The Capture of Cambrai, October 9th, 1918

[drjohndraper]

Hi David,

‘any thoughts on accessing the photo of General Draper from the 30s?

[DarrellDuthie]

On 23/08/2018 at 17:28, David Filsell said:

Just a thought. Is it actually evidence that the British really were 'disappointed' that the Canadians had Cambrian or that they were 'forced out, so that the British could take the credit - or were there ostrategic/tactical considerations for the decision - for instance Canadian losses - or judged to have done their bit having, as noted in the first post, suffered high casualty figures . I'm feel pretty sure that I have read no plausible accounts which suggest anything other than praise for Canadian efforts, at Cambrai and elsewhere nor indeed any reasons that their efforts were not fully recognised.

Hi David,

I actually looked into this. I found only some references from accounts written later that Canadian soldiers had groused that Imperial troops had secured the best winter lodgings by moving into Cambrai (the assumption of the average soldier being, even at that stage, that the war would progress into 1919). Other than that I found only the two war diaries from the Canadian battalions in Cambrai. The 5th CMR (the ones who really actually took the city) reported for October 10th the following terse command: "Orders received that we must evacuate CAMBRAI by 10.00 a.m.", at which point the battalion retired to dug-outs and trenches in the vicinity. The reference from the 4th CMR's war diary is, as is quoted earlier: " Well, we had no business taking CAMBRAI. Someone else, presumably the 3rd Army, wanted the city – volunteered to take it - and were very peeved that the canucks were occupying and defending the place. We are ordered to clear out, which we do, and are all clear of the place by 13.30 and on our way to rest billets". I've included an image of it below to give a flavour of the war diary. Most war diaries I've come across tend to be rather sparse and stilted in their descriptions, which makes that of the 4th CMR quite interesting and, in this case, revealing. Barring total fabrication, the tone in both war diaries suggests somebody was peeved. For obvious reasons I don't think this was Byng. It may have been the XVII Corps commander, or one of the divisional commanders, who were indeed to have taken the city, or perhaps it was nothing more than simple hearsay. Regardless, the perception clearly did exist. To my mind, the thought that someone would be annoyed is not entirely strange. After all, as long as men are involved, emotions always play a role. And this was the first major French city to be liberated. I think, for instance, of US General Clark in WWII who chose to "liberate" Rome, against orders, but thereby allowed German forces to escape - his primary goal. Don't forget as well, during the spring offensives, the Canadians were fairly widely derided as being "Foch's pets". As to the extremely hard-fought 1918 Battle for Cambrai, it continued for a couple days a mile or two north of the city, as Canadian and British troops fought to secure the bridgehead on the eastern side of the Canal de L'Escaut. I hope this may help.

 

Regards,

Darrell

 

[David Filsell]

Darrell

Thanks for the detailed reply.

We have really what is a presumption by the highly effective Canadians. I cannot but feel that the orders were not given for the reasons given in the original text since the Canadian and Australian contingents, like the Indians, were components of the British Army and operated under the same overall commander, Earl Haig. (And were considered highly effective well regarded troops - even if they, like the Australians were not considered safe around other units horses and supplies. : )

It would be interesting to go through the chain of war diaries above battalion level to see what they record of the decision to withdraw the Canadians. I simply do not think it feasible to accept - without question - the statements as given as proof of the assertion without further detailed research. I say this not a a Brit, but because I have come across similar accusation of 'glory hunting' an favouritism before at battalion level about brigade decisions, at brigade level about divisional decisions and on up the tree.

Whatever, simply because of the high casualty figures any reasonable commander might well have considered the Canadians had done their bit and it was wiser to replace them. 

 I note again,  this is a battalion diary. What light, I wonder, do Canadian brigade and divisional diaries reveal about the decision. I think another 'proof, essential to accept a, relatively low level, assertion, although, as often I could be wrong.

Regards

David

 

 

Edited 28 August , 2018 by David Filsell

[stiletto_33853]

Not so sure the description of "The Iron Brigade literally took the city" is strictly 100% accurate, or the statement the 5th CMR were the ones that actually took the city is either. Further research would be needed as David says.

 

3rd Army were in Cambrai having approached from the south, still sifting through the appendices of which their are a large amount, see attached 3rd army diary.

 

Andy

Edited 26 August , 2018 by stiletto_33853

[stiletto_33853]

1st Army Diary

[stiletto_33853]

1st Army reports on operations state the Canadians captured the north half of Cambrai, not the entire town. With 3rd Army entering the town from the south.

[David Filsell]

The key word in the 1st Army Diary is "relieved". Although this could imply involvement in actions judged a failure, it seems to me more likely to have meant job done, exhausted, or reduced in number, or, simply, a higher command's judged need or planned circulation of units in  an action to ensure pressure on the enemy was maintained or increased by 'fresh troops'. That tired troops  needed to be brought out of the line. That said one can understand hurt feelings if a formation felt it unnecessary to be pulled out, although published works often indicate nothing but pleasure in being relieved relief from being at the sharp end. It does seem that that they were simply relieved from holding a defensive flank and nothing indicates that it was done to enable British troops to take undeserved credit.

[DarrellDuthie]

I must say I do wonder whether the writer of the 4th CMR war diary came up with a cause-effect relationship that didn't exist. Which is to say somebody might have been "peeved", but that wasn't necessarily the reason for the orders to pull out. In fact, thinking about it, it would seem sort of pointless, anyhow. What happened, happened, and switching troops around a day later wouldn't change anything. As David says, I think the relief is indeed precisely that: both battalions and the entire 3rd Division did move (on the 11th) to Queant for two weeks. What I find interesting is how and why this idea that someone in 3rd Army was peeved came about in the first place. Did someone say something? And who would that be and to whom and when? Or was it is just hearsay, etc., etc. Unless someone's described this in memoirs somewhere, we may never know.

[stiletto_33853]

Maybe the 3rd Army were a little peeved because Cambrai was a tad out of the Corps Boundary, except for the very north suburbs and would probably been regarded as a prize. Who knows?? however the information given regarding taking the city is inaccurate, as you can see from 1st Army reports on operations they captured the north of Cambria only.

[stiletto_33853]

Canadian Corps Orders from 1st Army

 

[DarrellDuthie]

Hi Andrew,

You've gone to a great deal of work and what you've unearthed is extremely interesting.

 

I might just point out however the barrage map was the original plan, which obviously underwent some changes!

 

I thought you might be interested in the following: the Brigade WD for the day in which the actual positions are noted. I added a map to make sense of it all. The Brigade reported being in map squares A 10,11,12,16,17,18. This appears to be what is meant by the north of the city. 

All the best, Darrell

 

 

 

[stiletto_33853]

Hi Darrel,

Thanks, presumably so. There is no doubt that the Canadians were in Cambrai as noted by 1st Army operation reports and the Brigade Diary. I am still not convinced re. the lower echelon diaries through consulting other little snippets in the Army Diaries  and have to agree with David regarding them and some element of glory hunting, not unusual. Seen up to Corps level in many instances, also apportioning blame, objective would have been reached if the blankety division had kept to it's objectives etc. There is just such a volume of orders, reports, build ups etc to wade through, 11 files of 260 odd pages a file for October 1918, just in the one diary, then comparing it to the other Army. The barrage map is in the file for ops on the 8th, but as you say matters change.

Great stuff though.

Edited 27 August , 2018 by stiletto_33853

[Peter Maxfield]

The Nicholson map shows the 8th C.I.B. coming in and crossing Cambrai. 1st and 2nd C.M.R.s up to the edge of town after their heavy losses in the fighting at St. Olle (MacGregor got his V.C., and Lt-Col. G Chalmers Johnston, D.S.O., M.C. called it "the most desperately fought engagement of the war for our battalion."

Pages 457-458 of Nicholson have:

On the Canadian right flank the 4th and 5th C.M.R., leading the 3rd Division's attack, had advanced through Neuville St. Rémy and crossed the canal on partly demolished bridges to enter Cambrai itself. Chief opposition came from spasmodic enemy shelling, and except for small German rearguards the Canadians found the city deserted . . . General Loomis made a formal entry into Cambrai at 11:00 a.m., and by midday the 3rd Division had established a line of posts along the eastern outskirts. In the evening troops of the 24th British Division moving up from the south joined hands with the 2nd Division. The 3rd Division's front was pinched out, allowing its units to retire for a rest well-deserved after twelve days of continuous fighting.

 

 

[KernelPanic]

A fascinating thread!

[Peter Maxfield]

A little quote from: 'Nova Scotia's Part in the Great War,' by Various, Edited by M. S. Hunt, Chapter 2 at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/64101/64101-h/64101-h.htm 

The "Company" quoted, by context, seems to be "D" Coy of the 5th C.M.R. (At the reorganisation for 1st January, 1916 - “A” and “C” Squadrons, 6th C.M.R. Regiment were formed into “D” Company of the 5th C.M.R. Battalion).

Quote

The next fight was for Cambrai, which as far as this Company was concerned consisted of a hunt for Germans through the ruins, collecting souvenirs by the way. The Company had a brush with the Bosche on the other side of the town, but they were merely scouts left behind and pulled out as soon as fired upon. The Company was sitting down having dinner when the English troops came through. As there had been no barrage they did not know that the town had been taken. From here the Company went to Valenciennes and then on to Mons. 

 

[Peter Maxfield]

A rather good account by Captain S.G. Bennett M.C., R.E., in his: 'The 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles, 1914 - 1919' Pages 139 - 140.

     On October 8th the Battalion was told the plan of attack for the 9th. The Third Army was attackıng south of Cambrai and if they were successful the 2nd Canadian Division on the north of Cambrai was to cross the canal, hold the bridge-heads and join with the Third Army east of Cambrai. The Second Division was not to advance until the Third Army had gained the high ground in the neighbourhood of Awoingt. The 8th Brigade was to co-operate with the 2nd Division attack on the right flank, the 4th C.M.R. to advance to the Canal, clean up a few strong posts and secure the bridge-heads across the Canal. If the Second Division and 8th Brigade were successful the remainder of the Third Division was to follow and secure the town and the ground to the east until new bridges could be constructed.

     The Battalion was Iying to the immediate north-west of Cambrai with the Canal between - a formidable obstacle, with steep banks and considerable water. The Engineers were to move up pontoon bridges, tubular trestle bridges, ladders, and plank and cork floats to cross the canal. The attack was to take place on the 9th at 0130, or 1.30 a m. (The continental manner of expressing the time was adopted throughout the Army on October 1st). It was an unusual hour to attack, but it was a clear cool autumn night and the refections from fires burning in Cambrai lighted the sky.
     The attacks of the Second Division and the Third Army were so successful that there is nothing to narrate beyond the fact that the German defence snapped and the reaction to the tension of the last ten days meant a sudden burst into the territory beyond Cambrai. At 1.30 a.m. "C" Company attacked and within an hour all objectives were reached. At daybreak the Battalion crossed the Canal, passed through the city and by 8.00 a.m. was established on the eastern outskirts of Cambrai, in touch with the 5th C.M.R. on the right and the 26th Battalion on the left. There were no casualties during the attack and the only serious opposition was met while crossing the Canal.
     The Battalion who were the first in Cambrai saw how a city could look after occupation by the Germans. The houses were in a filthy condıtion and on every side were evidences of looting and pillaging. The scenes in Cambrai before it was evacuated can be pictured by the official statement of a German prisoner:

Bavarian and Prussian troops recently came to blows over their loot, with the result that one officer and fifteen Prussians were killed. The officer was thrown from the third floor of a house and broke his neck.

 

Some extracts from a German order of the 187th Infantry Regiment dated September 21st, 1918, throw an interesting light on the mentality of the German soldier at this time:

The morale and disipline of our men has greatly decreased, on account of the elastic-defence tactics leadıng men to believe that the ground is of no value.

The Divisional Intelligence Staff commenting on these orders in a communiqué stated that the decrease in discipline and morale was shown by:

Unnecessary retirements, general conduct of men on leave, riots as in Cambrai when officers joined in the same crimes with the men. People in Germany blamed for writing to soldiers and referring to the war as the "great swindle."

     These statements are significant. They show what was beginning to happen to the interior economy of the German Army. There were still brave Germans fighting in the old patriotic way but undoubtedly from October onward the German Army was not what it had been.
     The Battalion held the positions east of Cambrai during the day and night of the 9th without experiencing counter-attacks or hostile activities, and was then relieved by the Seaforth Highlanders of the Third Army. They retired to the west of Cambrai and "billeted" in the old trench line. The next day they were having a general clean-up when H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, unheralded, looked in on the Battalion. After an informal chat with the officers he went on to visit another unit. The Battalion remained in this area for ten days. lt was here that the Battalion learned of the death of Major-General Lipsett . . . 

Edited 11 October , 2022 by Peter Maxfield