Lance Bombardier, Bombardier, Battery Commander's Assistant

[Ruth Ward]

Can anyone explain how much responsibility each of the above ranks/appointment had for the accurate firing of guns?

I am researching my grandfather's military service with 293 SB RGA as part of a family history project. Also, he is 'implicated' in the book by Ronald Skirth 'The Reluctant Tommy', & I am trying to gather evidence to show that, even if the 'accident' did occur (which is extrememly unlikely in any case), my grandfather was not the cause of it. He was, variously, a gunner, Lance Bombardier (MM card) & Bombardier (- addressed as - in a letter from Capt Ewatt). I know there are other posts/threads about these roles, but they do not seem to cover information about their respective responsibilities for the accurate firing of guns.

Any information or help with this would be very welcome (- even if it doesn't support my grandfather's case).

[Ravrick]

Hi,

I am an ex gunner myself, the 3 ranks gnr, L/Bdr and Bdr are only ranks and not job responsibilities. They could be employed as ammunition carriers, signallers, technical staff, quartermaster staff etc. Normally the gun crew would consist of Gunners & L/Bdrs with a Sergeant as the "No 1" or commander. The Sgt and the gun line officer would be responsible for checking the accuracy of the ammunition/fuze/charge and the "Bearing" and "elevation" (direction and distance to target) set on to the gun sight and that the correct shell and charge were loaded. Even if the incorrect information was set on the sight it was still the job of the No 1 to confirm it. Accidents did, and still do happen, but at the end of the day the No 1 is responsible for his gun.

Most accidents during WW1 were caused by faulty ammunition or "drop shorts" caused by worn out barrels.

Hope this helps,

Rick

[Piorun]

Fifty-plus years ago, as a Bombardier, I was No. I on a 25-pounder and responsible for supervising the unhitching, positioning, and ordering "fire". The gun-aimer was was also a Bombardier. Can't remember the rest of 'em or what the officers were doing. Antony

[Ruth Ward]

Hi,

I am an ex gunner myself, the 3 ranks gnr, L/Bdr and Bdr are only ranks and not job responsibilities. They could be employed as ammunition carriers, signallers, technical staff, quartermaster staff etc. Normally the gun crew would consist of Gunners & L/Bdrs with a Sergeant as the "No 1" or commander. The Sgt and the gun line officer would be responsible for checking the accuracy of the ammunition/fuze/charge and the "Bearing" and "elevation" (direction and distance to target) set on to the gun sight and that the correct shell and charge were loaded. Even if the incorrect information was set on the sight it was still the job of the No 1 to confirm it. Accidents did, and still do happen, but at the end of the day the No 1 is responsible for his gun.

Most accidents during WW1 were caused by faulty ammunition or "drop shorts" caused by worn out barrels.

Hope this helps,

Rick

Hi Rick - thank you for your reply - it's very informative. Do you know how the role/rank of BCA fits in with the others in terms of responsibility for accurate firing? Could a L/Bdr or Bdr be a BCA (am presuming a gunner couldn't be). Ruth

[Ruth Ward]

Fifty-plus years ago, as a Bombardier, I was No. I on a 25-pounder and responsible for supervising the unhitching, positioning, and ordering fire. The gun-aimer was was also a Bombardier. Can't remember the rest of 'em or what the officers were doing. Antony

Thanks Anthony. It's good of you to reply. Sounds like you had quite a bit of responsibility then - as Bombardier/No. 1? Ruth

[daggers]

The Battery Commander would spend much of his time observing and directing the fire of his battery from an observation post overlooking enemy positions. His Ack or assistant would be alongside helping to observe the fall of shot and to calculate the corrections in aim, to pass them back to the battery. He would be armed and carry equipment needed by the B.C. I am sure that a reliable Ack would be much valued by the B.C. and so would be in line for promotion from Gunner to Bombardier or Corporal.

Other Acks would assist the officers in charge of the gun position, where the BC's orders would be converted into detailed directions about the aim: line, elevation, setting of sights, fuses etc, to be applied to individual guns by their 'detachment' or crew who would be supervised by the No. 1, usually a sergeant. Technical stuff, needing some good maths, with responsibilities at each level.

'Field Guns in France' has been mentioned on this Forum before, and is a first-hand account by a very aggressive B.C. who was only too keen to be at his observation post. I cannot find my copy just now, but I am sure a search will bring up the details.

D

EDITED to add that map-reading would be another valuable skill.

[Ruth Ward]

The Battery Commander would spend much of his time observing and directing the fire of his battery from an observation post overlooking enemy positions. His Ack or assistant would be alongside helping to observe the fall of shot and to calculate the corrections in aim, to pass them back to the battery. He would be armed and carry equipment needed by the B.C. I am sure that a reliable Ack would be much valued by the B.C. and so would be in line for promotion from Gunner to Bombardier or Corporal.

Other Acks would assist the officers in charge of the gun position, where the BC's orders would be converted into detailed directions about the aim: line, elevation, setting of sights, fuses etc, to be applied to individual guns by their 'detachment' or crew who would be supervised by the No. 1, usually a sergeant. Technical stuff, needing some good maths, with responsibilities at each level.

'Field Guns in France' has been mentioned on this Forum before, and is a first-hand account by a very aggressive B.C. who was only too keen to be at his observation post. I cannot find my copy just now, but I am sure a search will bring up the details.

D

EDITED to add that map-reading would be another valuable skill.

Thank you so much for this information. It's very helpful. Am I right in thinking then that any rank could be a BCA including gunner - as long as he possessed the necessary skills/training? Was a BCA an 'appointment'? Ruth

[daggers]

No such rank as 'Ack' or assistant- an appointment, as you say. By strange coincidence I bought this morning a reduced price copy of 'Command on the Western Front' - the Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson - as it was cheaper than buying a magazine to read while waiting for an NHS appointment. Chapter 4 starts with a clear description of the work of forward observation officers and the transmission of fire orders to the gun positions.

There is too much to reproduce here, but if you can get a copy for £3.99 [cover price £9.99, Pen & Sword]or from a library you might find it worth it. It is not, however, a Gunner-focused book, as far as I can see.

Luckily I did not have to wait too long, and so only reached page 50 before I was seen!

Daggers

[ianjonesncl]

There are a number of areas where things can go wrong and if this occurs it is a matter if working back through the system to determine where an error occurred.

Starting with the observer, was the target correctly identified, was the target location used for computation of fire data correct grid correct, were the orders to the guns correct. The next stage is to look at ensuring that the same orders and data supplied by the observer were the same as applied by the person calculating the firing data. Any errors here would be the responsibility of an Officer. If this all ties up then the next stage is to look at the gun.

Was the gun pointing in the right direction was the correct range applied, was the right ammunition loaded, and was the right charge loaded. The individual gun survey would also need to be checked. The actions on the gun as has been pointed out are the responsibility of the detachment commander.

One other aspect of the system is to check battery and section survey. The guns could all be pointing in the wrong direction as a result of an error. This would be the responsibility of the Battery Commander or Section Commander.

The key point I believe is responsibility. Although a soldier could make an error, the ultimate responsibility lies with a Commander, whether this is at Gun, Section, or Battery level.

If this all checks out, failures in ammunition or equipment would then need to be looked at.

Any information on the particular incident?

[Ruth Ward]

Many thanks for this Ian - it's incredibly helpful. The author of the book claims that an untested & unregistered howitzer fired a shell which hit at a rock face & burst prematurely killing 2 & wounding 5, & putting the gun out of action. He claims that the gun was sighted too close to a rock face. Essentially he holds the BC, & my grandfather in particular, for causing this accident (chapter 7 - The Reluctant Tommy). I have quite a bit of evidence already that pours considerable doubt over these claims & indeed whether any accident took place at all. I also have quite a bit of evidence that contradicts some of the other claims in the book - which in my opinion is more fiction than fact (& should be classed as such by the publishers). Major Snow(don) and B/dr B. Bromley have had their good names & brave action denigrated most unfairly by this book - I'm hoping to put things right. Any help you, or anyone else, can give would be appreciated. Ruth

[Ruth Ward]

No such rank as 'Ack' or assistant- an appointment, as you say. By strange coincidence I bought this morning a reduced price copy of 'Command on the Western Front' - the Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson - as it was cheaper than buying a magazine to read while waiting for an NHS appointment. Chapter 4 starts with a clear description of the work of forward observation officers and the transmission of fire orders to the gun positions.

There is too much to reproduce here, but if you can get a copy for £3.99 [cover price £9.99, Pen & Sword]or from a library you might find it worth it. It is not, however, a Gunner-focused book, as far as I can see.

Luckily I did not have to wait too long, and so only reached page 50 before I was seen!

Daggers

Many thanks for the book reference, Daggers. Will try & get hold of a copy. Ruth

[ianjonesncl]

The author of the book claims that an untested & unregistered howitzer fired a shell which hit at a rock face & burst prematurely killing 2 & wounding 5, & putting the gun out of action. He claims that the gun was sighted too close to a rock face.

Ruth

This sounds like a Crest Clearance problem.

One of the checks that needs to be made when deploying guns is that the target can engaged without the shell hitting anything during it's trajectory. If the target is 5,000 yards away, the gun barrel will be elevated to achieve that distance. If that is insufficient to clear any objects in it's way, maybe a close object such as a tree, or a more distant object such as a hill, a shell will explode prematurely. As this accident put this gun out of action it would seem that this was a local crest problem.

I will need to check the WW1 manuals to see what the procedures were back then.

Ian

[ianjonesncl]

Ruth

I have just found this Topic 293 Siege Battery.

According to the post they served in Italy - was this when the incident occured ?

Ian

[ianjonesncl]

Ruth

If the problem was crest clearance then the following information would apply;

This is from Garrison Artillery Training Vol II (Siege) 1911 (Reprinted with amendments, 1914).

Battery Drill section 19 - Duties of the section commander

Para 8 - Each section commander is responsible that the trajectory of his guns will clear the ground to his immediate front.

The Battery Commander in WW1 was responsible for the positioning of the guns. It may be that the gun was positioned in a bad position, however, the Section Commander should have calculated the minimum elevations to clear any crests (the method is outlined in the manual). The Gun drill book for the particular equipment may also detail checks to be undertaken by the Detachment Commander, who in modern times is also responsible for checking his Gun is not crested.

There may be another clue in the statement, and that is the Gun was untested and un-registered. This could potentially mean that although the elevation was probably enough to clear a crest, the muzzle velocity was insufficient. This arises with worn guns as the trajectory to achieve the range with a barrel that has little wear, is different to a gun with a worn barrel.

Unfortunately if you have to deploy into a position with a crest problem, and fire a Gun with which there is little or no actual firing information, there is a risk.

Ian

[Ruth Ward]

Ruth

I have just found this Topic 293 Siege Battery.

According to the post they served in Italy - was this when the incident occured ?

Ian

Ian

The posts on this link were done on my behalf I think - when I was just starting to research my grandfather's military service & just before I knew about the book. (See my reply below about Italy)

Ruth

[Ruth Ward]

Ruth

If the problem was crest clearance then the following information would apply;

This is from Garrison Artillery Training Vol II (Siege) 1911 (Reprinted with amendments, 1914).

Battery Drill section 19 - Duties of the section commander

Para 8 - Each section commander is responsible that the trajectory of his guns will clear the ground to his immediate front.

The Battery Commander in WW1 was responsible for the positioning of the guns. It may be that the gun was positioned in a bad position, however, the Section Commander should have calculated the minimum elevations to clear any crests (the method is outlined in the manual). The Gun drill book for the particular equipment may also detail checks to be undertaken by the Detachment Commander, who in modern times is also responsible for checking his Gun is not crested.

There may be another clue in the statement, and that is the Gun was untested and un-registered. This could potentially mean that although the elevation was probably enough to clear a crest, the muzzle velocity was insufficient. This arises with worn guns as the trajectory to achieve the range with a barrel that has little wear, is different to a gun with a worn barrel.

Unfortunately if you have to deploy into a position with a crest problem, and fire a Gun with which there is little or no actual firing information, there is a risk.

Ian

Ian

All this information is great - thank you. 293 SB served in Italy & my grandfather was awarded an MM for action 15 June 1918 - Battle of Asiago. I very recently acquired a copy of an article about the Battle of Asiago - 'Our Guns in Italy' (Journal of Royal Artillery 1922?). In it the author says that there were problems siting the guns, finding gun platforms, difficulties making the necessary calculations, having to fell some trees etc. - all due to the nature of the terrain & the need to remain undetected by the enemy. (I think he says that 'lone' guns on the flanks were used to do some testing, but may need to check that again). He goes on to say that all these problems were eventually resolved.

My grandfather was a Gunner initially, then a Lance-Bombardier (- given in 94th Brigade War Diary June 1918 Awards Appendix 11 - I think, & on his MM card - although there has been some discussion about this on this forum). He is addressed as 'Bombardier' in a letter (from Capt. H. Evatt) informing his wife of his MM in July 1918, & I have a photo of him in Italy, November 1918 wearing a single chevron on his sleeve. Do you think he could have been a sub-section commander on or before 15th June? (Or even after come to that?).

Ruth

[kenf48]

Ruth, firstly can I congratulate you on your persistence and attempts to expose what is truly a fantasy.

I first came across Bombardier Skirth in Ian Hislop's Channel 4 Documentary on conscientous objectors. To be honest I didn't pay too much attention to the details of his 'revelation from God' which led to his determination to 'do no more harm' and henceforth when ranging the guns to allow for the first salvo to miss the target. I don't recall the Asiago Campaign being mentioned, irt may have been, it may not.

I then came across him in Michelle Barratt's 'Casualties of War' an interesting book with 'five lives' of survivors of the Great War. I recognised Skirth's story, and in the book a detailed account of the events you refer to. I have to admit in the context of the book (written by the mother of Duncan Barrett, the editor of the 'Reluctant Tommy') I didn't question the direct quotes from Skirth's memoir which is at the IWM.

Your post made me think a bit more about the account. I wasn't aware of the book you refer to so had a look on Amazon, where Duncan Barrett's introduction is available and he, in fairness questions Skirth's account, pointing out the misnaming of the battery, and 'Major Snow'. I revisited the account in Casualties of War where Skirth claims that after the incident he ran to the Italian First Aid Post where his friend 'Giulio' had an ambulance. Skirth accompanies the men in the ambulance which is hit by shellfire and two of the wounded are killed, while Giulio is wounded and Skirth loses his hearing. Later he names one of the dead men as Sergeant Waller who 'died in the ambulance with Skirth', as receiving a posthumous DCM. As you say the only casualty from the Battery between the 15th August and 30th August is Gunner Walter Booker who died of wounds on the 15th. There is no record of a DCM being awarded to a Sergeant Waller. We could perhaps forgive him, as his editor seems to have done, for changing the names and twisting the truth but to my mind the whole edifice of his conversion falls and is exposed as a fiction if you consider Skirth's rank as a Bombardier.

As the artillery experts have pointed out sighting the guns was the responsibility of an officer. Extreme courage was called for to go forward from the guns and observe the fall of shot, the men were targets themselves. For Skirth to suggest he was roaming around hiding chapels from his senior officers and apparently time after time getting his calculations wrong is an absolute fantasy. Did no-one inspect the guns? Was he the only one to notice just as it was about to be fired?

If he was a forward observer how could he run back to the (allegedly) wrongly elevated gun and then put the wounded in the ambulance and accompany them? Who was observing the fall of shot from the rest of the battery? Never mind the sergeant in charge of the gun (Sgt 'Bromley' your grandfather I presume), what were the commissioned officers doing this time? I'd suggest as the account above records getting a siege battery into position was not a trivial undertaking.

As a bombardier he allegedly submits a report to Major 'Snow' who in the style of a pantomime villain 'puts Skirth's report to the flames' Chain of command anyone?

Michelle Barrett notes,''the naked self interest that lay behind Snow's refusal to acknowledge the report on the 'premature shell burst' was anathema to Skirth" She recounts Skirth' detestation of the regular officer class and therein perhaps she has stumbled on the motivation for his memoir and his account of the battle. In expressing this hatred of the Army he has paid no attention to his comrades reputation, he had moved on and was a school teacher when the 'memoir' was written, not a blue collar veteran struggling to get by. By his own confession he is either incompetent or a fantasist I think your grandfather's reputation and the gallantry that led to the MM is beyond this fiction and I hope the experts here will help you in your quest to expose this attack on his reputation, which belongs in the dustbin alongside many other dubious memoirs 'discovered' in the new millennium at least if it's classified as fiction we know what we are reading.

Ken

[Ruth Ward]

Ruth, firstly can I congratulate you on your persistence and attempts to expose what is truly a fantasy.

I first came across Bombardier Skirth in Ian Hislop's Channel 4 Documentary on conscientous objectors. To be honest I didn't pay too much attention to the details of his 'revelation from God' which led to his determination to 'do no more harm' and henceforth when ranging the guns to allow for the first salvo to miss the target. I don't recall the Asiago Campaign being mentioned, irt may have been, it may not.

I then came across him in Michelle Barratt's 'Casualties of War' an interesting book with 'five lives' of survivors of the Great War. I recognised Skirth's story, and in the book a detailed account of the events you refer to. I have to admit in the context of the book (written by the mother of Duncan Barrett, the editor of the 'Reluctant Tommy') I didn't question the direct quotes from Skirth's memoir which is at the IWM.

Your post made me think a bit more about the account. I wasn't aware of the book you refer to so had a look on Amazon, where Duncan Barrett's introduction is available and he, in fairness questions Skirth's account, pointing out the misnaming of the battery, and 'Major Snow'. I revisited the account in Casualties of War where Skirth claims that after the incident he ran to the Italian First Aid Post where his friend 'Giulio' had an ambulance. Skirth accompanies the men in the ambulance which is hit by shellfire and two of the wounded are killed, while Giulio is wounded and Skirth loses his hearing. Later he names one of the dead men as Sergeant Waller who 'died in the ambulance with Skirth', as receiving a posthumous DCM. As you say the only casualty from the Battery between the 15th August and 30th August is Gunner Walter Booker who died of wounds on the 15th. There is no record of a DCM being awarded to a Sergeant Waller. We could perhaps forgive him, as his editor seems to have done, for changing the names and twisting the truth but to my mind the whole edifice of his conversion falls and is exposed as a fiction if you consider Skirth's rank as a Bombardier.

As the artillery experts have pointed out sighting the guns was the responsibility of an officer. Extreme courage was called for to go forward from the guns and observe the fall of shot, the men were targets themselves. For Skirth to suggest he was roaming around hiding chapels from his senior officers and apparently time after time getting his calculations wrong is an absolute fantasy. Did no-one inspect the guns? Was he the only one to notice just as it was about to be fired?

If he was a forward observer how could he run back to the (allegedly) wrongly elevated gun and then put the wounded in the ambulance and accompany them? Who was observing the fall of shot from the rest of the battery? Never mind the sergeant in charge of the gun (Sgt 'Bromley' your grandfather I presume), what were the commissioned officers doing this time? I'd suggest as the account above records getting a siege battery into position was not a trivial undertaking.

As a bombardier he allegedly submits a report to Major 'Snow' who in the style of a pantomime villain 'puts Skirth's report to the flames' Chain of command anyone?

Michelle Barrett notes,''the naked self interest that lay behind Snow's refusal to acknowledge the report on the 'premature shell burst' was anathema to Skirth" She recounts Skirth' detestation of the regular officer class and therein perhaps she has stumbled on the motivation for his memoir and his account of the battle. In expressing this hatred of the Army he has paid no attention to his comrades reputation, he had moved on and was a school teacher when the 'memoir' was written, not a blue collar veteran struggling to get by. By his own confession he is either incompetent or a fantasist I think your grandfather's reputation and the gallantry that led to the MM is beyond this fiction and I hope the experts here will help you in your quest to expose this attack on his reputation, which belongs in the dustbin alongside many other dubious memoirs 'discovered' in the new millennium at least if it's classified as fiction we know what we are reading.

Ken

Ken, Thank you ever so much for your support & very detailed post. It's very good of you (& everyone else who has replied to my posts) to spare the time to do it. I have had a lot of support from people on the forum & am very grateful for all the information I've received. My biggest problem, really, is my own lack of expertise in this area - often when I get information (even when it's simplified) I don't always understand it, or know how it fits in with other information or, what questions I should be asking (not helped by inconsistencies in Skirth's memoir). I have been on quite a steep learning curve for some time & get very frustrated with myself at not always 'getting-to-grips' with it.

Michelle Barrett, like her son, obviously didn't do any checking beyond the most basic kind. I have researched Snow(don)'s promotions & awards in The London Gazette & 94th Brigade War Diary - he did not recieve any award or promotion whatsoever as a direct result of 15 June 1918 - as far as I can tell. He did not have a meteoric rise to the top, but eventually reached Colonel in 1927 - 8 years later than Skirth says he did. The inaccuracies such as the Battery number, & name changes are trivial in comparison to many of the other 'inaccuracies' I've uncovered &, in my opinion, they are red-herrings - by drawing people's attention to them, they are deflected away from the more serious inconsistencies.

As for Skirth's motivation for writing the book - he was an English literature teacher, & I suspect he wanted to write a novel which he did - (very) loosely based on his military service in WW1. Quite why Snowdon & my grandfather come in for such a clobbering I'm not sure, but 'conflict' & 'conflict resolution' are essential ingredients of any good 'story'.

Thank you again for your comments - they are much appreciated.

Ruth

[ianjonesncl]

Ruth

"In it the author says that there were problems siting the guns, finding gun platforms, difficulties making the necessary calculations, having to fell some trees etc."

This sounds like finding the least worst position for the guns. This is consistent with difficult terrain or for more modern Gunners deployment in built up areas. The type of problems that can exist for hilly mountainous country is finding a flat level platform or one that is not a bog. Guns quite often have to have their own individual survey plan, as opposed to a battery survey plan, and the nice straight line deployment seen on the Western Front is not possible leading to dispersion of the Guns. Calculation of survey and firing data is more complex. Obstacles need to be removed if they are causing a crest problem.

A Gun could have indeed been deployed "too close to a rock face" in these circumstances, however, was there much choice ?. Drills after that should have ensured that the correct elevation was applied to ensure the trajectory cleared any object in it's path - as per previous post.

From this post on 293 SB it indicates they were equipped with 6 in Hows (26 cwt). They fired a 100 lb shell, and would suggest in order to "destroy a gun" the shell must have exploded very close to the gun. A premature is a distinct possibility.

[ianjonesncl]

He is addressed as 'Bombardier' in a letter (from Capt. H. Evatt) informing his wife of his MM in July 1918, & I have a photo of him in Italy, November 1918 wearing a single chevron on his sleeve. Do you think he could have been a sub-section commander on or before 15th June? (Or even after come to that?).

Ruth

Ruth

A single chevron is a Lance Bombardier. To be a Gun Detachment Commander I would think he would have been at least a full Bombardier - 2 chevrons.

Ian

[Ruth Ward]

Ruth

"In it the author says that there were problems siting the guns, finding gun platforms, difficulties making the necessary calculations, having to fell some trees etc."

This sounds like finding the least worst position for the guns. This is consistent with difficult terrain or for more modern Gunners deployment in built up areas. The type of problems that can exist for hilly mountainous country is finding a flat level platform or one that is not a bog. Guns quite often have to have their own individual survey plan, as opposed to a battery survey plan, and the nice straight line deployment seen on the Western Front is not possible leading to dispersion of the Guns. Calculation of survey and firing data is more complex. Obstacles need to be removed if they are causing a crest problem.

A Gun could have indeed been deployed "too close to a rock face" in these circumstances, however, was there much choice ?. Drills after that should have ensured that the correct elevation was applied to ensure the trajectory cleared any object in it's path - as per previous post.

From this post on 293 SB it indicates they were equipped with 6 in Hows (26 cwt). They fired a 100 lb shell, and would suggest in order to "destroy a gun" the shell must have exploded very close to the gun. A premature is a distinct possibility.

Thanks for this Ian - all extremely helpful. I've checked the article 'Our Guns in Italy' (Major A.G. Rolleston) - it says that the 18pdrs were on a forward slope (on the Asiago ridge - rocky, pine forest & precipitous in places. (Presumably they were firing over Asiago ridge/crest, beyond their own infantry on the front line & onto the enemy facing them?).There seems to have been little opportunity to test/register the guns generally because there was little action for a time, & they didn't want to reveal themselves to the enemy. It also says that on the 15th June '... some gallant deeds were done by batteries in more forward positions. Guns were run out of their emplacements to engage advancing infantry at point blank range, ... some ... gunners made effective use of their rifles at close quarters when almost surrounded by the enemy ...' (p.148). Is it likely then that the 6" Howitzers were in this more forward position? (The enemy had crossed the river Piave in a couple of places & temporarily gained ground only to be pushed back by the end of the day). Incidentally, Skirth claims that 293 SB didn't have any rifles. (293 SB were engaged in 'counter-battery' work - not sure what this means - targetting enemy gun batteries?).

Ruth

[Ruth Ward]

Ruth

A single chevron is a Lance Bombardier. To be a Gun Detachment Commander I would think he would have been at least a full Bombardier - 2 chevrons.

Ian

Ian - I might have misunderstood info given on previous posts re this, but thought that Bombardier = 1 chevron in WW1, & that Lance Bombardier = 'appointment' (no chevron?). I know this changed after 1920ish.

Ruth

[squirrel]

WW1

One chevron = Bombardier

Two chevrons = Corporal

Post War - sometime in the 1920's

One chevron = Lance Bombardier

Two chevrons = Bombardier

[Seany]

Good points, well made.

My grandfather served in 293rd and my own research around his battery lead me to suggest that there is much to question in the Skirth memoirs and whilst that can be forgiven in respect of the passage of time, his tarnishing of reputations cannot. I was initially excited to discover, via another forum member, the 'Reluctant Tommy' but after trying to fit his view of events alonhgside the war diaries etc, I have become somewhat disappointed with it.

Ruth, firstly can I congratulate you on your persistence and attempts to expose what is truly a fantasy.

[Seany]

RE: I have researched Snow(don)'s promotions & awards in The London Gazette & 94th Brigade War Diary - he did not recieve any award or promotion whatsoever as a direct result of 15 June 1918 - as far as I can tell. He did not have a meteoric rise to the top, but eventually reached Colonel in 1927 - 8 years later than Skirth says he did.

I also could not find the award of DSO in the London Gazette supplement for the period suggested but note in the 94 Brigade war diary for June 1918 a DSO being gazetted on the 3rd June and him being mentioned in despatches in May 1918, so not related to any action on 15th June.

The promotion to full Colonel may not have been until 1927 but he was a Lieutenant Colonel at the Italian armistice - the IWM photographs that you have are titled Lt. Col Snowdon and men of the 293rd etc..., and he was subsequently in command of three artillery brigades.

I've lost track of him after that but always wondered what his family's perspective would have been on the claims made by Skirth.