Douglas Haig and the First World War

[George Armstrong Custer]

And 'much' is now done

Well, as much as you can "do" as far as planting doubt about a book you've never read by an author you know very little of is concerned - not very academically rigorous though, is it?

I'm not sure where you get the "Lloyd George was somehow responsible for Britain's involvement in the war" from, that's not actually what the NY Times summary or Roch's book's criticism of Lloyd George's actions in August 1914 are saying - on the contrary, the clue is in the headline: "Says Premier Hung Back". As to your never having "come across anything previously to support Roch's assertion," I can only suggest you widen your reading. If you ever get around to starting a thread deconstructing Roch's criticisms of Lloyd George (hopefully having read his book first!), I'll happily give a reading list of supporting commentary and criticism.

[bmac]

George,

You do seem to be getting extremely touchy about this subject. I would ask, if this were a meeting, for everyone who had ever heard of Walter Roch to put their hands up - and not expect many to show. There is precious little provided by Google (though for those of us with the time and inclination a copy of his book is available HERE) which leads one to suspect that this is not a widely read or widely known of book, which is perhaps not surprising for, as far as I can see, it has not been in print since it first came out in 1920.

I thought I had raised a reasonable point that an ex-MP of a party recently all but destroyed at the polls might have an axe to grind against the person he might see as responsible and to ask whether anyone of note supported his views. Would I have been accused of 'planting doubt' about a modern day politician in a similar position had I raised such a point? Personally I would imagine many would view such a person's views with some circumspection if presented as a definitive account of their 'targets' career. Politicians tend not to write critical accounts of erstwhile colleagues from the goodness of their heart.

As to LG being 'responsible' what the NY Time article also says is that "Mr Roch suggests that, if Lloyd George had agreed to Mr Asquith's firm policy five days earlier, war might have been averted". Personally I read that as Roch suggesting that a different course of action by LG somehow could have stopped the war, a fairly serious accusation one might think. I draw from this that Roch is slyly suggesting that LG, because of this failure, was in some way responsible for the war breaking out, i.e. by opposing the war he made it happen (yes, I had read that bit). Personally, in the spirit of forum 'good will', I had hoped that, having raised the, perhaps, little known book of Mr Roch as substantiating your criticisms of LG, you might easily have been able to lay your hands on something other to suggest he was more than just a disgruntled and embittered ex-politician. You're not going to do so, which is fair enough, and I have better things to do with my life than argue with you on this particular subject right now.

Finally can I just say thank you for your kind invitation that I "widen my reading". I shall take it in the generous spirit in which I am sure it was meant. I also undertake in future never to 'plant doubts' about books without providing a decent level of supporting evidence for my concerns. I would hope others might go down this path too.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Bill,

What subject am I getting extremely touchy about?

I made a comment on this thread based, inter alia, on my conclusions drawn from a book by Walter Roch which I have and which I referenced. I am open to my conclusion being challenged by an informed critic in the appropriate place. I made it clear before your first post on the subject that this thread was not the place to go off on a detailed investigation of L-G. I have, however, said on several occasions since that I am more than happy to explore the topic - including Roch's view of L-G's war - on a new thread. You have persisted in trying to tie such a debate to this thread, despite now claiming that you've more things to do in your life right now. And no, I don't accuse you of 'planting doubt' about a politician per se, but about his book which you've never read. The bottom line is that you are trying to argue the merits or defects of a book based upon a couple of paragraphs in the NY Times - you must know that's an unsustainable position. And your suggestion that the fact that Roch's book is long out of print is an indication of worthlessness is a specious one and, I'd suggest, a rather desperate and inadequate substitute for your own lack of knowledge of the book.

I have repeatedly indicated my interest in pursuing this topic on a new thread and that I would be happy to discuss the supporting evidence for much of what Roch says there, so your "you're not going to do so" jibe is without foundation. You've called into question a book you haven't read (and apparently have no intention of doing so despite having googled an online copy when trawling for something to support the aspersions you've cast on it) and no amount of dissembling can change that. If you want to investigate and mount a defence of L-G against Roch, who's stopping you? I'm merely asking that you don't do it on this thread.

Finally, you're right - I did suggest you might widen your reading on the subject in a generous spirit, and I think it's something you should do. After all, you've just devoted the best part of a day to attempting to undermine a book you've not read - and doing so on on the wrong thread. Looking for stuff on google to sustain your preconceptions - even if you'd found any - doesn't count. Unfortunately this all seems on a par with your suggestion elsewhere that Stuart Wortley was sacked because of some unspecified 'vendetta' against him by Haig, or your part in the unfortunate television hatchet job on D'Oyly Snow with it's hoary 'donkeys' cliches. Given that background, and if I were an uncharitable person, I might suspect that your real interest here in defending L-G from a Haig admirer like Roch may be a case of "my enemy's enemy is my friend." Otherwise why insist on keeping this discussion going here rather than on a thread of its own where it properly belongs? I don't mean this in a rude way, but read the book, draw your own conclusions, then put up or shut up on a new thread.

[MelPack]

George

Don't hold back! Hit him with your 'everyone is mad' theory of history.

I am sure that there is a suitable tome on the subject published in 1921 that is no longer in print.

Ciao

Mel

[George Armstrong Custer]

I take it you've nothing to add one way or the other on the Harris book Mel.

[armourersergeant]

Why oh Why oh Why does it always have to degenerate in to an implied or even right in your face insult at individuals.

Everyone has an opinion, it does not mean they are right. But they are entitled to it.

I am regretting I raised my question and reignited this little fire!

Regards

Arm

[simonharley]

For anyone interested (and I should imagine there are a few), Walter Roch's book is available for free download in .pdf format from archive.org:

http://www.archive.org/details/mrlloydgeorgewar00roch

Simon

[eviltaxman]

I think this thread has now travelled as far as possible. There is now a link to the book - Read it and make your own minds up.

To save any further problems, I'm closing the thread.

[eviltaxman]

After a discussion of the Mod team we have decided to re-open this thread. Could I therefore please ask everyone taking part (in any thread) to remember the rules of the forum and to follow them.

Thank you.

[PMHart]

I am really grateful to the moderators as the fully considered reviews of this book have not yet appeared,

Thanks chums,

Pete

[David Filsell]

Paul Harris is now back from a sojourn teaching in the US. I saw him yesterday and he seemed unaware of the of the disputation about the book. Not least he reacted to the views expressed about his (over?) use of secondary quotes and pointed out thast he had used much primary material. He told him about this thread, of which he was unaware. Soooo - he may pop up with some reaction!

[George Armstrong Custer]

It'd certainly be interesting to have the opportunity to engage him on specifics, David.

Best,

George

[Michelle Young]

I started reading it last night, so far so good but personally I dislike the way it is broken down into essay type chunks, with bold headings. And another bugbear of mine, I prefer notes at the end of each chapter rather than at the end of the book.

Michelle

[Michelle Young]

Found some annoying typos on a map and in the text with place names incorrectly spelled.

Michelle

[sjustice]

Still waiting for the review.

George? Are you still going to provide same?

Kind Regards,

Simon

[George Armstrong Custer]

Simon, other committments allowing, I'll try to get something up by this evening.

[sjustice]

No rush. Good to know you're going to provide it. Cheers.

[Michelle Young]

The map illustrating the battle of Neuve Chappelle is wrongly annotated, with the allied front lines before and after the battle reversed so it appears a retreat. Silly things like that and the place names mis-spelled on the Aisne map detract from the text.

Michelle

[George Armstrong Custer]

OK, here we go. As noted in an earlier post I have been compiling a detailed critique, not only of Harris's conclusions but also of his research which, as I've also already mentioned here, is largely derivative of secondary works such as G. J. De Groot's 1988 biography. I have also already observed that correcting all of the errors in the Harris book would entail a virtual re-write of the whole thing. I have therefore decided to concentrate upon a single episode from the Harris book in which I believe all the flaws of interpretation and research which characterise the whole work are encapsulated in one relatively easily deconstructed narrative. This is the sub-chapter titled Robertson, Haig and the attack on French: Mid-October-early November 1915 on pp. 182 - 184 of Harris, which starts as it means to go on and kicks off with the ludicrous suggestion that Haig was the motive force behind French's removal, and that his actions might reasonably be interpreted as mutiny! Those with a horror of detail should look away now, for I have attempted to demonstate evidence for my views that not only are Harris' broad conclusions flawed but that the referenced minutiae upon which he builds them is too often just plain wrong, non-existent, misinterpreted or misrepresented. To do this obviously necessitates a degree of detailed exploration in this review, for which I make no apologies.

Harris begins by referencing Haig's diary account of Sir William Robertson's visit to Haig on the 17 October 1915, and their discussion of the competence of the BEF's C-in-C, Sir John French. Harris states (the bold italics are mine):

"Haig's account of his conversation with Robertson on 17 October 1915 makes it clear that, by this stage, he was not merely briefing against French to French's superiors. He had also made himself the leader of a conspiracy within the BEF. He was openly discussing the competence of Sir John French with subordinates, commenting adversely upon it

and encouraging their endorsement of his opinion. He was, in effect, drawing his corps commanders into a plot to overthrow the commander-in-chief. If someone less well connected had behaved like this, he might reasonably have been accused of gross disloyalty, even mutiny. Haig knew, however, that his was a conspiracy the King would support and that few significant ministers were likely to oppose. If mutiny had support at the highest level, and if it succeeded, then none dare call it mutiny.

These are astonishing accusations of a 'plot', 'conspiracy' and 'mutiny' hatched and led by Haig, which he supposedly launched on the basis that his royal connections would protect him from the usual consequences of mutiny. On Haig's royal connections, I 'd just like to note here that Harris scatters allusions to these throughout his book without ever feeling the need to give any references as to how Haig manipulated this connection in practice in any particular instance. I'd like to make it clear that the King was the figurehead to whom all army officers swore their oath of allegiance and that the King had requested, in addition to Haig, that many of his most senior officers keep him up to speed with their thoughts on military affairs - these included French himself, as well as Smith-Dorrien, Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, Hubert Gough, Lord Loch, and the Earl of Cavan amongst others. Neither French, Smith-Dorrien nor Stuart-Wortley's royal connection saved them from being dismissed - and Smith-Dorrien in particular was a very close friend of the King. Yet Haig's similar connections are routinely noted without corroboration as if they conferred some kind of pass to do as he liked. To borrow a phrase from Gordon Corrigan, such an idea is absolute poppycock! But to return to Harris's accusations of "conspiracy" and "mutiny". For such a far reaching and extraordinarily serious accusation by an historian one would expect to find irrefutable and damning evdence to support it in his references. So, what references does Harris give in support of the above quoted passage? Well, he gives one reference - "Haig's account of his conversation with Robertson on 17 October 1915." In which case, one might suppose that Haig's diary entry for that date is a lurid confession of plotting with junior officers after he has persuaded them to endorse his own view that French ought to be removed - and that some satisfaction is expressed that the support of the King will protect him from charges of mutiny. One would also be looking for evidence to support Harris's contention that Haig thought that when the government became aware of "his" "conspiracy" that "few significant ministers were likely to oppose [it]." So, let us quote this red-hot smoking gun of a diary confession with its revelations of dastardly plotting and fomenting of mutiny:

(From Haig's Diary, Sunday 17 October 1915)

As regards Sir J. French, Robertson told me that when he was in London, Lord Stamfordham [George V's Principal Private Secretary, and the King's conduit of communication to his generals] called him up on the telephone from Sandringham and asked him by the King's orders whether he did not consider the time had come to replace Sir. J. French. Robertson did not answer. He saw the King afterwards in London, and now he came to discuss the point with me. I told him at once that up to that date I had been most loyal to French and did my best to stop all criticism of him or his methods. Now at last, in view of what had happened in the recent battle over the reserves, and in view of the seriousness of the general military situation, I had come to the conclusion that it was not fair to the Empire to retain French in command on this the main front. Moreover, none of my Officers Commanding Corps had any opinion of Sir John's military ability or military views: in fact, they find no confidence in him. Robertson quite agreed, and left me saying "he knew now how to act, and would report to Stamfordham." He also told me that the members of the Cabinet who had up to the present been opposed to removing French had come round to the other opinion. French does not get on with the French: Joffre seems to have no great opinion of his military views and does not really consult with him. It is most important at the present time to have someone to put the British case and combine with the French in aiming at decisive results in their plans of operations.

And that's it! If we compare what Haig actually wrote in his diary for 17 October 1915 with what Harris extrapolates from it in the passage from his book quoted earlier, then it is quite clear that his talk of Haig originating a 'conspiracy' and fomenting 'mutiny' with the a priori knowledge that his 'plot' would be protected by the King is nothing more than the product of Harris' febrile imagination. His outlandish accusations have no basis in fact, as a sober examination of these reveals. Firstly, it is clearly the case that Robertson was briefed in London to the effect that both the King and the Cabinet supported French's removal before he travelled to France to sound out Haig on the matter. In other words, the political impetus, with royal support, for French's removal had already begun in mid October before Haig was consulted by Robertson for his opinions. Harris admits as much on p.181 of his book when he writes "Apparently [Robertson] wanted to be sure of Haig's support and was not yet certain that the First Army commander was committed to Sir John French's overthrow." Leaving aside for a moment the hyperbole of Harris's description of French's dismissal as an "overthrow", it quite simply beggars belief that he goes on from this to contend that Haig was the originator of a 'plot'/'conspiracy'/'mutiny' to 'overthrow' French. French's removal was a political decision, one taken with the encouragement of the King, and Haig was only consulted subsequent to Robertson having been approached in London. Despite this, Harris insists that after their meeting on 17 October, "the Haig-Robertson connection now became critical." Apropos of nothing, he throws in the gratuitous fact that "both officers came from the cavalry." So what? So was French! Having hinted with that bald statement at the possibility of some kind of cavalry cabal, Harris takes it no further. But there's more. For as well as speciously hinting at a conspiratorial cavalry link between Haig and Robertson, Harris simultaneously cannot resist taking another dig at Haig by attempting to portray him as somehow looking down on Robertson as socially inferior, writing:

They had known each other for years and seem to have had a degree of mutual respect, though they were not, and never really became, friends. Their backgrounds were totally different. [..........] [Robertson] never acquired, and perhaps never wished to affect, all the attitudes that Haig associated with being a "gentleman", and Haig sometimes found his plain,

plebeian manner of speaking rather irritating."

What is Harris's source for his statement that Haig found Robertson's "plain and plebeian" speech "irritating"? He cites three. One is from pp 1 - 7 of David Woodward's Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the Great War, another is from p.66 of the same author's essay Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig in Bond & Cave's Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On, and the third is Haig's diary for 13 February 1916. Pretty comprehensive, you might think. Until you actually read these cited sources.

In the first, Woodward's book Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, the cited pages, pp 1-7, give Robertson's family background but the only mention of Haig is on pp 2-3, in the context of him having, like Haig, attended the Staff College at Camberley and imbibed the lessons there, and as a result, as Woodward notes, "He and Haig were in complete agreement about concentrating British forces in the theater that attrated the main body of the enemy, which throughout the war was France and Flanders. As Robertson writes in is memoirs, "There was never, so far as I know, any material difference between us in regard to the main principles to be observed in order to win the war." So, no mention of Haig finding Robertson's "plain and plebeian" speech "irritating."

In the second, Woodward's essay in Haig: A Reappraisal, the cited p. 66 in its turn quotes and cites p. 214 of Gerard De Groot's 1988 biography, which quotes and cites Haig's diary entry for 13 February 1916. So, Harris is basing his statement on a diary entry via two secondary quotations. The only one out of Harris, Woodward and De Groot who actually looked at the diary page in question in the archives was De Groot. Unfortunately for Harris, in this instance De Groot consulted and quoted the typed version of Haig's Diary. In the original manuscript diary, Haig writes simply that "[Robertson] spoke with great confidence about everything and I am sure that it is good for the Gov^t. and the Country to have such a man at this time. But he talks too much out "I" - "I'll 'ave to get rid of 'im" etc. He remains very well and will succeed I feel sure." In other words, Haig is saying that Robertson is a good man in his newly appointed position of CIGS, but is a little prone to "I this..." and "I that..." There's no "irritation" apparent from Haig at Robertson's "plain and plebeian" speech. Yet this is the source to which Harris's citation for saying so ultimately leads. Woodward, who is apparently the only source in this chain which Harris has actually read, is an American academic who completely misses the humour of Haig's reproducing of Robertson's dropped aitches in his diary. Yet this misses the point that Robertson's words "'Orace, you're for 'ome," became legendary through the army and became almost his signature line - indeed it was suspected that 'Wully' played up to the image by deliberately exaggerating the trait in his speech! Woodward may also have led Harris astray when he writes on p. 66 of Haig: A Reappraisal that "Rather than the affectionate 'Wully,' Haig at times referred to Robertson as 'The Iron Ration' or 'Old Wully', the latter nickname apparently suggesting that Robertson lacked drive or energy." What that really means, of course, is that Woodward completely fails to recognise affectionate humour in such British colloquialisms. Haig regularly referred to esteemed individuals - who were often just a few years older, or even younger than, himself - with the prefix "old" - an example from his diary was given on the 'Haig's Diary - version longue' thread when, speaking of the French General Maistre, Haig wrote "He is about 61 years of age, and seems a clear headed old man. We have always got on well with him. He worked under Foch at the French Staff College for some years, and is an intimate friend of the latter."

The third reference cited by Harris is Haig's diary itself for 13 February 1916, which I quoted above from the original manuscript diary written up by Haig that night. It seems, though, that De Groot having cited that diary entry, that Woodward and then Harris simply quoted De Groot and in the process failed to realise that the addendum to it quoted by De Groot is a post war addition in the typed version to the original manuscript diary entry. As a reminder, here's what Haig wrote in the original manuscript diary on the nght of 13/02/16: "[Robertson] spoke with great confidence about everything and I am sure that it is good for the Gov^t. and the Country to have such a man at this time. But he talks too much about "I" - "I'll 'ave to get rid of 'im" etc. He remains very well and will succeed I feel sure." In the typescript version, however, written up after the war, has been added the comment at the bottom of the page: "How much easier , though, it is to work with a gentleman." Woodward, in his essay in Haig: A Reappraisal, cuts and pastes as follows: "I am sure that it is good for the government and the country to have such a man in authority at the War Office at this time...How much easier, though, it is to work with a gentleman." This creates a pejorative remark that Haig never wrote in his original diary, and which did not appear in that form in the typed version. Harris uses Woodward's sleight of hand and expands it into Haig being "irritated" by Robertson's "plain and plebeian" speech. Never happened.

This is but one of the dozens of such gratuitous 'digs' at Haig with which Harris' text is studded, but having disposed of this particular example of such small scale pejoratively slanted distortion of Haig's character, we can now move on to Harris's assertions on Haig and Robertson's differences over the conduct of operations on the Western Front in February 1916.

I have already quoted Robertson (in Woodward, referenced above) to the effect that "There was never, so far as I know, any material difference between us in regard to the main principles to be observed in order to win the war." Yet on p. 183, Harris writes that

In terms of the conduct of operations on the Western Front, however, they had very different ideas. Robertson was an early believer in "step by step" offensive methods: supporting a series of short infantry advanced with concentrated artillery firepower, and in this way gradually grinding the enemy down. Haig, by contrast, continued to hanker after achieving a rapid breakthrough that would substantially change the strategic situation."

Once again, Harris cites this assertion to Woodward's essay in Haig: A Reappraisal, pp 66-7 and also to Haig's diary of 18 January 1916. On p. 67 of Haig: A Reappraisal Woodward states that "Instead of the one-step break-through supported by cavalry that appealed so much to Haig, Robertson wanted a slow and gradual advance to make attrition work in Britain's favour." For this statement Woodward in turn cites his own book, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, pp 11-14, in which on p. 12 he quotes Robertson thus: "If the Germans are to be defeated they must be beaten by a process of slow attrition, by a slow and gradual advance on our part, each step being prepared by a predominant artillery fire and great expenditure of ammunition." Yet on p. 14, Woodward concedes that "[....] Robertson, although he didn't rule out a rupture of a section of the enemy's front, deprecated the idea of a win-the-war breakthrough." Whilst it's difficult to reconcile Woodward's idea that although Robertson could allow the possibility of achieving a rupture of the enemy's front he wouldn't try to exploit it if it happened, Haig's diary entry of 18 January 1916, which Harris cites, puts him almost exactly in accordance with Robertson's idea that no rupture would occur without a wearing out preparation:

(From Haig's Diary, January 18 1916)

The principles which we must apply are:

(1) Employ sufficient force to wear down the enemy and cause him to use up his Reserves,

(2) Then, and not till then, throw in a mass of troops (at some point where the enemy has shown himself to be weak) to break through and win victory.

[............] It’s desirable that this ‘wearing out attack’ be begun simultaneously by all the allies. Report says that the French look to the British and the Russians to carry out this preliminary action, because they have not got enough men!...

This hardly supports Harris's simplistic assertion that in January 1916 Robertson advocated " 'step by step' offensive methods [.......] gradually grinding the enemy down" in contrast to Haig being supposedly wedded only to the idea of "achieving a rapid breakthrough that would substantially change the strategic situation."Harris then (p.183) makes the following extraordinary claim:

At GHQ in 1915 [Robertson] was in a good position to evaluate Haig as a field commander and, although he might sometimes pretend to be an uncritical admirer, it is unlikely that he was, in reality particularly impressed.

"Pretend to be uncritical"? "Unlikely that he was"? These are Harris's suppositions pure and simple, for in the absence of a source for these statements they are things he could not know without having been inside Robertson's head! This kind of unreferenced "he thought" or "it is likely that" suggestions pepper this book and frankly are just not on in an academic book which purports to be 'definitive.' For a reference for his assertion that Robertson sometimes pretended to be an uncritical admirer of Haig Harris cites "Esher's Journal, 23 September 1916. Quoted in Woodward's Sir William Robertson, p. 64.' " Yet no such statement or reference to Esher's Journal of 23 September 1916 appears on p. 64 in Woodward. What is apparent, however, from this critique of just a part of the Harris book, is the extent to which it relies on Woodward's work for both conclusions and references - some of the latter of which, as we have seen, are either wrong or just don't exist. And this over-reliance on secondary sources for whole chunks of the book, as well as for derivative stylistic cues, is a pattern which is repeated - notably with regard to De Groot's 1988 biography. Still, to to be fair to Harris, and even though it doesn't appear where he cites it in Woodward, we should ask whether Esher's original Journal entry for 23 September 1916 supports Harris's contention that Robertson "pretended" to be an uncritical admirer of Haig whilst in reality he was not particularly impressed? The short answer is no. Here's what Esher says:

PARIS

September 23 1916

Sir William Robertson arrived to tea, which he had in my room. He spoke warmly of D.H. "He is a fine soldier, and has done mighty well. I could not have done what he has.. I knew he was the only man to command the army. I might have had the command myself, but I knew he was the better man and that my place is where I am now." This was a great deal for Robertson, with his dour reserve, to admit.

If nothing else, Esher was a shrewd judge of character - something which Harris, ironically, concedes on p. 183 where he calls Esher "an astute observer" - and if he'd suspected Robertson was flanneling over Haig he'd have confided as much to his Journals. Esher, in fact, is going to be central to completing this discussion of the errors over Haig's role in French's dismissal which Harris perpetuates. All of which Harris would have known if he'd consulted Esher's Journals in full. Even where Harris cites Esher's Journal directly, he does so in a manner so partial as to change the meaning of the original. For instance, on p. 183 (and despite what I've just quoted from Esher on Robertson above), Harris notes that "Lord Esher, an astute observer, thought Robertson would ideally have wished to be commander-in-chief himself." Harris references this to Esher's Journal for December 9th 1915. But here is what Esher's Journal for that date actually says:

PARIS

December 9 1915

I think Robertson would prefer to command the army in France; but I think he honestly believes that he can be more useful in London; and I further believe that he is one of those rare characters who refuse to allow their wishes, or even their interests, to influence them.

In other words, Esher's emphasis is on Robertson's honest belief that he can do the most good in London as GIGS and not the fact that he may perhaps have preferred the C-in-C appointment. On p. 184 Harris states that "By mid November Haig felt confident enough to discuss the reorganisation of the supreme command with the still-influential Lord Esher, who operated as a sort of unofficial liason officer in Paris. Haig told Esher that Robertson should be CIGS and that Kitchener's powers needed to be curtailed."

On p. 183 Harris had suggested that "in the course of the autumn [of 1915], therefore, Robertson and Haig seem to have reached an understanding that if they were successful in getting rid of French, Haig would become commander-in-chief, while Robertson would replace Archibald Murray as CIGS." We are back with that "seem" again - "Robertson and Haig seem to have reached an understanding....." Harris references Haig's diary for 24 October 1915 on this. Haig's diary for that date is an extensive entry which is only partially reproduced in Sheffield & Bourne, and for reasons of space and context I cannot at this point reproduce more than the points relevant to Harris's claim of a plot between Robertson and Haig to become respectively CIGS and C-in-C, but I shall return to other aspects of the diary entry for this date later in this review. What Haig's diary says of himself and Robertson is this:

Sir W^m. Robertson came to see me & stayed to lunch. He was anxious that I should write to some of my friends in the Gov^t. and urge the importance of not sending troops to the Balkans. I said I hated intriguing in such a way, and that (except for him) I had no official knowledge of what was intended - I would express my views to the King with whom I am dining tonight, but the best solution in my opinion was that he (Robertson) should go home as Chief of the General Staff - the Gov^t. seem quite incapable to deciding on a sound military policy and sticking to it. Two vital points must be attended to before we can hope to be victorious. (1) We must have a larger army and (2) units must be trained. R. said French was in London with views more unsettled than unsure!

No evidence there to support Harris's allegation of a quid pro quo where one gets CIGS and the other C-in-C, nor that Haig and Robertson decide to instigate a move to have French removed - yet Harris adduces no evidence from any other source for his assertion that they did. As one of the creators of the General Staff under Haldane Haig definitely saw by the late autumn of 1915 that someone of Robertson's calibre was required in London, and saw it as his duty to say so. That's a far cry from being evidence to back up an accusation of a mutually beneficial "conspiracy" though. Harris also claims on p. 183 that Haig and Robertson began a co-ordinated attack on Sir John French, whose days as C-in-C were numbered once it began. As evidence of this "conspiracy" and "attack" Harris claims that when the King visited France on the 24 October 1915 he spoke with Haig's corps commanders, Rawlinson, Gough and Haking who "united with Haig and Robertson in denouncing their commander-in-chief." Leaving aside for a moment the fact that Harris has produced no evidence of Robertson and Haig working in unity against French to bring about his downfall, Harris states that prior to his visit "it seems clear that [the King] had already decided that French had to go" - in which case, and given the political unanimity in the Cabinet that French had to go, a "conspiracy" by Haig and Robertson was superflous. It gets worse though. Harris goes on to assert that Haig's corps commanders were united in denouncing French to the King because they had been "in all probability briefed by Haig." This "in all probability" forms the basis of Harris's ludicrous assertion that Haig was guilty of "mutiny" by "drawing his corps commanders into a plot to overthrow the commander-in-chief." What hard evidence does he supply for this astonishing claim? Well, the clue is in that "in all probability", because the hard evidence isn't there. Harris cites two sources for his suggestion that Haig coached his corps commanders before they spoke against French to the King - one is a secondary source, being p. 276 of G. H. Cassar's The Tragedy of Sir John French, which source I have not been able to access at this stage - so if some kind soul out there has it, perhaps they can share its revelations with us. The second source Harris cites for his allegation is Haig's own diary, again from the 24 October 1915. In fact, Haig's diary for that date provides evidence for precisely the opposite of what Harris claims regarding the corps commanders having been briefed by Haig before having seen the King. Here is what Haig's diary says:

(From Haig's diary, October 24 1915)

After dinner the King asked me to come to his room, and asked me about Sir J. French's leadership. I told him that I thought the time to have removed French was after the Retreat, because he had so mismanaged matters, and shown in the handling of the small Exped^ny. Force in the field a great ignorance of the essential principles of war. Since then, during the trench warfare, the army had grown larger and I thought at first there was no great scope for French to go wrong. I have therefore done my utmost to stop criticism and make matters run smoothly. But French's handling of the reserve in the last battle, his obstinacy & conceit, showed his incapacity and it was impossible to prevent him doing the same things again. I therefore thought strongly that for the sake of the Empire French ought to be removed. I personally was ready to do my duty in any capacity and of course w^d. serve under anyone who was chosen for his military skill to be c in c. - The King said that he had seen Generals Gough & Haking that afternoon, and they had told him some startling truths of French's unfitness for the command. - Gen. Robertson also told him that it was impossible to deal with French: his mind was never the same for two consecutive minutes!

11.30pm H.Q. Hinge

In other words the King tells Haig of the "startling truths" regarding French's "unfitness for command" which he had been told by the corps commanders that afternoon. But Harris has also claimed, remember, that Haig and Robertson's meeting earlier that same day, 24 October 1915, was where they hatched their "conspiracy" to oust French and become respectively C-in-C and CIGS. So presumably, until the "plot" had been hatched between himself and Robertson, Haig couldn't have briefed his corps commanders as to what to say to the King in support of it. Could he have done so afterwards? Could Haig have met with Robertson at lunchtime, decided upon their "co ordinated attack" on French, then briefed his corps commanders before they spoke with the King that same afternoon? Not according to Haig's manuscript diary for the day (which, as I've noted, is only partially reproduced in Sheffield & Bourne). The diary for 24 October 1915 tells us that Haig attended a large scale Church Parade with the King at 11am. Robertson did not come to see him until after that "and stayed to lunch". According to Harris this is when they hatched their scheme to get rid of French - yet as we have seen, Harris's citation of the Haig diary account of that lunchtime meeting offers no evidence in support of that allegation. According to the diary, Haig went riding in the afternoon - ie after his luchtime meeting with Robertson - accompanied, as was often the case, only by a King's Messenger "towards Robecque." The King meanwhile, as we know, was off seeing Haig's corps commanders who were putting him straight on French's shortcomings. Haig went to dinner at the King's residence at Chateau Jumelle close to Aire for 8.30pm. It was after that meal that the King asked Haig to come to his room and after asking his own opinion on French, filled him in on what his corps commanders had told him about French that afternoon. Quite frankly Harris's allegations of Haig's "plotting", "conspiracy" and fomenting of "mutiny" look increasingly ludicrous the more you look at the evidence he cites in support of his theories. My main purpose in going over these points in such detail has not been to vindicate Haig of Harris's specious charges, but to highlight the manifest failings of his research and interpretation which run through the whole work. But over and above this, the real clincher in refuting Harris's charges against Haig in respect of French's removal comes not from another historian but from the contemporary record kept by the man who, more than any other individual, found himself privy to the reasons for and the mechanics of French's dismissal. This was Lord Esher.

As we have seen earlier in this review, Harris cites Esher's Journals in respect of Haig and Robertson, but an examination of the passages referenced found that they failed to support the argument which Harris based upon them. But although Harris cites Esher's Journal via the secondary source of Woodward, he also lists one volume - vol. 3 out of the 4 volume set - of Esher's published Journals. Volume 3 covers the years 1910-1915, ending on 17 December 1915. Three things need to be stressed about Esher before looking at what he has to say of relevance. Firstly, as Harris himself concedes, Esher was an astute observer and, as I have added, a shrewd judge of character. Secondly, he was a great friend of Sir John French, meaning that his judgements on French's failings as C-in-C and the need for him to go for the good of the country were reached regretfully and with a heavy heart - and for that very reason they are invested with an entirely believable air of integrity. Esher was also to become close to French's successor, Douglas Haig, and grew to admire his qualities and achievements as C-in-C. Thirdly, it was precisely because of his close friendship with French that Asquith entrusted Esher to travel to France and inform French of the Cabinet's decision to relieve him of his command as C-in-C of the BEF. All of this put Esher right at the heart of the decision making and executive process of French's removal, making his contemporary Journals and letters something of a privileged insiders view of the whole affair, and his insightful observations and close knowledge of the participants are probably unique. Here's excerpts from Esher's Journal, the first of which obviously references the Cabinet shift against French which Robertson told Haig had come about by mid-October. I quote them at some length because what is crystal clear from them is that - as it had to be - French's removal was a political decision, taken after both the government and the King had sought the views of the army and corps commanders - most of whom frankly responded that it was past time for French to go. J. P. Harris cites this volume of Esher's Journals, so ought to be aware of their significance and the fact that they totally undermine his Haig "conspiracy" and "mutiny" theories:

(From Esher's Journal, GHQ, 14 November 1915)

When I got back to Blendecques, I found Henry Wilson by Sir John's (French) bedside. He too had heard rumours about the intentions of the government with regard to Sir John, and from a good authority. [.......] No changes have reached Paris. In no letter that I have received is there even a whisper

(From Esher's Journal, London, 23 November 1915)

In consequence of two urgent telegrams from Mr Asquith I left Paris yesterday and came to London.

I saw the Prime Minister at the War Office at five. He said that the Government have come to the conclusion that a change must be made in the Supreme Command on the Western Front. He expressed very friendly sentiments towards Sir John personally, but said that very reluctantly and after long and patient consideration he was driven to the conclusion that Sir John was physically not equal to the work before him; his health had been deteriorating, and he was constantly being laid up, which was undesireable in a Commander in the Field. Finally that recent events had shown a change was desireable.

I asked if this last remark referred to the Battle of Loos, and he replied that in part it did, but not altogether. He had made most careful enquiries, had interviewed a great number of officers, and everything he had heard only went to confirm his opinion. I remarked that, while not questioning his conclusions, I could only say in regard to the Battle of Loos that the responsibility for such a failure as may have occurred was an arguable proposition and would remain so for all time. He replied that Sir John seemed of late to be unable to rise to the height which the situation demanded, and that he had asked me to come over in order that I might, as an old personal friend, after hearing his views, return and break to Sir John the conclusions at which he had arrived. He was anxious to make everything as smooth for the Field Marshal as possible. He suggested that in Sir John's own interest he should take the initiative and tender his resignation on the ground of age and fatigue. [..........] I said to him that he had imposed a very disagreeable task on me, but I would think over the matter and see him again on the morrow. So this, I fear, is the end. I am sure, from his demeanour and his word, that the Prime Minister - whose kindness of heart is unquestioned - has come to this resolve after much perturbation of mind. [..........] If the time, the set, is come; if the little Field Marshal must pass from this turbulent scene into tranquil life, hoping for nothing again, I pray for the illumination of his spirit when the blow falls. But it is damnable to have to deliver it, and friendship has its curse as well as its blessing.

(From Esher's Journal, London, 24 November, 1915)

Again at five o'clock today I saw the Prime Minister at the War Office. This time at my request. I had written and took with me the following letter:

"MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I want to be quite clear upon one point. I assume that your decision is final, and not conditional. The method of dealing with this difficult matter depends, as you of course will see, upon your answer."

The Prime Minister walked up and down the room twice after reading this letter, and then said: "Yes, you must take it that the decision is final." I said: "Very well, I will leave for France tomorrow morning." This was all that passed. I then left the room. It was necessary to get this answer clearly from Mr Asquith, as I have no intention of being used as an instrument to manoeuvre Sir John out of his command.

(From Esher's Journal, Blendecques, 25 November 1915)

Crossed to France, and went straight up to G.H.Q. The Field Marshal had been inspecting troops all day, and arrived late at G.H.Q. Directly I told him exactly what had occurred in the plainest language.

It is on an occasion like this that his perect simplicity of character is so attractive and moving. He said at once that he could conceive of nothing that he had done to provoke Asquith to remove him from his command. [...............] After dinner, the Field Marshal sent for Brinsley Fitzgerald. I had to tell the story again. By this time the Field Marshal had reacted and his mood had changed. He was keen to show a fight, to dare the Government to turn him out and do their worst. There was nothing to be done except to give him time to calm down, and to point out all the obvious difficulties in fighting so intangible a thing as a Coalition Government, and the hopelessness of such a contest.

Napoleon knew that he could never survive as the servant of the state, but only as its master.

And the wording of the account of a conversation (below) between Robertson and Esher rather refutes Harris's notion that Haig and Robertson felt they would automatically get to carve up the posts of CIGS and C-in-C between them - they are the likely candidates, but the appointments were in the gift of the Coalition Government - tellingly Esher writes of "If [Robertson] goes to London as Chief of the Imperial General Staff......"

(From Esher's Journal, GHQ, 26 November, 1915)

[...............]In the evening the Field Marshal [French] left.

After dinner I went with Robertson to his private room. Sir John, of course, had told him the whole story this afternoon. Robertson sees perfectly well that the future command of the army rests either with Douglas Haig or himself. He knows, also, that the proper conduct of the campaign, which now embraces the whole world, requires the presence in London of a strong Chief of the Staff.

Robertson's antecedents, his extraordinary career, and his love for the army, very naturally incline him to wish for its command. But his cool judgement and his true appreciation of our military necessities lead him to the correct conclusion that his place is at the War Office. He said to me that it would be a great sorrow to have to quit this army in the Field, which, as Quarter-Master General and Chief of the General Staff, he had done so much to create. It is impossible to talk with this man and not appreciate his fine, disinterested outlook. He may think of himself, as we all do; but primarily he sees the peril of his country and casts about for safeguards. That he would subordinate his desires and personal advantage to his duty I feel confident. If he goes to London as Chief of the Imperial General Staff it will not be from inclination, but because, weighing all the chances of the war, he feels convinced that it is a sphere where his powers will be best utilised for the winning of it. The rugged virtue of the man must be obvious to anyone upon a very short acquaintance.

What Harris has really missed, however, is the letter contained in Vol. IV of Esher's published Journals - though as Harris only cites Vol. III in his bibliography that's hardly surprising. This letter, written a year after French's fall, is to Lord Stamfordham, George V's Private Secretary. In it, Esher explicitly refutes French's suspicions that Haig had been the motive force in his ousting, and at the same time Esher invokes Stamfordham's knowledge of the truth of this:

PARIS, December 3rd 1916

[To Lord Stamfordham]

Your diagnosis of the little Field Marshal [French] is quite accurate. He is not an intriguer, but just a passionate little man with, as you say, hot temper and uncontrolled feelings. Anyone can work him up into a sort of mad suspicion, so that he falls an easy prey to the people about him. It was impossible to get him to see D.H. [Haig] or accept an invitation to visit our lines. He was angry with me because I tried to soothe his lacerated feelings, lacerated by his own vain imagining, as the idea incrusted in his mind that D.H. ousted him from his command is, as you well know, false. However, his talk with the King did him the world of good. These personalities are terrible in a crisis such as that through which we are passing. I have suffered much from them myself. The only thing to do is to shut one's ears and go on doing one's duty according to one's lights.

Finally, I recently came across an original manuscript letter from Esher to Haig stuck into the bound typescript copy of Haig's diary at the NLS (many such original documents are pasted into the typescript diaries held at the NLS). It is dated 27 December 1915 - 8 days after Haig took command of the BEF. It has, so far as I can ascertain, never been published before, not even in the published edition of Esher's Journals. The key passage is the third paragraph, where it is clear from what Esher writes that Haig is unaware of the full story of how Robertson got the appointment as CIGS which Haig had advocated - "some day I will tell you the details of a very curious story." Esher had, since being impressed with Haig at a meeting in November 1915, in turn advocated Haig for C-in-C, and his delight in the fact that the men who in his view were best qualified for the jobs of CIGS and C-in-C had actually ended up in those roles is palpable. As far as Esher was concerned, it was the ideal outcome for the country, but not one which, to judge from the way he writes, he'd thought was absolutely inevitable. Here's the letter:

Roman Camp

Callander

27 December 1915

My Dear Douglas,

Day dreams - having their origins long long ago - have come true, and I pray that the fates may be propitious, and guide you to victory.

If human skill and profound attention to military studies avail anything in a damnable war such as this, our armies, in your hands, should dominate the situation before many months are passed. I think of you with constant affection and regard, as you will know.

Everything we discussed, when last we spoke, as regards old Robertson etc. has materialised. Some day I will tell you the details of a very curious story.

I now want to know this: Writing - as I am - a sort of intimate history of the war, which may be both readable and helpful hereafter - when more eminent hands undertake the task - will you give me the same facilities I have hitherto enjoyed, of coming to G.H.Q. from time to time and going about unmolested, with the greater privilege of talking to you at odd moments? Be frank about this! Refuse if you think it an intolerable bore!

I am here for a week or two of rest, before returning to France.

As regards any difficult "liaisa" both between you and the French whom I know very well, always contact me.

I can never forget our talks on a certain hill in Buckinghamshre, from which date many things.

Bless you, dear Douglas, and all good fortune attend you.

Yours Ever,

Esher

Remember that Maurice is A.P. and many other things in Paris and that - at a pinch - you will find him devoted and useful.

I have tried to show that Harris's crude portrayal of a "conspiratorial" "plot" amounting to "mutiny" hatched by Haig and Robertson to seize the positions of CIGS and C-in-C is, to say the very least, built upon very shaky ground, which foundation is undermined even more by his careless use of sources or through a demonstrable misinterpretation of them. I would argue that these are faults which are found throughout this book. Throughout the book, too, Harris repeats G. J. De Groot's practice of prefacing or appending every unavoidable mention of a Haig achievement with a personal opinion designed to denigrate or diminish it. I may return to some of the more blatant examples of this at some point, but enough for now I think!

© GAC 2009. This post is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproducion of any part may take place without the written permission of the author.

[sjustice]

Intriguers! as, no doubt, l'eminence gris would have cried! He would have been thoroughly enjoying all the exchanges.

George. Thank you for your time in compiling such a thoughtful and rigorous part-review.

Your message is as loud and clear as your skill is in evidence. Bravo.

I am moved to think of the late John Terraine and 'To Win A War', also built on secondary sources. Terraine's knack for synthesis allied with his analytical skill, nose for the truth and a fair deal saw him through.

Did I hear Mr. Harris was in the building?

Kind Regards,

Simon

[George Armstrong Custer]

Did I hear Mr. Harris was in the builing?

If he is, he's apparently got nothing to say.

[PMHart]

Hi chums,

I'm not surprised he's got nothing to say - he should be utterly ashamed of himself. Still he can console himself with the 'prestigious' Templer prize awarded by his peers! My review for Amazon (as below) was pretty succinct but I think George's fantastic demolition job has exposed the book for what it is - a biased ha(i)giography. Now all together - just because a book says it is academic doesn't mean it is! And please don't buy it to 'see what the fuss is about'. Either wait till it is remaindered or get it from the library. Best of all just ignore this worthless tosh....

Pete

This depressing book is truly dreadful. It pretends to be 'academic' and 'fair' but is neither. The author is relentlessly biased against Haig and uses every form of 'weasel' words to attack him at every point of the narrative culminating in the statement that Haig 'apparently' died from a heart attack. Just out of interest note that Lady Haig wrote, "He died from the first attack of angina ...... His heart was in a very bad state, due, I am told to the constant and prolonged strain of what he came through during the war." A less negative biographer Gary Mead wrote, "A post-mortem examination revealed Haig had suffered a massive heart attack; there was no inquest." And so it goes on. Every Haig achievement is either undermined or totally discounted as a matter of course. The book even at crucial points 'imagines' what Haig 'might' have been thinking in the absence of any real evidence - it really is truly awful!! Harris clearly simply doesn't understand or 'get' the Great War. Ignore prestigious sounding 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch your back' awards/reviews; indeed avoid this book like the plague. So the wait goes on for a fair modern military biography examining Haig's career by someone with a thorough understanding of the strategy and tactics of the war.

[SiegeGunner]

My review for Amazon (as below) was pretty succinct

Your review does not appear to be on Amazon now: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Douglas-First-Camb...8196&sr=1-1

[PMHart]

Hi Mick,

There seems to be a gap between submission and appearance! But that's what I wrote! See you Thursday I hope!

Pete

[SiegeGunner]

There seems to be a gap between submission and appearance! But that's what I wrote! See you Thursday I hope!

The technical term for such a gap is 'oblivion'. Yes, looking forward to Thursday.

Mick