14th Division - Inverness Copse & Glencourse Wood

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The 14th Division were ordered to make an attack which took place on the 22nd. The objective was to be a 'Green Line' running from Jasper Avenue, at the southern point of the Divisional line, eastwards to round Herenthage Chateau, thence northwards through Fitzclarence Farm, then north-north-west through Glencourse Wood to the most northerly point of that wood. The assaulting brigades were to be the 43rd, on the right, and the 42nd, with the 41st in reserve. In the 43rd Brigade the 6th Bn. Somerset L.I. (plus one company of the 10th D.L.I.) would assault on the right with the 6th Bn. D.C.L.I. on the left having as their task the capture of Inverness Copse and the open ground between that and Glencourse Wood as far as the line of Fitclarence Farm. In the 42nd Brigade the assaulting battalion was the 5th Bn. K.S.L.I., which was to capture the western portion of Glencourse Wood. Four tanks were detailed to assist in the attack and were given special objectives. The assaulting troops were on no account to delay their advance to wait for the tanks.

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When the action began the 7th & 8th Rifle Brigade were still in camp at Dickebusch. The 9th Rifle Brigade, still at Ritz dug-out, on the night of the 21st, in company with neighbouring battery positions, was heavily shelled, a large proportion of gas shells being included. Despite the utmost expedition in assuming box-respirators many gas casualties occurred and the total of casualties, included gassed, was sixty-three.

At zero hour (7.00 a.m.), August 22nd, the assaulting troops moved forward. On the right all went well and the 6th Bn. Somerset L.I., with it's attached company of the 10th D.L.I. reached the objective, not without some stiff fighting.

In the centre the 6th Bn. D.C.L.I. was held up at once by machine-gun fire from the front between Inverness Copse and Glencourse Wood. The arrival of a tank enabled this battalion to capture and occupy the northern portion of a trench, which was, however, still some four hundred yards short of the objective. The 5th Bn. K.S.L.I. on the left quickly reached its objective except on the right where its line bent back to connect with the left of the centre battalion.

From 8.15 a.m. onwards there was a gradual absorption of troops by the 43rd Brigade. By 10.20 a.m. the three companies of the 10th Bn. D.L.I. reinforced successively the now hard pressed 6th Bn. Somerset L.I. in Inverness Copse and their place was taken by the 6th Bn. K.O.Y.L.I. who moved up from Sanctuary Wood.

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By 11 a.m. the line held in Inverness Copse ran north and south about two hundred yards from the west edge and shortly before this the 41st Brigade was ordered to send a battalion to Zillebeke Bund where it would come under the 43rd Brigade; on arrival this battalion (8th Bn. 60th) was ordered forward to Sanctuary Wood and at 12.20 p.m. the 8th Rifle Brigade moved to Zillebeke Bund to replace it. During the afternoon concentrations of the enemy were dispersed by artillery fire and an attack on the right was beaten off by small arms fire; but three companies of the 6th Bn. K.O.Y.L.I. had now become involved in the fight, so the 8th Bn. 60th (41st Bde) was ordered to relieve one company of the 6th K.O.Y.L.I. and one company of the 5th Oxs & Bucks L.I. (lent earlier by the 42nd Bde.) in the original front line of the 43rd Brigade.

At the end of the day the line held from rather beyond the south-west corner of Inverness Copse to near the centre of the north edge of the copse; thence it turned back sharply westwards to an enemy trench three hundred yards from the old front line; thence for three hundred yards due north and thence north-eastwards to the Green Line which it then followed to the northern divisional boundary

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There had at one time been a probability of the 8th RB and the 8th Bn. 60th being moved into the line this night with a view to an attack at 4.00 a.m. This however, was overuled by the 14th Division and the battalions stayed where they were at Zillebeke Bund, but still under the orders of the 43rd Brigade. The 7th RB had once more been moved at very short notice to Chateau Segard, not being required, bivouacked there for the night.

The 9th RB remained at Ritz dug-out in reserve to the 42nd Brigade whose H.Q. at the same place were bombed, resulting in fifteen casualties.

On 23rd August, an early morning attack with tanks had been arranged to capture the remainder of the Green Line but, owing to anti-tank gunfire and the state of the ground, only one tank managed to get beyond the line of the infantry and reached its objective, near Fitzclarence Farm. Soon after this the enemy delivered a strong counter attack on our front between Inverness Copse and Glencourse Wood but this was broken up by small arms fire assisted nobly by the one tank.

It had been intended to relieve the 43rd Brigade with the 41st Brigade on this night and orders had actually been issued; these, however, were cancelled, the 14th Division having received orders from the IInd Corps to hold the 41st Brigade in readiness for a further operation.

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In order to release the 8th Bn. 60th of the 41st Brigade, now with the 43rd Brigade was ordered to relieve it this night with a battalion.

So the situation on the evening of the 23rd was that the 43rd and 42nd Brigades were still in the line but that the latter brigade was relieving a battalion of the 41st Brigade which was under the 43rd. The 9th Battalion Rifle Brigade, was to have relieved the 9th Bn. 60th of its own brigade on this night but was now deputed to relieve the 8th Bn. 60th which would bring it under the 43rd Brigade. The latter battalion was to drop back to Zillebeke Bund, there relieving the 8th Rifle Brigade which would then go back to Dickebusch.

During this day the 7th Rifle Brigade had remained at Chateau Segard but eventually, after various orders and counter-orders, moved back to Dickebusch during the night.

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Events during the night of the 23rd/24th and on the early morning of the 24th did little to simplify the situation.

Owing to the late receipt of the new orders and heavy shelling the leading platoon of the 9th Rifle Brigade could not leave Ritz dug-out trenches until 12.30 a.m. on the 24th; as it was twenty-eight casualties were incurred.

The position to be occupied was in the old front line in support from a point midway between Stirling Castle and Inverness Copse to midway between Clapham Junction and Glencourse Wood; an offensive flank was to be formed also eastwards from the formewr point to just inside Inverness Copse.

Shelling was heavy and continuous and remained so for many hours and the relief was not complete before the first enemy counter-attack about dawn and there was intermingling of the two battalions. However all troops north of the Menin Road were relieved, and some of the troops south of the road.

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The following account is taken from Colonel Pickering's report on the operations.

"Owing to heavy casualties during the preceeding five days my Battalion went up to relieve as follows:-

1 company (3 strong platoons) to take over north of the Menin Road.

1 weak company (2 strong made up platoons) in reserve near Stirling Castle.

1 made up company (4 strong platoons) to hold the support line south of the Menin Road and the right offensive flank.

"The whole of the support line came into position before dawn and, though the two platoons detailed were not sufficient to man the whole line, the gaps were soon filled by men of other units. The two strong platoons were apparently not correctly guided and did not get up until the enemy attack had begun, with the result that some platoons of the 8th Bn. 60th were not relieved and remained holding their positions; so my two platoons took up a position in a line of shell holes south of Jasper Alley (i.e. near the offensive flank). H.Q. of the 8th Bn. 60th also remained in the line.

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"Meanwhile Captain N.E. Lee, 8th Bn. 60th, although having been relieved, thinking the situation serious, kept his two platoons near Stirling Castle, finally sending them up as ordered by me to fill up the gaps in the old front line. Shortly afterwards this officer was unfortunately killed and his platoons reduced to a total of ten other ranks.

"About this time, under the orders of the O.C. 6th Bn. KOYLI, my reserve platoons were sent to reinforce to 6th Bn. Somerset L.I.; one platoon on right of old front line and one platoon forward - well into the heart of Inverness Copse: this platoon, which went over thirty six strong, never left Inverness Copse though it was reduced to a serjeant and four men. This serjeant, Willey by name, collected a few stragglers of other battalions and held a post at the north end of the copse, but south of the Menin Road, until relieved."

All the morning the fight in Inverness Copse swayed back and forth; three times the troops in front were driven out and three times they reformed and went forward again. There was a great dearth of officers and Colonel Pickering, having lost three out of his four, dared not lend his one remaining officer elsewhere without risking the loss of the support line which was his battalion's charge.

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Reinforcements were called for on three occasions by different units but all that could be spared was a scratch platoon made up of every available rifle at Battalion H.Q. and the aid post.

The enemy, in the meanwhile, had established himself in the trench connecting Inverness Copse and Glencourse Wood, from which he sent out bombing parties, all of which were beaten back.

The position on the north of the Menin Road was a strong one with a fine field of fire and had the enemy advanced from the west edge of Inverness Copse he would have suffered heavy casualties. At one time the situation seemed serious as, although there were probably sufficient men in the sector to stop the enemy from getting a foothold in our old front line, they were scattered in shell holes and there were no officers left to rally and re-organize them.

"It was then," said Colonel Pickering, "that we held a conference between O.C.'s 10th Bn. D.L.I., 6th Bn. D.C.L.I. (both of 43rd Brigade), 8th Bn. 60th (41st Brigade) and 9th Bn. Rifle Brigade (42nd Brigade); it was decided that with the present troops, who had suffered heavily in casualties, at out disposal, it was impossible to turn the enemy out of his trench and be sure of having sufficient left to hold the old front line should our counter attack prove unsuccessful. The freshest troops to do this counter attack were those of my Battalion and we had none other with which to garrison the old front line in their place; also owing to the very heavy shelling and machine gun fire it was impossible to transfer troops from south to north of the Menin Road, without suffering heavy casualties.

"It was essential too that the ridge be held at all costs and the continued bombardment led one to expect further attacks.

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The account pays a tribute to the work of the brigade carrying parties and particularly that of the runners - both regimental and brigade - who never did a trip to the front without carrying S.A.A., or bombs, as well as messages.

Two final notes are: "The enemy at one time used liquid fire but we got a Lewis-gun turned on immediately. This dispersed the operators and I believe the whole machine went up later as a very dense cloud of smoke came out of the enemy trench and seemed different from a dump going up."

Again: " The few survivors from Inverness Copse had the time of their lives, sniping and picking off Huns, not to speak of several bombing encounters."

During the afternoon reinforcements of the 8th Bn. Rifle Brigade arrived, and after a conference, it was decided to post them south of the Menin Road, strengthen the line (and) offensive flank, and push forward posts into Inverness Copse while one platoon, being overcrowded, spread up north of the Menin Road.

"Later the 7th Bn. 60th and 7th Bn. Rifle Brigade came up to relieve all troops in this sector. I made myself responsible for the relief of all troops north of the Menin Road while O.C., 10th Bn. D.L.I. and O.C. 8th Bn. Rifle Brigade handed over all south of the Menin Road. My relief was complete by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th when I proceeded to Zillebeke Bund."

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8th Rifle Brigade, 24/8/17

It is now necessary to go back to the early hours of the 24th and trace the consequences of the uncompleted relief of the 8th Bn. 60th when H.Q. and one and a half companies remained in the line.

During the night of the 23rd/24th the 8th Rifle Brigade, at Zillebeke Bund, was expecting relief by the 8th Bn. 60th and eventually, as has been seen, only two and a half companies arrived. The relief, however, was carried out as far as was possible and "C", "D" and half "A" Companies of the 8th Rifle Brigade marched back to Dickebusch, leaving at the Bund Battalion H.Q., "B" and half "A" Companies with two and a half companies of the 8th Bn. 60th.

At 1.10 p.m. orders were received for all troops at the Bund to reinforce the original front line. Accordingly, Colonel Prideaux-Brune took up the composite battalion to report to O.C 10th Bn. D.L.I. at Clapham Junction. The move was made through an intense barrage and 2nd Lieutenant W.W. Wines was killed, Captain B.H. Bennett, 2nd Lieutenant T.D. England and about forty ranks being wounded. Captain E.C. Squire with half "A" Company and 2nd Lieutenants Sprotson and T.D. England with their platoons of "C" Company were ordered to re-occupy the western edge of Inverness Copse. They were held up by machine gun fire about three hundred yards short of the wood where they occupied a line of shell holes astride the Menin Road and parallel to the western edge of the copse. Here 2nd Lieutenant T.D. England was wounded - apparently for the second time that afternoon.

At dusk 2nd Lieutenant W.N. Sprotson with both platoons of "C" Company re-occupied the western edge of the copse and consolidated. A right flank was formed along Jasper Avenue manned by representatives of all battalions in the 43rd Brigade to join hands with the 24th Division on the right. At 3.00 a.m. H.Q. and the one and a half companies of the 8th Rifle Brigade were relieved by the 7th Rifle Brigade and returned to the Bund.

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7th & 8th Rifle Brigade, 24/8/17

Once more it is desirable to turn back to the 24th to follow the movements of the 41st Brigade - less those elements whose story has been covered up to the early hours of the 25th.

At mid-day on the 24th the 41st Brigade from Dickebusch, executing a manoeuvre similar to a change of base, moved by lorry to a position of readiness near the Ecole - outside the Menin Gate: the Brigade now consisted of the two 7th Battalions and the errant two and a half companies of the 8th Rifle Brigade commanded by Lieutenant W.A. Crebbin, M.C. Whilst there orders were received placing the two 7th Battalions at the disposal of the 43rd Brigade and the two and a half companies of the 8th Rifle Brigade at the disposal of the 42nd Brigade. In due course that evening the two 7th Battalions were ordered up to take over the front line held by the 43rd Brigade and the two and a half companies of the 8th RB that of the 42nd Brigade.

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So, having arrived back at the early morning of August 25th, the occasion is convenient to take stock of the situation The 9th Rifle Brigade on this morning was moved to the Ecole, and thence later to the Cafe Belge where it was embussed and moved to camp at Wippenhoek. It had finished with these operations and may well be left there for the present.

At 6.0 a.m. the H.Q. 41st Brigade relieved the H.Q. 43rd Brigade at Dormy House - just east of zillebeke.

The position now was that the two 7th battalions were holding the original sectors on the brigade front. occupied by them on August 17th, and the two and a half companies, 8th Rifle Brigade, the original right sector of the 42nd Brigade front opposite Glencourse Wood, with H.Q. and one and a half companies at Zillebeke Bund.

Both the 41st and 42nd Brigades were expecting relief that night - but such was not to be. The Staff of the 70th Brigade, 23rd Division, had arrived early and all arrangements had been made for the relief when, at 3.30 p.m., orders were received from IInd Corps that the relief was cancelled and that the 41st Brigade was to remain at the disposal of the 23rd Division and to take over the whole divisional front supported by two battalions of the 70th Brigade. Accordingly the 8th Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment arrived that night at Zillebeke Bund relieving the 8th Bn. 60th which returned to Chateau Segard and the 8th Bn. K.O.Y.L.I. went to Half Way House.

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The same night H.Q. and one and a half companies 8th Rifle Brigade moved up to Hooge Tunnel and with the two and a half companies already there took over the left sector of the divisional front, with its left at the extreme northerly point of Glencourse Wood.

During the night 25th/26th, in accordance with orders from the 23rd Division the Brigade established a chain of posts running in a slightly half-moon shape from the north west corner of Inverness Copse to the south west corner of Glencourse Wood and at 2.0 a.m. attemoted to establish posts in the enemy trench connecting the two - the Bone of Contention. Of these posts one was to be established by the 7th Rifle Brigade, just north of Inverness Copse, and was so established by "C" Company by 2.0 a.m., August 26th; an enemy counter-attack immediately developed and 2nd Lieutenant Hosler was last seen endeavouring to repel it; he was, it was feared, killed. Meanwhile, other posts were put out, at 3.0 a.m. it is stated, and "information as to what occured after the occupation of these posts is obscure." As far as can be ascertained confused fighting took place, posts being taken and retaken, until at 3.45 a.m., a heavy bombardment came down on our front line with an extremely severe barrage about Clapham Junction and along the Stirling Catle ridge. This continued until about 4.40 a.m. Under cover of this bombardment the enemy again attacked, capturing one post in Inverness Copse, but being repulsed by two others also in the copse.

When it was reported that the enemy had penetrated the front line the S.O.S. was sent up from Battalion H.Q. and the response was prompt and exceedingly heavy. As soon as it came down the enemy retired and made no further attack. The enemy was said to have used a flammenwerfer but some observers thought that it was some kind of phosphorous grenade.

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Meanwhile by 2.45 a.m. the 8th Rifle Brigade had occupied the posts ordered. In the attack just described the posts in Glencourse Wood repulsed the enemy, but one post between the wood and the copse was captured. The 7th Bn. 60th at the same time lost its left post adjoining the 8th Rifle Brigade.

Once more, during the forennon of this day, all arrangements were made for relief, the G.O.C. 23rd Division and his three brigadiers visiting H.Q. 41st Brigade for the purpose. Shortly before 1 p.m., however, the Commander of the 41st Brigade (Brig-General P.C.B. Skinner) was instructed to report as soon as possible at Divisional H.Q., and on arrival there was informed that the brigade would not be relieved that night, but would have instead to capture the German trench connecting Inverness Copse with Glencourse Wood and previously referred to as the Bone of Contention.

At the ensuing divisional conference it was decided that the trench, on which it was impossible an artillery barrage and which was very strongly held, was to be captured by means of a tank attack and six tanks were placed at the disposal of the brigadier 41st Brigade for this purpose. Unlike the orders for the attack of August 22nd upon this occasion it was understood clearly that the attack was to be carried out only in co-operation with the tanks and, failing the arrival of the latter, no attack would be delivered.

On the return of General Skinner to his H.Q. orders were issued and dispositions made, therefore in this sense.

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At 8.30 p.m. that evening it began to rain and poured in torrents throughout the night, transforming the whole countryside into a swamp.

At 11.30 p.m. orders were received from the corps commander that, failing the arrival of the tanks, the attack planned was to be carried out as a surprise attack before dawn. Orders were therefore hurriedly communicated to battalion commanders - it now took two hours for a runner to reach Battalion H.Q. from Brigade H.Q. - and the position was that two alternative forms of attack were contemplated, one if the tanks arrived, the other if they did not; their arrival or otherwise was to be reported to Brigade H.Q. before 4 a.m.

The tanks, however, arrived at their rendezvous, near Clapham Junction, by 2 a.m. on the 27th, so the tank attack, as arranged, was to be carried out.

But the tanks having reached their rendezvous got no further owing to the mud, so that when the infantry were expecting them at 4.45 a.m., August 27th, to begin the attack, they did not appear. It was now getting too light for a surprise attack so that the operation, as a whole, fell through.

The orders issued by the 41st Brigade for the tank attack gave the route to be taken by each tank and the 7th Rifle Brigade was ordered to detail a bombing squad to accompany each of the two right hand tanks. In addition each battalion in the front line, 7th & 8th Rifle Brigade with the 7th Bn. 60th between them, would detail one strong platoon to attack the trench in conjunction with the tanks.

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These orders were followed by a further message (received by the 7th Rifle Brigade at 2.0 a.m., the 27th) giving effect to the corps commander's orders already referred to, and ordering that, should the tanks not arrive, the trenches were to be carried by a surprise attack at dawn. The message directed that the assault would be carried out on similar lines to that arranged with tanks-except that there would be no tanks.

The three commanding officers concerned, in consultation with O.C. Tanks, agreed that the tanks could not start before 4.45 a.m. owing to insufficient light. They agreed further that if the tanks were not in sight by 5.0 a.m. that hour should be zero for the surprise assault.

Unfortunately by then there was too much light for a surprise and the assault, not unaturally, came to naught.

In the 7th Rifle Brigade 2nd Lieutenant W.E. Rushbrooke, according to his orders, attacked with his platoon at zero hour. Owing to the appalling condition of the ground the reached its objective piecemeal and was at once bombed out. 2nd Lieutenant Rushbrooke re-organized the platoon in shell holes and led it forward again but with no better results, he himself, inhappily, being killed.

In the 8th Rifle Brigade 2nd Lieutenant W.N Sprotson with a platoon of "C" Company was selected to make the attack. Most of his platoon became casualties on the way up to the forming up place and, although reinforced by No. 14 Platoon, the state of the ground and the absence of tanks destroyed any chance of success.

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From 4.0 a.m. to 9.0 a.m. the enemy kept up a terrific barrage; thereafter the day was quiet and the rain continues.

During the forenoon of this day, the 27th, it was proposed by the staff of the 23rd Division that the 41st Brigade should remain for yet another three days in the line.

General Skinner's representations on this point are too obvious to need reproduction; suffice it that they were held to be conclusive and it was decided to relieve the brigade the same night.

The 8th Rifle Brigade was relieved by two companies of the 8th Bn. K.O.Y.L.I. (23rd Division) which suffered many casualties from a heavy barrage between 8.0 and 9.30 p.m., and the relief was not complete until 5.15 a.m. on the 28th.

Meanwhile the 7th Rifle Brigade was not quite out of the wood. During the evening, enemy movement had been noticed and it was thought that this presaged an attack. The barrage mentioned above came down at 8.0 p.m. and at the same time a shower of rifle grenades fell on our front line followed by an infantry attack in waves. The S.O.S. was immediately sent up from the line and repeated from Battalion H.Q. The main attack came from the Bone of Contention and was directed against the left flank of the 7th Rifle Brigade, though a feint attack was made on the right.

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Four or five waves composed this attack which was met with rifle fire and Lewis gun fire and with bombs, including many German ones found in our lines. A post of the 7th Bn. 60th afforded valuable assistance with enfilade fire from the left. The enemy suffered heavy casualties but in some cases succeeded in getting up to our trench, where he was met on the parapet in a hand-to-hand fight with the sword. About 8.10 p.m. our barrage fell, but at about 8.20 p.m. a second attack developed which was similarly repulsed, the enemy in his retirement suffering severely from our barrage. A number of his men came forward with their hands up calling out in English "Don't shoot !" One prisoner was taken. The enemy concerned in the attack wore new, clean clothing of a smoky-grey colour, whereas the men seen holding the line were dressed in a uniform of a light sea-green colour. It appeared that a force of "Sturm Truppen," some three hundred strong, was employed and at dawn a large number of enemy corpses was seen in front of our line.

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General Skinner's comment on the report of this action as follows:-

"14th Division.

"Forwarded in continuation of my No.__ of 27th inst. I think this may be considered a very creditable performance on the part of the 7th Rifle Brigade.

(signed) " P.C.B. Skinner,

Brigadier General

Commanding 41st Infantry Brigade

29/8/17

(Copy to 23rd Division for information)"

Relief was not complete until about 8.0 a.m. on the 28th, when the 7th Rifle Brigade rejoined the remainder of the 41st Brigade, at Dickebusch.

So concluded for the 14th Division what is referred to in the Official Despatch as a "minor operation."

Its cost to the three Battalions of the Rifle Brigade was, in the 7th, the six officers whose names have been mentioned and one hundred and thirty one other ranks; in the 8th Battalion, the three officers mentioned and one hundred and twelve other ranks; in the 9th Battalion besides the three officers mentioned, Captain H.C. Round, D.S.O., M.C., and 2nd Lieutenant D. Thistlewood were killed; 2nd Lieutenant J.E. Savill was wounded and missing; several officers were slightly gassed, whilst, of other ranks, there were two hundred and seventy two casualties, including gas cases.

After resting at Dickebusch on August 28th the 7th and 8th Battalions moved on the 29th to the Meteren area,. The 9th Battalion on the 29th marched from Wippenhoek to Thieushoek, near Caestre. At the end of the month the 14th Division received orders to move to the Neuve Eglise area.

Andy

[colinah]

Andy,

Many thanks for your account of this battle in which my gt. uncle was killed on 26th.

august with 7th. bn. KRRC. Is this the bn. that you call 7th. bn. 60th. ? If so to what does

that refer please. I have their war diary but is there also a brigade or division diary that I

could obtain?

Regards, Colin.

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Colin,

Yes the reference of the 60th is the KRRC, their old Regimental number, before that it was the 62nd Royal American's. I have the 14th Divisions War Diary and their orders, barrage maps etc., glad that you found the piece of interest, certainly was a bit of a mix up with the KRRC and the Rifle Brigade spending a long long time in the front line.

Andy

[Guest Jksdelver]

Interesting post .my Grandfather Private 33123 Scarth A was killed at Inverness Copse August 24th 1917. He served in the 6th Bat KOYLI

[neverforget]

Fantastic post Andy! My great uncle would have been there had he not just copped it at Arras in May.Thanks for your dedication. A very enjoyable half an hour. (I think that must be a record for the amount of time to read one post )