British Army Reforms 1902-1914

[PhilB]

One gets the impression from reading that, following poor performance in the Boer War, the Army Reforms converted a Victorian style officer corps of dilettantes into a much more effective formation for fighting WW1. It`s easy to assume that, had the Boers not exposed British deficiencies, this change might not have taken place. Do we owe the Boers a big "Thank you" or would we have muddled through anyway?

[Desmond7]

And to ensure we remain firmly on topic, when we quote examples and provide text it would be helpful is such submissions concentrate primarily on the kind of lessons officers who SERVED in WW1 learned/did not learn from the Boers? Or how officers who served in WW1 were 'honed' by the upper echelons because of the said reforms.

An interesting question which could well throw up some good information.

Des

[David Filsell]

Desmond

Your injunction is far to presciptive and why in your opinion should responses be so limited. Your lines are likely to restrict useful debate. At the very least you ignore the political consequences of the war which led to army and training reform. Before prognosticating, not least see Dunlop "The Development of the British Army 1899 -1914"and Spiers "The British Army and Society 1815 19142" for starters. There is a strong body of opinion that it was organisational, logistical, training and musketry lessons that were learned overall by Whitehall from the Boer war - not tactic - that were influential, and whilst some of these may well feature in the limited debate you suggest, your formula is likely to scratch the surface of the influence of the war on the British army. Many of the learned lessons from what was effectively a small colonial war were unlearned, forgotten, irrelevent by 1914, and those that had been learned by the likes of Plumer, Rawlinson, French and Kitchener - eg mounted colums, concentration camps, segmentation of land, proved of very little relevence to war in Europe as they were to fight it.

Please rethink your ill and limited considered strictures.

With best regards

David

[Chris_Baker]

Field Service Regulations. No Boer War, no FSR. No FSR, no performance by the Old Contemptibles or indeed anything that followed.

[squirrel]

No SMLE, no Service Dress and equipment, no improvement in medical services, no improvements in musketry training, no improvements in artillery................

And those Officers who served in the Boer War learned how not to do things in most cases.

[ulsterlad2]

Indeed Chris, FSR. I'm just reading Terranine's "Douglas Haig: The educated soldier" at the minute and he mentions the lessons of South Africa a few times.

Page 42:

South Africa had exposed the want of a general doctrine of war in the British Army, a system of thought and organization, laid down by the General Staff, to which every officer would automatically conform, and would be known to be conforming.

Page 43: (Talking about FSR 1 & 2)

.... it constitutes a major, but almost entirely forgotten contibution to later victory.

[truthergw]

An area I have been studying for several years with exactly that question in mind, " How did the Boer War actually affect the Great War". Unfortunately my notes would possibly fail to conform to Des' parameters.

[Ron Clifton]

The British Army learned a lot of lessons from 1899-1902, and the shock that that campaign delivered showed up some of the complacency, as well as the deficiencies, of the late Victorian Army when facing a European-race and well-equipped enemy. They also learned from the failures of the Russians against Japan in 1905.

Recent campaign experience, followed by the chance to absorb the lessons, was something that the French, Germans and Austro-Hungarians all lacked, and it showed.

I don't think that it was specifically the Boers as such who were responsible for these lessons: it so happened that they provided the suitable conditions, and at the right time, under which the lessons were learned.

Ron

[PhilB]

I don't think that it was specifically the Boers as such who were responsible for these lessons: it so happened that they provided the suitable conditions, and at the right time, under which the lessons were learned.

Ron

If, as you say, Ron, the deficiencies were shown when fighting against a "European-race and well-equipped enemy", it is fortunate that it was the Boers as most other campaigns since the Crimea had not been against such opponents?

I suspect that, whether the Boer War had happened or not, we`d still have been in the same situation by late 1915 by which time the Old Army was largely gone and the new BEF had been constructed. Are there any reasons to believe that, without the reforms, we couldn`t have got through to late 1915?

[T8HANTS]

I submit the 1903 Bandoleer Equipment as evidence for the British Army being over influenced by the Boer War, and the P14 Enfield as evidence of those nasty foreigners not following our timetable!

For my own interest does anyone still read " The Defence of Duffers Drift", as part of officer cadet training?

Gareth

[Terry_Reeves]

I would contest the assertion in the original post that the Victorian officer corps was dilettante, but that is for another occasion.

The process of reform I would contend, started well before the Boer War, and was a matter of evolution brought about, not just by experience of a particular war, but also influenced by such things as changes in education and technology. The British Army instituted a system of education for its troops in the mid - nineteenth century recognising that literacy and numeracy were advantageous. The 1870 Education Act helped produce a better standard of recruit, although this took some time to filter through. After the Crimean War there were reforms in medical services coupled, later, with such advantages in medical technology such as X Ray. The Cardwell Reforms of 1871 brought about wide- ranging military structural changes and last, but not least, came the massive changes in weapons technology. It was the latter that had a major impact on warfare in WW1 - technology driving tactics. Machine guns, improved artillery weapons, and aeroplanes with all the advantages they would bring amongst other things. The Boer War enquiry was just a step along the way.

TR

[Ron Clifton]

Phil

Yes, the point I was trying to make that the British Army had not had to fight European-race well-equipped enemies since the Crimea (and arguably not entirely, even then), and that the shocks deriving from that conflict accelerated the subsequent changes. I would also agree with Terry's comment that reform had already been proceeding in late Victorian times - itself largely as a result of the similar deficiencies exposed in the Crimea - but I wonder whether, in the light of the long period as C-in-C of the conservative Duke of Cambridge, those reforms would have proceeded as fast as they did in 1902-1914 without the Boer War experience.

As it was, the BEF of 1914 was able to "hit the ground running" and I am not sure that that would have been the case without the post-1902 reforms. It is a fascinating "what-if" to ask how the BEF of 1915 would have coped without these reforms, not least of which was the work begun by Col G F R Henderson which culminated in FSR Part I, as well as all the other training manuals compiled during that period. I am sure that the British Army would have done its best and that that best would have been very good, but I am not sure it would still have been good enough not to lose the war. As it was, we had to learn even more from the shell-shortages and the faulty tactical doctrines of 1916 before victory finally came.

Ron

[SiegeGunner]

I've just come upon this thread after being out for most of the day. Glad to see lively discussion of the evolution of military organisation and warfare leading up to the Great War, but saddened by the premature and quite needless, indeed fatuous, prescriptions by a Moderator. Members whose principal focus is on the Great War do not need to be told in advance what they may and may not discuss. I would like to learn, from Pals who know the history of that era, how the experience of the Boer War influenced later events, and this is a perfectly proper place for that knowledge to be shared.

Mick

[Pete1052]

I hadn't realized that Col. GFR Henderson had a role in writing the Field Service Regulations. Most biographical sketches of him cite his teaching at staff college and his published writings such as his biography of Stonewall Jackson. The teaching of Jackson's campaigns begun by Henderson became a standard subject for British officers for several decades. If I recall correctly Henderson was a protege of Sir Garnet Wolseley and he had a premature death shortly after the conclusion of the Boer War.

[akduerden]

My understanding from reading De Groot's "Douglas Haig" was that changes to the staff college system and army organisation were largely resulted from reviews of the Prussian general staff system and 1870 war. That said I believe the Boer War was a catalyst for a further review of the British Army although the desired changes were largely based on other experiences.

Additionally, I would argue that the 1905 war did little to enforce changes in the British Army or any army other than possibly the Germans. They were the only observing non-combatant country who realised the potential of the MG and acted on it. None seem to have learned the lessons that even the Japanese came to realise during this conflict - power of trenches, massive munitions consumption, importance of artillery and battery tactics, detailed planning and the staff required to do it.

Andrew

[Desmond7]

I am delighted to see that the topic has stayed on course. Some may regard polite appeals for focus as fatuous .. I felt I gave a broad path for relevant comments. We have not had a debate ON the Boer War .. that was my intention.

Members have made their points. I accept them. Let debate continue and in the spirit of learning I would now encourage anyone who has felt unable to post due to my initial 'prescriptions' to do so.

[David Filsell]

[Desmond

Had you said that - no debate about the Boer War - that would have been a different point. But in fact, in view of the war's relevance a debate about any aspect of the Boer War might well have proved of interest - and relevance to WW1. But I have made my point and thank you for your retraction.

Very best regards

David

[Northern Soul]

I've been looking into the participation of the Volunteers in the Boer War recently (well, the King's Own version, at least) and although the Volunteer Active Service Companies raised within the county regiments (and the Yeomanry) did not, by and large, participate in the major actions, I think the South African campaign was something of a watershed for the "part time gentlemen soldiers" in that it demonstrated that there was a substantial and, more importantly, reliable, body of reserves waiting to be tapped into in time of national need. This was formally recognised with the formation of the Territorial Force in 1908 and the amalgamation of the Volunteers with the Militia and incorporation into their parent county regiments etc.

The general reputation of the TF in the First Wold War is well-established and I would venture that their performance stemmed from the wider lessons learned by the Army Council (Kitchener apart?) about their capabilites while serving in Natal and the Orange Free State in 1900-1902.

On a separate theme, Alfred Dykes, the CO of 1/King's Own in 1914, was at Spion Kop when 2/King's Own were caught unprepared in a badly-exposed position and suffered a large number of casualties from artillery fire. On that occasion he came through unscathed. 14 years later history repeated itself at Le Cateau when 1/King's Own were caught unprepared in a badly-exposed position and suffered a large number of casualties from artillery fire. His luck ran out on the second occasion, as did the luck of a lot of his men. Was there a learning point here that was never picked up?

[PhilB]

Additionally, I would argue that the 1905 war did little to enforce changes in the British Army or any army other than possibly the Germans. They were the only observing non-combatant country who realised the potential of the MG and acted on it. None seem to have learned the lessons that even the Japanese came to realise during this conflict - power of trenches, massive munitions consumption, importance of artillery and battery tactics, detailed planning and the staff required to do it.

Andrew

Maybe the War of 1905 came at the wrong time for the British to take full advantage. Just having finished the Boer War and grappling with the changes brought about, it just wasn`t the best time to change tack and look at the lessons from another war. And it may just be that we didn`t consider that a war between the combattants of 1905 was one that could have lessons to teach us! Remember, we still grossly underestimated the Japanese in WW2.

[stripeyman]

In 1914 I would think that a large number of both junior amd senior NCOs would have served at private soldiers in the Boer war.

The fact that they had see active service was of no doubt a factor in the dogged resistance put up by the BEF in the early defensive battles.

Bob Grundy

[Northern Soul]

In 1914 I would think that a large number of both junior amd senior NCOs would have served at private soldiers in the Boer war.

The fact that they had see active service was of no doubt a factor in the dogged resistance put up by the BEF in the early defensive battles.

Bob Grundy

How true is that Bob? I once thought it likely but since I have delved more into the pre-war service of Old Contemptibles I have come to realise that perhaps there weren't as many Boer War veterans in the BEF of 1914 as I might once have thought.

The majority of men enlisted for a term of 12 years so if they had seen meaningful active service in South Africa (I'm not talking about dying of boredom guarding blockhouses after it was all over bar the shouting) they would have been time-expired by August, 1914. Of course they could have re-enlisted but I suspect that they would not have been immediately shipped out to France when there were droves of eligible Reservists to mobilise first. The ones I have come across in this category didn't really get out there until early-1915, and there weren't that many of those either.

Andy.

[Chris_Baker]

You could of course extend your service beyond 12 years, either full time or by going into Section D Reserve. Most of the Boer War vets I have found who continued to serve right through tended to be the CSMs, CQMS's, men in the transport, etc by August 1914.

[stripeyman]

Well that has demolished my simple thought on the subject.........I know my place.

You are quite correct of course.

Bob Grundy

[Ron Clifton]

Don't run yourself down, Bob!

Quite a lot of time-expired men, who had done their twelve years, would have rejoined the colours, but in TF units or the New Armies. Few of these would have seen service in France in 1914, but quite a lot in 1915 or later.

Ron

[PhilB]

For the benefit of those, like me, who aren`t acquainted with all the changes brought about between the Boer War and WW1, would someone care to give a brief rundown of what was perceived to be wrong in 1902 and what changes were made?