Perceptions of the Great War

[Seadog]

Instead of my posting snippets of what follows on various threads I believe that it would be better that I create this thread to stimulate debate on some of my own personal views of the accepted perception of what is primarily the British experience of the Great War. I sincerely believe that this perception is skewed in favour of the “they were all victims” and “what a disaster, mud, blood & incompetent Generals” etc. Whist of course there is no doubt that these are valid issues, they seem to be for the media and others the only views portrayed of the conflict.

I believe that there is another side to this, that of the courage and fortitude of the armed services in responding to the needs of the Country as perceived at the time. For example given that Germany invaded neutral Belgium and subjugated large areas of France, what exactly was this Country to do in order that our allies were supported in their hour of need and the invader was defeated? As for what I can best describe as some sort of “Death Culture” pervading the study of WW1, I give as a genuine example of this the time that I attended a meeting of the local WFA at which we were shown photos of a recently married couple whose were delighted to pass around their snaps taken on honeymoon posing in CWGC War Cemeteries. Just one further example was a Xmas meeting where the quiz involved naming war cemeteries as photographed by members.

As we get closer to the 100^th anniversary of the start of the war I believe that it is important to reassess the popular perception of the conflict in the light of the conditions pertaining at the time and by doing so to recognize the tremendous efforts of the soldiers and in particular all those who returned home and continued as best they could to live their lives and contribute to society plus the populations of the devastated areas whose stories have not been recognized, certainly in the English media. I would be interested in member’s views on this subject, bearing in mind that we are not rewriting history.

To support my views as detailed in Para 2 may I direct readers attention to some of the topics on this forum under “Classic threads”, such as “Two brothers killed on the same date! (sic), “Favorite gravestone inscription” and “Three sons killed in action” there are of course many more.

Regards

Norman

[Old Tom]

I think you are correct and that there are many reasons for this. To my mind the two most significant are as follows. The first is the often cited effect of popular fiction and other programmes which stress casualties rather than the reasons for whatever is being portrayed and the methods being employed and the limitations of the technology of the times. The second is the huge interest in tracing family history which, because most families had some involvement in the war, leads to cemeteries.

As 2014 approaches, I would suggest that matters that should be given much more attention include:

The reasons for the war, in particular how the politicians and their military advisors failed to appreciate the likely outcome of a war in Europe. While there is little doubt that Germany provoked the war they were influenced by the actions of the other powers. French and Russian agreements and the British increases in naval power for example.

The part played by the Russian and French armies in the early part of the war. I other words to balance the common view that the British army played the major part in defeating the Germans.

The time needed for the UK to form, train and equip an army capable, as it was for the last 100 days, of playing a major part in forcing the Germans to seek an amistice.

The part played by the Royal Navy in containing the German fleet and preventing the supply of food and materials to Germany.

Old Tom

[mhurst]

Well said, and I would encourage anyone interested in the FWW to read Gary Sheffield's excellent "Forgotten Victory", which addresses many of the points you raise.

Melvin

[phil andrade]

You're spitting against the wind, Norman.

The "Death Culture" aspect that you describe is bound to hold sway, more so in this country than in others. This reflects the unique experience of the UK 1914-18, in so far as it reperesented a departure from the traditional "British Way of War".

I don't say this to dismiss your arguments ; I think you're discerning in your comments.

Apart from the Black Death, the Great War was the nation's supreme demographic tragedy. Some might insist that the Civil Wars in Britain in the mid sixteenth century were comparable, but I doubt that.

" A tragic and unecessary conflict..." That's how our late John Keegan described The War of 1914-18 in the opening sentence of his history.

I endorse your suggestion that a more positive "spin" on the intellectual, moral and cognitive qualites of the people who fought the war is needed. I am upset, though, by the tendency of some to try and downplay the scale of the carnage, especially by flawed statistical comparisons with other conflicts, both before and after the Great War.

To try and assess the impact of the war without countenancing the colossal death toll is like trying to make an omelette without breaking eggs.

Phil (PJA)

[Steven Broomfield]

I remember a well-known (now deceased) amateur historian whom I very much admired referring to as "Somme Vermin" those people who semed to take some strange pleasure in visiting the sites of disasters, rather than the sites of successes.

Maybe it's the british psyche - we like failure.

BTW, I took the lovely Mrs Broomfield to some WW2 Italian battlefields for our honeymoon. We did go to Rome and Pompeii, too, I should add, but there's something, you must say, amazingly romantic about the sewers of Anzio.

[phil andrade]

there's something, you must say, amazingly romantic about the sewers of Anzio.

Yes....the expression "like a rat up a drain pipe" comes to mind !

The Great War, I would have thought, enhanced British prestige. Notwithstanding the defeats at Gallipoli and Kut, the conflict resulted in a British Empire that was bigger than before. Moreover, the role taken by the British in winning that war was the pre-eminent one, as anyone familiar with the record of the Hundred Days will agree. The Second World War, in contrast, diminished the status of the British in Imperial terms, both relatively and absolutely. Dunkirk, Greece, Crete, Tobruk and, above all, Singapore : a record of defeat and even - as Churchill himself remarked - disgrace.....this provides a far more appetising feast for our national self deprecators than anything from 1914-18.

And yet, people here still dismiss the Great War as dismal in its conduct and futile in its outcome.

Phil (PJA)

[JN Heddle]

My perception of WW I, is one where the Generals and Politicians were just waiting for the spark the erupted in the first war moves (invasion of Belgium).

In essence, both the Allies and the Central Powers werer 'champing at the bit', so to speak, to launch their Armies and reclaim past slights, no matter how insignificant to others.

What the Generals really forgot about was, the greatly expanded growth in the power of the improved weapon systems and how truly lethal that they were (the machine gun for example).

Most countries, Politicians, Generals and the General Populace, were waiting and eager for revenge, as the French surely were for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine in 1870-1871.

The Balkans werre called the 'power-keg' of WW I, but I believe that it was a side show, and the major powers thought that they could control it.

But the unprovoked German invasion of neutral Belgium was what got the Politicians to eagerly go along with the Generals thirst for revenge and bring the public with them.

vaya con Dios

John

[Seadog]

Thanks for the responses so far. Just a couple of points which members may want to contribute to, the first I am afraid is one in my original post that given that war was declared in 1914 and that Germany invaded neutral Belgium followed on the western front by attempts to reach Paris thwarted by the courage of the British and mainly French armies, what then could the British have done differently to force the invader both to retreat and agree to an armistice as happened in 1918. I think that this question plus what were the German war aims in 1914 on the western front are both fundamental to our understanding of the conflict.

An extreme view would be that if we did nothing and maintained entrenched positions presumably the war would have extended into the 1920`s were it not perhaps for the British naval blockade. Lastly was there an actual point in time when the accepted view of the war being mass slaughter, lions led by donkeys etc was actually formed and became prevalent in this country. There are regular examples of the attitude of the media to WW1 as this example published on the Telegraph website today when reviewing the latest episode of Parades End

“Darkly humorous in tone, it found the putty-mouthed aristocrat Christopher Tietjens (Benedict Cumberbatch) stationed in a base depot near Rouen, fed up with the monotony and harebrained bureaucracy of life on the Western Front”. (My bold text)

What also interests me is the form that the UK commemoration of the 100^th anniversary of the war will actually take in 2014 mind you I think that I already know.

Regards

Norman

[Alan Tucker]

What also interests me is the form that the UK commemoration of the 100^th anniversary of the war will actually take in 2014 mind you I think that I already know.

Regards

Norman

I think the key word here is 'commemorations'.There will be plenty to admire judging by what I have heard at several meetings of the Birmingham Centenary Programme group and from the BBC. But there will also plenty to get our teeth gnashing with inaccuracies and 'lions led by donkeys' style rubbish. One test will come at the end - the Battle of the Hundred Days must be commemorated for the tremendous feat of arms it was.

[Chris_Baker]

What the Generals really forgot about was, the greatly expanded growth in the power of the improved weapon systems and how truly lethal that they were (the machine gun for example).

...

But the unprovoked German invasion of neutral Belgium was what got the Politicians to eagerly go along with the Generals thirst for revenge and bring the public with them.

Do explain further, as these statements fit no historical analysis or evidence that I have ever seen.

[Seadog]

Thanks for the comment Alan (Post 9), I totally agree with you regarding the Battle of the Hundred Days which to me draws a parallel with the Battle for Normandy 1944 including the Falaise Pocket which saw some of the most intense combat that the Allies were involved in but in my experience receives little coverage, it is a shame that our view of modern history is so selective.

Regards

Norman

[JN Heddle]

Do explain further, as these statements fit no historical analysis or evidence that I have ever seen.

I, like you and many others on this forum, have read many books on the First Woorld War. Two that come readily to mind are :

Tuchman, Barbara, 'The Guns of August' ; Dell Publishing Co Ltd, New York, 1962.

Harria, John; 'Covenant With Death', Arrow Books Ltd, London, 1969.

These two books and several others, though not explicitly stating, "fit no historical analysis", have formed the opinion that I stated.

vaya con Dios

John

[Chris_Baker]

Please be explicit. I am particularly intrigued by the "Generals thirst for revenge". Intrigued mainly as I believe it to be twaddle - but I am always happy to revise an opinion in the face of evidence.

[Ron Clifton]

"The generals' thirst for revenge" might apply to the French Army, but I suspect that the majority of the French population needed little encouragement to follow them and reclaim Alsace and Lorraine.

What revenge would the British generals have sought? The Agadir incident of 1911? I don't think so!

Ron

[James]

The 'Lions led by Donkeys' theorists always fail to come up with any coherant alternative plan when confrunted by the realities of Haig's (and other Generals) position both militarily, geographicly and politically.

Conflict on such a scale will by default allways invite large casualties, as has already been mentioned Normandy 1944.

I think the generals were well aware of the effect of machine guns barbed wire etc.

[widavies]

Let me throw this into the mix, which has been remarked upon in many books since. What did the end of the conflict actually achieve for the surviving common soldiers and post war. Overall the social benefits were positive. The breaking down of the British caste system, rapid technological advances, better medical facilities, better jobs, housing, training, chance to travel, new experiences, mixing of the gene pool due to geographical reorientation, more power for women etc. More learned people could add more to this list as well as referring to the complete restructuring of the European map and the removal of many feudal monarchies that were still in place. Yes it was tragic that so many lost their lives through whatever causes, but what did we and the worlds people actually gain from the "Great War".

Regards

Will

[LoweK]

As the great continental game of chess drew near to a stalemate Germany spat the dummy out and tipped the board over and invaded Belgium.

But what has always stuck to the back of my mind is the way that ALL classes volunteered, with pride and passion, their heads held high marching through the towns and cities. It was an adventure that filled them with excitement something they could not resist, only when the reality of death, distruction and hooror hit them did their views change. I can remember my Granny calling the politicians "War Mongers", my Grandad called the brewrey's lazy B's...... He just believed they did what had to be done. There are many reasons and many views of how the war started. Social benefits did improve, women were looked at as more equal, but the travesty is, we learned nothing from the war, as subsequent wars have proven, even today our young men are falling because of mans antipathy to one another.

Kevin

[Guest]

The 'perception' would depend on which subset of the population we are considering. To address Seadog's original post, there are two interesting chapters in "The British Army in Battle and Its Image 1914-1918" by Stephen Badsey which address this

Chapter 1. Introduction: The Western Front in Public History 1914-2014

Chapter 3. Blackadder Goes Forth and the 'Two Western Fronts' Debate 1914-1918

The latter chapter in particular charts the course of the Great War in minds of popular culture of the British. He draws attention to the idea that the debate is not the preserve of the British and highlights similar issues in Australia, Canada and America and aims criticism at Keegan for having entrenched views. The bibiography provides a rich vein of literature on this debate.

It seems one can hardly pick up a new book on the Great War without the introduction touching on the perceived influence of 'Oh What a Lovely War' and 'Blackadder Goes Forth' on the (British) nation's alleged perceptions of the Great War. Similarly the now widespread denigration of the 'Lions led by Donkeys' school of thought (and the proliferation of books with the word 'myth' or 'real' and 'truth' in subtitles and chapter headings) would suggest that the revisionist school has gained a very strong foothold and is (within informed circles) now the mainstream view. It is difficult to prove that the common public perception is still deeply rooted in the “they were all victims” and “what a disaster, mud, blood & incompetent Generals” that Seadog suggests. More than a few authors have suggested that the mass of literature on the War Poets fuelled the 'victims' school of thought for many generations. There can barely be a generation of British school children who have not had Wilfred Owen as part of their English Literature curriculum. If one was to take teaching in today's (British) schools, from my limited experience (father of four teenagers) I think the educational establishments are now taking a considerably more balanced view (despite the War Poets). I was pleasantly surprised by their understanding of the Great War.

If we want to find evidence to support the 'Lions led by Donkeys' school (first published in 1961) reinforced by the likes of Norman F Dixon's 'On the Psychology of Military Incompetence' (1976) I am sure there is still plenty to be found. If my library is anything to go by there is also plenty of literature to support the revisionists' view starting (arguably) with Terraine's 1963 book 'Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier' (1963 - only 2 years after Lions Led by Donkeys) I think the two views continue to co-exist. The former seems to be steeped in subjective conjecture and the latter stands on the shoulders of rigorous academic research. The differentiating factor is education. Differences in levels of education generate differences in levels of understanding in all subjects. This is not unique to the Great War. In my view the 'Donkeys' view is rapidly receding despite repeated attempts by the low end of the media and films such as 'Gallipoli' (1981) to revive it and the revisionist school is gaining ground rapidly. I suspect this shift will steadily accelerate going into the 100 year anniversary. I am bracing myself for the counter-revisionist school to emerge....

The historiography of the Great War is a subject worthy of its own book. The bibliography of the books written on the Great War reveal interesting patterns in the peaks and troughs in the volume of publications relating to the Great War. The immediate post war period saw a steady flow of non-academic unit histories which ran from 1918 through to the very early 1930s. In parallel the Official Histories became the dominant reference points with all their inherent (alleged) weaknesses. Contagion between publications was rife. The OHs ran from the publication of the first volume in 1923 to the last in 1949. In recent years Andrew Green's excellent book "Writing the Great War - Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948" (pub 2003) has provide some refreshingly (revisionist) evidence that the OH authors were not apologists and provided more balanced accounts than the 'Donkeys' school would have us believe.

The post WWII years to the early 1960s was a particularly barren period for publications on WWI. Against a general low level of interest in WWI there were occasional surges in interest in the late 1960s and again in the late 1970s and then a steady increase from the mid 1980s into the 1990s with a spike in 1993.

One has to consider that prior to 1967 access to much of the primary source material such as War Diaries and official papers relating to WWI were not available to the public. Prior to the internet age the material was still not easily accessible to many. There is a good case to be made that the ease of access to source material at IWM, NAM, TNA and the Liddle Collection to name a few has coincided with more determined academic analysis which has driven the revisionist school. I suspect the number of university courses offering the opportunity to study military history is a factor too.

A very small sample of books might suggest the revisionist school continues to make headway -

"The Great War and the British People

" (second edition) by J M Winter (1985, revised 2003) - Through a rigorous forensic analysis of demographic data he provides strong evidence to suport the argument that the Great War actually 'improved life expectancy of those lucky enough to have stayed out of uniform' especially among the working class population. He also draws attention to the fact that casualties were social class-specific, with the best off bearing a disproportionate burden as a per cent of those involved. He extends this argument suggesting that the War reduced the demographic disadvantages of being born into a working class family. He makes the assumption that this hypothesis is all counter-intuitive and further argues "

there is a host of data to support the hypothesis that paradoxically the Great War was both a catastrophe and a benefit"

.

"Six Weeks The Short and Gallant Life of the British Officer in the First World War"

by John Lewis Stempel (2010) - provides some compelling evidence that the privileged classes died in significantly higher proportions than the working classes - measured as those died as a per cent of those who served. He cites the high death rates of the Public School educated Officers (and men) and similarly high figures of University educated men. I would imagine these facts would be a surprise to most in the Lions Led by Donkeys school. Similar evidence can be found in the hefty 545 page tome "

The Aristocracy and the Great War

" by Gerald Gliddon (2002).

"Playing the Game: The Junior Infantry Officer on the Western Front 1914-1918"

by Christopher Moore-Bick (2011) - Similar to Six Weeks (above). It is interesting to contrast this with Peter Parker's "

The Old Lie: The Great War and the Public School Ethos

" (1987)

"Retreat and Rearguard 1914: The BEF's Actions from Mons to the Marne"

by Jerry Murland (2011) which reinforces Ascoli's "

The Mons Star

" and despite counter-arguments by Zuber in "The Mons Myth" (that word again) provides a more positive account of the BEF during the opening stages of the War

Lastly I would suggest that the very existence of bodies such as the Western Front Association and the GWF stand as testimony to the rising interest in the Great War and a more academic approach to establishing fact rather than accepting worn out 'axioms'.

Just my thoughts. MG

[Rob Connolly]

Seadog, rather than paraphrase it here, I would recommend Dan Todman's "The Great War: Myth and Memory", which analyses the way in which perception of the Great War has changed over time.

I have found a useful intellectual counterbalance for those who abhor the casualties of the Somme/Arras/Passchendaele as if suffering was a uniquely British experience - by the end of 1914 the French army had suffered about 950,000 casualties (i.e. about 8 times the size of the entire BEF in 1914).

[JN Heddle]

Please be explicit. I am particularly intrigued by the "Generals thirst for revenge". Intrigued mainly as I believe it to be twaddle - but I am always happy to revise an opinion in the face of evidence.

Believe that it is 'twaddle', if you will, but I came to this perception after years of reading many books. Not just of World War I, but wars before and after.

The two works, on World War I the left an impression on me and aided in forming my opinion of, "Generals thirst for revenge", were The 'GUNS of AUGUST' and 'The PEOPLE'S WAR BOOK and ATLAS', cited below, with excerpts. I am not out to change any ones opinion to my way of thinking. As per the title of this thread, this is my own opinion.

1 - Tuchman, Barbara, 'The Guns of August' ; Dell Publishing Co Ltd, New York, 1962.

Chap 1, pg 16-25 - “ …… Edward [King Edward VII of England], the arch plotter …. of Germany’s encirclement; ….. cast a shadow between Germany and the sun. “He is Satan.

You cannot imagine what a Satan he is !”

“This verdict, announced by the Kaiser [Wilhem I] before a dinner of three hundred guests in Berlin in 1907, was occasioned by one of Edward’s

continental tours undertaken with clearly diabolical designs at encirclement.”

“In the nine short years of his reign, England’s splendid isolation had given way, … a series of “understandings” or attachments, but not quite alliances …..

with two old enemies France and Russia, one promising new power, Japan. The resulting shift in balance registered itself around the world and affected every

State’s relations with every other.”

“The German ambassador thought the King’s [Edward VII] visit was “a most odd affair”, and supposed that an Anglo-French rapprochement was the result

of a “general aversion to Germany.” ……., the rapprochement became the Anglo-French Entente, signed in April 1904.”

“Germany might have had an English Entente for herself had not her leaders, suspecting English motives, rebuffed the overtures of the Colonial

Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, in 1899 and again in 1901.”

“In German practice, Mr Roosevelt’s current precept for getting on with your neighbours was Teutonized to, “Speak loudly and brandish a big gun.”

“ ….. one dominant idea; “the German lust for power …. And fixed as its policy the extermination of France.” He [PM Georges Clemenceau] told Edward [VII]

that when the time came when France needed help, England’s sea power would not be enough, and reminded him that Napoleon was beaten at Waterloo, not

Trafalgar.”

“Bismarck’s maxim “Keep friends with Russia” and the Reinsurance Treaty that implemented it, William [Wilhelm II] had dropped along with Bismarck in the

first and worst blunder of his reign. Alexander III, the tall, stern Czar …, had …… in 1982 and entered into an alliance with republican France, ….. .”

“Edward [VII] really desired peace, the Kaiser scribbled furiously in the margin; “Lies. He wants war. But I have to start it so he does not have the odium.”

“War, he [Gen von Bernhardi] stated, “is a biological necessity”; it is the carrying out among humankind of “the natural law, upon which all the laws of Nature

rest, the law of the struggle for existence.”

Chap 2, pg 34-44 - “Ever since 1892, when France and Russia had joined in military alliance, ….. . These arrangements made it inevitable that in any war in which she engaged,

Germany would have to fight on two fronts against both Russia and France.”

“They had been taught by Field Marshal von der Goltz, in his book, The Nation in Arms, that “We have won our position through the sharpness of our sword,

not the sharpness of our minds.” The decision to violate Belgian neutrality followed easily.”

“Schlieffen, having embraced the strategy of :decisive battle”, pinned Germany’s fate to it. …….. :Belgian neutrality must be broken by one side or the

other,: his thesis ran, “Whoever gets there first and occupies Brussels and imposes a war levy of some 1,000 million francs, has the upper hand”.”

“Belgium was an open path in either direction, whether Germany or France would use it depended on which of the two wanted war the more.”

“Leopold [iI] ……… reminded the Kaiser that ……. His Minister and Parliament would never consider such a suggestion.”

“That was the wrong thing to say, for the Kaiser flew into one of his rages and scolded the King for putting respect for Parliament and Ministers

above respect for the finger of God.”

“ ……… to achieve the superiority in numbers over France which he [schlieffen] needed for a quick victory. He decided to use reserve units in the front

line.”

“In 1914 two events sharpened Germany’s readiness to a fine point, In April, England had begun naval talks with the Russians, and in June, Germany

herself had completed the widening of the Kiel Canal. ……. On June 1^st, he [Gen von Moltke] said to Baron Eckhardstein [Austrian Army Chief of Staff],

“We are ready, and the sooner the better for us”.”

Chap 3, pg 46-74 - “Under the peace terms dictated by Germany at Versailles in 1871, France had suffered amputation, indemnity, and occupation. ……… At Bordeaux ….

Deputies of Alsace and Lorraine walked from the hall in tears, leaving behind their protest ; “We proclaim forever the right of Alsasatians and Lorrainers to

remain members of the French Nation. We swear for ourselves, our children, and our children’s children to claim the right for all time, by every means in the

face of the usurper”.”

“The annexation, … opposed by Bismarck, who said it would be the Achilles’ heel of the new German Empire, was required by the elder von Moltke and

his Staff.”

“The memory of Sedan remained, a stationary dark shadow on French consciousness. “N’en parlez jamais; pensez-y soujours” (Never speak of it; think of

it always) had counseled Gambetta.”

“ … Victor Hugo urged ….. “France will have but one thought; to reconstitute her forces, gather her energy, nourish her sacred anger, raise her young

generation to form an army of the whole people, to work without cease, to study the methods and skills of our enemies, to become again a great France, the

France of 1792, the France of an idea with a sword. Then one day she will be irresistible. Then she will take back Alsace-Lorraine”.”

“The one thing that held together all elements of the army, whether old guard or republican, Jesuit or Freemasons, was the mystique d’Alsace. The eyes of

all were fixed on the blue line of the Vosges “

“The Germans were stilled gnawed by envy of the country they had conquered. “As well off as God in Franc,” was a German saying. ... . ,,, believing

themselves superior in soul, in strength, in energy, industry, and national virtue, Germans felt they deserved the dominion of Europe. The work of

Sedan must be completed.”

“ Living in the shadow of that unfinished business, France, reviving in spirit and strength, grew weary of being eternally on guard. Eternally exhorted by

her leaders to defend herself. ……… her spirit rebelled against thirty years of the defensive, ………The “idea of the sword” fulfilled the need. ……. It was

called élan vital, the all conquering will. ........ Her genius was in her spirit, the spirit of la gloire, of 1792, ……. “

“Translated into military terms …. élan vital became the doctrine of the offensive………….. On one hand Foch preached a mystique of will ….. his famous

aphorisms, “The will to conquer is the first condition of victory,” or more succinctly, “Victoire c’ est la volonté, and, “A battle won is a battle in which one will

not confess oneself beaten”.”

“Foch’s principles …….. were taken up …….. by Col Grandmaison, ……. Director of the Ttoisième Bureau, or Bureau of Military Operations,….. . Col

Grandmaison grasped only the head and not the feet of Foch’s Principles. Expounding their élan without their sureté, he expressed a military philosophy

…….. the offensive á outrance, offensive to the limit.

“The new Field Regulations ……. In Oct 1913…….. opened with …..; “The French Army, returning to its tradition, henceforth admits no law but the

offensive.” “the offensive alone”, it proclaimed, :leads to positive results.” ……French Army marched to war in 1914 under a banner marked cran.”

Chap 4, pg 63-74 - “A question that Wilson asked of Foch …. In January 1910, evoked an answer which expressed in one sentence the problem of the alliance with Englans, as

the French saw it.”

“What is the smallest British military force that would be of any practical assistance to you?”, Wilson asked.”

“Like a rapier flash came Foch’s reply, “A single British soldier --- and we will see to it that he is killed”.”

“By the spring of 1914 the joint work of the French and British General Staffs was complete to last billet of every Battalion, even to the places where they

were to drink their coffee. The number of French railroad cars to be allotted. The assignments of interpreters, the preparation of codes and ciphers, the forage

of horses was settled or expected to be consummated by July. ……… While the military prearranged the lines of battle, England’s political leaders, pulling the

blanket of “no commitment” over their heads, resolutely refrained from watching them.”

Chap 5, pg 75-76 - “In 1911 Gen Dubail, then Chief of the [French] War Ministry Staff, was sent to Russia to indoctrinate the Russian General Staff with the need for seizing the

initiative. ……………… Dubail obtained a promise that as soon as the front-line forces were in position, without waiting for concentration to be completed, the

Russians would attack, ….. East Prussia …. “

Miller, James. Martin (Editor in Chief, ex US Consul to France and Germany), Canfield, HS (Paris War Correspondent and World War Analyst) and Plewman, WR )War Critic, Toronto Star); ‘The People’s War Book and Atlas’, RC Barnum Pub Co, Cleveland, Ohio; FB Dickerson Pub Co. Detroit, Michigan, Better Farming Ass’n, Cleveland Ohio and Imperial Pub Co, Toronto, Ontario.

Chap 1, pg 21-25 - "Europe had been an “armed camp” since ….. 1871, but diplomats had averted crises created by the militarists of the Central Powers. But in 1914, the

Influences working for war definitely triumphed in Germany and Austria …. .”

“Germany sought war. ……… attitude of Great Britain … conciliatory. France ….. realized that Germany constantly sought provocation …. [France]

acted in a spirit of the greatest caution ….. . Russia …. Had not recovered from her war with Japan and was sitting tight upon a lid of seething cauldron of

internal problems.”

“……… Germany’s main object was to guard herself and strengthen herself against an attempt by France to regain Alsace and Lorraine. ……. Germany,

as France regained her strength, plotted new aggression against her. “

“France and England were face to face like birds in a cockpit, while Europe, under German leadership, was fastening their spurs and eager to see them

fight. Then, suddenly, they both raised their heads and moved back to the fence. They had decided not to fight and the face of European things was

changed.”

“The seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908, …… prompted by Germany …. Was the second of the great crises which Prussinanism

engineered. ………. Thus for the first time was openly revealed the policy of the Central Powers to ignore Treaty obligations ….. .”

“In Germany. Provocation to war became a necessity to save the face of the military party.”

“German diplomatic documents collected since the outbreak of the great war, reveal the military preparations of Germany and Austria ….. .”

Chap 1, pg 40-41 - “The first days of Aug 1914, saw Europe seething with military preparations. …… Secret mobilization had been going on in Germany for weeks before the

assassination at Sarajevo. The assembling of Prussian strength against France began as early as Jul 21^st.”

“Bismarck and von Moltke and their successors had striven to create the predominant military strength of Germany since …. 1871.”

“France, confronted for years by the fear of German encroachments maintain a standing Army and an easily mobilized first Reserve of 1,500,000 men....“

“….. poured in the forces of Colonies, another bit of the writing on the wall that Germany had ignored, She had expected the disintegration of the British

Empire, but the answer ….. thousands upon thousands from Canada, and Australia and Britain’s far East possessions who fought for the banner of the

Empire.”

This may be a giant leap on my part, but this is how I arrived at my perception.

vaya con Dios

John

[phil andrade]

a useful intellectual counterbalance for those who abhor the casualties of the Somme/Arras/Passchendaele as if suffering was a uniquely British experience - by the end of 1914 the French army had suffered about 950,000 casualties (i.e. about 8 times the size of the entire BEF in 1914).

An essential feature is not that it was a uniquely British experience - or even perceived to be - but that it was, indeed, a unique experience for Britain. The casualties were abhorrent. The circumstances in which they were sustained were aberrant. This was not the British way of war. Mercantile and financial might had allowed Britain to engage in warfare on the periphery while the continental armies massacred each other in land warfare. Of course, British generals and soldiers participated in - and even led - the continental hosts. But even at Blenheim and Waterloo, the British contingents had been minorities in the victorious armiy. The Somme and Passcnedaele were different, in so far as the British took the leading role and suffered the major casualties. This was not only abomination, it was aberration, too.

Phil (PJA)

[Seadog]

Again very interesting posts in particular the suggested reading material which I will follow up. I share no doubt with many the accepted view that the battle of the Somme was necessitated to relieve the pressure being applied to the French at the battle of Verdun and the fact that in 1917 the British Admiralty had stressed that if the U-boat bases on the Belgian coast were not eliminated then the decimation of the merchant fleet would make furtherance of the war unsustainable. Both explanations seem to me to be plausible and though from this distance in time appear to be flawed in their execution I wonder just what other alternatives there were available given the weapons and tactics of time plus the entrenched positions the enemy had constructed in the case of the Somme and the multitude of concrete fortifications in the case of 3^rd Ypres.

There are still two questions (of many) that I find interesting to consider even almost 100 years after the events of 14-18, these being what were Germanys ultimate war aims in 1914 and given that the conflict developed on the Western Front into a war of entrenchment with the Germans not attempting to break the deadlock after 1915 at Ypres until the offensive of 1918, with due respect to the situation at Verdun, just what options did the Allies and in particular the British have available other than those two great and ultimately costly offensives of 1916 and 1917.

Regards

Norman

[Chris_Baker]

This may be a giant leap on my part, but this is how I arrived at my perception.

vaya con Dios

John

All wonderful stuff, John, but without a shred of evidence in support of your two assertions, namely that the Generals had forgotten firepower and that they had a lust for revenge. The latter may have been the case with the French, but what revenge do you believe the British Generals had in mind?

[JN Heddle]

All wonderful stuff, John, but without a shred of evidence in support of your two assertions, namely that the Generals had forgotten firepower and that they had a lust for revenge. The latter may have been the case with the French, but what revenge do you believe the British Generals had in mind?

Chris

Regarding my statement, “…forgot about was, the greatly expanded growth in the power of the improved weapon systems…”, is a lapse of thought on my part. The Generals did not ‘forget’ firepower, but they did underestimate the effect of firepower as a result of its improvement. Ian Hamilton, the British Military Observer (later Gen Sir), and Max Hoffman (later Gen), the German Military Observer; both for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905; came to same conclusion about the usefulness of Cavalry, summed up by Hamilton’s comment, “ ….. the only thing the Cavalry could do in the face of entrenched machine guns, was to cook rice for the Infantry.” The British War Office began to wonder if his months in the Orient had not affected his mind, while German Gen von Moltke, upon readingHoffman’s report, was inspired to comment, “There neverwas

such a crazy way of making war!”. [see Tuchman’s, Guns of August, Chap 11, pg 216]

When war erupted in August 1914, the Generals had slowly arrived at the conclusion that machine gun firepower, when entrenched, was a powerful weapon, and explored further ways on how to improve their use of machine guns in defence. The Germans grasped this faster than the Allies.

The French Field Regulations, trained their soldiers to cover 50 meters in 20 seconds on maneuvers, but on the battlefields, of August 1914, the German machine gunners needed only 8 seconds to fire, thus neutralizing the Infantry assault with ghastly results. [see Tuchman’s, Guns of August, Chap 14, pg 262]

Likewise with artillery fire, the same French Field Regulations calculated that their 75s would neutralize the defensive, forcing the entrenched enemy, in their parapets to keep their heads down and fire into the blue. Hamilton had warned that an entrenched defensive line, under shrapnel fire, could continue to fire, through loopholes, straight at the assaulting Infantry. [see Tuchman’s, Guns of August, Chap 14, pgs 262-263]

The battlefields of August 1914, blew away a lot of long held ideas of fire power and they had to play catch up to overcome its effectiveness, due to the many improvements since 1905.

-----------

The title of this thread is; Perceptions (insight; apprehension; discernment; comprehension) of the Great War. What I have written, whether by misinterpretation or by reading ‘suspect’ material, is my perception of the Great War, based on the books that I have read. . My apologies if my perceptions have made anyone uncomfortable.

Summing up what I have posted :

Germany wanted recognition from Europe, which was not forth coming. They blamed France for this and their dislike of France deepened to the point of the German General Staff preparing and updating the conquest of France on a yearly basis. To do this they continually expanded their Army to attain the numbers in order to conquer France, again. The Germans were discussed with this lack of recognition and formed plans to correct it.

France suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Germany in 1870-1871, and their slowly simmering regret at this smarted on their pride. Finally, this slow burn was galvanized by the deep philosophers in their Officer Schools. This gradually found the French General Staff drawing up plans for a conquest of Germany. The French wanted revenge for the humiliating defeat at Sedan, defeat and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.

Britain, did not have any animosity to any European Country, except perhaps, for France and Russia, with both of which, they were in a sort of ‘friendly intrigue’ where their respective colonial holdings came into contact, in Africa (France) and Asia (Russia). But their animosity towards Germany heightened when Germany began an expansion of their Navy to try and rival the British Navy. Britain patched up their relations with France and Russia, in order to deal with the blatant threat, by Germany, to their pride and joy, the Royal Navy.

Austria-Hungary had a great desire to bring the Slavs under their wing and expand their Empire, after Germany had ‘locked’ them out of expansion in the rest of Europe, after the Six Weeks War of 1866. In 1908 they annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, which greatly angered Serbia and to a lesser extent, Montenegro.

Russia kept a finger on the pulse of the affairs affecting the Slav Nations which were being threatened by both Austria-Hungary (in the Balkans) and Germany (in Poland, which was a Duchy of Russia). The Russians did not like anyone meddling in their ‘sphere of influence’, and look suspicipously at both Germany and Ausr=tria-Hungary.

The Balkan Countries, had just kicked Turkey out of most of the Balkans in 1912, in the 1^st Balkan War. Afterwards the Bulgarians were enraged at Serbia and Greece, who in a secret treaty between, had divided up Macedonia, to the disadvantage of Bulgaria. In the 2^nd Balkan War in 1913, Bulgaria lost most of their gains from the 1912 War to Roumania and Turkey, who saw a chance to take lightly defended territory, while Serbia and Greece split Macedonia between them. The Bulgarians were, to say the least, not happy with this turn of events as well as the sting inflicted on their pride.

In the midst of all this, France made an Alliance with Russia, became a friend of the Balkan Countries and joined in a ‘Entente Cordiale’, with Britain. This move by France made Germany feel surrounded by enemies, when in reality France, Britain, Russia and the Balkans were trying to protect themselves from the a perceived bellicose Germany.

As for ‘evidence’, all one has to do is a lot of reading and pondering on what one has read, just so long as you do not misinterpret or are way-laid by ‘suspect’ material .

If I have been persuaded in my perception by disinformation put out by something I have read and misinterpreted it, I apologize to the forum members. I do not believe this to be the case, but I can be persuaded to change my view by pointing out the errors of my ways.

The references used by the authors of the many books I have read over the decades, appear to be true, but with some of them showing unmistakable bias, have a ‘axe to gind’, or verbosity, but that does not cancel out the facts stated in the majority of them.

I am by no means an expert in discerning the reliability of the two books that formed the basis of my opinion, but I do not believe that the ‘Guns of August¹’ or ‘The People’s War Book and Atlas¹’ are spurious writings of disinformation.

Reference

Tuchman - Tuchman, Barbara, 'The Guns of August' ; Dell Publishing Co Ltd, New York, 1962.

vaya con Dios\

John