The "machine guns" of Mons ?

[Dragon]

And your increasingly pedestrian posts, which you choose to call pertinent questions, have been amply answered time and again by the German readers in this thread. You need to go back and read them, I mean really read them, instead of allowing your interpretation to be coloured by an underlying personal loathing of the Germans which has come out yet again in your comments. I can't tell what you mean in your reply to me, but please don't bother trying to elucidate as I'm not that interested. I have enjoyed the experts' posts in the thread - thank you to them.

George - I accept your point, but I have the impression that Paul and Richard are able to be impartial and are trying to answer the questions which have been asked. I felt that they did so clearly. Several other people have commented that Salesie's responses are confused, not just me.

[salesie]

And your increasingly pedestrian posts, which you choose to call pertinent questions, have been amply answered time and again by the German readers in this thread. You need to go back and read them, I mean really read them, instead of allowing your interpretation to be coloured by an underlying personal loathing of the Germans which has come out yet again in your comments. I can't tell what you mean in your reply to me, but please don't bother trying to elucidate as I'm not that interested. I have enjoyed the experts' posts in the thread - thank you to them.

George - I accept your point, but I have the impression that Paul and Richard are able to be impartial and are trying to answer the questions which have been asked. I felt that they did so clearly. Several other people have commented that Salesie's responses are confused, not just me.

Dragon, your angry indignation would suggest that I've touched a raw nerve somewhere along the line - otherwise, if wholly satisfied with the "experts" answers why would my "confusion" bother you so much?

Cheers-salesie.

[Halder]

So, Richard, my judgement on your quest is more of a warning really - getting down to the human level, telling the story of the ordinary soldier can easily make us lose sight of reality. It can be misleading in itself, from a historical point of view.

Actually, 'getting down to the human level', certainly insofar as the Germans are concerned, brings the reality of the war into much sharper focus. The German Soldat in Poland, for example, in many cases willingly participated in atrocities: burning houses down, beating Poles, executing Jews, as their diaries, letters and first-hand experiences, recorded in the autumn of 1939, reveal. Anyone who's read my book on the Polish campaign will tell you it most certainly does not beat the drum for the Wehrmacht.

[salesie]

Actually, 'getting down to the human level', certainly insofar as the Germans are concerned, brings the reality of the war into much sharper focus. The German Soldat in Poland, for example, in many cases willingly participated in atrocities: burning houses down, beating Poles, executing Jews, as their diaries, letters and first-hand experiences, recorded in the autumn of 1939, reveal. Anyone who's read my book on the Polish campaign will tell you it most certainly does not beat the drum for the Wehrmacht.

I'm glad to hear it, Richard. Which, if you can tolerate my confusion a little longer, begs the question: What you say of the German Army and its soldiers in WW2 is, as far as I can see, the common perception held by most of us - so, if we share this belief about WW2, how have "the accounts of both World Wars been badly one-sided - at times to the point of being misleading"? Are we in agreement that this only leaves our perceptions of the German Army in WW1 to be debated?

Cheers-salesie.

PS. I've taken this WW2 line with Richard, because he admits that WW2 is his specialist subject, and he did state that we have been mislead in our perceptions of the German Army in both wars - and, if the debate moves on, then hopefully we will discuss how the germination of the seeds of these atrocities can be traced to pre-1914 German society and culture.

[Paul Hederer]

Paul, I am listening to your attempts at answers, the problem is they're non-answers (even when I re-word my questions using your own criteria). Every one of your "answers" has been a self-contradictory, generalised attempt to justify your assertions that "a lot of information out there on the German Army in English, and accounts of its actions, are just plain wrong...in that it is incomplete, or factually not accurate." You tell us you are on a quest to write better history, "to provide a better understanding of the war" - if the version you wish to put forward is "better" than our current understanding then, logically, you must have a good idea as to the specifics of why our current perceptions of the war are not as good as the version you wish to write. Yet, with every answer you fail to be specific.

It seems to me, Paul, that you don't truly understand your own quest - and admitting that fact would be fair enough, we've all had an urge to do something without knowing the precise reason why. But when you keep making firm statements telling us that we've all been mislead and that you and your "partners" will shed light, from German language sources, on our misconceptions then you really need to be much more specific as to how and why - otherwise, if your answers to specific questions about your quest "to provide a better understanding of the war" remain self-contradictory and generalised then how much faith can we place in the conclusions you have/will draw from your own research?

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie,

First you accuse me of not stating my views and then you state that my unstated views are contradictory! This is becoming laughable.

I think I have a very good idea of where I'm heading, thanks for your concern though.

"...But when you keep making firm statements telling us that we've all been mislead..."

Oh my, there you go putting words in my mouth again. I never said that or even implied it.

I must admit that I think no matter how many times the contributors of this thread clearly and succinctly state their views you seem almost determined to misunderstand.

I'll let you bat the ball around with some other people for awhile. My arm's a bit tired.

Paul

[Halder]

I'm glad to hear it, Richard. Which, if you can tolerate my confusion a little longer, begs the question: What you say of the German Army and its soldiers in WW2 is, as far as I can see, the common perception held by most of us - so, if we share this belief about WW2, how have "the accounts of both World Wars been badly one-sided - at times to the point of being misleading"? Are we in agreement that this only leaves our perceptions of the German Army in WW1 to be debated?

Cheers-salesie.

PS. I've taken this WW2 line with Richard, because he admits that WW2 is his specialist subject, and he did state that we have been mislead in our perceptions of the German Army in both wars - and, if the debate moves on, then hopefully we will discuss how the germination of the seeds of these atrocities can be traced to pre-1914 German society and culture.

Hi Salesie,

It's almost impossible to generalise about an entire force - it's most definitely not a black and white issue, ie good Wehrmacht/bad Wehrmacht. There are distinct differences between the Ostheer and the Westheer; the latter fought a much more civilised war, if war can ever be civilised, largely conforming to the rules of war. In the East there is ample evidence both in Poland and Russia that German soldiers actively participated in atrocities, but it's difficult to say if it was endemic. It certainly wasn't isolated, but neither was it wholesale.

What I can say with a fair degree of certainty is that the soldier believed almost unwaveringly in Hitler until the very final months of the war. Whether or not he knew what believing in Hitler in its entirety meant, I'm not sure. Most of the comments in the Feldpostbriefe I've studied from the summer and autumn of 1944 view him as a great leader and man of honour more than anything. The ordinary soldier, for the most part viewed the July 20 plot as an abomination, celebrated its failure and was scathing of the plotters.

There are similarities between the German soldier WW1 and WW2 - and actions. Perhaps the best example I can give is the franc-tireur psychosis in France and Belgium in 1914 and a similar attitude in Poland 25 years later.

As this is a WW1 forum I don't want to go too much down the WW2 road. There are two excellent WW2 fora on German history (they also have substantial WW1 history sections) if you seek further answers, Axis History Forum and Feldgrau. They are frequented by some of the heavyweights of English-language German military historians, much like many WW1 authors are active here.

[salesie]

Salesie,

First you accuse me of not stating my views and then you state that my unstated views are contradictory! This is becoming laughable.

I think I have a very good idea of where I'm heading, thanks for your concern though.

"...But when you keep making firm statements telling us that we've all been mislead..."

Oh my, there you go putting words in my mouth again. I never said that or even implied it.

I must admit that I think no matter how many times the contributors of this thread clearly and succinctly state their views you seem almost determined to misunderstand.

I'll let you bat the ball around with some other people for awhile. My arm's a bit tired.

Paul

Sorry, Paul, my mistake. When you said in post #633 that "As far as being misleading, sure you could say that too. A lot of information out there on the German Army in English, and accounts of its actions, are just plain wrong...in that it is incomplete, or factually not accurate" I thought you were being serious, thought that you actually meant it.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

Hi Salesie,

It's almost impossible to generalise about an entire force - it's most definitely not a black and white issue, ie good Wehrmacht/bad Wehrmacht. There are distinct differences between the Ostheer and the Westheer; the latter fought a much more civilised war, if war can ever be civilised, largely conforming to the rules of war. In the East there is ample evidence both in Poland and Russia that German soldiers actively participated in atrocities, but it's difficult to say if it was endemic. It certainly wasn't isolated, but neither was it wholesale.

What I can say with a fair degree of certainty is that the soldier believed almost unwaveringly in Hitler until the very final months of the war. Whether or not he knew what believing in Hitler in its entirety meant, I'm not sure. Most of the comments in the Feldpostbriefe I've studied from the summer and autumn of 1944 view him as a great leader and man of honour more than anything. The ordinary soldier, for the most part viewed the July 20 plot as an abomination, celebrated its failure and was scathing of the plotters.

There are similarities between the German soldier WW1 and WW2 - and actions. Perhaps the best example I can give is the franc-tireur psychosis in France and Belgium in 1914 and a similar attitude in Poland 25 years later.

As this is a WW1 forum I don't want to go too much down the WW2 road. There are two excellent WW2 fora on German history (they also have substantial WW1 history sections) if you seek further answers, Axis History Forum and Feldgrau. They are frequented by some of the heavyweights of English-language German military historians, much like many WW1 authors are active here.

OK, Richard, you're right, we'd best stick to WW1 from now on.

You've already mentioned certain similarities between the German soldier in WW1 & 2 - do you see any signs of the seeds of Nazism starting their germination in pre, and during, WW1 German society and its military?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

I have put together the following map, which illustrates the relative positions of the various BEF units on the morning of 23rd August. The German forces represent what Smith-Dorrien's II Corps HQ knew at 9.20 am on the day of the battle. The War Diary states:

"A Corps, probably 4th, advancing from NIVELLES towards BINCHE;..."

This is represented by the short arrow on the bottom right. Binche is actually off the map, almost due east of Harmignies.

"...another corps, probably 9th, advancing from BRAINE-LE-CONTE towards MONS."

This is represented by the arrow top right.

"A mixed force, probably some portion of 2nd Corps, advancing from ATH to S and SE, but strength and even existence of any corps numbers on this latter road has not been fully confirmed."

This is represented by the arrow top left.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I am travelling at the moment. Next week, I will publish copies of the above map amended to show the respective positions from the British viewpoint at 2-3 hourly intervals during 23rd August. The various quotes will be marked according to time and location. The German perspective will be overlaid.

Robert

[Jack Sheldon]

I have been travelling since the end of October, so my silence on this thread has nothing to do with an attempt to dodge the column or avoid further debate. I see that the discussion has been maintained with customary vigour during my absence and I have just spent some time reading myself back in. I was not going to comment again about Salesie's view on my assessment of the the outcome of Le Cateau - save to say that of all the misleading and one sided views of a battle in the Anglophone literature, the account of that engagement surely illustrates the precise point, in particular with regard to the vexed casualty question. We are still waiting for further contributions on this subject, but nothing so far posted convinces me that the long held British view that the German army suffered grievously high casualties at Le Cateau is anything other than delusion. It is also my view that although the German First Army was a much larger organisation, its own failures meant that it never brought that preponderance to bear on the day or later against the BEF and that, in terms of troops actually engaged at Le Cateau, the reinforced II Corps was comfortably superior in numbers.

The fact that British errors in leaving their right flank uncovered and local German pressure forced II Corps into hurried withdrawal does not alter that fact. I also continue to believe that both II Corps and its commander were lucky to get away with such a situation - bold and courageous though it undoubtedly was. Smith Dorrien later described his retreating troops as 'like a crowd coming away from a football match' (or similar words, as we write on charge sheets). That is certainly a comforting, homely image, but it does not paint a picture of a force which could have done much in the face of large scale, determined cavalry action. It is hard not to contrast the feeble efforts of the German cavalry, with that of Grant's cavalry under Sheridan after Sailor's Creek. Riding aggressively, they cut off one quarter of the surviving Confederate army and effectively sounded the deathknell of the entire Confederacy when they reached Appomattox first.

Coincidentally, this afternoon whilst searching for something else, I came across the following passage in The First World War Vol I: To Arms by Professor Huw Strachan (p 223). He is a scholar for whom I have the utmost respect when it comes to historical judgements. This is his assessment of Le Cateau:

"In reality, Smith Dorrien's Corps was scattered and exhausted and had been fighting continuously for three days. By the time it was fully assembled around Le Cateau in the early hours of the 26th, daylight made it impossible for it to extricate itself. Smith-Dorrien decided he must turn and fight the Germans, the better to secure his retreat. Anxious to stiffen the infantry, the artillery of 5th Division placed its guns well forward to give direct support. The effect was to ensure that German counter-battery fire hit both elements simultaneously. Le Cateau cost II Corps 7,812 casualties. The morale of some, regular soldiers though they were, snapped. On the following day the commanding officers of two exhausted battalions, now at St Quentin, agreed to surrender rather than carry on. The conclusion of Sir John French - that Smith-Dorrien should not have fought at Le Cateau and that the action had effectively broken II Corps - seemed well founded. Smith-Dorrien did not agree. In the event his corps, though severely tried, did not lose its cohesion.

He was extraordinarily lucky. He had assumed that I Corps would close up, having passed the Forest of Mormal and so secure his right: in reality the effect of Landrecies had been to widen the gap between the two corps. However, von Kluck still imagined that the British line of retreat lay to the southwest, not the south and the Germans had therefore failed to appreciate the British alignment, and - as at Mons - had thus found their attack deprived of coordination. Once again poor German intelligence allowed inferior British forces to fight a successful delaying battle against Kluck's army. During the battle von der Marwitz's cavalry corps fought dismounted and therefore did not push towards II Corps' flanks; after it, it failed to pursue..."

I find myself in the stocks from time to time, but I draw great comfort from the fact that, on this occasion at least, I am in distinguished company.

Jack

[salesie]

Basically, Jack, you've gone full circle, back to your introduction to the Le Cateau Guidebook (an almost identical scenario to Strachan's) i.e. German error and bloody good luck saved the day for II Corps? As I said earlier; poor intelligence, lack of co-ordination, and pretty useless cavalry highlights poor soldiering and generalship on the German part - luck doesn't come to it. According to your introduction and Strachan's summary, if taking away the red-herring about Smith-Dorrien's luck, both of you tell us that the German Army wasn't up to the job, and I agree.

Smith-Dorrien made his own luck that day, his intelligence was no better than the Germans, his own forces were also off-balance, but his men were far from useless. I could understand the point about luck if Le Cateau was just a blip in a continuous line of outstanding victories for the Germans, but it wasn't - as I've also said before, the German Army in the West never achieved any of its objectives at any time during the war, so were the Allies just lucky throughout the war, or did the German Army simply not rise to the occasion, not live up to its much vaunted reputation, from the very beginning?

Cheers-salesie.

[Halder]

Were the Allies just lucky throughout the war, or did the German Army simply not rise to the occasion, not live up to its much vaunted reputation, from the very beginning?

Probably a bit of both. In the end in both wars prepondence of Allied men and materiel told - you can't take on the world and win. There are moments in both world wars when there was an equilibrium between forces on the Allied/Central/Axis sides and the German forces should have done better, notably the spring 1918 offensives. And there are times when the Germans were outnumbered (Tannenberg, Fall Gelb) when tactical brilliance succeeded. For me Fall Gelb/Rot is the single greatest victory of either world war for the sheer audacity of the plan. It worked tactically, but strategically it didn't deliver a knock-out blow to the Allies.

I cannot help agreeing with Wilhelm Groener, probably the most level-headed of the senior officers on the General Staff and Ludendorff's successor. Unlike his predecessor, he never leapt on the stab-in-the-back legend. He was far more rational - and far more critical of the General Staff's performance:

"Most generals spent the entire war living under dangerous self-deception. They did not recognise the true strategic and political situation, they clung on to thoughts of wonderful successes on the battlefields, they were proud of the bearing and deeds of their troops and were in some cases inclined to not even take serious defeats seriously. Almost none of them realised the dangers arising from the failure to achieve our strategic goals in battle."

He wrote that after WW1; it applies equally to WW2.

[salesie]

Probably a bit of both. In the end in both wars prepondence of Allied men and materiel told - you can't take on the world and win. There are moments in both world wars when there was an equilibrium between forces on the Allied/Central/Axis sides and the German forces should have done better, notably the spring 1918 offensives. And there are times when the Germans were outnumbered (Tannenberg, Fall Gelb) when tactical brilliance succeeded. For me Fall Gelb/Rot is the single greatest victory of either world war for the sheer audacity of the plan. It worked tactically, but strategically it didn't deliver a knock-out blow to the Allies.

I cannot help agreeing with Wilhelm Groener, probably the most level-headed of the senior officers on the General Staff and Ludendorff's successor. Unlike his predecessor, he never leapt on the stab-in-the-back legend. He was far more rational - and far more critical of the General Staff's performance:

"Most generals spent the entire war living under dangerous self-deception. They did not recognise the true strategic and political situation, they clung on to thoughts of wonderful successes on the battlefields, they were proud of the bearing and deeds of their troops and were in some cases inclined to not even take serious defeats seriously. Almost none of them realised the dangers arising from the failure to achieve our strategic goals in battle."

He wrote that after WW1; it applies equally to WW2.

I agree, in the main, with the thrust of your post, Richard. However, in my opinion, the period Aug-Nov 1914 was the only time that Germany could have won the war by pure military means in the field. I think that by spring 1918 the strategic die was cast, and, despite the extra divisions from the East as well as the "new" tactics, any offensive by then was ultimately doomed to failure. Haig, in his final despatch, likened the spring offensive to the advance of the Old-Guard at Waterloo, and I can agree with that analogy.

My reasoning behind this is straightforward: The only way Germany could win was by military means in the field - its army was, in essence, its one and only truly strategic weapon. But the Allies possessed more than one i.e. the allied armies plus the Royal Navy plus the vast resources of the British Empire, and, although it took Britain over a year to fully realise what was needed and to gear-up for total-war, the strategic power of the Royal Navy began to weave its slow to bring results, but strategically vital, web from day-one. You're right in part when you say that manpower and materials decided WW1, but I would add that political and social upheaval inside Germany also played a vital part in deciding the final outcome. And all this was not brought about by luck - the Allies, Britain in particular, out-performed Germany in every area. Allied armies held the German armies in check in the field (in the West that is, where the outcome was always going to be decided), the Royal Navy began to starve and de-stabilise Germany from day one with its highly effective blockade and it prevented the U-boats from repaying the strategic faith that Germany placed in them, British Military Intelligence waged a highly effective subversion/propaganda campaign, and the financial clout and resources of the British Empire meant that total-war could be fought totally. And last, but not least, all of this had to be effectively managed or it would not have been so successful.

In the event, Germany imploded under the sheer weight of all these powerful, strategic forces. But in Aug-Nov 1914, these forces were not really a factor - this is why I say that Germany grossly over-estimated its own military prowess but seriously under-estimated the capabilities of the Allies, and if the German Army couldn't bring victory in 1914 (maybe 1915 before Britain finally woke up to what was needed?) then it never could win. Wilhelm Groener was right about the German Staff, "Almost none of them realised the dangers arising from the failure to achieve our strategic goals in battle." But I would ask the question; can any strategic goals be achieved with just a single strategic weapon when true total-war is joined?

Cheers-salesie.

[Guest]

Not sure if this adds anything new, but it's another book on the subject.

THE RETREAT FROM MONS The Operations of the British Army in the Present War by G S Gordon

page 32 (46 of 124)

" The enemy at first came on in masses, and suffered severely in consequence. It was their first experience of the British "fifteen rounds a minute," and it told. They went down in bundles — our men delighting in a form of musketry never contemplated in the Regulations. To men accustomed to hitting bobbing heads at eight hundred yards there was something monstrous and incredible in the German advance. They could scarcely believe their eyes; such targets had never appeared to them even in their dreams. Nor were our machine- guns idle. In this, as in many other actions that day and in the days that followed, our machine-guns were handled with a skill and devotion which no one appreciated more than the enemy. "

Mike

[Guest]

On 7.9.2008 at 12:30, Jack Sheldon said:

This is the first part of an attempt at a more considered reply regarding casualties. It comes with every imaginable health warning, but is likely to be reasonably accurate as far as it goes.

There were three German corps operating in or around Mons: IX Corps (Gen der Inf von Quast), IV Corps (Gen der Inf Sixt von Arnim) and III Corps (Gen der Inf von Lochow). They and their constituent formations played widely varying roles over the two day period and only some of them were heavily engaged.

The first formation, IX Corps, was organised as follows: 17th Inf Div, comprising 33 Inf Bde (IRs 75 & 76) and 34 Inf Bde (Gren R 89, Fus R 90 & Jaeger Bn 9) & 18th Div comprising 35 Inf Bde (IR 84, Fus R 86) and 36 Inf Bde (IR 31, IR 85)

Here are the figures I have gleaned:

33 Bde (St Symphorien)

IR 75 KIA 39 OR; Wounded 5 officers and 232 OR; Missing 'up to' 40

IR 76 KIA 11 Wounded 79

34 Bde (Not much involved)

Gren R 89 KIA Lt Georg Gade & 2 OR; Wounded OLt Stratmann, 3 NCO & 19 OR

Fues R 90 History exists, but I do not have one. Figures unlikely to be high.

Jaeg Bn 9 was already workin with Higher Cavalry Commander 2 by this stage.

35 Bde (Storming of bridges at Nimy and Obourg, advance into Mons)

IR 84 (Nimy) KIA 1 officer, 3 NCOs & 20 OR, Wounded 6 officers, 10 NCOs & 45 OR

Fues R 86 (Obourg) KIA 30 OR, Wounded 6 officers & 90 OR

36 Bde

IR 31 KIA 2 OR, Wounded 13

IR 85 KIA Hauptmann Hermann Groepper, Lts Heinrich Driver, Freiherr von Schele & Ernst Trebitz, Wounded 2 officers. There were also 184 OR casualties (KIA and wounded not differentiated).

The only tentative conclusions we can, perhaps, draw from these figures is that the fight for the bridges does not seem to match the popularly reported German blood bath. Work continues.

Jack

 

On 6.9.2008 at 15:15, phil andrade said:

Jack, your revelations shatter our cherished myths. I am disillusioned. Didn't German accounts testify to the Old Contemptibles giving a good account of themselves at Mons?

Were there any missing in addition to those casualties you cited?

As for the local cemetery, might the Germans have been moving on so quickly that they didn't stop long for recovery of their dead? Maybe many were taken to bigger cemeteries elsewhere. I have even read that the Germans cremated some of their dead: an intriguing picture in your book on the Somme comes to mind.

Or are we to accept the prospect that German casualties at Mons were relativley trivial? The figures you provide certainly suggest that they were.

Phil.

Hi, can confirm what phil andrade mentioned: that many were taken to bigger cemeteries. The a. m. Lt. Heinrich Driver was transferred to a cemetery at his home town. I suppose, many others too at the beginning of WW1.

Regards

 

[dansparky]

On 11/10/2008 at 10:02, Tom A McCluskey said:

 

Hi Tom, can i just ask what is the above source?  It does not appear to be from The War the Infantry Knew or A Atteridge's History of the 17th Northern Division.  Ah, i have it now the German Army in War.

Edited 25 September , 2017 by dansparky

[dansparky]

On 12/09/2008 at 23:12, nigel67 said:

I believe bloem wrote more of this in the magazine "Die Wocke" in 1916 here he remarks upon the deadly machine-gun fire of the english ! qoute "we were only exposed to machine guns,but there were many,which shot execellently and were absolutely invisible "

relating to the fighting near the village of tertre,

fact is both machine guns of the 1st west kents were left over the canal and it was the rifle fire of A company 1/rwk that inflicked the damage upon the 12th brandenberg grenadier regt,

I have a full account of the regiments accounts of the encounter if any one wants them,

regards Nigel.

Have found this quoted in Invicta, but obviously not referenced.  You mention Die Wocke, have you any idea where this can be obtained?   Is it referenced anywhere that you know of? 

[SiegeGunner]

25 minutes ago, dansparky said:

You mention Die Wocke, have you any idea where this can be obtained?   Is it referenced anywhere that you know of? 

 

I suspect this publication will be 'Die Woche' (The Week).

[dansparky]

4 hours ago, SiegeGunner said:

 

I suspect this publication will be 'Die Woche' (The Week).

Thanks, Siege Gunner.  Has anyone access to this?  or has anyone seen it specifically referenced elsewhere?