The Learning Curve

[PhilB]

We`ve had "interesting" discussions on the learning curve for the Western Front. Personally, I think there are two curves to consider - one showing how fast one could reasonably expect a competent command to follow and one showing the actual learning rate. Opinions differ as to where they are relative to each other. I don`t recall seeing any discussion on the learning curve at sea though. I`m not so well read on naval matters and I`d appreciate the comments of any who are. How steep was the curve at sea in terms of ship construction, weaponry and strategy/tactics?

[Chris_Baker]

John Terraine's "Business in great waters" is a good starting point. It is about the war against the U-Boat. As fast and as torrid and costly a learning curve as anything seen on the Western Front.

[ph0ebus]

John Terraine's "Business in great waters" is a good starting point. It is about the war against the U-Boat. As fast and as torrid and costly a learning curve as anything seen on the Western Front.

Hi Chris,

Thanks for the book tip, and I second your thoughts at the end of your post. Of course, chance factored in sometimes as much as training did, from the books on the u-boat war that I have been reading. On more than one occasion in the thick of u-boat attcks there were rookies that survived and seasoned men who died just based on where they happened to be standing or what they happened to be doing when the torpedo hit home.

I am thinking of the ship I'm chasing where on her final voyage four seasoned sailors initially failed to rejoin the ship at New York but were persuaded to come back; also in New York several new crew were added who stated it was their first ship. Three of the four returned sailors died, and all the rookies survived the subsequent u-boat attack and loss of the vessel.

Thanks,

-Daniel

[per ardua per mare per terram]

I am thinking of the ship I'm chasing where on her final voyage four seasoned sailors initially failed to rejoin the ship at New York but were persuaded to come back; also in New York several new crew were added who stated it was their first ship. Three of the four returned sailors died, and all the rookies survived the subsequent u-boat attack and loss of the vessel.

Being a seasoned sailor would not make a great difference to surviving a torpedo attack. As you say luck and location were larger factors.

[Clio]

The war at sea was attritional from the outset. Conversely attrition was adopted on the Western Front in 1916. This guerre de course is slow burn until February 1917 when the Germans finally adopt a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. At no stage does Germany possess sufficient U-boats to make this blockade work (it takes two years for both sides to order, build and commission a submarine). On the other hand the British have no answer to the submarine menace until November 1917.

The seeds of technological progress were sown in 1916 on the British side but did not come to fruition until the autumn of 1917. Germany's adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare acted as a catalyst and forced through technological innovations One thinks here of the research carried out at Vernon into mining and depth charges. The mass production of the D Depth charge and the H2 mine. The hydrophone experimentation at Hawkcraig and Portland. One might also refer to the restructuring carried out by Jellicoe and reforms to the Auxiliary Patrol. Perhaps the most seminal factor of all in the Allied victory at sea, was the (gradual) adoption of the convoy system from June 1917. Only by the spring of 1917 does Britain possess sufficient escorts to contemplate the introduction of the convoy system.

I would argue that as regards the Western Front, 1916 was the great year of learning lessons. At sea, the pivotal year was 1917 and the learning curve was short and near vertical on the Allied side.

My recommendation is that you read Spindler and Jellicoe. Get both sides of the discourse.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

The learning curve was all the steeper for the Navy, because they had not been involved in a naval war since Napoleonic times (in terms of ship to ship engagements). The supposed master strategist Mahan was still advocating the use of ramming against capital ships!

[PhilB]

The learning seems to be very much in the area of U-boat/submarine warfare?

[David B]

Phil,

it had to be considering that one torpedo - costing little - could take out most vessels be they merchant or war

with the consequent loss of men, materiel and order of battle.

David

[SiegeGunner]

The supposed master strategist Mahan was still advocating the use of ramming against capital ships!

If it ain't Broke, don't fix it ...

[Clio]

Had the Germans heeded his report before the outbreak of hostilities, you might have been talking about Leutnant Blum as the master strategist of the naval war rather than Mahan. By the time the KDM rediscovered Blum in their dusty Murwick libraries c 1916, it was far too late.

As for the German learning curve, with the exception of Falkenhayn, few German decision makers saw the need for a joint strategy between KDM and army. Look at it this way, the British had been making plans for a distant naval blockade of Germany since 1912. The German high command was aware of this but there was no 'plan B' in the event of the Schlieffen Plan failing and Germany coming under sustained economic blockade. A case could be made for stating that in the years leading up to war those close to the Kaiser should have foreseen the need for more investment in experimental craft (submarines or torpedo craft) capable of degrading Britain's likely blockade.

By the outbreak of war, U-boats were still regarded with uncertainty by the big-ship fixated KDM. By the time the KDM did turn to U-boats it was too late. UCIIs and UBIIs (capable of seriously taking the war to British coastal waters) did not enter service until the autumn of 1916. This factor allied with the indecision and vacillation which so characterised U-boat policy August 1914-Feb 1917, effectively bound the U-boat at a critical juncture. Had UC and UB boats been available in significant numbers during the Autumn of 1915 (long before the British had any effective answer to the U-boat) the outcome may have left Germany in the ascendant at the beginning of 1917 ie the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign could have begun a year earlier.

It ought to be remembered that there were no precedents for submarine warfare (though there were precedents for fighting a guerre de course) It follows that the KDM learning curve 1917-1918 was as steep as that of its British counterpart, with a pronounced spike in 1918 as many of the tactics later perfected later by Donitz (such as night surface attacks and wolf-packs, convoy attacks and A/S evasion techniques) evolved. Bauer and Michelsen were highly capable commanders who developed highly effective U-boat strategies but these strategies in turn, unfolded within a structure imposed by lesser men who had little conception of submarine warfare. By the time that the concept of unrestricted submarine warfare became accepted policy, there would never be sufficient U-boats to effectively blockade Britain.

[PhilB]

Phil,

it had to be considering that one torpedo - costing little - could take out most vessels be they merchant or war

with the consequent loss of men, materiel and order of battle.

David

Had this been foreseen or was it forced upon the naval commands by the early experiences of WW1? Did development of surface ships and tactics take a back seat?

[per ardua per mare per terram]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Mar 11 2009, 09:27 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The learning seems to be very much in the area of U-boat/submarine warfare?

The learning went across the board. For example, from the British side: Coronel showed how outclassed ships barely 10 years old were and Falkland produced a learning curve for gunnery; Dogger Bank for signalling and command – neither of the latter were absorbed. There was also a steep learning curve for the use of aeroplanes, by land and sea. For example the Friedrickhaven and Cuxhaven raids in 1914 led to further steep learning.

[Clio]

...submarines and victims QED.

To return to the original question:

a) Lessons we could reasonably expect Admiralty to have learned

Prior to 1914 advocates of submarine warfare were in the minority. While the capacity of torpedoes was well known (Russo Japanese War) submarines remained experimental. Only visionaries of the capacity of Fisher and Hall could have forseen the challenge of the U-boat. However the signs were all present by June 1916

i) By mid 1916 the chances of a decisive Mahanesque North Sea confrontation between opposing battle fleets was increasingly unlikely

ii) The distant blockade was working (and hurting civilians as well as combatants) but it would take years to drag Germany to her knees - not least because of a shortage of destroyers, overseas submarines etc required to impose the blockade

iii) It was highly probable that the KDM would adopt a prolonged campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in future, thus placing Britain herself under blockade. Such a blockade would undoubtedly cause shortages, placing an immeasurable strain upon the socio-economic cohesion of British society.

iv) Britain was not only highly vulnerable to such a campaign, there was actually no viable defence against the submarine. Mines of 1914-1917 did not work, nets were useless, depth- charges impotent. The Auxiliary Patrol was an ill-disciplined laughably equipped rag-bag of units. Commerce and Admiralty alike, regard convoy as an anathema.

British shipyards are working at capacity building warships, by the end of 1916 yards are forced to rapidly expand in order to replace mercantile tonnage as well as build warships.

The actual learning curve

The more acute minds within Admiralty recognise these factors and respond accordingly. In 1916 the Vernon shore base is commissioned by Admiralty to examine and replicate the design of German mines. Experimentation in fields of hydrophones and depth-charge design takes place. In December 1916 Jellicoe restructures A/S and Trade departments within Admiralty, improving communications between Room 40 and key Admiralty departments. By assembling a range of mosaic fragments Admiralty can anticipate KDM movements even if it does not yet have the means to meet the U-boat challenge. These seeds (mines, depth-charges, hydrophones) are destined to come to fruition in late 1917. By late 1917 Britain finally has yard capacity to produce sufficient warships to both maintain the blockade and potentially provide convoy escort.

Convoy is the only real defence against the U-boat by seizing the initiative regarding where to strike, how to strike and when to strike. Faced with the desperate losses in the Spring of 1917, the vacillation of neutral trading powers and the increasing availability of suitable escorts, convoy is slowly introduced then gradually extended despite fierce resistance from ship owners. Convoy had been around since the 15thc but it took the shock of April 1917 to convince vested interests that the survival of Britain depended upon convoy yet the lessons had been there since the first phase of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Spring of 1915.

By November 1917 the technological graphs begin to intersect. Britain now has hydrophones, H2 mines, Type D depth charges and sufficient units to put them into effect. Armaments industries such as Armstrong Whitworth and Vickers now have the capacity to put the new designs into mass production. A/S and convoy escort tactics evolve with the advent of these new weapons. Vast and innovative minefields such as the Folkestone Griz Nez Barrage and the Northern Minefield restrict the activities of the U-boats which are increasingly forced to attack stragglers and independent vessels, inshore in shallow, heavily defended coastal waters. My March 1918 the U-boat threat has been largely mastered via a combination of allied technological innovation, numerical superiority and effective A/S tactics.

Thus on the British side the learning curve is short and very steep. While it had its share of 'old salt horses', faced with unrestricted submarine warfare 1917/18, Admiralty learned hard and it learned fast.

[Hyacinth1326]

This is a fascinating and much neglected question.  I agree with much of what Clio has written here. 

 

I would wholly concur that Spindler and Jellicoe provide superior overviews to the issues involved with regard to Handelskrieg. It is impossible to grasp the trajectories without accessing both British and German contemporary detailed sources. The Technical History Series in  ADM 275/20 and ADM 275/23 are also essential to any appreciation of these matters. Yard capacity, decisions as to whether switch production to building warships or replacement merchant vessels, labour dilution, labour unrest, material shortages, all fed  into the equation. I would however point out that judging from Technological History series regarding the introduction of convoy on the East coast, the 'technological graphs' barely intersected in 1917. If I may illustrate with just one example, the pressure on escorts remained immense through 1917 and well into 1918.

 

I would contend it was in mid 1918 rather than late 1917 that the U-boat menace was mastered.Papers relating to Admiral East Coast in ADM 137/2241 indicate that even at the end of hostilities the East coast convoy system relied not upon new warships but ancient '30 knotter' and 'River Class' destroyers which spent more time having boilers cleaned in Immingham than accompanying convoys. It is evident that the 7th Destroyer Flotilla based on the Humber and charged with convoy defence was largely unfit for purpose.  I suspect new destroyers were directed to the Grand Fleet and convoy protection depended upon whatever bargain basement units remained. New destroyer production undoubtedly contributed to to the ability to protect convoys by releasing more Grand Fleet destroyers for this purpose, particularly on the run between Lerwick and later Methil for Bergen but it is more difficult to quantify than Clio (Eric) contends. Otherwise agreed that the learning curve is steep (for both sets of belligerents). Nobody really understood the power of the submarine so the 'competence' line must be drawn with extreme caution, then factor in a two and a half year lag in terms of materiel.

Edited 15 May , 2020 by Hyacinth1326

[David Filsell]

Out of interest, with nothing of value to contribute, you may be intersted to know that  John Terraine always regarded Business in Great Waters his best book.