relentless pressure on the advance is not comparable with wearing the enemy down in long-term static warfare.

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I agree with what you're saying to an extent, but if we look at the Normandy 1944 campaign then attrition became an inescapable aspect of fighting in the 'Bocage' and for the Commonwealth assaults on and and break-out from Caen and the local areas surely. Casualties undoubtedly differed between the two World Wars in terms of NUMBERS committed to fighting in France and their relation to the wounded and killed figures in both conflicts, but I think I'm right in the assertion (as John Terraine tabulated) that percentage figures were comprable? Forgive me if I'm wrong, my 'library' is currently elsewhere so can't check!

And

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No doubt that casualty figures during the toughest battles in the West in WW2 were comparable with the worst in WW1, but static warfare was always temporary by comparison. In less than a year, the battlefront went from the beaches of Normandy to Torgau on the Elbe.

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Very true, but wasn't that was more due to contemporary technological and mechanical advances, as well as to the Fronts that developed due to initial and 'final' Axis dispositions, as it was to Generalship?

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'Public appearances' surely more to do with ease and rapidity of transport and greater fluidity of fronts. Casualties were comparatively light, but when they became heavy, enemy casualties were much heavier still. Not a classic war of attrition as per WW1 because positions were more mobile. Keeping up relentless pressure on the advance is not comparable with wearing the enemy down in long-term static warfare.

Russian and German casualties on the Eastern Front in WW2 were not comparatively light, and both sides on that front took far more casualties, in number and rate, than any front in WW1 (Russian losses being much heavier than German ones). Only in the West were Allied overall casualty rates comparatively lighter than WW1 - consequently, the Western Front in WW2 must not be considered in isolation because without the Eastern Front then the fighting in the west would have been, by necessity, much more severe and therefore at least as attritional, and probably more so, than WW1.

Mobile warfare is not the key to lessening attrition rates - it does in fact increase the rate of attrition, as the Eastern Front in WW2 clearly demonstrates. Even in WW1, the rates of attrition were actually higher in the two periods of mobile warfare in the west, Aug-Nov 1914 & Mar-Nov 1918, than in the massive set-piece, static battles that everyone seems to focus on. Relentless pressure on the advance carries a higher rate of attrition (for both sides) than long-term static warfare. And, given that the wearing-down of the enemy's forces is necessary for victory in total-war, wearing-down is not dependent on whether the warfare is mobile or static in nature.

The responsibilities of the commanders were the same, in essence, in both wars i.e. to defeat the enemy whatever his dispositions, and if circumstances so dictated then attrition became inevitable (even in the west in WW2, on occasion). Monty's overall casualty rates in WW2 were only lighter than those in WW1 because he was allowed by circumstances to fight a different kind of war to Haig - Haig did not have the luxury of the Red Army wearing-down the German Army in the east; the BEF and the French Army had to do that job by themselves in the west in WW1, and indeed, the German Army in the west was substantially reinforced from the east in early 1918. What price Monty’s attrition rates in the west being less if the Russians had collapsed nine months before the end of WW2, collapsed in Sept 1944?

Please don't ignore the impact of the Eastern Fronts, Gents, when making comparisons.

Cheers-salesie.

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With respect, the fighting in the Bocage was not a battle of "attrition" in the classical sense. It was merely a bloody bad place to fight offensively. Long-term attrition of German forces was never the aim of Allied commanders in the area. To the contrary, it was essential that they get out and away as soon as they could. Antony

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With respect, the fighting in the Bocage was not a battle of "attrition" in the classical sense. It was merely a bloody bad place to fight offensively. Long-term attrition of German forces was never the aim of Allied commanders in the area. To the contrary, it was essential that they get out and away as soon as they could. Antony

No one is suggesting that attrition was the specific aim of Allied commanders in Normandy - just the outcome of fulfilling the strategic necessities.

Cheers-salesie.

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Monty apparently said this:

"Snow of course was quite useless; he was an old man (59 at the time) and ought to have been sent home long before. He merely told his divisions to get on with it and there was no coordinated artillery plan. In many cases failure is put down to tired troops. My experience is that it takes a lot to really tire the soldier. The more tired he is the more it is necessary to ensure that he is given a good "kick off". So often this was not done. The real people who were tired were the commanders behind; Corps commanders were getting pretty tired by 1917 and few of them knew what went on at the front. Snow was one of these."

Some of what is said here is true some is not, typical Monty IMO.

I wonder if the ignoring of the facts, not believing the intelligence reports, could constitute some of the above comments when considering Arnheim?

Regards

Arm

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No doubt that casualty figures during the toughest battles in the West in WW2 were comparable with the worst in WW1, but static warfare was always temporary by comparison. In less than a year, the battlefront went from the beaches of Normandy to Torgau on the Elbe.

A challenge here, if you'll forgive me.

It's true that the casualties suffered by the rifle companies in Normandy were comparable with many of the episodes of the Great War, but they were not comparable with the worst that had been suffered 1914-1918.

British battalions that went into action on July1st 1916 suffered casualties, both numerically and proportionately, that vastly exceeded rates experienced in 1939-1945 in the West, and the same could be said of many other occasions in the Great War. The New Zealand division suffered heavy casualties at Monte Cassino in May 1944, but they paled besides those sustained in a single day at Passchendaele in October 1917; the Australian division sustained about 2,700 casualties in a week at El Alamein, which was half the loss suffered in a single day at Fromelles, or Pozieres.

Then there were even more terrifying casualties suffered by the French in the early battles of 1914 - the 6th Colonial, at Rossignol, on August 22nd 1914 incurred 10,500 in a few hours, more than a third of them fatal...not even the Soviet experience 1941-1945 exceeded that.

True, we muist not imagine that the British infantrymen of 1939-1945 enjoyed a soft option compared with their fathers, and the Canadians at Dieppe and the Poles at Monte Casino did take extreme casualties. But we must beware the mantra, cited by Sheffield and Corrigan, that the casualty rates in Normandy exceeded those of the Somme and Passchendaele.

Phil.

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My personal opinion is that much (most) of what Monty said and did was about promoting the Monty myth, so I would always take a very large pinch of salt with any of his comments. Having just read Beevor's excellent book on Normandy, I suspect it was his 'name' that prevented Monty being bowler-hatted at several times; as a tactician, I wouldn't rate him too highly, either.

Normandy wasn't a success - he was a braggart who raised expectations which slightly timid tactics were unable to attain, and from what I know of Alamein, it wasn't the sweeping movement we think of, but rather a series of set-piece advances (under GW-style barrages), designed to wear-down before breaking through.

A post-War story sums the man up, IMHO: at a dinner party, his hostess, Lady Diana Cooper, suggested that she couldn't keep calling him Viscount, or whatever, and asked for his suggestion. He pondered a while and then said she could call him 'Field Marshal'. Insufferable little man.

I am biased, though: my old dad had the 'pleasure' of driving him in Cairo. Dad said he was the rudest man he ever met; on the other hand, dad would have willingly died for Alexander, who was a real toff.

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In his memoirs Monty certainly commented that he never saw French or Haig during the war and 'only twice' did he see an army commander. Certainly when he was Brigade Major of 104 Brigade during 1915-16 he frequently accompanied his brigade coimmander around the trenches. During WW2 it was not so much that he made frequent visits to the front line. Rather he was always keen to show himself to its troops, especially by gathering large groups of them and giving them talks about his intentions so as make each individual soldier feel that he had a part to play in the approaching battle.

Charles M

PS I see that Michael has beaten me to it!

I agree the FM wrote his Memoirs in 1958 and the Chapter on 'My Early Life' was but a brief resume. In his book 'A History of Warfare ' produced in 1968 with the help of a team of reseachers there is a useful synopsis-Chapter 20 on the 1914-18 War (35 pages) which is well worth reading, in which the FM provides far more insight into the generalship of the WW1 and I quote:

'The War defied the attempts of the generals to master it, but the generalship was by no means all poor. If the War produced no soldier of genius, Falkenhayn, Ludendorff, Mustapha Kemal, Plumer, Monash, Allenby and Brusilov were all outstanding fighting commanders. Lawrence and Lettow-Vorbeck had their special abilities. I would name Sir John Monash as the best General on the western front in Europe, he possessed real creative originality, and the war might well have been over sooner, and certainly with fewer casualties, had Haig been relieved of his command and Monash appointed to command the British armies in his place. Haig was unimaginative....................'

The FM also makes this observation in his book 'A History of Warfare':

'Haig never seemed to me to get himself over to the soldiers. He would inspect the troops in complete silence, there is a story that one of his staff suggested it would create a good impression if he would occasionally stop and speak to one or two of his men. He took the advice and asked one man "Where did you start this War?" The astonished soldier replied "I did not start this war, sir, I think the Kaiser did". Haig gave it up after this encounter! Nevertheless its the spoken word above all else which counts in the generalship of men.'

Philip

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Insufferable little man.

I am biased, though: my old dad had the 'pleasure' of driving him in Cairo. Dad said he was the rudest man he ever met; on the other hand, dad would have willingly died for Alexander, who was a real toff.

That very much echoes my dad's opinion. He served in North Africa in the Eigth Army, and was an admirer of Auchinlek, who, apparently, had achieved a vital success in the first battle of El Alamein in July 1942.

Seventy British generals were killed in The Great War.

They were not chateau bound nincompoops, and we can assume that their mortality rate indicates that they were willing to take their share of risk. A prolonged static war, on the gigantic scale of the Western Front, necessarilly entails the need for high command to remain in situ at HQ, especially given the communication technology available 1914-1918.

Rather than dismiss Monty's comments out of hand - which I'm tempted to do - we might do well to reflect on how his contemporaries perceived their experiences of 1914-1918. What did Alexander, Slim, Auchinlek, Wavell and Gort have to say when they referred to their Great War tours of duty? Were they as disparaging of the High Command as Monty ?

Phil.

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Monty's opinions were biased to a great extent by his battalion CO's behaviour in the early weeks of the war - one of those who signed a "surrender" document at St Quentin which Tom Bridges sorted out IIRC.

IIRC in his memoirs he mentions Senior Staff Officers and Commanders never being seen in the front line but then, as has been pointed out, it is not their job.

Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley in one of his books states that the front line is not the place for a Commander. How could one control a battle when only about ten men at best could hear you over the noise?

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IIRC in his memoirs he mentions Senior Staff Officers and Commanders never being seen in the front line but then, as has been pointed out, it is not their job.

Tricky one that, Squirrel. Could a Senior Staff Officer or Commander function properly without going in the front line? Technically - yes, but ideally? Put it this way - if you were a SSO/Commander, would you be seen in the front line? I think I`d feel obliged to.

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With all due respect, Montgomery was not saying that commanders were never seen in the front line

It is much more simple than that

What he said was, 'there was little contact between the generals and the soldiers'

and 'the higher staff were out of touch with the regimental officers and the troops'

Montgomery saw this as fatal for morale

His own way of getting over this mistaken attitude was to (in Lewin's words)

"evolve a knack of seeming to address each man in person. By his own confession, it is clear that many of his characteristic creeds and methods were based on a study of Napoleon. After the young Corsican's famous Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797 General Desaix observed: 'he has never seen a regigiment which he has not persuaded that he concidered the best in the Army'. This was the art which Montgomery gradually perfected... ... ... what Liddell Hart once said Marlborough possessed - 'the power of commanding affection while communicating energy."

Michael

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Monty was very fond of mythologising as stated earlier. In his memoirs he looked back to the 1st Warwicks counter-attack at Haucourt to save the Rifle Brigade in the retreat from Le Cateau with considerable use of hindsight.

He later wrote...

“There was no reconnaissance, no plan, no covering fire”.

Nigel Hamilton, Montgomery’s biographer slavishly follows his subject with harsh criticism of command at all levels at Le Cateau and Haucourt. The 10th Brigade was at a disadavantage in terms of reconnaissance anyway as they had not been joined by either their cavalry or cyclists. Monty totally ignores the desperate nature of the situation 1st Warwicks, 10th Brigade and 4th Division faced as they were forced back.

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QUOTE (Phil_B @ Sep 9 2009, 05:23 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>
Tricky one that, Squirrel. Could a Senior Staff Officer or Commander function properly without going in the front line? Technically - yes, but ideally? Put it this way - if you were a SSO/Commander, would you be seen in the front line? I think I`d feel obliged to.

Depends on time, place, circumstance and reason Phil.

If a Commander thought that a personal recce was required why would he do it himself when he had the Staff to do this?

During a battle he would be better off further back trying to see the whole picture rather than putting himself in danger to see a small area of operations.

During the early part of the war, when things were perhaps more "fluid" for want of a better word,many Brigade and sometimes Divisional Commanders did go to the front line during their own attacks and attacks by the enemy and many became casualties as a result.

A visit to the front line before or after a battle would have more effect from the PR angle IMHO and probably less risk of becoming a casualty as well. Also more likely to see what the mood and conditions were like and actually learning something.

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To what extent do you guys think that the much-trumpeted version of Haig's tactical and strategic theories regarding, for want of better words 'pummelling, break-in and break-out and then pursue the enemy' were actually echoed by the Allies' experiences in Normandy after D-Day? This kind of warfare might not have been planned (and Haig has been criticised in the past for his retrosepctive comments along the line of 'oh, wel thats how I planned it in the first place') but was it inevitable?

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