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Remembered Today:

Douglas Haig and the First World War


George Armstrong Custer

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I only received this book this morning, so this is obviously more in the nature of an alert to its existence than a review, which I will come back with when I've gone through its 652 pages.

A quick read of the Introduction, the index and the jacket reviews reveals, however, that this is not in the nature of the badly-needed update of John Terraine's 1963 dissection of Haig's performance as C-in-C of the BEF in the Great War. All that this book would appear to share with Terraine is that it is not intended as a full biography of Haig's life, but rather as a military history of him as a Great War commander. Consequently the summations of Haig's early and later life are cursory and unenquiring. Terraine gets one mention in the text, and one footnote. In these Harris somewhat grudgingly admits that Terraine won the argument over 'Westerners' and 'Easterners,' and that as a result "Practically all First World War scholars of real substance are "Westerners" now." Despite this, Harris by no means goes on to endorse Terraine's view of Haig as one of Britain's great military commanders - something he makes clear in footnote #3 to his Introduction, where he also expresses what seems to be astonishment at Walter Reid's "wholehearted endorsement of Haig's contribution to the British war-effort 1914-1918" in the latter's Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig, which was published in 2006.

Harris sees his own book in the following terms: ""What follows is neither a polemic in attack upon, nor a defence of, Haig's reputation. Rather it is an attempt at a balanced, judicious consideration of one of the most important figures in British military history." My initial impression, from an informed use of his index this morning, is that Harris in fact goes on to damn Haig with faint praise and that his conclusions are not as dispassionately balanced as his Introduction suggests. Although my final thoughts on this must await a reading of Harris' entire text, this is an initial personal impression which seems to be supported by Paddy Griffith's review on the back cover, which concludes: "His [Harris'] ultimate conclusion is that the anti-Haig camp has very much the right of it, although much of the hysteria attaching to this issue has been lamentably over-done. This, surely, has got to be the long verdict of history." One imagines that the late John Terraine would despair to see such predictions on the long view of history on these issues still being put forward at the 90th anniversary of the Armistice. I imagine, too, that if this is Harris' verdict then some of those whose assistance he mentions in his Acknowledgements will be similarly disappointed - notably Douglas Scott, Haig's grandson.

Every historian likes to bring something new to the table in their work, particularly when working in such a well-trodden furrow as Haig's reputation as a military commander. Harris delineates his own deus ex machina in his critique of Haig's command as follows:

"Perhaps most controversially it is argued that Haig was not the perpetual optimist of legend. In 1914 he went to war full of anxiety about Britain's lack of preparedness and proved a nervous, somewhat battle-shy corps commander in the initial weeks of campaigning. Over-confidence and excessive strategic and operational ambition were, indeed, his besetting sins as commander-inchief in 1916 and 1917. Yet the evident failure of his plans for 1917, combined with his diminishing faith in his allies and a growing fear of Bolshevism had, by the end of that year, made him doubt the realism of pursuing a complete victory. While he was keen to retain his command at almost any price, he became, in the early weeks of 1918, a keen advocate of a compromise peace, apparently prepared to accept terms that would have left the Germans the real winners. His confidence in the Allies' capacity to defeat Germany decisively fluctuated greatly in the course of 1918, but remained somewhat fragile. From mid-October until a few days before the Armistice was signed, at a time when the German army was actually on its last legs, Haig was arguing that Germany must be offered very generous terms if the fighting were to end that year. In these last weeks he was, in effect, playing down the impact and significance of the victories his own army was achieving."

As I read his book I shall be interested in discovering what writings of Haig's Harris selectively deploys in order to make this picture of a pessimistic - almost defeatist, it would seem - picture of Haig advanced in his Introduction a convincing one. This aspect of Harris' new book seems to be a rather more critical expansion upon the note of puzzlement he sounded over what he extrapolated on Haig in October 1918 in his Amiens to the Armistice from ten years ago. In that book Harris wrote "Haig played a crucial role in shaping the events of the Hundred Days. It is difficult to imagine the war coming to an end in 1918 without his influence. By 11 August he had conceived the possibility of terminating hostilities in 1918, being apparently the first senior figure on the Allied side to do so." In this earlier book Harris then goes on to express his puzzlement at Haig's "sudden loss of optimism after 17 October...........," though he concludes that "His [Haig's] unwonted and unwarranted pessimism in late October had no discernable effect on the course of events, but it indicates a lack of the sureness of touch, of that capacity to read a complex military situation clearly, which is one of the hall-marks of a truly great commander. Yet Haig, though no military genius, conducted his last campaign, the greatest in British military history, with a combination of resolution and discretion which few of his contemporaries could have matched."

Whether Haig was or was not a 'military genius,' Harris' emphasis of Haig's "loss of optimism" in October 1918 as being inexplicably "odd" and evidence of a "lack of [] sureness of touch" did not convince Brian Bond in a review he wrote of Amiens to the Armistice: "Harris is puzzled by Haig's sudden loss of optimism in mid-October about the imminence of victory, but this was surely due to reports that enemy resistance was stiffening and might well lead to a prolongation of the war unless moderate armistice terms were offered." I think Harris' apparent expansion of that theory of Haig being prone to pessimism and anxiety from 1914 through to 1918 in his new book will be a difficult case to make convincingly, and that consequently making it a central plank of his book may be a fatal flaw. There are, of course, numerous sources on Haig's optimism at moments of crisis, and some of his sternest critics have used his diaries and letters to nail him for that very 'fault' of over-optimism. So Harris will have his work cut out to convincingly prove his assertion that Haig the optimist was a "legend." All of which makes me look forward to getting to grips with this book over the next couple of weeks. One thing I can say with confidence. Although I almost certainly will not agree with most of Harris' broad conclusions, I know the book will be compiled with scholarly rigour and that it will be an important addition to the Haig historiography and debate. And although my initial impressions are that Harris has become very much more critical of Haig as C-in-C since his book of ten years ago, I am also sure that the latest will be a reasoned - if mistaken - critique as far from the paranoid polemics of Denis Winter's Haig's Command as can be.

Finally, and disappointingly, there's the usual over-used selection of photographs scattered through the text. There's a wealth of photographic material that's never been used - Haig was one of the most photographed people of the war. What a pity, then, that publishers' photographic editors continue the lazy option of using the same over-used pictures from the IWM's vast collection.

Douglas Haig and the First World War, by J. P. Harris. Published by Cambridge University Press (November 2008). 652 pages. ISBN: 978-0521-89802-7. Price: £25.

ciao,

GAC

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Thanks very much for the swift overview, George. I have not seen any advanced publicity for the book.

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Very interesting, thanks. I shall look forward to this book with interest. I have been led to believe that that Harris had some difficulty finding a publisher. But he is as you say a rigourous researcher and should be worth reading.

Regards

David

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Very interesting, thanks. I shall look forward to this book with interest. I have been led to believe that that Harris had some difficulty finding a publisher. But he is as you say a rigourous researcher and should be worth reading.

Regards

David

Yes, that's something Harris indicates in his Acknowledgements, David: "This project might not have seen the light of day had it not been for the support of Professor Hew Strachan of the University of Oxford. Professor Strachan was prepared to consider for the military history series of Cambridge University Press a book that, it's author feared, had become unfeasibly large for publication by the purely commercial presses."

The fact that it's published as part of an academic series by a university press may explain why, as Ian has noted, there's not been a lot of advance publicity. Having said that, at £25 it's remarkably competitively priced for a university press book of such length, and I see Amazon is doing it for £18.99.

ciao,

GAC

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Torygraph

No comment!

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So do we now hate him for not wanting to kill enough men?

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From The Times

November 11, 2008

Field Marshal Douglas Haig would have let Germany win, biography says

Ben Hoyle, Arts Reporter

He is the most pilloried military leader in British history, caricatured as a butcher and a bungler who sent hundreds of thousands of men over the top to their deaths. Now a new biography pins a further damning indictment on Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. Late in the final year of the First World War, it argues, he was pushing for a peace that would have left Germany as the real winner of the war.

According to Dr J. P. Harris, senior lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Haig was not quite the uncaring monster of popular myth but nor was he, as some recent studies have suggested, a clear-sighted and imperturbable leader who should take the credit for Britain’s ultimate victory. Rather, he was a poor battlefield commander who “didn’t have the sort of intellect that could penetrate the fog of war”.

In Douglas Haig and the First World War, published today on the 90th anniversary of the Armistice, Dr Harris argues that Haig’s failings led him to misread the strength of the German armies, counselling aggression when they were strongest in the middle of the war and caution as they weakened spectacularly in its final weeks.

Haig became the leading advocate of a compromise peace in Britain, Dr Harris said yesterday. “He wanted to offer the Germans very, very, easy ceasefire terms in late 1918.” This would apparently have left Germany armed and in possession of its territorial gains in Eastern Europe.

“He seemed to show no realisation of just what a serious defeat for Britain such a peace – which might have left Germany as the hegemonic power on the Continent – would actually be.”

Among the arguments he cited were the weakness of the other Allied armies (the French were “worn out” and the Americans “disorganised”) and the threat of Bolshevism overrunning Germany if the peace terms were seen to be too humiliating. By 1918 Haig was “rather shaken, somewhat confused, subject to mood swings, oscillating in his strategic judgments and, at times, willing to abandon the pursuit of clear-cut decisive victory”.

Haig was a hero in his lifetime. As commander-in-chief, he presided over the greatest run of victories ever achieved by the British Army in the run-up to the Armistice and in later years he helped to set up the British Legion. More people turned out for his state funeral in 1928 than lined the streets for Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997. By the 1960s his reputation was in tatters, with John Mills’s portrayal of him in the film Oh! What A Lovely War fixing his image as a buffoon.

The one constant belief has been in Haig’s unswerving pursuit of a final and complete victory. It is also inaccurate, Dr Harris said. In the final month of the war Haig “seemed to lose faith in his ability to conclusively defeat the German armies and thought it was necessary to offer them very moderate ceasefire terms followed by a moderate peace that may indeed have left Germany with many of its ill-gotten gains in Eastern Europe.” Haig did not even expect the Germans to disarm – they would be left with a full complement of weapons, including artillery.

The armistice that the Germans eventually signed amounted almost to unconditional surrender. Seven days later Haig was offered a viscountcy, which he bartered up to an earldom.

Terry Charman, senior historian at the Imperial War Museum, where In Memoriam, an exhibition on the First World War, runs until September, welcomed the new insights. But he added: “We tend to forget that it was the British armies that won the First World War in the field, not the Americans or the French or the Belgians and if we blame Haig for the disasters we must credit him for the victories too.”

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G'day George

The one thing that l can't get over from my perception of Haig was his, seemingly, inability to read the ground or see the obvious?

Here l talk about the mud of flanders, the shell pocked battle ground that Haig was latter surprised to find out could never have supported the assault as planned. (he went riding off after planning talks, rather than ensuring the staff come to grips with the details?)

I tend to believe Haig was carried to some extent by the talent of his Generals and staff, they had learned much by 1917. He to me is an enigma, and l am first to admit l haven't read extensively on Haig, so all l'm doing is posing the questions l have carried in my head.

If Generals like Monash, Rawlinson etc could make worthwhile plans why couldn't Haig?

I don't hold with the notion that as the C-inC all he had to do was waved his hand over the map and say, "make it happen"

Why did he employ the tactics of attrition?

RDC

l can ferret out resources to 'enlighten' me if you point them out.

cheers mate

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dekenai,

Although we're getting away from the most focus of this thread, please enlighten me with the source for your statement "Here l talk about the mud of flanders, the shell pocked battle ground that Haig was latter surprised to find out could never have supported the assault as planned".

Jim

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I'm heartily glad that this book has seen the light of day - yes, I'd heard that it was stuck in development hell (with another publisher) and nearly got spiked. A quick examination of the book, and I declare an interest as I've known its author in a professional capacity for twenty years or so - it's brilliant and will be a new benchmark.

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dekenai,

Although we're getting away from the most focus of this thread, please enlighten me with the source for your statement "Here l talk about the mud of flanders, the shell pocked battle ground that Haig was latter surprised to find out could never have supported the assault as planned".

Jim

Jim

I will get something out when l get home

rdc

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g'day Jim,

a quick reply between jobs.

these are excerpts from Bean.

http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/5/chapters/21.pdf

http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/5/chapters/22.pdf

I have other books at home, but none too flattering, and none solely on Haig.

Haig always wanted the cavalry ready , being a Cav man. but at 3rd Ypres?! even if it didn't rain it was fanciful.

Haig seemed to want to act quickly in case he lost the initiative from the Germans? but what were they going to do?

No one stood to Haig to have him reconsider. They suggested, but l guess they didn't want the sack?

Yes, the battle was 'won' and objectives taken , but the cost? --and this is what l query about Haig. Again the fighting man did an unbelievable job, and suffered for it.

His staff went to the front, and commiserated with the frontline commanders, but l can't recall reading anything about him tripping up there himself. I will stand corrected if need be. Men had to die to win the war, but attrition?

I am not holding court here, l am asking questions.

cheers

RDC

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My copy is on the way from Amazon - looking forward to reading it.

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..................

The one thing that l can't get over from my perception of Haig was his, seemingly, inability to read the ground

cheers mate

.........................

It wasn't Haig's job to read the ground. That was for the lower ranking commanders. He designated units and resources and gave them a task. It was their job to work out the best way to carry out that task with the available resources. If they thought the task impossible, it was their duty to say so.

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It wasn't Haig's job to read the ground. That was for the lower ranking commanders. He designated units and resources and gave them a task. It was their job to work out the best way to carry out that task with the available resources. If they thought the task impossible, it was their duty to say so.

Couldn't disagree more. If not 'read' then certainy understand, otherwise he could have equally run the war from London.

It was the firstly Kiggells job to ensure that the staff appreciation was accurate and Haigs job to know the facts. From this the unit and sub-unit commanders can make their plans. One of the first things in a staff appreciation is the ground you're fighting over, and the ground the enemy commands.

Again a C-in-C doesn't just wave his hand over the map and say, "go at it boys!"

There is evidence that his Commanders protested the plan, but Haig pushed this aside.

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The CiC decides the strategic aims for the coming year. With the aid of his staff, he apportions the different tasks to the relevant forces. The tasks are broken up at each level and handed out, all the way down the chain until eventually lowly subalterns are tasked with their missions. Each level is given a job and a certain amount of resources and it is their job to decide how best to accomplish their task. You may not like it, but that is how it was done. Not even a senior NCO will be told how to do his job. He has been trained, he will have been given all the information available then he delegates the different duties. The men will be well aware of the ground they have to cover, where the hot spots are and what to do about them. It is not Haig's job to go around pointing out mud holes or telling them where the MGs are. He has planned to capture Bapaume or Passchendaele because that is, in his estimation, the strategy which will lead to victory in the war and he has handed the job to Rawlinson or Gough. It doesn't matter whether the ground is easy or hard, wet or dry. He plans 8 or 9 months ahead of time. He doesn't know what the weather will be like nor does he care. He allots tasks because they are strategically necessary. He trusts his subordinates to do what needs to be done in the best possible manner.

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" It is not Haig's job to go around pointing out mud holes or telling them where the MGs are".

Tom,

neither was l suggesting this if you re-read my post.

and the flexibilities built into the plan, like if it rains, (as is does in Autumn in Flanders) what options are attached to the strategy?

and a for having the cavalry ready to exploit?--what?

A grand strategy is pointless if it remains the 'be all and end all'.

Bean writes;

The charge against Haig’s plan and conduct of operations

is, not that they were ineffective-his strongest critics admit

that they had considerable result-but that they were

enormously expensive.

If he had pushed on in July as Plumer wanted, or even waited until the 10-13th Oct, but it seems again inflexibility of grand strategy won.

Plumer could plan. When Gough had doubts he was replaced by Plumer

Again Bean;

Birdwood, who knew that his troops were almost exhausted, hoped for post-

ponement; but, as his corps had but a slight task on the flank

of II Anzac, whose commander was for attacking, he did not

care to protest.

Drenching rain continued until midnight.

Haig decided to let the assault go forward.

To do so meant abandoning his strategic designs for 1917; not to do

so, was to forgo the sure method that lately had served him

so well. Haig cannot have been unaware that the basic

conditions-careful preparation, protection by the artillery,

and maintenance of the infantry’s f reshness-were possibly,

if not certainly, unobtainable in the mud, especially now that

the speed and depth of the strokes were being increased in

view of the weakening morale of the Germans. All the

commanders would have liked to stop the offensive.

Haig pushed on clinging stubbornly to his 'strategy'. Birdwood simply acquiesced.

Bean;

For advice as to the practicability of attacking, he

looked to the local commanders, in referring to them on

October 7th he expressed his great anxiety “ that there should

be no postponement unless absolutely necessary.”“

Did he spell out exactly what those necessary conditions were? why not

I have quoted Bean because he is all l have to hand until l return home. What l have read to date even Haig's supporters say this was not one of his better judgements, as was Loos and the Somme (again always having the Cavalry to hand in case, which tells me he didn't understand the ground).

Tom, it cost a lot of lives. Chateris was said to have said after viewing the battleground, "I didn't realise the conditions---".

My final point is that unit commanders and sub-unit commanders, as you rightly say, have the job at hand. It is up to them to use 'crash through' tactics, not the C-inC. Attrition, or as Haig put it, 'wearying down' is one way to win a battle, but not the thinking mans way.

regards

Richard

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If, as Bean suggests, all the commanders were in favour of halting the offensive, then they could and should have done so. If Haig had been confronted with even a majority of opinion against fighting on, then he could not have forced them to fight. Haig himself had stopped a battle on the first day because it had achieved nothing but cost heavy casualties and there was no point in fighting on. The men given the task were required to do their best but were not expected to incur casualties uselessly. That was true at every level. You opened the thread by saying you could not understand Haig's inability to read the ground. In the fighting in the Sudan and South Africa, Haig demonstrated uncommon ability in just that area. That was when he was a junior officer, fighting in the field.When he was CiC, it was no longer required of him to read the ground. The responsibility laid on him by the British Government was to lay down strategic aims and to co-operate with the other Allies in order to wage a war.

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A bit of a shot from the hip....in view of the great preponderance of pro Haig history from Terraine through to Sheffield, isn't it time we had a rather more hostile assessment, in order to keep things more interesting? Haig is an enigmatic figure, we can interpret him in a multiplicity of ways. I have found myself automatically coming to his defence for thirty years, and I think it's time for a change!

Phil.

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A bit of a shot from the hip....in view of the great preponderance of pro Haig history from Terraine through to Sheffield, isn't it time we had a rather more hostile assessment, in order to keep things more interesting? Haig is an enigmatic figure, we can interpret him in a multiplicity of ways. I have found myself automatically coming to his defence for thirty years, and I think it's time for a change!

Phil.

hostile or balanced Phil?

Haig certainly was enigmatic. He did have some forethought--organising the Army on 'professional' lines, introduction (with Haldane) of the territorial army, continuance of musketry for Cav Officers, 'freshening' up of Aldershot to name a few. On the other hand he was stuck in the old ways of the Cavalry. Slow to intro MG's & use of acft, inflexibile belief of obedience to orders regardless. His contemporaries called him 'Lucky Haig'. He had the Kings ear and solid contacts that helped him advance.

As for Strategies, thats the job of the secretary of war and the War Office, Kitchener, then DLG in 1916. As for Sudan and Sth Africa in relation to Western Europe, there is a phrase , "Chalk and Cheese".

It will be interesting to see what this new book makes of him. I have only read Gary Mead's book, "The Good Soldier", which he certainly was, but as to C-in-C---?

RDC

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"Lucky Haig" indeed!

Turning to the historiography, do you think that Terraine resued Haig?

In this respect, whether we agree with him or not, I think we have to acknowledge Terraine as pretty superb.

Has there been any other military historian who was made the same impact in the past fifty years?

Phil.

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"Lucky Haig" indeed!

Turning to the historiography, do you think that Terraine resued Haig?

In this respect, whether we agree with him or not, I think we have to acknowledge Terraine as pretty superb.

Has there been any other military historian who was made the same impact in the past fifty years?

Phil.

Apparently John Mosier's work brings forth strong opinions B)

More seriously, perhaps Paddy Griffiths?

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