Stormtroop Tactics

[David_Blanchard]

I am now in the process of writing up a thesis on the Battle of the Aisne 1918. At the moment I am checking proofs, bibliography and such like.

I have just come across an email I send out a while back for help with Stormtroop tactics. Just wondering if anyone can add to my questions which I outline below from the original email:

'I am researching for an MPhil at university concerned with the battle of the Chemin des Dames, May 1918. As a result I have been looking at German methods of attack in each of the three phases of the German offensive, March, April and May of 1918. The storm troop assault squads played an important role in the March battle, and as such their part has been researched by Martin Samuels in 'Command or Control?' as well as 'Storm troop tactics' by Bruce Gudmundsen, and the work of Tim Lupfer, but the role of the storm troops in the April and May battles appears to have been neglected. The work of Travers, 'The Killing Ground' and 'How the War was Won', have been useful, but don't deal specifically with German tactics.

I am particularly interested in two areas:

1.

I have recently come across two books, which briefly mention storm troops and the April offensive:

'The fifth Army in March 1918' by W Shaw Sparrow (Pub 1921) which states the following:

"Ludendorf, when regretting his half-successes in the Lys valley, which followed the events of March 1918, places among the causes the fact that his men were not storm troops."

'Amiens 1918' by Gregory Blaxland

"Ludendorf implies in his memoirs that his expectations were not high. The fourteen division of the von Quast's sixth Army selected for he opening assault (of which six were in second lines) were all fresh, but they suffered from the complexes of inferior grading, being 'trench' divisions as opposed to 'storm'."

Neither of these two books provides footnotes dealing the provenance of the source, but the implications are that they came from Lundendorf's memoirs. I have checked Ludendorf's 'My War Memories' but there are very few details given of the April offensive and no mention of storm troops.

I would be very grateful for any suggestions as to how I could trace the origins of the above references, which state that storm troops were not used in April 1918. Or alternatively provide me with other works covering the role of the German Army in April 1918 (the Official History by Edmonds says little about the tactics used by the German Army).

2.

It would appear that Ludendorf did indeed regret not using storm troops in April, in his War Memories (page 614) he states:

"It was necessary to instruct the troops according to the tactical lessons learned in the latest fighting ….. greater importance attached to storm troop tactics".

It would therefore appear that the German Armies that attacked on 27th May 1918, had been thoroughly prepared to use these tactics in battle. I have no real evidence on which to base these claims, only inference from Ludendorf's memoirs, and the evidence of the overwhelming advance of German troops on that day. (The OH by Edmonds, uses German monographs, but again little is explicitly stated about the use of these assault formations, other than that the attacking division had been prepared for 6 weeks prior to the attack).

Again, I would be grateful if anyone could help me with written sources regarding the tactics used by the German Army in May 1918. I have also consulted most of the operations and tactical works of Travers, Griffiths, Zabecki and Bidwell and works edited by Bond, but if any recent work concerned with German storm troop tactics has been produced I would be grateful to receive any suggestions.

Regards

David

[Robert Dunlop]

I don't know of any recently published works on stosstruppen, which is one of my areas of special interest.

As to the post-Kaiserschlacht use of stosstruppen, it is difficult to get direct evidence. However, there are some pieces of evidence that I have been able to glean.

In the British Official History of the Battle of Lys (p 192), there is the following quote concerning the attack on Givenchy: 'The captured orders of the 4th Ersatz Division show that the reduction of the Givenchy salient was to have been carried out by two forces, each of a regiment of three battalions, strengthened by storm troops and heavy machine guns. The salient was not to be attacked directly, but outflanked and isolated; there was to be no frontal attack across the (mine) craters, but machine guns mounted at commanding points were to engage the defenders whilst the enveloping attacks were in progress.'

The German left wing failed in their mission. This left their flank exposed throughout the subsequent advance along the Lys. Further attacks were mounted against the salient. All failed. The only British description that I have read of the subsequent attacks mentions waves of troops, which is not characteristic of storm troops. Thus, it would appear that storm troops were used on day one but were probably not available or not used subsequently.

I have found British accounts of various engagements can give clues about the use or otherwise of stosstruppen. I don't rely on British soldiers actually referring to storm troopers. I look for references to flamethrowers and small groups attacking from shell hole to shell hole, quickly and heavily supported by machine guns. Nothing else that I have read about the Battle of Lys suggests they were used to any extent.

The second piece of information is the attached photograph, which purports to show storm troops in operation on the Aisne. I must admit, the photograph looks more like the training ground at Sedan to me.

The most detailed description that I have of the action on the Aisne comes from Colwill's book 'Through hell to victory'. In writing about the 2nd Devons' experience, he mentions: "When the barrage lifted..., we saw the Germans coming in long lines, one close behind the other. They were not more than 500 yards from us, coming over our old front line trenches. Behind their lines we could see them in dense numbers, bringing down the road all sorts of transport and guns." You could argue that this pattern of attack is not indicative of storm troops. The actual attack on the 2nd Devons consisted of rifle grenadiers firing first, then supported by riflemen who gave covering fire to the grenadiers that approached close enough to lob stick grenades. Again, this does not suggest stosstruppen.

The British were on a flank in the Aisne offensive. Unlike Givenchy, it could be argued that the British positions were not as critical to the success of the attack. Hence, the presumed absence of stosstruppen does not mean they were not used elsewhere.

This is the best I can for the minute. I will check some of my other sources again. Junger's book is no direct help because he was wounded in March and did not return until after the Aisne. Similarly, Renn (who received storm troop training) was wounded in March as well. However, indirectly their experiences remind us that the losses of stosstruppen were high in Kaiserschlacht. The highly specialised sturmbatalliones were parcelled out across the attacking divisions. Ultimately, I think the major success factor was the artillery barrages - the influence of stosstruppen has been overplayed by some authors, IMHO.

Robert

[David_Blanchard]

Robert,

Thanks for taking the time out in providing me with some sound advice. Could you tell me the provenance of the photograph please?

I have recently finished a chapter on the German attack on the Aisne.

Email me off forum and I shall send it to you.

Regards

David

[Borden Battery]

Hello David

My late Grandfather was with the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade which was detached from the Canadian Corps and motored down to Amiens and area to provide firepower to stem some of the German attacks. If interested, I can forward the transcribed War Diary sections of the unit that might be of interest to you. It was a very fluid situation and much of the 5th Army was just not prepared to it.

Regards

Dwight Mercer, Regina, Canada

[Robert Dunlop]

Dwight

That would be fascinating. Did you get a chance to talk to him about his experiences. It was an interesting innovation and I have read of their exploits elsewhere.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

David

The photograph was from Der Krieg 1914-19 in Wort und Bild 1918, a German periodical. While it is attributed to the Chemin des Dames, it does look like a training exercise to me.

Robert

[Borden Battery]

Hello Robert ...

Regarding my late Grandfather, yes, we had several conversations about his experiences in the Great War. As it turns out, I was the only person he talked to - of course that is another story.

In addition, we have found all the surviving letters written home. These have been scanned at 720 dpi for the family and the text has been transcribed and heavily footnoted to enable family members to understand some of the context from which he is writing. The URL address for the letters of Private Richard William Mercer can be found on a website operated by Brett Payne in New Zealand. There is a Canadian connection with this New Zealand site.

http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.com/~b...wm_letters.html

Further, I have transcribed the War Dairies for the Borden Motor Machine Gun Battery within the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade. I have included a short part of the war diary in this message. During this March 1918 period, 51 of 56 men in the Borden Battery were casualties as a result of a stand at Clery-sur-Somme near Peronne. My grandfather was one of the survivors and was shortly put back into combat to hold the line at Villers-Brentonneax where he was wounded for a second time.

Excerpt from 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade War Diary - March 1918:

Thu., Mar 21, 1918 VERDREL, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Fine.

Work on Emplacements continued.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly, M.C.

Fri., Mar 22, 1918 VERDREL, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Fine

Works on Emplacements continued.

Orders received from O.C. Canadian Corps M.MG. Brigade to "Stand by" and prepare to move.

Battery ordered out of the line, arrived in Camp about 2 a.m. 23rd inst.

Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly, M.C. Returned from Can. Corps Gas School.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly, M.C.

Sat, Mar 23, 1918 VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Fine

Battery left Camp about 5:30 AM. in convoy with the Canadian Corps Motor Machine Gun Brigade and proceeded to VILLERS-BRETONNEUX by way of ST. POL, DOULLENS and AMIENS arriving about 5 p.m.

At 9:30 p.m. Orders were received to "Stand by" and at 11:30 p.m. Battery moved off and proceeded to CORDIE, under Command of Capt. W.C. Nicholson, M.C., Lieut. F.G. Waldron and Lieut. R.H.A. West on arrival at CORBIE, about midnight.

Capt. Nicholson reported to the 7th Corps.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly, M.C.

Capt. Nicholson called up Lieut. Inch who had been back from the line with the men and the armoured cars. Inch was to try and get a message back to headquarters asking for immediate reinforcements. The message ran:

0. C. CDN CORPS MMG BDE

CIO 7th CORPS

Battery in position (sheet 62c) H5a 5050. 1 am in command of both machine-guns and infantry. We have only four guns left which are being manned; others captured or out of (action) order. Capt. Holland wounded. Lieuts. West and Waldron killed. Lieut. Snyder killed, wounded or prisoner. All my NCOs in Borden ('C') Battery casualties except one. I have only six men left. 'B' Battery has two NCOs, six ORs and one officer left. Both our flanks are in the air and we are being shelled by all calibres, snipers and machine-guns are busy. Enemy took Clery this a.m. about 9:30 and we are fairly well consolidated in an old trench 1000 yards west of the village. Here the infantry are being relieved tonight but no word of relief for us. Enemy aircraft are active. We have only one tripod left. Troops broke and ran this a.m. Great difficulty to rally them. One motorcycle blown up. Cars intact, also solos. Supply of ammunition short. No bombs or flares.

Weather good. Strong east wind. Very misty and many grass fires make it smoky, observation poor as consequence.

No support troops in evidence. Men in fair shape considering all but would heartily appreciate a rest.

Cars at Maricourt cross roads. Presence of Motor cars and our men undoubtedly saved situation somewhat. Capt. Holland did mighty fine work.

W.D. Nicholson Capt.

O.C. Borden M.M.G. Balleo,

3:55 p. in. 24-3 - / 8

by dispatch rider

Am trying to get in touch with Brigade but no answer yet DMGG and staff probably captured.

W.C.N.

Sun, Mar 24, 1918 VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, FRANCE- Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Fine

About 2 a.m. Battery proceeded to MARICOURT and came under the Orders of the 21st Division arriving there about 6 a.m. Orders were received to proceed to CLERY, and from there at 7:15 a.m. arrived at Support Line in H.4.C. Sheet 62C at 8 a.m..

A heavy smoke Barrage was blowing from the East, but not evident hostile activity. Two guns were placed in CLERY Village under command of Lieut. R.H.A. West, shortly after the Enemy broke through on our left flank and overran the Village. One (of) our guns was blown up and the crew of the other completely killed or wounded, one officer, one N.C.O. and one man remained, they managed to save a Tripod.

The remaining guns were placed on the MARICOURT-CLERY Road in an old shallow Trench with no wire in front. This trend was on the forward slope of the Ridge, observation was good, and as good targets were constantly presenting themselves our Guns created great havoc.

We held this Trench until 1 p.m. during which time our Casualties were exceptionally severe. Lieut. F.G. Waldron and Lieut. R.H.A. West were killed by enemy snipers, they being very active, causing many casualties.

Our Guns kept up harassing fire until our Supply of ammunition became exceedingly low. There being a Trench 50 yards to the rear, behind a stronger line, the Guns were withdrawn to this stronger line.

Casualties were continually being received during the whole afternoon. Until 5 p.m. we had only 3 guns (1 out of action) Capt. W.C. Nicholson, one N.C.O. and two men.

We had been reinforced about 11:30 o'clock by the 15th Cheshires, 35th Division, and we arranged with them that we should hold the line until 8 p.m., but the Enemy attacked in force on our left flank, and at the same time on our front in mass. We were compelled to withdraw, but not before we had poured a terrible fire in the close Enemy Ranks.

While proceeding down the Road near Hemp Dump Capt. W.C. Nicholson was hit in the arm by a ricochet, and forced to leave the Line.

The remainder of the Battery, Sergt. A. Peek and two other Ranks were instructed to report to D.M.G.C. 35th Div., and were then given instructions to return to Brigade H.Q's VILLERS-BRETONNEAUX arriving about 3 a.m. 25th inst.

During the latter part of the afternoon 8 O.R.s, who had been assisting out wounded, attached themselves to "B" Battery, and were joined later by 13 O.R.s under Sergt. C.D. Salkeld, who had arrived as reinforcements.

The Party rested at BRAY overnight.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly, M.C.

Mon., Mar 25, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE- Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael/Mars)

Fine

Details attached to "B" Battery in the line, went into Action during the day patrolling the Roads in Armoured Cars.

At about 5:30 p.m. Orders were received to move Head Q'rtns to HÉBECOURT, leaving at 6 p.m. and arriving at HÉBECOURT about 8:30 p.m.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly, M.C.

Tue., Mar 26, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE- Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael/Mars)

Fine

Party in the line with "B" Battery continued using the Cars for sniping work during the day, at 3:30 p.m. the Cars withdrew out of action and returned to CORBY, rejoining the Brigade at HÉBECOURT about 2:20 a.m. 29th inst.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

Wed., Mar 27, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE- Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael/Mars)

Fine

In reserve at HÉBECOURT.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

Thu., Mar 28, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael/Mars)

Dull with rain

In reserve HÉBECOURT

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

Fri., Mar 29, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Changeable, rain in A.M.

In reserve HÉBECOURT

The following Officers have been posted to this Battery.

Lieut. J.M. Pebbles

Lieut. A.E. Millward

#2069, Sergt. G.W. Cummins, Wounded in Action, while serving in the line with "B" Battery.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

Sat, Mar 30, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Fine

Lieut. F.P.O'Reilly, MC, arrived at HÉBECOURT, and took command of the Battery.

Reorganization was commenced.

29 O.R.'s Taken on Strength from Can. Corps. M.MG. Reinft. Depot.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

Sun, Mar 31, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Partly fine - Rain

Battery in Command of Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly, MC, Lieut. A.E. Millward of the Battery and Lieut. T.A. Smith of "A" Battery, left Camp about 5 p.m. and proceeded to the line, taking up position between MARCELCAVE and VILLERS-BRETONNEUX.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

Mon., Apr 1, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Fine

Battery in the line in Battle Positions at approximately V.7.C (Sheet 62). Carrying on with covering fire for Infantry.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

Tue., Apr 2, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Fine

Carrying on with covering fire for the Infantry. Great deal of Enemy shelling of rear areas.

--- signed F.P.O'Reilly, Lt., MC, OC

Wed., Apr 3, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Fine

Battery in the line, One Gun Crew doing out post duty on front of the Front line was knocked out by shell fire slightly wounding Sergt. C.D. Salkeld and Pte. R.W. Mercer.

Orders received to withdraw Battery and return to HÉBECOURT, arriving early in the morning of the 4th inst.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

Thu., Apr 4, 1918 HÉBECOURT, FRANCE - Ludendorff Offensive (Operation Michael)

Rain

Battery Cleaning Guns and fighting equipment.

At about 5 p.m. Orders were received from OC Canadian Corps M.M.G. Bde. that 6 Guns were to proceed to the line, 2 Guns remaining in reserve at HÉBECOURT.

Lieut. A.E. Millward in command of Six Guns left Camp at 5:30 p.m. and reported to Capt. H.F. Meurling, MC who was in command of Group.

Battery taking up Battle positions at O 30C 75 Sheet 62D.

--- signed Lieut. F.P. O'Reilly , MC

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you very much for posting these extracts. Having just visiting Maricourt, Clery and Peronne, it is doubly interesting.

Robert

[Borden Battery]

Hello Robert

If you have time, I would like to get a written, visual impression of Clery-sur-Somme so as to better understand the geography of the area where my Grandfather fought one of his battles.

Regards

- Dwight

[Robert Dunlop]

The Somme River is surrounded by gently rolling countryside. There are occasional large woods on the upland areas. Otherwise, there are no hedge rows or fences to mark boundaries between the arable farms. Down by the river, there are numerous trees and bushes lining the shore. The river is not particularly fast flowing and forms numerous small 'lakes' along its looping course. It was really pretty, quite deceptive when you think of all that took place there.

The villages, including Clery, were totally destroyed and rebuilt. You can often see the red brick, cream lintel buildings that were funded by the government after the war dotted amongst the more recent homes. There are numerous fishing chalets along the river.

I have attached a trench map of the village, dated from 1916:

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The next three photographs are taken from the Australian Memorial at Le Hamel. There are some steeper 'cliffs' on the northern banks of the river here, which you may be able to make out in this photo

[Robert Dunlop]

This is the view to the east

[Robert Dunlop]

And to the west. You can see some of Le Hamel village, which is pretty typical of the villages along either side of the river.

Robert

[David_Blanchard]

Thanks for the photographs and the extracts from the diary fascinating.

Once I have finished my work on the Aisne, I would like to look into this period more, especially from the perspective of the 50th Division

[David_Blanchard]

Not to be out done! This is a now and then photograph from the Aisne battle taken on the 27th May at Savigny sur Arde, south of the Aisne.

This photo can be seen in the British Battle Insignia (I) Book by Mike Chappell page 42 : Men from the Northumberlands involved in the retreat. My Great Uncle was taken prisoner that day who was also in the Northumberlands:

[Borden Battery]

Thanks ... it is a little surreal to view the images. Thanks.

[Greenwoodman]

More evidence of use of stormtroops in the April offensive, page 208 of the Official History states that the 57th Brigade (19th Division in the Messines sector) "was attacked, according to identification and prisoners' statements, by two storm and eleven other battalions". The 19th Division's history page 176 says pretty much the same, that the 57th Brigade faced "as many as eleven battalions and two 'storm' battalions".

[vb136]

Concerning the German stormtroops and the battle of 27 May: In the 7 Armée area, the Sturmbatallion 7, did not operate as a close unit. Instead, the battallion was divided into 8 Sturmblocks, each consisiting of ca 40 soldiers. Each block was armed with rifles, grenades, rifle-grenades, flame-throwers and light & heavy machine-guns. Four of the blocks were also equipped with one light trench-mortar each. The blocks were then assigned to attacking divisions, with one block as a reserve.

According to order from the Army HQ, the Sturmblocks were not assigned to attack in the first wave, being instead assigned to the second and/or third wave of attack.

The source for this information is a book by Fritz Ristow: Sturmgrenadiere, published in Germany in 1959. Ristow had served in Sturmbatallion 7 during WW 1. If you are interested, and read German, I can copy the pages relevant to the battle of 27 May and send them to you.

Best regards,

[chris.wight]

David, Martin Kitchen put out a book, "The German Offensives of 1918" in 2001.

[Robert Dunlop]

Sadly, very little detail about stormtroops in it.

Robert

[Borden Battery]

The recently re-translated book entitled "Storm of Steel" by Ernst Junger [Michael Hofman- Pengiun Press 2003] contains a chapter [The Great Battle] with a personal account of a German storm trooper during March 1918.

Regards

- Dwight Mercer, Regina, Canada