Creeping Barrage

[rumplestiltskin]

Morning all.

I understand how the creeping barrage works, but did it develop by a general progression of the war,and was it thought a idea of one commander or did it just evolve by different idea's by many people. And was it's success only achieved when the Artillery finally had it's full quota of guns,and limitless amounts of shells, and also when observation and communications evolved, and which army perfected it and gained most success with it.

Terry.

[SiegeGunner]

Must you post in red, Terry? Apart from being unnecessarily strident, I find it more difficult to read than the standard text colour.

[Old Tom]

I expect the search facility will provide lots of information about creeping barrages. Off the cuff, there is no definitive evidence of the originator. Possibly the French. Possibly the BM RA of the 18th Division Major Brooke (well known in WW2 at much higher rank). The technique was used by some, but not all divisions on the first day of the Somme offensive. 18 Div was one that made a significant advance which may indicate the effectiveness of the technique.

Old Tom

[rumplestiltskin]

Thank you i will have a butchers in search, better colour Blue?

TERRY

[SiegeGunner]

Most people find the default text colour perfectly adequate, Terry, but if you insist on setting a variant colour, yes, that shade of blue is easier to read than red.

[johnreed]

This text is taken from "The Evolution Of Artillery in The Great War" by Lt. Col. A F Brooke DSO psc fisrt published in the Royal Artillery Journal 1924.

BATTLE OF THE SOMME.

With five months of continuous operations, the Battle of the Somme provided suitable conditions for trying out some of the tactical ideas which had resulted from the last year's fighting. We have seen in a previous article that the organisation of the artillery had made distinct strides during the winter months preceding this offensive. We were now provided with artillery capable of exercising a marked influence in the field of battle. Certain refinements in its organisation, and reinforcements to its strength were still required to bring it up to the standard which it reached during the latter part of the war, yet it had attained its early, manhood, and its actions at this period are consequently of particular interest to us.

The policy of destruction received a free rein, both tactical and strategical surprise was entirely sacrificed, the four days' preliminary bombardment of Loos was replaced by one of seven days. We endeavoured to destroy all the wire covering the front system of defences, all fire trenches, strong points, and main communication trenches, whilst the early stage of development of our counterbattery methods prevented us from also including the hostile batteries in our scheme of destruction. Trench mortars were now available in sufficient numbers to be entrusted with the destruction of the front line of wire entanglements. All other wire defences were engaged with 18 pounders firing shrapnel since no efficient wire cutting H.E. Shell was available at that date. The trench destruction was entrusted to the Corps heavy artillery. The decision as to the degree of destruction required was transferred to the actual infantry units destined to carry out the attack. Such a procedure may at first strike one as logical. The individual destined to carry out an assault over a given trench system should be the best judge as to the degree of destruction required to ensure success to his undertaking. On closer examination the procedure presents certain aspects which alter the case. Destruction can only be obtained by protracted methods and by the creation of shell torn areas obstructing forward communication. Yet neither of these factors affected the enterprise of the unit to which a limited objective had been allotted, they only concerned the higher formations, but certainly exercised a vital influence on the operation as a whole. The result of such a decision could only lead to longer periods of preliminary destruction, and greater obstruction through shell torn areas.

Turning to the artillery support during the initial attack and the subsequent operations of the prolonged struggle, we observe distinct progress in the artillery tactics. We had failed to appreciate the paralyzing effects possible in preparatory bombardments but we were beginning to realise the neutralising possibilities in the support, of the actual attack. The germ of the new "rolling" or "creeping" barrage had, as we have already seen, been evident at Loos. The battle opened with the attack of July lst still supported by a system of "lifts" from trench to trench regulated by a pre-arranged time programme. The whole object of this method, being to prevent the defenders manning their trenches until such time as the assault¬ing troops were sufficiently close to them to admit of the trench being rushed before its fire power could be re-established. The Germans were quick to realise that the only method of avoiding such neutralisation of the fire power of the defence lay in siting a proportion of automatic weapons in the space intervening between the trenches. It therefore became necessary to sweep the ground in advance of the attack, irrespective of all visible defences. We produced a curtain of fire moving in advance of the assaulting troops, regulated by a time table based on the predicted rate of advance of the infantry. By a process of trial and error we arrived at the required density of this fire, and the distance of each lift necessary to cover all the ground. With a maximum rate of fire of four rounds per gun per minute we found that one 18 pdr. Per 25 yds. of front would provide a sufficient maximum volume of fire, whilst variations in the density of this fire could be regulated by reduc¬tions in the rates of fire. To ensure that all ground should be covered by our curtain of fire in its forward movement, we decided that lifts of 100 yards would meet requirements. During the course of the attack definite pauses were arranged conforming to the capture of the various objectives and providing the protection required by the infantry against hostile counter-attacks. As the battle progressed our curtain of fire was found to be lacking in sufficient depth. Casualties were suffered from hostile fire origin¬ating in advance of the zone covered by the barrage. This fault was remedied by additional curtains of fire from 18 pdrs., 4.5in hows. and medium artillery in advance of the initial line.

The parent of the rolling barrage, namely the trench to trench lifts, had left an unfortunate legacy to its offspring in the shape of unnecessary complications. The attacking infantry, used to definite lifts from one trench to another, whilst approving of the inter¬vening ground being covered, insisted on the curtain of fire being built tip on each successive trench. Had all trenches been parallel to each other and to the front of attack complications would not have arisen, this was not the case, as a result barrages were attempted necessitating intricate evolutions of fire which were neither possible nor necessary, and calculated to introduce serious errors.

Our tactical conceptions of artillery support in the attack had by now altered materially from those held in 1914. The "accessory" role of the artillery was now left far behind, the days were gone of attacks planned by infantry with artillery requested to co-operate to the best of its ability. The infantry, deprived of its mobility through the hostile fire power, now required a combined plan of attack to regain its power of movement through the proper applica¬tion of the available artillery power. This degree of mobility had, however, only been regained through the sacrifice of the power of manoeuvre in the attack. Our plans of attack were assuming a rigidity which required considerable re-adjustment in our tactical ideas.

The long drawn out nature of the Somme battle provided suit¬able conditions for further developments in our systems of harassing fire, which had already been in evidence during the previous year's fighting. We realised that the efficiency of such fire was dependent on the accuracy of the available intelligence and the care with which programmes of harassing fire were produced.

Our lack of faith in the efficiency of our methods of counterbattery work is well exemplified by the massive gun emplacements constructed to support the initial attack. Gradually the lessons we had learnt in 1915, combined with our daily increasing experience, resulted in the adoption of improvised methods in an endeavour to co-ordinate the various existing counter-battery efforts. A Heavy Artillery Group H.Q. was selected in each Corps, and made responsible for counter-battery work, the commanding officer of the group becoming to all intents and purposes the counter-battery officer of the future. Although at that date still unofficially recognised, this new system at once produced marked improvements in our counter-battery methods. Hostile artillery intelligence now became systematically collected and collated, the work of survey sections was developed and turned to good use, methods of engaging hostile batteries became standardised, and last but not least, the ca-operation of artillery and aircraft was directed into proper channels.

John

[rumplestiltskin]

Thanks for that John .

Regards Terry.

This text is taken from "The Evolution Of Artillery in The Great War" by Lt. Col. A F Brooke DSO psc fisrt published in the Royal Artillery Journal 1924.

BATTLE OF THE SOMME.

With five months of continuous operations, the Battle of the Somme provided suitable conditions for trying out some of the tactical ideas which had resulted from the last year's fighting. We have seen in a previous article that the organisation of the artillery had made distinct strides during the winter months preceding this offensive. We were now provided with artillery capable of exercising a marked influence in the field of battle. Certain refinements in its organisation, and reinforcements to its strength were still required to bring it up to the standard which it reached during the latter part of the war, yet it had attained its early, manhood, and its actions at this period are consequently of particular interest to us.

The policy of destruction received a free rein, both tactical and strategical surprise was entirely sacrificed, the four days' preliminary bombardment of Loos was replaced by one of seven days. We endeavoured to destroy all the wire covering the front system of defences, all fire trenches, strong points, and main communication trenches, whilst the early stage of development of our counterbattery methods prevented us from also including the hostile batteries in our scheme of destruction. Trench mortars were now available in sufficient numbers to be entrusted with the destruction of the front line of wire entanglements. All other wire defences were engaged with 18 pounders firing shrapnel since no efficient wire cutting H.E. Shell was available at that date. The trench destruction was entrusted to the Corps heavy artillery. The decision as to the degree of destruction required was transferred to the actual infantry units destined to carry out the attack. Such a procedure may at first strike one as logical. The individual destined to carry out an assault over a given trench system should be the best judge as to the degree of destruction required to ensure success to his undertaking. On closer examination the procedure presents certain aspects which alter the case. Destruction can only be obtained by protracted methods and by the creation of shell torn areas obstructing forward communication. Yet neither of these factors affected the enterprise of the unit to which a limited objective had been allotted, they only concerned the higher formations, but certainly exercised a vital influence on the operation as a whole. The result of such a decision could only lead to longer periods of preliminary destruction, and greater obstruction through shell torn areas.

Turning to the artillery support during the initial attack and the subsequent operations of the prolonged struggle, we observe distinct progress in the artillery tactics. We had failed to appreciate the paralyzing effects possible in preparatory bombardments but we were beginning to realise the neutralising possibilities in the support, of the actual attack. The germ of the new "rolling" or "creeping" barrage had, as we have already seen, been evident at Loos. The battle opened with the attack of July lst still supported by a system of "lifts" from trench to trench regulated by a pre-arranged time programme. The whole object of this method, being to prevent the defenders manning their trenches until such time as the assault¬ing troops were sufficiently close to them to admit of the trench being rushed before its fire power could be re-established. The Germans were quick to realise that the only method of avoiding such neutralisation of the fire power of the defence lay in siting a proportion of automatic weapons in the space intervening between the trenches. It therefore became necessary to sweep the ground in advance of the attack, irrespective of all visible defences. We produced a curtain of fire moving in advance of the assaulting troops, regulated by a time table based on the predicted rate of advance of the infantry. By a process of trial and error we arrived at the required density of this fire, and the distance of each lift necessary to cover all the ground. With a maximum rate of fire of four rounds per gun per minute we found that one 18 pdr. Per 25 yds. of front would provide a sufficient maximum volume of fire, whilst variations in the density of this fire could be regulated by reduc¬tions in the rates of fire. To ensure that all ground should be covered by our curtain of fire in its forward movement, we decided that lifts of 100 yards would meet requirements. During the course of the attack definite pauses were arranged conforming to the capture of the various objectives and providing the protection required by the infantry against hostile counter-attacks. As the battle progressed our curtain of fire was found to be lacking in sufficient depth. Casualties were suffered from hostile fire origin¬ating in advance of the zone covered by the barrage. This fault was remedied by additional curtains of fire from 18 pdrs., 4.5in hows. and medium artillery in advance of the initial line.

The parent of the rolling barrage, namely the trench to trench lifts, had left an unfortunate legacy to its offspring in the shape of unnecessary complications. The attacking infantry, used to definite lifts from one trench to another, whilst approving of the inter¬vening ground being covered, insisted on the curtain of fire being built tip on each successive trench. Had all trenches been parallel to each other and to the front of attack complications would not have arisen, this was not the case, as a result barrages were attempted necessitating intricate evolutions of fire which were neither possible nor necessary, and calculated to introduce serious errors.

Our tactical conceptions of artillery support in the attack had by now altered materially from those held in 1914. The "accessory" role of the artillery was now left far behind, the days were gone of attacks planned by infantry with artillery requested to co-operate to the best of its ability. The infantry, deprived of its mobility through the hostile fire power, now required a combined plan of attack to regain its power of movement through the proper applica¬tion of the available artillery power. This degree of mobility had, however, only been regained through the sacrifice of the power of manoeuvre in the attack. Our plans of attack were assuming a rigidity which required considerable re-adjustment in our tactical ideas.

The long drawn out nature of the Somme battle provided suit¬able conditions for further developments in our systems of harassing fire, which had already been in evidence during the previous year's fighting. We realised that the efficiency of such fire was dependent on the accuracy of the available intelligence and the care with which programmes of harassing fire were produced.

Our lack of faith in the efficiency of our methods of counterbattery work is well exemplified by the massive gun emplacements constructed to support the initial attack. Gradually the lessons we had learnt in 1915, combined with our daily increasing experience, resulted in the adoption of improvised methods in an endeavour to co-ordinate the various existing counter-battery efforts. A Heavy Artillery Group H.Q. was selected in each Corps, and made responsible for counter-battery work, the commanding officer of the group becoming to all intents and purposes the counter-battery officer of the future. Although at that date still unofficially recognised, this new system at once produced marked improvements in our counter-battery methods. Hostile artillery intelligence now became systematically collected and collated, the work of survey sections was developed and turned to good use, methods of engaging hostile batteries became standardised, and last but not least, the ca-operation of artillery and aircraft was directed into proper channels.

John

[RammyLad1]

John

one of the most informative replys that I have read, thanks for sharing

Duncan

[squirrel]

Thanks for posting that John - very well written and explained.

[Old Tom]

I knew I could leave it to a Gunner to produce a full answer. Lt Col Brooke - the one that I referred to.

Old Tom

[stevem49]

In Sept 1916 men of the 9th Sherwood Foresters got a bit too close to the creeping barrage and suffered a number of casualties!

S

[Anthony Gorst]

Would that be the future CIGS during the later unpleasantness?

I knew I could leave it to a Gunner to produce a full answer. Lt Col Brooke - the one that I referred to.

Old Tom

[johnreed]

Yes

John

[michaeldr]

The creeping barrage pre-dates the Great War, and when the latter eventually arrived, this device was not uniformly taken-up with enthusiasm

Prof Tim Travers quotes Brig Gen J B Jardine (GOC 97 Brigade, 32 Div, X Corps) writing to Edmonds 13 June 1930: see CAB 45/135 & The Killing Ground ISBN 0 85052 964 6

p.143 in the latter

"Jardine had been an observer at the Russo-Japanese war, and had seen the value of infantry following up close behind the artillery barrage. So at the last rehearsal before the attack of 32 and 36 (Ulster) Divisions on 1st July 1916, Jardine suggested to Rawlinson, who was in attendance, that the leading lines were not close enough to the barrage. "How close should they be?" asked Rawlinson. "30 to 40 yards, and expect some casualties," replied Jardine. Rawlinson did not like the reply, and said "Oh, 30 to 40 yards!!?" "Well Sir, that's what the Japanese did." And his [Rawlinson's] rely was "Oh, the Japanese" in a rather sneering way"

regards

Michael

[Bert Heyvaert]

I understood that it was first used to good results by the British on 9th of august 1915, when they recaptured the Crater at Hooge (Ypres). The element of surprise being vital to the succes of the action, 6th division troops followed close behind the barrage.

The action was considered a complete succes. When reading the regimental histories of the opposing German units the effect of the barrage is very clear. Their reinforcements and mortar companies that were sent in to reinforce the garrison were blown to bits by the barrage when it lifted from the crater lips to the area behind and were immediately met by British infantry as soon as the barrage lifted once again.

The action showed that, on a terrain that was quite small and well known, with the crater being one hell of a landmark,the system worked quite well. Not sure if the french used it before.

regards,

Bert

[nigelfe]

IIRC a creeping barrage was first used in the Boer War, see Pakenham's book.

The realisation about neutralisation seems to have emerged in the first half of 1915 with regard to CB, the emergent doctrine for which seems mainly to have been the work of BG/MG Franks (a veteran of Omdurman and the first comd of 1 HAR Group). In essence he recognised that while destruction of HBs was a continuous activity, neutralisation was the only option during specific operations when the need was to temporarily silence HBs causing problems for the assaulting infantry. From this the concept of neutralisation seems to have spread. It all seems obvious but in 1944 US doctrine still hadn't got it!

During WW1 the terms 'bombardment' and 'barrage' gained particular meaning, unfortunately they subsequently become confused and used interchangeably, this usually means the writers don't really know what they are writing about. Barrage meant standing or creeping etc (creeping and rolling are not the same thing) 'curtain' of fire (ie gun aimpoints spread along a line, 'bombardment' meant fire to destroy strongpoints, trenches, etc, using lines of fire parelle (or converged). CB was either destruction or neutralising.

[crickhollow]

Can someone provide a simple description of exactly how a creeping barrage was effected from the artillery point of view?

Presumably the options are:

1. Incrementally raise / lower (?) the barrel to extend range

2. Move the artillery piece forwards by an agreed distance?

3. Add extra propellant to the firing of the shell ?

Thanks

[ianjonesncl]

2 hours ago, crickhollow said:

1. Incrementally raise / lower (?) the barrel to extend range

The methodology used

2 hours ago, crickhollow said:

2. Move the artillery piece forwards by an agreed distance?

 Impractical.

The guns would loose accuracy as they moved and it would require additional preparation of gun platforms

2 hours ago, crickhollow said:

3. Add extra propellant to the firing of the shell ?

Impractical

Charges are pre-prepared with precise measurements of propellant. Opening up charges and adjusting the weight is impractical and highly prone to errors. 

[ianjonesncl]

The start of the process is the production of a barrage map at Divisional or Corps level. This provides the basis for the calculation of firing data for individual guns - bearing / elevation (range) and if appropriate fuze setting.

The guns will be allocated on an Artillery Operation order which will detail the locations units will be required to fire on, the time schedule and any other instructions.

Units will calculate the firing data for individual guns and issue a firing programme outlining the timings and data for a particular barrage line. 

And guns will then fire on the target lines as required........

[crickhollow]

Thank you 'ianjonesncl' for the reply - you are obviously well-qualified to comment!

I do have a further query: if you raise the gun barrel the shell goes higher but presumably falls shorter than if the barrel was lower?

So a creeping barrage from a fixed position starts with barrels high then gradually lowered by agreed degrees?

Is this right?

 

Thanks

 

 

[petwes]

With a field gun as you increase elevation the range increases.

Peter

[ianjonesncl]

21 minutes ago, crickhollow said:

I do have a further query: if you raise the gun barrel the shell goes higher but presumably falls shorter than if the barrel was lower?

Other way around with a gun.

If you elevate a GUN barrel the rounds goes further until it reaches 45 degrees (Modern day Low Angle)

On a HOWITZER, which is designed to fire at angles over 45 degrees, as you elevate the barrel the round falls shorter. (Modern day High Angle)

From what I have seen in Artillery Operation orders, the vast majority of Creeping Barrages were fired by 18 pounders. The guns would fire at the appropriate elevation on the first barrage line, then the elevation would be increased for each subsequent barrage line. I would think if the following barrage line locations are not at right angle to the opening line of fire, changes to bearing would have been required.

Another factor in the calculation of elevation is the type of ammunition. If shrapnel is being used then a fuze setting is required. From what I have seen, rather than a different fuze setting for each barrage line (longer time of flight), the elevation was adjusted. The elevation for the target location would be calculated, and the angle of sight is adjusted so the fuze detonated at the appropriate height above the target.  The angle of sight is the difference between the gun battery location and the target location, in this case the target location being the appropriate height above the target. The consequence of this drill is that a constant fuze setting could be used through out the barrage.

44 minutes ago, crickhollow said:

So a creeping barrage from a fixed position

Yes

As an indication the barrels should be roughly at the same position, though this is very much dependant upon the gun barrel wear if there are adjustments to firing data for muzzle velocity.

The practical aspect of this is that by observing the position of gun barrels as thy change targets you can see if any gross errors can be observed, ie a gun pointing in a different way to others. 

 

[Old Forge]

I've checked two relevant Gunner histories (FM Sir Martin Farndale's 'History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery - Western Front 1914-18' and Shelford Bidwell & Dominick Graham's 'Firepower'). They have broadly similar views on the development of the creeping barrage. The gist in both books is that it wasn't of French origin. Bidwell & Graham cite the 'distaste of French field gunners for calculation and the evident admiration of their infantry for the precision of British artillery, even in late 1914' (p84). Both books cite Loos as the stepping stone to the first true 'creepers' on 1 July 1916, albeit with their adoption being limited to certain divisions and only partially applied.

I haven't time to transcribe, so attaching photos of Sir MF's excellent description, with full acknowledgement to the author.

Edit: pages showing in the wrong order, but page numbers are shown...

All the best,

Richard

Edited 26 January , 2023 by Old Forge
Adding full quote from 'Firepower'

[crickhollow]

Thanks for the clarification - this is clearly a rather technical topic and I 'know nothing'...

Just to simplify:  is it the case that a gun barrel is unlikely to be raised above 45 degrees?   There comes a time when elevation shortens the range as shell energy is expended  in gaining height?   Guns are physically located so that the longest range can be reached with appropriate elevation.  Then the guns start with an elevation for the nearest target and gradually raise the barrel. 

Is the order to raise the barrel from say 25 degrees to  27 degrees which in turn moves the target line some by so many yards. The barrel is raised  in unison by degree increments together with all other guns ?  The gun needs to be level and in line with other guns? Is this  checked after each firing?

Is there a stage when the furthest target can only be reached by moving the gun forward?

Howitzers are best for close range targets but maybe limited ability to extend their range?

Thanks

[petwes]

I think the maximum standard elevation for an 18 pounder was about 16 degrees. The 4.5" Howitzers operated by the RFA used variable charges.