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Remembered Today:

First reports of the BEF at Mons


Robert Dunlop

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These are the first reports of the BEF received by the German 1st Army Command on 22nd August, 1914, as recorded by von Kuhl in 'Der Marnefeldzug 1914':

'At 1100 hours the Cavalry Army signalled by radio: "Patrol fire at the canal 6 kilometers east Mons. Roeulx (northeast of Mons) clear. Area up to the Schelde clear." Of the greatest importance was the radio message received at 1150 hours: "A patrol of 4th Kurassier Regiment has definitely identified a squadron of Englishmen at Casteau northeast of Mons." The [German] 4th Cavalry Division reported by radio (1640 hours): "Englishmen [at] Maubeuge." The IXth Army Corps reported at 1500 hours: "According to a statement by inhabitants, Mons is to be occupied by English troops." At 2150 hours, the Corps sent a supplementary message: "18th Infantry Division reports that English forces occupy the crossings over the Canal du Centre between Nimy [on the northern outskirts of Mons] and Ville-sur-Haine [about 4 miles east of Mons]."'

Robert

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Robert - since I'm a bit 'lite' on the opening days of the war, can I ask how the German reports 'tie in' with the British accounts of the opening encounters?

Des

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Starting with the 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards ;)

'August 22

Several patrols were sent out during the night and did some good work... The gist of the information received, obtained from various sources - fugitives and residents from the surrounding country, including a retired General - led Major Bridges to the conclusion that the Germans were pouring south on every road from Brussels, and that their numbers must be at least 400,000 on this front. This information was sent back to the Cavalry Division, which it reached on the morning of the 22nd.

Just before dawn, the Squadron moved forward to a wood about a mile away, on a commanding position. Nothing, however, was seen, and at about 6.30 am it was decided to push forward along the main road towards Soignies, and contact was definitely established with the head of the German column on that road. The main road was struck at the little village of Casteau [note correlation with German report], where the Squadron halted in concealment, while the scouts were sent on. They reported a German patrol in sight, coming down the road; our patrol was directed by signal [see below] to move straight back towards the south, to draw on the Germans. Two Troops were dismounted ready to open fire, the other two Troops drew swords ready to pursue. About six German Dragoons were seen coming cautiously down the road. At about five hundred yards from the ambush, they apparently smelt a rat, stopped and consulted, and then turned round and slowly went away. At this moment the first shot by the British Army in the war was fired by Corporal Thomas "C" Squadron. Captain Hornby, thinking he could catch them, asked for permission to try, and was ordered to charge with the two mounted Troops. This was done straight down the main road, which was paved and tramlined, being about thirty yards in width, with a ditch on either side. Captain Hornby soon found himself up against a German Squadron which was following their scouts. This also turned and fled. A chase followed for about one and a half miles. During the pursuit, the Uhlans were joined by one or two Troops of Hussars who swelled the rout. The leading troops under Captain Hornby came up to them at the bottom of a slight hill. The men cheered and drove right in amongst them, sabring several and dismounting many, who were taken prisoners. Many of the Germans threw away their long lances during the fight, and tried to surrender, but did not get much opportunity.

There was some shooting out of windows of houses by the roadside during this melee. The remnants were pursued till Captain Hornby was pulled up by rifle fire from troops deployed across the road. Major Bridges concluded that he was up against the head of a German Cavalry Division, as cyclists were to be seen and entrenchments in front of our position on a hill about four hundred yards off.'

There are more details about this action in 'Tickled to Death to Go'. Ben Clouting was a horse-holder in the action. He described how the scouts were used:

'As the Regiment rode through the Belgian countryside, a Connecting File was adopted. The purpose of the File was to give the Squadron early warning of danger ahead by sending out scouts in advance of the main body of troops. These scouts rode on both sides of the road, followed some 200 yards behind by two troopers who would pass on signals between the scouts and the squadron. Signals were given with a rifle. A vertical movement up and down meant trot, a rifle held vertically still meant halt. If the enemy were spotted, the rifle was pushed up and down three times in a horizontal position, and so on. The rifle sling was always turned towards those you were signalling to, for despite being khaki, it showed up better than the dark brown wood of the rifle.'

Robert

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The 4th Hussars were operating as part of Allenby's Cavalry Division. Here are some snippets from their regimental history:

'22nd August [1914]

At 6 am the brigade moved out to the high ground north-west of Bray, A Squadron... taking over the outpost line at Maurage from a squadron of the 5th Lancers.

During the morning a German aeroplane came over low - while an excited Belgian peasant brought news of a German Army advancing from St Vaast.

Patrols from A Squadron soon encoutered enemy patrols, which retired on being fired on. At noon, A Squadron was withdrawn somewhat, and two strong patrols were sent to Maurage and Boussoit respectively to watch the crossings of the River Haine, with orders to remain out till 5 pm. These saw several hostile cavalry patrols, Heyman's patrol knocking over several men, first blood thus being drawn by the regiment. In the afternoon, a serious enemy infantry attack developed on our right against the 5th Cavalry Brigade, the village of Peronne being set on fire. The 16th Lancers took some part in this fight, and German field guns then shelled us lightly, the Brigadier, General Gough, having a narrow escape.

At 5.10 pm orders were received from the brigade to march to Elouges as soon as all detachments were in, and the brigade moved off about 6 pm over a country intersected with roads running through iron foundries and coal dumps, making it a very diffcult matter to find the way after night fell.'

Robert

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And this information from the superb history of the 15th Hussars:

'22nd August 1914

As far as the 15th Hussars were concerned, the march into Belgium did not entail any contact with the enemy. The various patrols from the squadrons returned to billets in the evening. They had all gained touch with our cavalry, who had become engaged with the enemy during the day.'

So when the British cavalry were at the forefront, the infantry divisional cavalry squadrons kept in touch with their colleagues.

23rd August 1914

The right of the 1st Division, and therefore the right of the British Army, rested on the little village of Peissant, and between this place and the left of the Fifth French Army there existed a gap of a few miles, to watch which the 2nd Troop of C Squadron [only a tiny force], and a proportion of cyclists were sent. Lieutenant

Stanhope's troop was ordered to watch the front of the outpost line about Binche and Merbes St Marie. If the enemy advanced in any force he was to fall back on the outpost line.

This small force never became actively engaged; a squadron of German cavalry approached the edge of the village, and the two troops opened fire upon it at long range, whereupon the enemy retired. Hostile patrols continued in observation, but made no serious effort to advance'

B and A Squadrons operated together on this day: 'Patrols were pushed forward to hold the bridges at Obourg, Havre and Thieu. These positions were taken up without difficulty, but shortly afterwards the German advance commenced. The experiences of these advanced posts were almost indentical. The enemy, in more or less close order, advanced against the bridges, only to be met by the fire of the men holding them.'

Robert

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As usual ... top class.

Many thanks

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Hussars, Uhlans, charges etc ... different world.

Almost a different war!?

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This is brilliant many thanks Robert for some outstanding information.

Regards

David

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Thanks, David. It gets really interesting when you analyse what the commanders did with the information. Bear in mind that all a higher commander could tell from the information quoted so far is that contact had been made. There was more information came in from the aerial observers. I will try and add this too.

Robert

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  • 3 years later...

Hussars, Uhlans, Dragoons... I want to settle this;

I was under impression that it was the 4th Kurassiers that were met with the first shots by the B.E.F on the Western Front. According to "Long, long Trail"-site it was the 2nd, but several sources identify them as the 4th.

During the early days of war, almost all German cavalrymen were called "Uhlans" by the British. However the Uhlans had a distinctive headgear (as well as Hussars did) ... German Kurassiers and Dragoons however both used spiked pickelhaube and I understand if these two were sometimes mixed. Especially if seen from a distance.

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As one whose primary interest lies in infantry, I hope I am not asking a silly question ...

Here goes.

Is there any merit in my thinking that Britain's cavalry regiments would have learned many useful lessons from their 'Imperial Police Force role 'throughout the Empire/Boer War/North West Frontier etc ... i.e. would their tactics have been superior to the German cavalry who lacked such experiences.

Sorry for my pitiful wording of the question ... cut to the chase ... were the German Cav less modern in their tactical thought than the British?

I appreciate that 'modern' and 'cavalry' do not neccessarily equate :lol:

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Desmond, if you have a chance to read Richard Holmes' Riding the Retreat: Mons to Marne 1914 Revisited, do it. I'm sure you find everything you're looking for.

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Good pointer. Thanks

Des

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Des, you have posed a very interesting question. It is often stated, in the English literature at least, that the British cavalry were superior to their German counterparts. Cavalrymen of the time certainly expressed this view on many occasions. They were not referring simply to the superior capabilities of the SMLE versus the German cavalry carbine, nor to the markmanship training that cavalry received in order to use the SMLE to best effect. Subsequently, many commentators have picked up on these comments, either quoting them verbatim and/or migrating these comments into the summary statement that prompted your question. Once you scratch the surface of the secondary analyses, however, it is rare to find that German accounts have even been considered. So I would urge caution in assuming that British cavalry were better. This assumption has to be subjected to critical evaluation IMHO.

There is no doubt that the British cavalry's proficiency with the SMLE resulted from the Boer War experience. Steve Badsey's excellent book on the evolution of British cavalry doctrine clearly sets out the evidence for this.

Cavalry tactics were, however, far more complex than just the ability to use the rifle/carbine and the capability to use the sword/lance. Any discussion that focuses on these comparators is far too limited. Neither side had significant pre-war experience in the use of divisional cavalry (ie cavalry attached to infantry divisions) nor in the manouevring of whole cavalry corps (the British didn't enter the war with a cavalry corps, though arguably it could have created one so this difference is immaterial IMHO). The use of independent cavalry formations was very 'modern'. You can trace many tactics of modern cavalry units directly back to the experience gained in August/September 1914. It should be noted, for example, that Heinz Guderian was a wireless operator with a German cavalry unit at the beginning of WW1. His experiences at that time were important in evolving the strategy behind the Panzer formations that entered WW2.

Robert

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Robert - thanks for that insight and the valuable hint to 'look over the fence' so to speak .. your reply now has me asking myself ..

OK So the British have all this small war cavalry experience/mounted infantry etc. But as you point out, the British army had no real field experience in recent times of fielding such a unit as a Cavalry Corps ..

Which begs the question, in this titanic clash of Euro-military superpowers who DID think and work in terms of Cavalry Corps .. was it ever truly possible for the German army to have the channel 'flank' of their Schlieffen plan operation weighted heavily with fast moving cavalry? Would a more judicious use of cavalry as a massed formation in 1914, advancing swiftly and avoiding pitched battle, have had a similar effect to the German movements of 1940?

Again, I stress my knowledge of cavalry and the in-depth nature of operations at this stage of the war is 'weak' to say the least!

Des

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Des, another excellent question and one that has been raised by other commentators in the past. Before addressing the use of the cavalry on the outer 'rim' of the German wheel into northern France, I want to note that German cavalry had been operating extensively for at least two weeks prior to the BEF cavalry reaching their first billets in France. This point is important when evaluating the reports from British cavalry about their first contacts with their German counterparts. The latter were cavalry attached to infantry formations, not the independent cavalry unit that was heading towards Ostend in search of the BEF. There is one source that is often quoted, namely Bloem's account of German cavalry being surprised by the BEF north of the Canal and then galloping back in a state of disarray. At at tactical level, there is no doubt that some German cavalry patrols were badly mauled by the BEF infantry outposts. What is less well understood is that these patrols immediately set in train a series of events that are only hinted at in British accounts. For example, the encounters near Obourg and Nimy led the German cavalry patrols to immediately report back to the German 18th Infantry Division and IX Armeekorps. This precipitated an immediate and significant redeployment of the advancing German forces. Artillery were pushed forward, past the German infantry columns. The field guns were deployed around the Mons salient in the area opposite Nimy and Obourg. Heavy artillery fire was then able to support the subsequent the infantry assault, which penetrated deep into the British positions and threatened to split the BEF forces either side of Mons itself. The speed with which this took place reflected the pre-war training and the experience, albeit limited, of the earlier weeks of the war.

Of course, one reason why the German divisional cavalry were surprised is that their independent counterparts in H.K.K. 2 (II Cavalry Corps) were providing the distant screen in the wrong place. Ideally, the independent cavalry formation (akin to the British Cavalry Division) should have been out in front and should have picked up the British advance guards much earlier. Potentially, this would have given more time for the German forces to find any open flank and begin manoeuvring to exploit it, while manoeuvring to pin the BEF in place at the same time. In encounter battles, which is what the earliest battles in the war were going to be, the whole aim was to use cavalry to blind the enemy while gaining as much information about the enemy as possible. In the very first weeks of the war, the German independent cavalry corps were quickly in action. They bypassed Liege for example and penetrated into Belgium ahead of the fall of the fortresses. In the Ardennes region, the cavalry pushed through to the Meuse near Dinant and paved the way for the subsequent outflanking manoeuvre on the right flank of Lanrezac's Fifth Army. This has important consequences for the BEF on the Fifth Army's left flank, as we well know.

This brings me to the first consideration with respect to your question. At the very outset, the German independent cavalry had a very important role to play across the rest of the German advance.

As the German advance continued, some of the German independent cavalry formations were put into gaps between the German infantry. Thus whole cavalry divisions were used to plug gaps in the German forces advancing through the Ardennes for example. Other cavalry corps, most notably H.K.K. 1 were pulled out and then transferred across to the right wing. Von Richthofen's Corps (not the pilot, but his uncle) had pushed west(ish) to towards the Meuse (and Lanrezac's right flank) and then skirted north up and around Namur, then back down to threaten Lanrezac's left flank. H.K.K. 1 was about to come in behind the French Fifth Army, whose left flank and rear were now exposed by the withdrawal of the BEF, when the distances travelled took their toll. The horses needed re-shoeing and the Corps came to a halt. The French intercepted von Richthofen's wireless message (via the Eiffel Tower) and realised that the threat was there. They called upon the BEF to help, but Lanrezac was able to extricate his Army from the impending trap, just.

The example of HKK 1 illustrates what might have been possible, but it has to be borne in mind that HKK 1 had an important job to do elsewhere first. In other words, more cavalry would have been needed if the right wing was to have had a major force to sweep around Paris. At least, that was in the mindset of the German planners, based on contemporary thinking about the use of independent cavalry formations. We know that the German military did not get the budget needed to create these formations before the war.

Might the German divisional cavalry have been sufficient, ie have done sufficiently well without the Intel of preceding independent cavalry to forewarn them? In retrospect, there is some evidence to support this. Zuber's account of the Battle of the Frontiers in the Ardennes shows how the German divisional cavalry assets significantly outperformed their French counterparts and, coupled with the astute operational capabilities of the parent infantry formations, enabled the Germans to outmanoeuvre the French advances and deliver serious reverses. Perhaps a foreknowledge of this outcome would have given German planners the confidence to place more cavalry corps on the outer wing, but this is an area where the lack of experience in the use of these formations, particularly the capabilities of 'divisional' cavalry, were largely unknown, Indeed all previous evidence, mainly from the American Civil War (which was well known to German cavalry thinkers, for example (but not only) through the writings of von Borcke, who served with JEB Stuart), could have suggested otherwise, bearing in mind that massed cavalry formations were a late 'invention' in that war.

The other evidence to support your proposal comes from the Race to the Sea. German cavalry corps played a major role in enabling the Germans to achieve strategic and operational parity in the race. There was no possibility of the cavalry acting in advance of affiliated infantry formations; there weren't enough of either to go round. The problem, of course, was that the cavalry did not have enough punching power to advance through the enemy once contact was made. Herein lies the ultimate problem with the proposed solution. Massed cavalry corps on the extreme right flank, hugging the sea, would not have guaranteed a different outcome. The area between the BEF and the coast was not devoid of French troops. It would have been more easy to stop, or significantly slow, German cavalry compared with German infantry. At the end of the day, from what I have read so far, the lack of the latter would still have been the major problem.

Robert

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Thorough answer - thank you very much for that.

Des

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