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Remembered Today:

The "machine guns" of Mons ?


i_m_bob

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Oh dear! To think I started this stone rolling. One of the reasons that I normally set my face against getting into discussions about casualties is that they tend to generate more heat than light. Furthermore, the casualty count is only one measure of the outcome of a battle or campaign. Throughout history, for example, some commanders have accepted heavy casualties and tactical defeats during a campaign in order to achieve a higher strategic aim. An obvious pre-Great War and, therefore, I hope, non-controversial one, is Grant's 1864-1865 campaign. In the context of the war as it then stood, Grant decided that the strategic centre of gravity of the Confederacy was the Army of Northern Virginia under Lee. He gathered up his troops, crossed the Rappahannock and suffered an unfavourable outcome, including much higher casualties at the Wilderness, though he knew that he had caused Lee casualties that the latter could not afford. Any one of Grant's predecessors would have turned back north after the Wilderness, but not Grant. He ordered a left hook and very nearly arrived first at Spottsylvania, which could well have finished the war. Instead he took another tactical defeat during the following days, but advanced yet again, being hit hard at the North Anna River and, most notoriously, at Cold Harbor near Richmond. As we know, this attritional method of fighting was expensive to the North, but it spelled disaster for the South and once the siege of Petersberg concluded at Five Forks, all that remained were some skirmishes on the way to Appomattox. The point here is that right up to and including the failure to take Petersberg in one initial rush, the south continually bested Grant tactically and inflicted higher casualties. However, with each successive engagement or battle the Army of Northern Virginia became progressively weaker and the ultimate outcome inevitable once all the railroad links to Richmond were cut. So at any point during the first half of this campaign, who was 'winning' and who was 'losing'?

Turning now to the reliability of my figures. I am not one to state that something is correct beyond doubt, if absolute proof is lacking. I caveat much of my writing, because I dislike the predilection of some historians for the use of unverifiable assertions. In my view they encourage the development and perpetution of myth and I do not wish to be responsible for false ideas gaining currency through repetition. As a result, for the benefit of this discussion, I worked my way through the figures but provided a health warning. It is, however, too large a step for my caution to be written off as though the figures tell us nothing - hence my use of the First Army statistics to show that the long-accepted British view that the German losses at Mons were awe-inspiringly awful is mistaken. (I was going to write 'is a load of baseless ********', but this is a polite thread).

I cleave firmly to the view that the performance of the BEF against the odds in 1914 speaks for itself and requires no enhancement through exaggerated accounts of what they achieved at particular moments. What counts at Mons, for example, is not whether the BEF caused the German army 3,000, 6,000 or 9,000 casualties. The important thing is that at a critical moment of the campaign they imposed a full twenty four hours of delay on the right wing of the German advance. Take a look at p 187 of the magnificent Liaison 1914 by Edward Spears, where he states inter alia 'General Lanrezac's anxiety for his left would have been further increased had he known that but a few hours before von Buelow had ordered von Kluck to direct the IX and III German Corps to the west of Maubeuge, whence they were to carry out an enveloping attack against the left of the Fifth Army. This order was, however, never executed, for these corps had been engaged for some eighteen hours in fighting the British, who had thus saved the French left.'

The question about why the German army did not mop up the BEF during the Retreat from Mons is an interesting one, which I have addressed elsewhere. My opinion is outlined in my introduction to the Le Cateau guidebook, which I offer here as a download.

Le_Cateau_German_Introduction.doc

Finally, thanks to Paul, for that interesting contribution. I do not know where the information about possible cremation came from and I still have not found a German source, which mixes up rifle and machine gun fire, but the search goes on.

Jack

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What an interesting thread this has been to read - and one which demonstrates that answering a question which, on the face of it, might seem simple is in fact often a complex process. If I might add a couple of observations.

Firstly on the issue of British musketry capability in 1914. In A Soldiers Life, John Lee convincingly establishes that General Sir Ian Hamilton in his two year tenure from 1898 as Commandant of the School of Musketry at Hythe, Kent, successfully applied to the British Army his ideas on rifle training which had earlier transformed the Indian Army in that respect. From Hamilton's time a British soldier fired seven times more ammunition on the ranges at Hythe than any conscript in any other European army. Lee concludes: "Every commandant of Hythe between the Boer War and the First World War claimed to have created the astonishing efficiency of the British battalions that poured fifteen aimed rounds a minute into the German formations at Mons and Ypres in 1914. All of them built upon the modernizing revolution of Ian Hamilton." We can accept, then, that long-standing training techniques were behind the undoubted efficiency and superiority in musketry of the BEF in 1914.

Secondly, on the issue of how frank the German accounts were on losses in the immediate post-war period. Salesie has quoted Smith-Dorrien on this: "That the enemy received a very serious blow, and losses far heavier than ours, and gained a wholesome respect for the efficiency of British troops are facts beyond dispute, and the failure of their official accounts to expatiate on the battle is ominously suggestive of their being none too proud of the results." Smith-Dorrien's suggestion of German reticence on this point is one which is endorsed by the British Official Historian, J. E. Edmonds. In a Note added to the original Preface in the 1925 second edition of volume I of Military Operations France and Belgium, 1914, Edmonds writes as follows:

At Xmas 1924 the first two volumes of he German official account of the war were published. They take the narrative of the operations in the Western theatre up to the 27th August, and call for no comment here except as regards the Battle of Le Cateau. Less than seven pages are allotted to this action; and they entirely fail to clear up what happened on the German side; but the endeavours to hide Kluck's defeat are of sufficient interest to summarize.

On the evening of the 25th August Kluck ordered a continuation of the pursuit to the south-west, and soon after 5.30 am on the 26th Marwitz's three cavalry divisions, riding due south, came into collision with the British 4th Division. "Heavy atrillery fire from the neighbourhood of Esnes brought their attack to a stand-still." The report of the cavalry action did not, however, reach Kluck until 11 am, and it ran:- "II Cavalry Corps in very heavy fight with enemy at Solesmes (sic) and La Cateau (sic), and is making progress in places by attacking. Support requested." From this it was deduced that the cavalry had caught and was holding the British, and this erroneous impression was deepened by the receipt soon afterwards of a report from the 2nd Cavalry Division that it had "attacked strong British columns retiring westward (sic)." [There then follows a summarised dissection of the ensuing actions around Le Cateau, before Edmonds says of the German history's account:] As for the three unfortunate cavalry divisions we are told nothing after the 11 am report, except "the Cavalry Corps assembled in the area east of Cambrai, and remained there the rest of the day, without participating any further in the fight, and without taking up pursuit of the British." It is somewhat difficult, therefore, on his own narrative, to agree with the German official historian, that "the result of the Battle of Le Cateau was an unqualified success for the First Army." The losses in gaining the "success" are not mentioned; there is no doubt that they were stupendous.

So, whilst actual figures might be up for debate there is reason to be cautious about how scrupulous the post-war German histories were in admitting casualties and the cost of any successes in the opening weeks of the war.

Thirdly, and leading on from actual casualty figures caused by British musketry in 1914, is the question of whether or not it achieved its purpose regardless of the number of casualties inflicted in doing so. This has already been best answered on this thread I think by posts from Tom McC. and Jack which complement each other: Tom wrote: "It needs to be pointed out [....] that there was no intention of 'defending Mons to the last' or hold ground indefinitely. It was a delaying operation (for 24 hours) to allow the French to sort out their issues. [....] Please don't lose sight of the fact that inflicting non-fatal casualties on the enemy along with making him take cover and unable to manouevre, restrict his freedom of movement and have an impact on morale [is] also achieving the desired effect." Which Jack expands upon as follows: "What counts at Mons, for example, is not whether the BEF caused the German army 3,000, 6,000 or 9,000 casualties. The important thing is that at a critical moment of the campaign they imposed a full twenty four hours of delay on the right wing of the German advance. Take a look at p 187 of the magnificent Liaison 1914 by Edward Spears, where he states inter alia 'General Lanrezac's anxiety for his left would have been further increased had he known that but a few hours before von Buelow had ordered von Kluck to direct the IX and III German Corps to the west of Maubeuge, whence they were to carry out an enveloping attack against the left of the Fifth Army. This order was, however, never executed, for these corps had been engaged for some eighteen hours in fighting the British, who had thus saved the French left.' " Between them Tom and Jack have summed up what is essential about the British performance at Mons - not casualties inflicted, but time bought.

Fourthly is the issue of the origins of the Germans mistaking rifle fire for machine guns. I've seen Edmonds' Official History cited as a source for this. Edmonds is usually quoted out of context, with the following passage cited in isolation: "The Germans imagined that they were everywhere opposed by machine guns only, not realising the intensity of British rapid fire." This has been put forward to support the claim that the Germans couldn't tell the difference between rifle and machine gun fire. Most assume that this means that the Germans couldn't differentiate the sound of rapid rifle fire from machine gun fire. But that is not what Edmonds is saying at all. He is clearly stating that such was the intensity of the British rapid rifle fire that the Germans had difficulty discerning which of the incoming was rifle and which was machine gun in origin. The Germans difficulty in this respect is more believable if we look at what Edmonds says immediately before and after that statement. Before it, he writes (my bold italics) : "[T]he attack upon the bridge of St Ghislain was stopped while three hundred yards distant from the canal by the accurate fire of the West Kents and the machine guns of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, and the half company of the Scottish Borderers, on the left of the bridge, who all alike had excellent targets, and took advantage of them to the full, with little loss to themselves." Then comes the passage about the Germans imagining they were everywhere opposed by machine guns. Following which Edmonds goes on to describe how a German machine gun at a house by the railway bridge of Le Herbieres "was instantly silenced by one of the East Surrey's machine guns."

In other words, nowhere does Edmonds refer to British rapid rifle fire being poured into the Germans unsupported by machine guns - machine guns are always present in support of the musketry. This is a crucial point, I think. The noise of British (and German!) machine guns was present at all times, alongside that of the British rapid rifle fire. Amid this confusion of noise, combined with the astonishing rate of delivery of rifle fire and the physical effects of the incoming volume of shot, it must have been difficult to evaluate what was machine gun in origin and what rifle. Finally, although Edmonds adds a footnote quoting Bloem to the end of the passage on the Germans imagining that they were facing massed machine guns, he cites it only as a "full and dramatic account of the attack of the Brandenburg Grenadier Regiment." In other words, Edmonds does not suggest Bloem as a source of the Germans thinking that there were more British machine guns than there were, but merely as a witness to how his unit was "shot down [and] smashed up" by the intensity of the combined British rifle and machine gun fire upon them.

In conclusion, then, it seems that the origin of the myth that the Germans mistook British rapid rifle fire alone for machine gun fire is based upon a misreading of what Edmonds says in volume I of the Official History. In fact Edmonds nowhere refers to British rifle fire alone without also mentioning supporting machine gun fire. Neither does Edmonds state explicitly or implicitly that the German miscalculation of the amount of British machine guns was based on the sound of the British rapid rifle fire. Instead he quite clearly bases the alleged German miscalculation of the amount of British machine guns being deployed upon the intensity of fire coming from the combined British rapid rifle fire and machine guns. This, to me, seems quite plausible - particularly as the German troops being subjected to that volume of incoming were not battle tested. And ultimately, of course, it was the shock of that fire upon them - regardless of actual numbers killed - which halted the Germans and achieved the British purpose of holding for 24 hours.

ciao,

GAC

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I have nothing to add to that post of George's except to confirm that as the Good Looking Tom said earler, Bloem consistently distinguishes between rifle and machinegun fire. At one point he complains about coming under enfilading fire from a British MG. I had a look at an English translation of von Kluck's, " The March on Paris". It is annotated post war (1919). Von Kluck is very sketchy in his ideas of the positions of the forces engaged around the Battles of Mons and Le Cateau. Whether this reflects original fog of war or a fudge on his part to defend his actions, I will not hazard an opinion. If this was typical of the sources used by the German O.H. they definitely need treating with caution.

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I enjoyed reading your introduction to the Le Cateau Guidebook, Jack. But would make two points:

Firstly, it seems to be written purely from a German point of view i.e. it tells us what you believe Von Kluck did wrong but nothing of what Smith-Dorrien may have done right. As such, it is perhaps out of focus - for example, did none of Smith-Dorrien's actions create any of Von Kluck's errors? Was there no action-reaction going on?

Secondly, unreliable intelligence, brought about by a lack of modern communications, was a major headache for both sides in 1914. Consequently, is it fair to give such importance to this facet - could your heavy emphasis on poor German intelligence not be seen as making excuses for Von Kluck? After all, Smith-Dorrien had exactly the same problems with intelligence, as did every other commander in those days, whether German, French or British.

Overall, I get the impression when reading your introduction to the Le Cateau Guidebook that you believe in luck; that Von Kluck was unlucky and, therefore, his bad-luck "allowed" Smith-Dorrien to get extremely lucky. I, on the other hand, don't believe in luck - I ascribe to the principal espoused by the famous golfer, who, after winning a major tournament, responded to a shout from the crowd of, "You were bloody lucky", with the words, "Yes, and funnily enough, the more I practice the luckier I get!"

Consequently, I believe that you may do Smith-Dorrien and his II Corps a great disservice by only mentioning their actions at Le Cateau as being down to pure luck. I hope and trust that the piece you posted for download is but one part of a larger piece of work, giving both points of view?

Cheers-salesie.

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Salesie

Just a quick response, rather than a considered reply to your thoughts. This guidebook is a combined effort. My introduction was considering the German position; Nigel wrote the British one. Your point about lucky/unlucky is a misreading of what I said. I do not consider Kluck to have been unlucky, but I do think that it was lucky for Smith Dorrien that large-scale incompetence within the German First Army, especially within the intelligence organisation, meant that Kluck was quite unable to deploy his overwhelming strength against the British II Corps, encircle it and wipe it out, as he ought to have been able to do. Some commentators described S-D's standing against the German advance, imposing a check and extracting his corps in contact in broad daylight as nothing short of miraculous. As I wrote, Fortune favours the Brave.

Jack

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Salesie

Just a quick response, rather than a considered reply to your thoughts. This guidebook is a combined effort. My introduction was considering the German position; Nigel wrote the British one. Your point about lucky/unlucky is a misreading of what I said. I do not consider Kluck to have been unlucky, but I do think that it was lucky for Smith Dorrien that large-scale incompetence within the German First Army, especially within the intelligence organisation, meant that Kluck was quite unable to deploy his overwhelming strength against the British II Corps, encircle it and wipe it out, as he ought to have been able to do. Some commentators described S-D's standing against the German advance, imposing a check and extracting his corps in contact in broad daylight as nothing short of miraculous. As I wrote, Fortune favours the Brave.

Jack

Thanks for the quick reply, Jack - but, as I said, I don't believe in luck. Von Kluck's First Army's incompetence didn't make Smith-Dorrien lucky, it made him a better General. Otherwise, if he'd allowed such incompetence to permeate his II Corps then the luck would have evened out wouldn't it? Incompetence has nothing at all to do with luck, but it does have a lot to do with skill.

Of course, this is the main problem with one-sided points of view. You looked at E= and Nigel looked at =MC2, and the relativity, the action-reaction, was completely missed, and when it's missed in this way people tend to turn to luck (or blind faith) when trying to explain miracles.

Cheers-salesie.

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I believe bloem wrote more of this in the magazine "Die Wocke" in 1916 here he remarks upon the deadly machine-gun fire of the english ! qoute "we were only exposed to machine guns,but there were many,which shot execellently and were absolutely invisible "

relating to the fighting near the village of tertre,

fact is both machine guns of the 1st west kents were left over the canal and it was the rifle fire of A company 1/rwk that inflicked the damage upon the 12th brandenberg grenadier regt,

I have a full account of the regiments accounts of the encounter if any one wants them,

regards Nigel.

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Very interesting thread, all parties please keep posting!

Surely the sound of a machine-gun (consistent and regularly spaced firing) is distinguishable from that of massed small-arms fire (er - which would be displayed along a Poisson distribution ratio, i.e. ragged and inconsistent firing to any oneavesdropper?)?

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Salesie,

It looks like the Germans possibly had the edge with communications too, considering J F Lucy's comments concerning German field telephone cable:

There's a Devil in the Drum. Counter-Offensive on the Marne, page 161:

"The following day the advance continued and we went again into reserve, keeping some distance behind the forward troops, who this day met with resistance. We heard gun-fire ahead as we dropped into the valley of the Marne, and signs of war and death soon reappeared. Dead Highlanders were seen lying in the fields and on the roadside. Thin, black-japanned German cable ran in all directions across country. If this wire was successful in use, the Germans were ahead of us in signalling. It was so light that one man could carry miles of it."

Hope this is of interest

Aye

Tom McC

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...Thin, black-japanned German cable ran in all directions across country...

It seems the Germans were pretty good at getting their wires crossed, Tom.

Cheers-salesie.

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Now that I have a day of "rest", I'd like to take a closer look at the field-intelligence side of things, and how, especially in those days, the fog of war applied equally to both sides. From Smith-Dorrien's, Memories of forty-eight Years Service, chapter twenty-four.

Firstly, Mons: ...As to the fog of war, we certainly had no idea that such large forces were against us - the German account gives three and a half Divisions against our 3rd Division and two and a half against our 5th - whereas the Germans had no idea of our whereabouts or our strength. In his orders for the 23rd, so our Official History tells us, all the German Commander, General Von Kluck, could tell his troops was that he knew of a British Squadron of Cavalry near Mons, and that a British aeroplane had been shot down. The Germans do not appear to have known where we had landed, or that we were actually in the line of battle...

At Mons, both sides were ignorant of each others strength and relative disposition. The BEF was caught by surprise, through lack of reliable intelligence, as much as Von Kluck was.

Secondly, Le Cateau: "It will be difficult for any reader to realise the fog of war which surrounded us that night. Communication was most difficult, and although the Corps signallers, under that most resourceful of men, Major A. B. R. Hildebrand, R.E. (now Brigadier-General, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.), performed miracles with their wires and cables, it was impossible to find out the positions of units until hours after they reached them. Then it was not as if I only had the II Corps to deal with, for mixed up with them, fighting and retiring together, were the Cavalry Division, the 19th Infantry Brigade, and the 4th Division, none of which were under me, but were reporting their movements to and getting their orders from General Head-quarters, twenty-six miles to the rear...…

...However, some of the fog was cleared away by the arrival of General Allenby, accompanied by his G.S.O.I, Colonel J. Vaughan (now Major-General, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.) at my head-quarters at 2 a.m. Allenby told me his troops were much scattered, two and a half brigades being about Catillon, five miles east, and the other one and a half brigades at Viesly, six miles north-west of Le Cateau, that his men and horses were pretty well played out, and that he could not get into touch with General Head-quarters. He wanted to know what I was going to do, saying that unless I could move at once and get away in the dark, the enemy were so close that I should be forced to fight at daylight. I then sent for Major-General Hubert Hamilton, the Commander of the 3rd Division, whose head-quarters were close by, and asked him whether his troops could move off at once or at any rate before daylight, and his reply was very definite that the 3rd Division could not move before 9 a.m. The 5th Division were if possible in a worse plight, being more scattered, whilst of the 4th Division, which, though not under me, I could not possibly leave in the lurch, there was no news, except that they had last been seen after dark still in their positions south of Solesmes, covering the retirement of masses of transport and fugitives jammed up in the roads.

The following arguments passed through my mind:

a: It must be a long time after daylight before the whole force covered by rear-guards can get on the move.

b: The enemy are in force close to our billets (for such Allenby had impressed on me).

c: To turn our backs on them in broad daylight with worn-out men suffering from sore feet will leave us a prey to hostile cavalry supported by infantry in motors.

d: The roads are encumbered with military transport and civilian fugitives and carts, some still on the enemy side of our position, and time to allow them to clear off is essential.

e: The I Corps is reported to be engaged some miles northeast of us and to retire would expose their flank to the full brunt of Von Kluck's troops.

f: The Cavalry Division can be of little help in covering our retreat, for this Allenby had told me.

g: Our infantry have proved their staunchness and astounding accuracy with the rifle, our gunners are a marvel, and if Allenby and Snow will act under me, and Sordet will guard my west flank, we should be successful in giving the enemy a stopping blow, under cover of which we could retire.

Well do I remember the dead silence in the little room at Bertry when I was rapidly considering these points and the sigh of relief when, on my asking Allenby if he would accept orders from me, and he replied in the affirmative, I remarked : " Very well, gentlemen, we will fight, and I will ask General Snow to act under me as well." The die was cast...…

...Having decided to fight, there was a good deal for my Staff to do. General Head-quarters had to be informed, a message had to be sent to General Sordet to tell him and ask him to guard my west flank, and Snow had to be asked if he would fight under me, and last, but not least, carefully detailed orders for the battle had to be drawn up and circulated. Forestier-Walker, who was a very clear thinker and rapid worker, soon got all this done. To make certain that General Sordet should get the request, in addition to my message to him, a wire was sent to General Headquarters asking them too to invoke his assistance...…

...Thus ended the first and principal phase of the retreat. I might be expected to discuss whether the Battle of Le Cateau was worth the candle - with its heavy losses. The latter were :

Cavalry . . . . . 15

3rd Division . . .. 1,796

5th Division . . .. 2,366

4th Division . . . . 3,158

19th Infantry Brigade . . 477

Total . . .. 7,812 and 38 guns.

Of the above 2,600 were taken prisoners, but, whatever the losses, and whatever the results, I think I have shown that, without risking a debacle and jeopardising the-safety of the 4th Division and the I Corps, I had no alternative but to stand and fight. I claim no credit, but on the contrary realise to the full that fortune was on my side, firstly in having such an efficient force so skilfully and devotedly handled and led, and composed of troops so well disciplined and courageous as to be second to none in the world; and secondly in having an enemy who did not rise to the occasion."

Smith-Dorrien does state that fortune (luck) was on his side, but I would argue that he is merely displaying humility. The fog of war enveloped both sides equally, and II Corps was as much off-balance as the German First Army was (as well as being heavily outnumbered by Von Kluck's forces). In such a situation, both sides being equally blinded by the fog of war, is it not the case that Generalship is the deciding factor? Firstly, in ensuring that his forces are up to the task by eradicating as far as possible any incompetence. And, secondly, by his skilful "reading" of a constantly changing situation.

Von Kluck would seem to have fallen short in both these measures of generalship in not "rising to the occasion" - but at least he had the good grace not to put the skilful fighting-retreat down to Smith-Dorrien's good luck - I repeat Von Kluck's own words, "Certainly, he may say that I always had the greatest admiration for the British Expeditionary Force. It was the wonderful kernel of a great Army. I have already said it in my book. The way the retreat was carried out was remarkable. I tried very hard to outflank them, but I could not do so. If I had succeeded the war would have been won."

Was Smith-Dorrien just lucky to get away with it, or did he make his own luck by being the better General of the two?

Cheers-salesie.

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Very interesting thread, all parties please keep posting!

Surely the sound of a machine-gun (consistent and regularly spaced firing) is distinguishable from that of massed small-arms fire (er - which would be displayed along a Poisson distribution ratio, i.e. ragged and inconsistent firing to any oneavesdropper?)?

A single MG could certainly be distinguished from rifle fire but that is not the conditions applying in a firefight with artillery firing shrapnel, MGs and rifles contributing to a tremendous din from all sides. Bloem mentions an MG which enfiladed them from a position in a wood. Next day, his sergeant looked for it and found the sand bagged position where it had been. I have never seen shrapnel being fired but I would think that its effect troops in the open might not be dissimilar to troops being caught in the intersection of the beaten zones of two MGs or subject to a volley from good marksmen. Very difficult to sort out who is being hit by what and from where.

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Wounded: 4,932

KIA and Missing: 2,145 (Of which 1,284 Missing - some of whom turned up later)

Wounded, but not struck off unit strength, 1,051

Jack

Thanks for those statistics, Jack. Here are British casualties for the same period:

Killed : 1,161 ( as against 861 German)

Wounded:3,483( as against 4,932 German)

Missing: 9,765 ( of whom 8,190 were recorded as POWs)

Total : 14,409 = roughly double German loss.

A question: were the 1,051 German slightly wounded you mentioned in addition to the 4,932 tabulated as wounded ? On the assumption that they were included in the initial total, we have some failrly compelling evidence that the BEF got more bloodied than the Germans. Even if the vast majority of the German missing were killed - which I suspect they were - and the overall total of wounded was 6,000 instead of just under 5,000, it would still be irreconcilable with the traditional image of the Mons fighting.

An edit here...those British casualty figures are from the monthly returns as tabulated in the Military Effort.

Phil.

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Salesie

Many thanks for this excellent contribution. I have never seen the extract from Smith Dorrien before and it certainly is thought provoking. Of course he, very reasonably, had to state his case thoroughly after the shabby way he was treated subsequently. I do not think that any open minded student of the battle would take issue with his reasoning or fault his decision to make a stand. You point up and applaud the self-effacing nature of the case he makes. I would go further and say that his decision was one of extraordinary courage. The loneliness of command at that moment must have felt like an immense weight crushing him, yet he was able to take it and be supported magnificently by his reinforced corps. There are not many really big decisions during the careers of most generals but, when they occur, those men really earn their keep.

I have already sketched the litany of unforced errors committed by the German First Army, so I shall not repeat them here. Instead, it may be of interest to see a couple of extracts from Spears' book Liaison 1914, which I commend to everyone interested in this campaign as essential reading. First of all the performance of I Corps at Le Cateau seems to me all the greater, bearing in mind this description (p 208)

'On the evening of the 24th, when the first day of the retreat was over, the British were still a day's march nearer the enemy than the Fifth Army. They had escaped the German tentacles but the men were very tired. Indeed the exhaustion of both British and French was a source of great anxiety. The Germans must have been weary also, but what a difference between the fatigue of the advancing soldier whose feet alone are tired and that of the retreating man, who with aching limbs and eyes gritty with sleeplessness, bears on his shoulders the added weight of a heavy nagging imp sitting on his knapsack and whispering, 'retreat, retreat, retreat.' The endless humiliating drone of that terrible word makes the tired soldier feel the weight of each article of equipment and each round of ammunition as a living hostile thing, conspiring to drag him down into the dust of the road, while pounds of lead seem to be where his heart was and his heavy head droops wearily forward.'

[Regarding Le Cateau pp 235 - 236] The British had established themselves as such formidable fighters that the enemy did not dare to tackle them save with the utmost precaution and only advanced against them with a prudence that sometimes amounted to timidity. Had von Kluck attacked boldly when he found the British, in apparently mad challenge, awaiting the onslaught of his immense force, the overwhelming torrent of his troops must have swept them away. He did not do so, nor did he pursue them when they withdrew. After the battle the men of II Corps were scattered and some of the units were broken up in that terrible and unequal duel, but only by the difficulty of the retreat, not the direct action of the Germans. Only at one point, against the exhausted 5th Division, did the enemy succeed in interfering with the orderly withdrawal of the force. Elsehwere he was unable to make any impression: everywhere his infantry was met by the magnificently directed British arillery fire, the gunners stubbornly standing by the infantry, whilst all over the battlefield small units who had not received the order to retire hung on desperately to their ground, confusing and delaying the enemy's advance. Von Kluck's failure to pursue was again due, as at Mons, to faulty intelligence. He had been assured by his intelligence service that as the British army was based on Calais their lines of communication must run through Lille and Cambrai...He manoeuvred accordingly, that is, he extended his right the more surely to prevent the British from connecting up with their supposed lines of communication farther north. Von Kluck, misled by his intelligence, went on a wild goose chase and meanwhile the British army escaped.'

This post is quite long enough already, so I shall add a couple of other thoughts later.

Jack

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Thanks for that, Jack - I'm tentatively taking your last post to mean that we are in agreement that Smith-Dorrien made his own luck by being the better General of the two. Spears seems to confirm this i.e. German prudence, sometimes amounting to timidity, prevented Von Kluck's forces from sweeping away II Corps. So, would this lack of boldness, brought about by German recognition of the BEF's formidable fighting abilities (according to Spears), have made Von Kluck more willing to accept the flawed intelligence reports and go off on his wild-goose chase in order to cut the BEF's lines of communication, and, thus, starve them on the vine, rather than give battle again?

The German Official History would seem to confirm this i.e. Von Kluck believed he'd tangled with the whole BEF at Le Cateau instead of just the reinforced II Corps. This would seem to show that II Corps punched well above its weight and made Von Kluck's First Army exercise extreme caution when seeking contact with British forces. In other words, instead of maintaining close and costly contact with the retreating forces' "sting in the tail", a course of action which would have shown Von Kluck the precise direction of the BEF's route of march and highlight his flawed intelligence, he sought the perceived "cheaper" option of "starving them on the vine". Consequently, it seems to me that in just three short days the Germans gained a healthy respect for the BEF's fighting abilities; so much so that it affected their commanding-General's decision making. A classic case of action-reaction?

This brings me back to the paradox your casualty figures seem to evoke. If taking such low casualties why did Von Kluck and his First Army develop such a high regard for British skill-at-arms in such short a time span, and thus become so reluctant to give battle?

Cheers-salesie.

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Salesie

I have just been re-reading the Le Cateau section in the German Official History, but I have not seen the reference to von Kluck thinking that he had tangled with the entire BEF. However and bearing in mind that all such histories, regardless of their country of origin, will always put the best gloss on the matters they describe, a few interesting points do emerge.

It attempts, for example, by quoting a radio message from von K to the commander of Higher Cavalry Commander 1 sent early on 26 Aug 14, which ordered him to advance via Valenciennes, cooperate with Higher Cav Commander 2 and set about outflanking the British left wing, to suggest that the opportunity for encirclement was missed, only because Commander HKK1 was already responding to orders he had received from his superiors. I find that so much tosh. The cavalry could have been used in precisely that way, but it would have had to be negotiated at least 24 hours earlier and be followed by redeployment. To suggest that somehow a master stroke could have been pulled out of the hat at the last minute is unconvincing.

The situation on the British right flank went much more in favour of the Germans than either the centre or even more so the British left. This has a lot to do with the fact that one German infantry regiment (72) was pushing into Le Cateau by just after 6.00 am and there was time to develop the start of a distinct deep outflanking movement on the British right prior to the 5th Division withdrawal. The German cavalry never really got to grips with the precise location of the British left. Its mounted units which had been locked in contact against the British centre from early morning withdrew as soon as the German infantry closed up and whole swathes of HKK2, those who were not indulging in minor skirmishing and thus wasting time against weak French cavalry and territorial forces, assembled near Cambrai and contributed nothing further to the day

Here the official historian scented a lost opportunity and dished some criticism: 'The opportunity to strike a decisive blow was not exploited. The Army Commander and his Chief of Staff remained at Headquarters that day, just as they had on 23 August. This meant that, lacking quick and reliable means of communication it was not possible for them to intervene in a timely and decisive way to influence the course of the fighting, in particular [that] on the right flank of the Army.' Possible use of 20/20 hindsight here. Yes they could have gone forward. Maybe they should have done and perhaps they could have gripped the situation - or perhaps not. Command in 1914 often meant choosing somewhere where there was at least a usable telephone system and where your radio station was. Move away from them and the chance to influence events could be rather limited.

There is tacit agreement that the British units which did not receive the order to withdraw and stood and fought on played a significant role in the slow follow up. 'In centre of the battlefield where, despite the overwhelming fire of the German artillery some British troops were still holding out, an assault as evening approached, directed at Audencourt, was unsuccessful. Because 8th Division had made little progress elsewhere, the Corps Commander [Gen Sixt von Arnim], who arrived at Divisional Headquarters at 6.20 pm, ordered the division to go firm in its present positions and to wait until the arrival of IV Res Corps the following morning.'

Despite these various reservations, the verdict is that, 'The result of the Battle of Le Cateau was an indisputable success for First Army'

Back to Le Cateau casualties and the Spears' remarks about respect and what the employment of the mass of First Army might have achieved. I actually think that Spears' thoughts about intelligence failings are more helpful in explaining the events of the day and the slow follow up after Le Cateau. I also think that he underplays the fatigue in the German advancing units. They had been marching long distances for days already and both men and horses were extremely weary. There were major weaknesses in the way the cavalry was organised, equipped and operated and, yes, it was handled in a timid fashion. It is far from clear, however, that the Infantry formations had any particular fear of confronting the British and, although they all express respect for the fieldcraft, marksmanship and tactical awareness of the British troops, these are all post - first contact impressions, because the regiments which bore the brunt at Le Cateau were not those who had suffered the heavy casualties at Mons.

One slight misconception and, therefore unjust, criticism which has come down through the years, is that somehow during the brief period of fighting at Le Cateau, the Germans could have deployed their entire mass against II Corps. Even if the German First Army had been better balanced and deployed than it was when the battle opened, there is absolutely no way that such large forces could have manoeuvred with the rapidity that such remarks suggest - and the same would have been true for any other army in a similar situation. It takes absolutely hours to manoeuvre large formations - especially on foot - even short distances.

This brings me on to casualties. Recent work on the British figures has revised them downwards by about one third. This still means (largely due to the number of PW) that the British losses were at least twice those of the German army at Le Cateau. How come? Very simple, really. Only a small proportion of First Army was actually engaged at Le Cateau. It hardly amounted to more than IV Corps (once it arrived on the scene), some cavalry and their associated concentrated Jaeger battalions and, of those regiments of 7th and 8th Divisions who were actually involved in the fighting, several were engaged for a comparatively short time and still others did not even reach the area until it was all over bar the shouting. If there were not many targets for the II Corps to shoot at, they could not shoot many.

Jack

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This thread continues to engross. But as an aside I don't think that you just cannot dismiss luck - even if it's claimed as a result of practice. Mapoleon seems to have trusted it; the famous remark made when appointing a Marshal "is he lucky" has been widely written-up. And before anyone asks source I admit I have not got one - it just seems to be accepted. But chance, luck, good fortune, call it what you will (practised or divinenly given) is something that I have heard many vererans talk about. Even if it merely offers a shorthand for an unacountable action, reaction or event, luck is out there, and some seem to enjoy its benefits more than others.

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No one can deny that chance plays a part in a battle. A stray shot hits or misses an important target and so on. However, like Salesie( if I read him correctly), I believe that a commander who is often lucky is making his own luck. By being better at his job, fortune favours his endeavours and misfortune does not have the same adverse effect.

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Plus, of course, the more professional and competent the commander the more the chance that he can overcome moments of ill fortune - whereas a stroke of bad luck can finish a less competent commander.

ciao,

GAC

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It was a General not a Marshal, by the time you had got to Napoleonic marshal levels you'd been a general long enough for everybody to know if you were lucky or not.

I'm sure there were generals in all armies in many periods who owed their position in part to have been 'lucky' earlier in their career (Burnside, Hooker Buller and Townsend come to mind) unfortunately for those under their command, history has proven that luck without competence is not a good long term mix on the battlefield. I'm sure that there are also those who despite having competence proved singularly unlucky despite being in reality much more than just competent (going back to the ECW Prince Rupert comes to mind). There will have been some potentially good generals who sank without trace because of a piece of ill fortune early in their military career. Of course there is always the ultimate disaster of the incompetent and unlucky (Santa Anna for example).

However the best Generals are those who can spot and seize on a piece of luck when it happens but also have plenty of contingency plans for when things go pear shaped. In history I'd say that Wellington was very good at both (the former, for example, at Salamanca and the latter at Waterloo where he had a detailed contingency plan for continuing the campaign if he had lost). Napoleon although brilliant at capitalising on luck seems to have been less able to handle the ill fortune that also comes over a long enough period (no contingency plan for failure at Waterloo).

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IIRC and IMHO Napleon didn't expect to have to fight at Waterloo - hence no contigency plan. He had expected to defeat the British and Allied Army at Quatre Bras and the Prussians at Ligny.

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IIRC and IMHO Napleon didn't expect to have to fight at Waterloo - hence no contigency plan. He had expected to defeat the British and Allied Army at Quatre Bras and the Prussians at Ligny.

Same difference - he had no contingency plan for failing to do so

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Here's a description of the Battle of Le Cateau, penned by a participant, written in a letter home some weeks after the battle:

".......it was terrible work as we had to advance through a hail of bullets from rifles & machine guns & through a perfect storm of shrapnel fire. Our men behaved very well, though they were knocked down like ninepins....the whole air seemed full of bullets & bursting shells....we had 8 officers wounded, some very badly, and I should think 200 men killed and wounded..."

The soldier in this case was not German. He was Lt. Bernard Law Montgomery of the 1st Battalion, the Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

Far from endorsing our cherished view of the 1914 BEF as a force distinguished by unique professionalism, Monty, writing his memoirs 40 years after Le Cateau, gave us this account:

"On the early morning of the 26th August 1914, the 10th Brigade to which my battalion belonged was bivouacked in the cornfields near the village of Haucourt after a long night march. One battalion was forward on a hill, covering the remainder of the brigade in the valley behind; we could see the soldiers having break-fast, their rifles being piled. That battalion was suddenly surprised by the Germans and fire opened on it at short range; it withdrew rapidly down the hill towards us, in great disorder.

Our battalion was deployed in two lines; my company and one other were forward, with the remaining two companies out of sight some hundred yards to the rear. The C.O. galloped up to us forward companies and shouted to us to attack the enemy on the forward hill at once. This was the only order; there was no reconnaissance, no plan, no covering fire. We rushed up the hill, came under heavy fire, my Company Commander was wounded and there were many casualties. Nobody knew what to do, so we returned to the original position from which had begun to attack. If this was real war it struck me as most curious and did not seem to make any sense against the background of what I had been reading."

Reading this, I find Jack's revelations about the relative casualties at Le Cateau more easy to understand.

Phil.

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