Munitions Found on Lusitania

[MikB]

AFO 10 was unequivocal evidence that Admiralty was prepared to starve German civilians.

Using hardships applied to the population as a means of applying pressure to a government is not the same as murdering them.

[Clio]

no, but it more than justified unrestricted submarine warfare in the eyes of the central powers.

[centurion]

2nd Short Paper

Blockading

The British blockade

As well as removing the privateer from the high seas the Paris Declaration also altered the system of prize money and with it the treatment of merchant ships.. Gone were the days when a declaration of war meant a bonanza of prize money for the officers and men of frigates and corvettes that cruised the seas snapping up any enemy merchantman they could find. A much more formal structure had to be put in place.

The main load of the Allied blockade of Germany fell to the Royal Navy (with input from the USN in 1917/1918). The approach taken was roughly in line with the Paris Declaration although, being intended for use in an age of sailing ships without wireless, some parts of it had to be ‘interpreted’ or augmented. This appears, in part, appears to have been done by selectively applying parts of the London Declaration even though this was not international law per se. One part of the London Declaration that was not used was its list of what was and was not contraband. The Allies issued their own list of what they would treat as contraband and updated this from time to time. The Germans also published their own list of what they would treat as contraband. There was a degree of congruence between the two list, for example both included raw cotton even though the London Declaration had specifically stated that it should not be contraband.

The blockade did not originally apply to neutral ships sailing to their own ports or to other neutral ports, nor to neutral ships sailing to an enemy port with no contraband cargo or passengers (military personnel were regarded as contraband) but these were subject to search. Neutral ships sailing to and from their country's ports were subject to restrictions in that they had to follow certain sea-lanes, these were often inconvenient. Thus, for example, the Channel was restricted to cross wise traffic and Dutch ships wishing to sail across the North Atlantic or down to the Mediterranean or Africa had to proceed around the North of Scotland following a very restricted route until they were well clear of the British Isles. Furthermore there was a concern that neutral shipping would be used to avoid the blockade by having cargos consigned to a neutral port and then transported onward to Germany even though this might compromise the neutrality of the country involved. There was a degree of justification to this fear. As a result a form of rationing was imposed on neutral countries in that the tonnage of shipping and the amount of certain types cargos allowed through the blockade was limited. This meant all neutral shipping was subject to stop and search and, like other forms of stop and search, created a degree of resentment. The aim was to halt transhipment to Germany by ensuring that this would leave the neutral country involved short of essential supplies. It appears to have been largely successful, certainly in the Netherlands a body called the Netherlands Trust was set up with the purpose of ensuring that all material imported was for Dutch use and preventing the Germans from importing War supplies through Dutch ports (some did leak through however). The Dutch government also commandeered numbers of Dutch merchantmen to ensure that essential supplies reached the Netherlands.

The British blockade was carried out primarily through the use of surface ships, armed merchant cruisers largely manned by their original crews (though as RNR officers and men) being the preferred class of ship. The use of only surface ships enabled the provisions of the Paris Declaration to be adhered to by and large.

The British did not maintain a close blockade in the sense meant by this term in the Paris Declaration which envisaged sailing ships within sight of the enemy’s coast and of each other. Technology had moved on, the British merchant cruisers were not within sight of the enemy coast (which would also have brought them within range of modern artillery) but much further out. Nor were they in sight of one another. Typically they patrolled back and forth and were stationed some 20 miles apart. Given that the horizon from the look out was about 16 miles on a reasonable day this meant that none of the sea between them was out of view of one ship or another (or out of range of the 6 or 8 inch guns normally mounted) and most of the area was in sight of two ships. Wireless was available so they could notify one another of any ships spotted. How things worked at night or in fog is unclear (no pun intended) I have not been able to discover how this operated and any information is welcome. The blockade does appear to have been effective in that almost all the ships that needed to be stopped were stopped. In terms of the Paris and London declarations this is important as an ineffective blockade (one in which some ships were stopped but not enough) could be deemed illegal as it inflicted suffering without any chance of achieving a useful result.

If a ship was spotted and it was not identified as an Allied ship about its lawful occasions then it would be signalled to stop (by flag and/or signal lamp). If this achieved no result (possibly because some merchant ships kept a poor look out) then a shot would be fired across her bows, this was a time honoured signal signifying "heave to or I’ll sink you". If this did not cause what has been described as "a brown trouser event" on the merchantman and result in the ship heaving to then the next shot would be into her hull. The intent was still to make a point to the obviously obtuse captain. Traditionally this would be into her bows but as in WW1 this would mean the focsul where the crew had their quarters a different location might be chosen. This shot might well be fired by a light gun from the cruiser’s secondary armament. If still no action was taken by the merchantman then she would be sunk both metaphorically and literally. However I can find no reference to things ever going that far, if anyone has positive evidence to the contrary it would be interesting to see this.

Once the ship was hove to a boarding party would be despatched. This would consist of four or five men under the command of a junior officer or senior petty officer. They would be armed but expect no opposition, under the heavy guns of the RN cruiser resistance was useless, however positive cooperation might be lacking. Boarding the merchantman in what could be heavy seas was dangerous and some boats were overturned. Once on board the officer in charge would require to see the ships papers and cargo manifest. Fake papers and manifests were the most common subterfuge used to run the blockade. Machine tools became agricultural machinery; indeed all sorts of things including machine gun parts became agricultural machinery. Boarding officers had perforce to become skilled in spotting anomalies. At the same time a physical check might be carried out to determine just what cargo the ship was actually carrying.

Some ships contained hidden compartments or even false bottoms to holds. Checking this whilst at sea was not always possible as it would require freight to be moved or even unloaded, moreover much cargo could not be inspected without the removal of hatches and hatch covers, a very unsafe practice at sea and one that could lead to the loss of the ship in rough weather. It therefore was often necessary to send the ship, with a boarding officer, to a supervised port for inspection.

A ship discovered with contraband at sea would likewise be sent to a supervised port. It was not permitted to sink it unless allowing it to stay afloat would compromise the cruiser’s safety and operations. Even then the crew and passengers had first to be safely removed from the ship. Putting them in lifeboats was only permissible if there was a safe shore within easy reach and the weather and sea conditions were good.

Main sources/references

The Paris Declaration

The London Declaration

Official History of the RL Line

The Upheaval of War - R & J Winter

How the British Blockade Works - Rear Admiral de Chair interviewed by Henry Suydam

[simonharley]

AFO 10 was unequivocal evidence that Admiralty was prepared to starve German civilians.

What is AFO 10, out of interest? I can't find a reference for it anywhere via the twin wonders of Google and Google Books.

Merry Christmas,

Simon

[Clio]

Interestingly the concept of 'Distant Blockade' was integrated into Admiralty War Orders in 1912. The advent of torpedo boats (armed with torpedoes that actually worked unlike those used in the Russo Japanese war) and itsy-bitsy submarines used by maritme powers for harbour defence tended to rule out the prospect of 'close blockade'. Only submarines could be used for close blockade of enemy portswhich is the main reason why old salt horses like Sir Arthur Wilson underwent Damascene conversions.

Lusitania claimed to be 'the first technologically-executed mass atrocity' ????????????????????????????????????????????????

[Signals]

I guess i'll be shot down here, and i know this is only about WW1, but if we look beyond 1914/1918 taking the moral high ground on matters such as Luitannia is for what reason? Did any nation target Boer families during that turn of the century conflict? And invading Zululand with a modern army was for what real reason? And so it goes on.

Lusitania claimed to be 'the first technologically-executed mass atrocity' ????????????????????????????????????????????????

[simonharley]

If the former point is one about the British "Laagers" (concentration camps) in South Africa, it is worth remembering that the Spanish had introduced concentration camps in 1896 in Cuba and the United States introduced them at the same time as Great Britain did, in the Philippine Islands in 1900. And ascribing to Britain a conscious desire to incur 35% death rates IS somewhat controversial.

Simon

[ionia]

As well as removing the privateer from the high seas the Paris Declaration also altered the system of prize money and with it the treatment of merchant ships.. Gone were the days when a declaration of war meant a bonanza of prize money for the officers and men of frigates and corvettes that cruised the seas snapping up any enemy merchantman they could find. A much more formal structure had to be put in place.

The Paris Declaration said only the following:

"1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished;

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war;

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag;

4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

It did not deal with Prize Money which has always been a domestic matter and subject to legislation or Order at the beginning of each conflict.

[ionia]

The declaration finally abolished the role of the privateer (which was why the USA didn’t sign up to it). As a result there was the somewhat outré result of the USA (a non signatory to the declaration because she reserved the right to commission privateers) suing Britain and France (signatories) over their part in the building of privateers for the Confederate Navy (most specifically the Alabama).

The USA did not sue the British Government. It lodged a claim with that Government for damages covering the effect of the depredations by privateers the building or fitting out of which had been "aided or abetted" by the British. The liability for damages was admitted by the British and the amount thereof referred to arbitration. Note that it was only the amount of the damages that was to be arbitrated because it was in the best interests of the British, as the major maritime power, that the concept of this liability should be firmly established in International Law. The final outcome was therefore more of a benefit to the British than the USA, looking towards a future conflict.

[Clio]

Sorry Simon

I ought to have elaborated. The KDM rapidly learned via AFO 10 and 12 that Admiralty was gearing its North Sea policy towards 'distant blockade'. Faced with the prospect of economic warfare, in 1912 as a direct result of this knowledge, one of the sharpest minds in Flensburg turned towards exploiting Britain's own economic vulnerability confronted with blockade. The Blum Memorandum of 1912 made two salient points: firstly Britain was extremely vulnerable to blockade by submarine, secondly (and here Blum greatly underestimated the logistics required) blockade could be achieved with 200 boats (Donitz later reckoned it would take closer to 300).

The Blum Memorandum was not commissioned by the government and most of the KDM were happy to shelve it in 1912 preferring some big ship encounter in the North Sea to the attritional grind of unrestricted submarine warfare. Besides, everybody on both sides of the North Sea knew that submarines were really just floating sentry boxes, only good for defending harbours, should the 'distant blockade' venture a little closer. The findings of the Blum Report were however received with great interest by the students of Flensburg (ref Valentiner)

After Pathfinder, Hogue Cressy, Aboukir, Hawke, Formidable et al, KDM dusted down the Blum Report and looked with fresh interest

[HMS Zinnia]

Hi all ,

Lusitania & Mauretania were designed to carry 6" guns , the Lusitania plans available at the Glasgow University Archives Services ( GUAS ) do show this very good ...

This was one of the conditions for the Cunard Company to get the loans from the British Admiralty , to be able to build those two liners .

But the Admiralty , at the outbreak of the war , decided both ships were too big to be used as auxiliary cruisers , Lusitania continued her Atlantic service , while Mauretania became a trooper .

So , to me , Lusitania didn't wear guns when she sank .

Regards ,

Laurent

[centurion]

The Paris Declaration said only the following:

"1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished;

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war;

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag;

4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

I think this is very much a précis

It did not deal with Prize Money which has always been a domestic matter and subject to legislation or Order at the beginning of each conflict.

Well there was certainly the idea in the British parliament that it affected prize money as see this extract from Hansard 25 July 1862 MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE (a good naval name) "In case of war the officers would, no doubt, do their duty; but their energy would be somewhat lessened by the fact that there could be no prize money, in consequence of the abandonment of our maritime rights in the Declaration of Paris."

[bob lembke]

Years ago I bought a copy of Colin Simpson, The Lusitania, 1972, Little, Brown and Company, Boston/Toronto, 303 pages, and read it, and it seemed to my simple mind to largely settle most of the questions about the Lusitania, and to raise some tantilizing new ones. He uncovered the system used collaboratively by British and American officials to conceal the shipment of explosives and munitions, and included in the book photocopies of documents like manifests showing the shipment of large amounts of munitions, and, most explosively (pun fully intended), detailed the shipment of 600 tons (I think; my memory had been only 350 tons) of gun-cotton.

Seemingly there are two types of gun-cotton, one of which, supposedly, will spontaneously explode in contact with sea-water. Supposedly, the UK government bought 600 tonnes of gun-cotton of the spontaneously-exploding type, and, cleverly, decided to package it by baling by wrapping it in burlap. The book describes the construction of the ship, how it had a double hull, and how the space between the outer hull and the inner hull was not compartmented (the space within the inner hull was), so that a leak anywhere in the outer hull would allow the sea-water to flow the entire length of this space between the two hulls. The book states that the 350 or 600 tonnes of gun-cotton bales were stacked in this outer space against the outer hull, so that a leak anywhere along the outer hull would probably reach the bales. Incidentally, gun-cotton is a very "high-quality" explosive, very violent, so much so that it is not usable for many military purposes.

The book also states that the documents found indicate that the Cunard waybill said that the lower orlop hold contained 1248 cases of shrapnel, which one might imagine meant shrapnel balls, but the shipping note of the Bethlehem Steel Company, who supplied it, described it as: "1,248 cases of 3-inch shrapnel shells filled; 4 shells to each case and 250 cases to each lot; weight of the lot being 51 tons." It went on to mention that this shipment was the 23rd of 214 consignments covered by the same order. This load was placed against the bulkhead with No. 1 boiler room on the other side; in the hold was also, among other things, 74 barrels of fuel oil.

The documents also mention that the main orlop hold contained 4,927 boxes of .303 ammo, 1000 cartriges to a "case", and stated that the total weighed 173 tons. I do not understand if the author meant boxes = cases, or if there was another level of packaging. Would 4,927,000 .303 rounds plus several levels of packaging weigh 173 tons? That would be about 15 rounds to a pound. Seems OK to me. The rounds were filled and had fulminate of mercury primers, and estimated that the consignment included over 10 1/2 tons of explosive. Elsewhere in the book a shipment of fuses was mentioned. Additionally, there were a number of items in the documents that seem "fishy".

The book seems very well referenced and sourced, and includes lots of other stuff, including circumstantial evidence that Churchill may have cooked the whole thing up to affect the US. My statements above are to some degree from memory, as well as looking at the book on my desk, and I might not be 100% accurate in details in stating what the book states.

I never have heard this book being referenced in the occasional discussions of the Lusitania on the forum. Is it known to be fraud? Is the author (a reporter for the Sunday Times) known to be a fabricator? Is the book not known in the UK? Taking the book's assertions that seem to be based on identified and in some cases photo-copied documents, at least some of the questions that are hashed over endlessly seem to have been settled.

Bob Lembke

[centurion]

Why would anyone want gun cotton that exploded on contact with seawater? Even assuming that such a thing existed?

[simonharley]

The impression I have is that there are far more reliable sources on the sinking out there.

Keith Allen has an essay on the "Lusitania" controversy on the excellent GWPDA website;

http://www.gwpda.org/naval/lusika00.htm

Simon

[centurion]

Ordinary gun cotton does NOT explode when wet. There apparently was a form that could be exploded when wet (useful in mines etc) but this did NOT explode on contact with water (sea or otherwise).

[Guest geoff501]

Ordinary gun cotton does NOT explode when wet.

Probably material invented especially for the conspiracy theorists - it sells more books but evidently not this one.

It's no secret there were 5 million rounds of 303 and 5000 85mm schrapnel shells on board and also 46 tons of aluminum powder destined for explosives manufacture at Woolwich. Some of the munitions was close to where the torp hit, 50m from the bow and 3m below the water line, but not likely to contribute to the sinking which was almost certain when the 160kg of HE torp went off after hitting the hull at a relative speed of 40 knots. Damage to the riveted hull and the failure of bulkhead doors means it was certain to sink without any additional assistance. Perhaps some of the aluminum powder was really gun cotton? Would we then expect a much bigger explosion that the mere 160KG from the torpedo? The conspiracy theory started the moment Schwieger wrote in his log 'Unusually high detonation'. However he was probably unfamiliar with sinking passenger ships - cargo ships offer a different resistance to the explosive effect of a torpedo entering the hull. Perhaps all this stuff on board somehow justifies or excuses Schwieger's action? Is that your point Bob? Or is it a reason for the reported 'second explosion', which really made sure that the ship would sink, which was probably the boilers of steam lines fracturing. The energy stored in these far exceeded the HE in the torpedo. The double skin hull is, I think, a load of b*******. Was this invented by Brunel? To make the ship safer and not wide enough for storage.

(I seem to remember a body of a ship worker discovered in one, got riveted in during construction, cannot remember the full details). I really should not be here.

[centurion]

(I seem to remember a body of a ship worker discovered in one, got riveted in during construction, cannot remember the full details). I really should not be here.

Allegedly on the Great Eastern. Where should you be?

I think you make some good points. Why would the British bother to hide stuff in the double hull anyway - who was going to search the ship?

[bob lembke]

Ordinary gun cotton does NOT explode when wet. There apparently was a form that could be exploded when wet (useful in mines etc) but this did NOT explode on contact with water (sea or otherwise).

I can only reproduce what I find in this book, for which I have no independent knowledge of veracity. On pp. 95-96 the author quotes an affidavit that he said was found in the archives of the "investigation department" of the US Department of Justice. The affidavit is that of Dr. Ritter von Rettegh, who seemingly was an agent of the British Embassy in Washington, who the Brits supposedly persuaded to take a position at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy. The "Gaunt" in the account is Captain Guy Gaunt, the British Naval Attachee at the British Embassy, who supposedly was the person who negotiated the purchace of gun-cotton from Du Pont, although as a diplomat he could not actually formally place the order. The affidavit: I may excerpt parts that are not to the point but whose absence does not change the meaning. "On april 26th 1915, I visited him (Gaunt) at his office at his request. During the conversation we talked about explosives and he asked me to give him a statement of the character of the fuel used by the German Government in his submarines. After some little conversation he asked me what effect, if any, sea water coming in contact with gun cotton would have. I inquired of him why he wanted to know this. He said, 'We are required to send by one of our fastest steamers in the next day or so about six hundred tons of gun cotton, which we have purchased from the Du Pont Powder Company." I told him there were two kinds of gun cotton. One is the trinitro cellulose, made from the fibres of pine; that this gun cotton would not be affected by sea water, as it is non-hydroscopic. That the other called pyroxyline, made from cotton and highly hydroscopic, by the law of capillarity, absorbs water and moisture, especially when warm and in a loose condition. That under such circumstances if sea water comes into contact with the gun cotton immediately a chemical change takes place. The free sulphuric acid in the latter will be chemically attacked by the bromine and iodine salts and also common salts contained in the sea water, raising the temperature and causing sudden explosion. He asked me what to do to prevent this, and I said keep it in a dry place.

.....................................

He asked me in this conversation whether or not I thought gun cotton explosion caused the sudden sinking of the Audacious and Courbet. I said it was possible. ................................ Captain Gaunt gave me two cheques as a personal loan - one for fifteen and one for twenty-five dollars. ....................... "

Elsewhere in the book it is stated that the Brits attempted to buy some waterproof containers for the gun cotton from Du Pont, but they were not available. I know gun cotton as trinitro cellulose, perhaps the second type is not always or now called "gun cotton".

The book has a lot of detail, with the supposed sources, and some alleged photos of documents, for example, listing the ammunition supposedly in the cargo. If this is still not generally accepted, it would seem quite possible to check that the given sources are real.

The book also goes into the travesty of the inquest, where the captain of the ship was put on trial. framed by the government. (Supposedly he was ordered by radio not to zig-zag as he approached the area where the Navy knew German subs to be, then those radio logs were destroyed, and he was tried for not zig-zagging. But an "eager beaver" radio operator kept a second, unofficial record of radio traffic, and when they surfaced the prosecution failed, and the judge resigned from the bench: "he (the judge, Lord Mersey) formally wrote to Prime Minister Asquith, waiving his fee for the case and adding that 'I must request that henceforth I be excused from administering His Majesty's Justice.' "

Lot of other explosive stuff in the book, but I have no idea if they are true.

Bob Lembke

[centurion]

I think that author may be talking nonsense. Gun cotton is made from cotton - fairly obvious when you think of it. It is hygroscopic - I e it absorbs water. In this state it doesn't go bang. The first substance mentioned using wood fibres is not gun cotton.

If either of these was detonated by sea water (which I don't think is the case) then in the double hull is the very last place you'd put it as there would always be a chance of seepage from a strained plate or rivet.

[Jim Clay]

I really should not be here.

Geoff

I for one am glad to see you here. And I'm sure there are worse places to be.

(Thinks: has a 'Departed' ever returned? If not, you could be the first...)

Happy New Year any way.

Jim

[Pighills]

(Thinks: has a 'Departed' ever returned? If not, you could be the first...)

Jim

AAAAAARRRRRGGGGGHHHHHH - we is being haunted now

Seriously, Hi Geoff, nice to see you back - hope it's to stay!

Good to see a nice debate going on here.

I have to admit to knowing nothing about the subject, hence my complete lack of contributions, apart from the opening link, which I thought might interest someone.

[HMS Zinnia]

Lusitania didn't have a inner & outer hull skin . "Great Eastern" did , indeed .

There were of course bottom tanks , and the whole length of the boiler rooms was protected by the side bunkers , with their remote controlled watertight doors ...

the turbines rooms were also divided in watertight compartiments , each turbine having his room

That's all .

the side bunkers were supposed to protect the ship from sinking when torpedoed , history showed us that this was a wrong concept .

I think this Colin Simpson book is just full of crap !

regards ,

Laurent

[centurion]

concept .

I think this Colin Simpson book is just full of crap !

I think that was what I was trying to say but not very well - you've hit the nail on the head.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

And ironically I think based on a principal first applied by the Dutch during the Anglo Dutch wars of the 17th century. In fact such a right only applies to neutral ships in a belligerant's waters or ports. It was a long established principle and not particularly aimed at any specific nation.

It was one of the many tactics of the Dutch, hardly some strange invention in the 19th century.