Would the Allies desire to have a better army resulted in their defeat

[akduerden]

I wish to propose a topic for debate which has occured to me subsequent to reading a few books on WWI. The hypothetical topic then...

"If Lloyd George had been able to replace Haig as GOC BEF with a commander whose capabilities equaled Sir Ivor Maxse, Sir Claud Jacob or Sir Joh Monash in November 1916 would the Germans have actually won the war."

I accept that on face value this sounds as if I have lost my marbles but please hear me out before you shoot me down!

Assuming that such a GOC replacement was possible it would have taken the best part of 1917 for them to re-organise, retrain and re-equip the BEF and maybe to some extent the French. With this completed the ensuing battles could have been fought with the new combined-arms tactics (Cambrai, Hamel, etc) late in 1917. However Allied manpower would still have been a problem as costly battles would still have to have been fought during 1917 to keep pressure on the Germans.

I believe this would have given the German High Command enough time to assess the new tactics and adopt them for themselves (they had tanks, a good airforce, superior machine guns numbers and good commanders), which with the inevitable surge in manpower due to the collapse of the Eastern Front could have resulted in the major German offensives of 1918 achieving the objectives of capturing Paris and pushing the BEF out of France.

Would Britain's desire to curb the shocking losses of the Somme and become a better more professional army actually have resulted in their defeat by creating a superior enemy.

Now you may put me to the sword...!!!

Regards Andrew

[ian turner]

Would a Haig substitute have acted any seriously differently than Haig? And would the substitute have sufficient political nous to handle matters in that direction as well as the conduct of the war itself?

I think we have thrashed around on the war winning topic before and concluded that there was not a "magic bullet" that existed in terms of superior military intellect, weapons, tactics, strategies, etc that would enable either side to have delivered a knock-out blow. With that in mind I wonder if substituting Haig would have endangered the allied cause, not because it would take someone better time to get his act together, but because there was in reality none better. Maybe Lloyd-George had concluded that too?

And how would a Haig substitute prevail upon the French in terms of retraining and re-equipping?

The question implies that Haig was a drag on the British Army adopting war-winning new tactics, when in reality he presided over the very conditions that resulted in eventual victory.

[Chris_Baker]

I don't understand what another commander would have done differently to "re-organise, retrain and re-equip" in the first half of 1917.

[squirrel]

If there was another way to be found, then why did none of the other forces, allied or enemy, find it and use it?

[green_acorn]

Then there is the issue of "the new combined-arms tactics (Cambrai, Hamel, etc)", Monash conceived Hamel as a tank attack, supported by infantry (and obviously artillery and the other arms and services). The "idea" of "combined arms tactics" is quite a recent phenomenon, I believe initially used by the US armoured lobby in the 60's and much developed by the British in their Battle Groups and Combat Team operations.

But getting back to your argument, in the case of Monash was his "star" that bright in November 1916 that he could be a candidate for promotion and appointment to leap hundreds of fellow officers three levels of command (Div to Corps, Corps to Army and Army to GHQ)? Emphatically no, he was only a relatively junior and inexperienced divisional commander and was from the empire, not from the British Isles (but his origin is a minor issue). IF an Australian was somehow in the equation, which is only a hypothetical, at that point in time Chauvel's star would have been far brighter.

Cheers,

Hendo

[David Filsell]

Not least, your premise excludes any consideration of the dire state of the German state and its army. By late 17 food and resource shortages - largely caused by the naval blockade, whose significance in the defeat of Germany is often barely considered - were massive and the nation was suffering hugely. The tidal wave of bolshevism was causing considereable revolutionary zeal amongst the working classes, which was carried into the trenches by combed out new recruits. Militarily the spring offensives were a failure very largely because of severely deficient logistics. The army had been weakened by the formation of elite storm troop units. Fuel was short as were ammunition, cloth, leather, horses etc, etc etc. By June 1915 German was a busted flush. Would any of the proposed other British CiCs have made any difference to an army which had now nailed all arms operations - infantry, artillery air - which had been developed under Haig's overall leadership? I think not. That apart, I cannot but feel thatbBasically all "counter-factual" arguements are counter intuitive and irelevant- simply because they did not happen and cannot move arguments forward in any way at all.

[akduerden]

I understand that if reality is applied then there was little chance that a replacement would have been found with the qualifications required nor that Monash would not have been the right man. In fact personally I don't believe that British Society and the Army (nor the other allies) were capable of changing their perception or discourse on the reality of war during WW1.

The point is that should the British have changed their discourse on the realities of war by 1917 and introduced new strategies and tactics at a point when the Germans had time to adapt and apply their numerical supremacy it may well have lead to a German victory.

Was Britains best defence in fact their inability to seriously change their attritional strategy until it was to late for the German army and society to adapt?

Green-acorn: my use of the term "combine-arms" was not to represent the modern application of forces but to emphasise a change from the simplified use of infantry and artillery in attritional land combat. Neither do I believe Monash or any other Dominion commander would have been able to be GOC BEF at any point during or after the war.

Squirrel: By 1917 the political and social forces of each major combatant had begun to adapt their understanding of modern total war and seek a way of changing the reality of their citizens sacrifice. Virtually no army organisation had begun to do this until mid-1918. In reality the war ended before the military organisations had adapted.

Chris-Baker: Just having a different commander would have achieved nothing. My point is based on the premis that the drivers for change were in place to allow the tactics and strategied that did occur late in the war to have occured at an earlier time.

Ian Turner: I believe Lloyd George persisted in his attempts to replace and then curtail the influence of Haig for nearly the whole war so I don't think he had concluded that changing Haig would cause irrepairable damage. Your point about Haig (the British) influencing the French is a good one. Even if the British had changed it does not mean that the French would have been capable of such change. This may have actually aided the German's more.

Your last statement is the crux of my point. If Haig had not presided and the conditions had changed to reflect social adhorrance at the enourmous cost of life would this in turn have lead to German victory because the German's had the capacity to also change and would have had the numerical supremacy at a point where the allied armies were well below strength.

Thanks for all yout considered opinions...

Andrew

[PhilB]

The difficulties of finding a good C in C are exemplified by Lincoln`s several attempts before settling on a man whose military pedigree at the start of the war was not at all promising. Can we assume that DLlG would have been a better selector of miltary talent?

[TonyE]

I think David F's post regarding the state of Germany's forces is important to your premise.

You are concerned with Britain's methods of attack and the attritional aspect of their battle philosophy, but it must be remembered that the real harbinger of Germany's defeat was not any British attack, but rather the German Spring Offensives of 1918. Yes, the British gave way and the Germans made major inroads of up to sixty miles, but the under strength British army never actually broke and the line held.

This last ditch effort by the Germans left them in no state to hold the British attack at Amiens and the subsequent battles of the 100 days. I would also question your assertion that the Germans had superior MG numbers, as by that time there was an abundance of virtually all munitions on the British side. Similarly with the air forces. There may have been very high Allied losses but there was also the production capability to replace them over and over.

This would not have changed whoever commanded the BEF.

Regards

TonyE

[salesie]

With respect, Andrew, your assertions are somewhat oversimplified in that they are focused purely on the Western Front, the BEF and its C-in-C post 1916. It is my opinion that whether Haig had been replaced or not is completely irrelevant to the final outcome, the seeds of allied victory were germinated before he became the BEF's C-in-C (that's not say I believe he did a bad job, all in all he did a pretty good one. I just don't believe he was the architect of victory).

I believe that no purely military victory in the field is possible in total-war, no matter what tactics/operational initiatives are employed by any side. Only long-term strategic initiatives bring about victory by destroying one-side or the other's collective will and/or ability to wage war. And this takes time - the "military learning curve" in WW1 was not one-sided, both sides learnt from each other equally and thus forced an inevitable four-year stalemate, which only ended when other, strategic forces, eventually made their presence felt. Germany collapsed politically, economically and socially in the summer of 1918 and, as both a cause and an effect, the morale/collective will-to-win of its people and army collapsed along with it.

That said, I also believe that military pressure on the ground is an essential "ally" to these other forces in bringing about ultimate victory - attrition being the most important military aspect in total-war (the moral dimensions of this are for another thread; battle had been joined and the war needed to be fought to a final conclusion. It is, in some historical respects, a pity that WW1 was not fought to such a conclusion - but as I say, that discussion is for another thread).

In my opinion, the period Aug-Nov 1914 was the only time that Germany could have won the war by pure military means in the field. I think that by spring 1918 the strategic die was cast, and, despite the extra divisions from the East as well as the "new" tactics, any offensive by then was ultimately doomed to failure. Haig, in his final despatch, likened the spring offensive to the advance of the Old-Guard at Waterloo, and I can agree with that analogy.

My reasoning behind this is straightforward: The only way Germany could win was by military means in the field - its army was, in essence, its one and only truly strategic weapon. But the Allies possessed more than one i.e. the allied armies plus the Royal Navy plus the vast resources of the British Empire, and, although it took Britain over a year to fully realise what was needed and to gear-up for total-war, the strategic power of the Royal Navy began to weave its slow to bring results, but strategically vital, web from day-one.

It is right to say that manpower and materials decided WW1, but I would add that political and social upheaval inside Germany also played a vital part in deciding the final outcome. And all this was not brought about by luck - the Allies, Britain in particular, out-performed Germany in every area. Allied armies held the German armies in check in the field (in the West that is, where the outcome was always going to be decided), the Royal Navy began to starve and de-stabilise Germany from day one with its highly effective blockade and prevented the U-boats from repaying the strategic faith Germany placed in them, British Military Intelligence waged a highly effective subversion/propaganda campaign, and the financial clout and resources of the British Empire meant that total-war could be fought totally.

And last, but not least, all of this had to be effectively managed or it would not have been successful i.e. the politicians who, despite the occasional serious internal strife and the delay in realising what was actually needed for victory, kept the whole show on the road, with their diplomatic skills with allies, with their skilful economic balancing act between competing resources, and with their solidity of purpose in pursuing their goal. It was no fluke that the allied "team" out-performed the Germans; effective management of all resources was vital for victory.

In the event, Germany imploded under the sheer weight of all these powerful, strategic forces. However, the period Aug-Nov 1914 is something of an anomaly - it is a period of open warfare, before the total-war stalemate in the field set in. And, importantly, it is a period when the German Army had no disadvantage in manpower and resources; strategic forces were not really a factor. This is why I believe that Germany, pre-war and during, grossly over-estimated its own military prowess but seriously under-estimated the capabilities of the Allies. If the German Army couldn't bring victory in 1914 (maybe 1915 before Britain finally woke up to what was needed?) then it never could win. The period Aug-Nov 1914 is one that shows us more than any other period that in the final analysis the much vaunted German Army simply wasn't good enough in the first place.

Wilhelm Groener, a senior officer on the German General Staff and Ludendorff's successor, was post-war highly critical of the German General Staff's performance: "Most generals (German) spent the entire war living under dangerous self-deception. They did not recognise the true strategic and political situation, they clung on to thoughts of wonderful successes on the battlefields, they were proud of the bearing and deeds of their troops and were in some cases inclined to not even take serious defeats seriously. Almost none of them realised the dangers arising from the failure to achieve our strategic goals in battle."

Consequently, it seems to me that, as David said earlier, Germany was a busted-flush anyway by 1917.

Cheers-salesie.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

(they had tanks, a good airforce, superior machine guns numbers and good commanders)

How many tanks did they have, which had not been captured from the British? A hiatus in the fighting would have also enabled the allies to progress with the development of new modals and produce them in even greater numbers! Don’t forget that Haig saw the need for and ordered large numbers of both heavy and medium tanks.

Was their airforce any better than the RFC, let alone the RNAS? At some points they had better machines, but for how long? Again better materiel was developed in 1917, 18 and was going to be available in 1919.

Do you have any data relating to the Germans outnumbering the British in MGs by 1917?

The German commanders were FAILURES! They failed in 1914 and 1918; if in 1917 the British adopted the German tactic of just digging in and defending while the Germans came at them with new tactics they would have failed in 1917 too. Could the Germans sustain the casualty figures that they experienced on the Somme in 1916?

You have not addressed the question of whether they could withstand the naval blockade for any longer.

[akduerden]

Sorry for the delay in responding to you all - I have been away. I'd like to thank you all for the input and considered opinions. I think the impact of the RN blockade and state of Germany's economy in 1918 are overwhelming evidence that Germany would not have been capable even if there capacity for change was.

I will be adding books on the RN blockade to my reading list

Andrew