Parachutes and Balloons

[centurion]

Some time ago we had a discussion on parachutes (in which I may have annoyed some Teutonic members). Since then I've been trying to produce something on this subject. I've had to split it up into an overview of the types of parachute, the use of the parachute and then, possibly, more on individual 'chutes. Here for better or worse is part one.

The first parachute specifically designed for use in a military balloon was made and tested in 1913. Wing Captain E. M. Maitland, of the R.N.A.S. who was attached to the R.F.C. at Farnborough requested Messrs. C. G. Spencer and Sons to design and manufacture a parachute in a container that could be attached to the basket or gondola of a military balloon or airship. The work was carried out by M A Spencer and Maitland then tested the result by jumping from the British Army airship " Eta ".

In Germany the idea of using parachutes in military balloons had been rejected. The Chief Instructor in the Prussian Balloon Corps (Bavaria had its own separate Balloon Corps) Captain A Hildebrandt wrote in 1908 “For balloon work, parachutes are of no use ; they are merely suitable for country shows.” He appears to have been in part responding to suggestions by Kathe Paulus a well known German parachute jumper that military balloons be so equipped. He went on to make some patronising comments along the lines of ‘plucky little woman but…’ Hildebrandt’s argument was that it was safer to stay with the balloon and in peacetime conditions when a balloon had developed a serious leak he may have been right but not in war when the balloon might well be on fire.

France , despite having formed the world’s first ever military balloon companies in 1794, did not even have a balloon corps in the immediate pre war years as it had been decided that the military balloon did not fit in with the tactical doctrines of attack, attack and attack.

By mid 1915 most combatants had adopted the kite balloon for observation work and at the same time aircraft attacks on such balloons had become a serious problem. Britain decided at about this time to equip balloon observers with parachutes and thanks to the work carried out by Maitland and Spencer in 1913 was able to do so relatively quickly so that by September 1915 eye witness accounts of successful escapes by parachute were being recorded (eg at Reninghelst, south of Ypres - Autobiography of B. J. Green ).

Germany was slower off the mark so that it was not until early 1916 that the Prussian Army finally authorised Kathe Paulus to establish a factory in Berlin to manufacture balloon parachutes, these were not issued until April 1916 and in May 1916 at least 6 deaths were attributed to problems with the new ‘chutes. In the meantime France and Italy had adopted parachute deigns either modelled on or copied from the Spencer parachute.

The Spencer parachute had a semi rigid canvas pack shaped like a truncated cone (sometimes referred to as a ‘flower pot’). The canopy was folded inside this with the shrouds folded inside the broad end. A sturdy rope was attached to the shrouds and to the observer’s harness. Initially this was a broad canvas waist band with leg loops worn outside his flying suit (not unlike Superman’s underpants). The narrow end of the pack was fastened to the balloon basket. The canopy was essentially based on that developed by ‘Professor’ Parks van Tassell in 1886 (and appropriated by his assistant Thomas (Scott or Samuel) Baldwin). The rope connecting the harness to the shrouds was long enough to loop over the side of the basket thus allowing the observer freedom of movement whilst remaining connected to his chute. On being ordered to bail out he would dive over the side of the basket and his weight on reaching the end of the rope would pull the canopy clear of the pack. A small wooden device invented by Spencer ensured that enough air entered the canopy to ‘inflate’ it. The failure rate on a Spencer chute was calculated as one in two hundred (on the French chutes with did not have the Spencer device this was one in one hundred.) A disadvantage of the Spencer design was that the observer could not reach the shrouds to guide his descent. On landing he had to use a sharp knife to cut the rope to avoid being dragged (these knives can be seen listed in a balloon’s kit inventory and have caused the ignorant to cast scorn).

The initial Paulus chutes appear in photos and descriptions to have been very similar to those she used in her show jumping days. The pack was a flexible material bag hung above the basket (on a rod extending from the trapeze from which the basket hung) and on jumping the observer’s weight pulled clear the canopy (also based on the van Tassell design) . Accounts by early jumpers indicate that they could reach up to the shrouds and there was a quick release pull for use on landing. However looking at photos of the chute in place on a balloon it is difficult to see how an observer could perform his duties whilst attached to the parachute shrouds so that he would have had to take time to clip on before jumping (this may account for the early problems mentioned above). Later photos of German ‘chutes show square profile packs with semi rigid sides fastened to the basket sides and both accounts by jumpers and photos of ‘chutes under test clearly indicate that a Spencer style rope attachment had replaced the original connection to the shrouds. Even later accounts at the end of the war indicate that the Spencer approach was finally adopted in its entirety (and there is a photo of a German balloon with a Spencer shaped pack on the basket.

British use of the Spencer was not without problem. It was possible for an observer to dive clear out of his harness when exiting the basket. This was only discovered when one observer was fortunate, having done this, to collide with his fellow crewmate’s ‘chute on the way down (this collapsed the canopy but the Spencer device ensured that it reflated so they both came down on the one parachute) and thus survived to relate the problem. This fault may the reason why Basil Hallam (Gilbert the Filbert) died in a balloon jump. The harness was redesigned to include shoulder straps.

At one point an effort was made to persuade British observers to adopt the Calthrop Guardian Angel Parachute which was even more reliable than the Spencer but most preferred to stick with a battle proven design they already trusted.

The French (unhappy at using a British based design?) kept coming up with new designs but none showed much if any improvement. However a new approach was finally adopted in the closing days of the war. This was a parachute attached to the basket so that with one quick pull of a release cord the basket, observers and equipment all dropped away to safety.

[centurion]

I posted the above yesterday and I notice a number of views but no comments. Is this of interest? Should I persevere with part two (the experiences of some jumpers)?

[zijde26]

' ... Is this of interest? Should I persevere with part two ...

Yes, it is of interest.

You should persevere with part two.

I do have very similar photocards (given by german military people), (Kemmel-Locre-Reninghelst)-area.

Gilbert Deraedt

[zijde26]

Yes, it is of interest.

You should persevere with part two.

I do have very similar photocards (given by german military people), (Kemmel-Locre-Reninghelst)-area.

Gilbert Deraedt

see also : http://www.finebooksmagazine.com/issue/201003/battlefield-1.phtml

[fetubi]

Essential reading, I would say. Good of you to take the trouble. Keep it coming!

Trevor

[truthergw]

I'd be interested to see more. Not my area of interest and I certainly have no knowledge of it but I have a feeling of sympathy for the poor sods who were stuck in a basket watching a plane trying to kill them while the ground crew tried to get them down. Even the risk of parting company prematurely with your parachute must have been preferable to that. I had a teacher who had flown as an observer and I remember him describing the relief when they were supplied with parachutes. Although he was not convinced of their reliability, they were ' better than nothing'.

[dfaulder]

I am certainly interested; I have a "stub" of family history that I am wanting to flesh out regarding early parachutes.

David

[Adrian Roberts]

Should I persevere with part two (the experiences of some jumpers

)?

An interesting and unusual peice of research; by all means carry on

[David B]

Up to your usual standard Cent. (excellent) - a most intersting read and please continue.

David

[centurion]

Part 2.

Balloon busting began almost as soon as there were observation balloons to shoot down. The first anti balloon guns were field pieces mounted on ramps to provide the necessary elevation. The first time such guns were used was not as one might think in 1914 but in 1794 but this approach was still being used in WW1 with an equal lack of success in downing balloons. What they did do was to push the observation balloons further back so that their view was not as good as it might have been. Specialised anti balloon guns began to be built in the 1870s. However the great enemy of the balloon was not artillery but heavier than air aircraft. German figures show that out of 1,010 balloons lost during the war only 75 were destroyed by direct artillery fire whilst 471 were shot down by aircraft. Probably almost as many escaped being shot down but still sustained sufficient damage from attacks as to make them unusable. Other air forces suffered in similar proportion. A lot of balloon observers had to take to the parachute, for example American observers alone accrued some 116 jumps due to enemy attack. Some men jumped more than once (the unestablished record appears to be 9)

To understand the observer’s experience it is necessary to look at how attacks were made. Initially attacks took three forms; dropping bombs (or other incendiary devices) onto the balloon from above, hitting the balloon with rockets whilst diving onto it or machine gunning it (in this case either from an observer’s gun whilst flying broad side to the target or again diving onto the balloon with a pusher aircraft). Once synchronised machine guns were available almost all attacks on balloons were made by diving onto the balloon as steeply as possible whilst firing, pulling out into level flight and skedaddling before the defensive AA fire could zero in. In almost all cases the attack came from above and was over very quickly. Before the introduction of the parachute ground controllers would often order winching down to begin as soon as enemy aircraft were reported in the general area even if there was no evidence that they were intending to attack the balloon. Orders given to aircraft sent out against balloons suggest that the purpose was to ‘drive down’ the balloons (thus temporarily blinding the enemy) and destroying a balloon was a bonus.

Balloon observers had almost no upward vision in any direction this being blocked by the balloon itself (bad enough with the drachen balloons worse with the later, larger caquot type balloons). In any case their job was not to look at the sky but at the enemy territory before and below them. Left to their own devices in most cases the first time they would have known of an attack was when the burning balloon fell onto their basket, too late to bail out. The observers were utterly dependent upon look outs on the ground to spot potential attacks from aircraft. Each balloon (Allied or Central Powers) would have a ground controller who had the responsibility for ordering the observers to jump. This must have been a fearful responsibility, order them to jump because of a false alarm or a feint attack and you would be blinding that sector for as long as it took to winch down the balloon, put observers on board and winch it back up again. This could be long enough to allow the enemy to bring up and conceal an artillery piece or launch a raid which could cause many casualties amongst the front line troops. Misread the situation and your observers could be burnt alive. At the same time observers had to learn to trust their ‘chutes and their ground controllers (you cannot yourself see any danger but a disembodied voice on the ‘phone is telling you to jump out of the balloon and trust your life to a device that has previously been the province of the daredevil showman). At first some observers did not take up parachutes even when available. However after time both German and British accounts suggest a high degree of trust was established between between the observers and their ground controller, if he rang the basket and said jump any further words were spoken to empty air. As a result the number of jumps would exceed the number of attacks pressed home (based on American statistics in the ratio of 2:1).

Observers had very little time in which to jump, they not only needed to be away before the balloon fell on the basket and engulfed it but also needed to be sufficiently clear before the parachute canopy inflated to ensure that burning fragments from the balloon did not set it alight (this may have been one reason why British observers rejected the Guardian Angel parachute as its canopy opened almost immediately after jumping). Given this , the time taken to connect a harness might be too long; this may have been the problem with the early German Paulus ‘chutes – when in 1916 five German balloons were attacked by rocket firing Nieuport scouts none of the observers were able to escape despite having been issued parachutes the previous month.

With the Spencer style ‘chutes the means of exit was a headlong dive over the edge of the basket. This was not without problems as Flight-Sergeant W. S. Lewis discovered. Diving out of the basket he also dived out of his harness but managed to grab the shroud rope which wrapped itself around his neck and started to choke him. He then struck the winch cable which tore away his chute and catapulted him into the void until he hit his Lieutenant’s chute which then collapsed ( this begins to sound like Hoffnungs famous brick layer’s story). The resulting conversation between the two seemingly doomed airmen as they plummeted earthward is a model of British stiff upper lip.

"Sorry, but I couldn't help it."

"It's all right, old man, but couldn't you find some other bloody patch to fall on?”

The Spencer device then reflated the canopy flipping Lewis off but he hung onto something and the two men landed on the one chute (with Lewis underneath) in the Canadian front line (which the Germans then started to shell).

Other jumpers found the inability to use the shrouds to steer a problem, if there was only one tree for miles around they landed in it (and there was inevitably a photographer around to record it). One German jumper ended up in the River Meuse. On landing the jumper then had to cut the rope connecting his harness to the shrouds. If he had not taken the precaution of having a knife on a lanyard he could be dragged for some way. A final problem faced some British jumpers – French peasants who had heard tales (largely incorrect) of German spies being parachuted from aircraft and who could give them a rough time before they established their identity.

[Ed Woods]

I posted the above yesterday and I notice a number of views but no comments. Is this of interest? Should I persevere with part two (the experiences of some jumpers)?

There must be a wealth of information out there to compile into a very readble book on this subject. This is an aspect of the Great War I had never thought about before and I stumbled on your article by mistake. I wonder how many people have ancestors who were balloon observers but have no idea what there wartime experience was. Good luck on your future research.

[Adrian Roberts]

Once synchronised machine guns were available almost all attacks on balloons were made by diving onto the balloon as steeply as possible whilst firing, pulling out into level flight and skedaddling before the defensive AA fire could zero in. In almost all cases the attack came from above and was over very quickly.

Low level attacks were occassionally tried, such as the series of attacks by 40 sqdn's Nieuports in early May 1917. Edward Mannock scored his first victory in the operation on 7th May, and his diary records "crossing the lines at 15 feet". The flight leader, 19 year-old Captain Eric Nixon was lost due to ground fire, which may be part of the reason why low-level attacks were discontinued.

(I know your text says "almost all attacks .. were made by diving", so I don't doubt that you knew of this exception!)

[MACRAE]

I read this intrest what a fasinating insight, to early days of the parachute no reserve just the main chute, you took your chance and that was that. Very brave men indeed no doubt about it .

Dan

[centurion]

Low level attacks were occassionally tried, such as the series of attacks by 40 sqdn's Nieuports in early May 1917. Edward Mannock scored his first victory in the operation on 7th May, and his diary records "crossing the lines at 15 feet". The flight leader, 19 year-old Captain Eric Nixon was lost due to ground fire, which may be part of the reason why low-level attacks were discontinued.

(I know your text says "almost all attacks .. were made by diving", so I don't doubt that you knew of this exception!)

Can you provide more information? Balloons were attacked, self evidently, at the altitude at which they were flying! So the concept of a low altitude attack doesn't make sense (unless you were trying to catch the balloon on the ground). The normal choices were to attack from below, on the level or from above. A diving attack had a number of advantages, the balloon its self acted as a shield against ground fire and the speed built up allowed a fast exit (which might indeed be at low altitude). On the German side the Pfalz DIII was preferred for such attacks as it didn't tend to fall apart in dives (unlike the Albatross DIII). A low altitude approach might be an option in an attempt to catch the ground crew and flak by surprise but the attackers would have to pull up to the balloon's operating altitude for the attack. Attacking on the level had its problems as one Italian pilot discovered when he found himself flying through a cloud of burning hydrogen from an exploded KuK balloon. Attacking from below exposed one to the maximum of ground fire.

[squirrel]

Excellent Centurion. Well researched and written, full of detail and example. Is there more to come?

[centurion]

Excellent Centurion. Well researched and written, full of detail and example. Is there more to come?

Yes

[centurion]

Low level attacks were occassionally tried, such as the series of attacks by 40 sqdn's Nieuports in early May 1917. Edward Mannock scored his first victory in the operation on 7th May, and his diary records "crossing the lines at 15 feet". The flight leader, 19 year-old Captain Eric Nixon was lost due to ground fire, which may be part of the reason why low-level attacks were discontinued.

Just done some checking - it was the approach that was low level. I can find no details of the actual attack. From what I can find it looks as if they caught the balloons either on the ground or in the process of being winched up (or possibly down). I note that a number of triplanes were used as a high altitude distraction combined with artillery fire so it would seem possible that this was an elaborate sting fooling the Germans into winching down and then hitting them as the balloons reached ground level. The observers would never have stood a chance (unless they had been ordered to bail out before the winch down started). One of those coups that would be difficult to do very often.

[centurion]

BTW Mannock's MC citation states the height at which he crossed the lines was 50 feet

[David B]

Good read Centurion. I await the "more to come".

David

[Adrian Roberts]

Can you provide more information? Balloons were attacked, self evidently, at the altitude at which they were flying! So the concept of a low altitude attack doesn't make sense (unless you were trying to catch the balloon on the ground).... Just done some checking - it was the approach that was low level. I can find no details of the actual attack. From what I can find it looks as if they caught the balloons either on the ground or in the process of being winched up (or possibly down). I note that a number of triplanes were used as a high altitude distraction

BTW Mannock's MC citation states the height at which he crossed the lines was 50 feet

The account that I have is in Norman Franks and Andy Saunders Mannock: The Life and Death of Major Edward Mannock VC DSO MC RAF .

Their text says: "Once again 40's tactic was to fly fast and low in order to assail the gasbags from below... another flight [the Triplanes?] would go over at height and hopefully make the balloons start to descend."

Presumbly this was the theory of low and fast = difficult target; which is relatively effective in a Tornado doing 600 mph but less so in Nieuport at barely 100 mph. They quote Mannock's combat report which says he crossed the line at not more than 15 feet and returned at an average at 20 feet (but his MC citation may be a more realistic correction of this; 15 feet is barely a Nieuport's own length). He says "one parachute was seen to descend" [from all the balloons attacked]

The RFC communique [Chaz Bowyer edition] also says they crossed the line at 20 feet. A quick scan through the pages around this date, shows that under the heading of "artillery co-operation", on 7th May 93 targets were "dealt with" by aeroplane observation and 24 by balloon observation; the proportions are similar on other days which gives an indication of relative usefulness. Also, on 5th May (entry relates to 4th May), "No.29 balloon [british] was brought down by an HA, repaired and sent up again, brought down a second time, repaired and sent up a third time during the night. The same observer, Flt Sgt GGL Blake, was in the balloon each time and made successful parachute descents on each occasion". Presumably, the balloon did not catch fire and the damage was limited to bullet holes.

[centurion]

Two of the balloons were destroyed on the ground and two very close to the ground so probably not attacked from below. The other three were higher (but probably on their way down) but there is no info on the relative position of the aircraft when they attacked. All the attacking aircraft were damaged and apart from Nixon a number of pilots (including Mannock) were injured. It certainly appears to have been a sting and the AA crews attention was probably focused on the threatening triplanes. It would be difficult to pull off such a surprise very often and if the AA crews were alert and expecting the possibility of a low level raid a suicidal enterprise.

[centurion]

Here is part 3 - the balloons themselves

The idea of observing one’s opponent’s fortifications and troop movements from the air predates heavier than air flight by over 100 years. The World’s first military aviation unit was formed on March 29th 1794 as the Corps d’Aerostatier under a Captain Coutelle. Initially they were equipped with one hydrogen filled balloon ‘L’Entreprenant’. Military ballooning was obviously regarded as dangerous as the Corps’ personnel consisted of men regarded by the French Revolutionary authorities as politically unreliable or even criminal (and therefore expendable) – a sort of ‘dirty dozen’. They were actually used for hazardous duties on the battlefield whilst awaiting the arrival of their ballooning equipment. In practice the French balloon proved both successful and dangerous. Coutelle’s observations from L’Entreprenant of Austrian troop deployments played a significant role in the defence of Maubeuge and the retaking of Charleroi. On June 26th 1794 General Moriot used L’Entreprenant as an airborne command post at the Battle of Fleurus and won a victory. By 1796 the Corps d’Aerostatier had four balloon companies in service on various fronts. In 1797, at the insistence of the revolutionary government, L’Entreprenant and its support crew accompanied Napoleon Bonaparte on his Egyptian campaign. Although at least one flight was made at Giza no real use was made of the balloon. It would certainly have been of use to the French at the siege of Acre. (There is a mystery about the fate of L’Entreprenant. It has been said that it was lost when its support ship La Patriote was sunk at the Battle of the Nile but no such ship appears in the record of vessels destroyed or captured in the battle. It is possible that it was taken when British ships under the command of Sir Sydney Smith captured the convoy carrying the French siege train (which would explain the failure to use it at Acre) or it may have been in Cairo when the French garrison surrendered to British and Indian troops in 1801. In either case it is remotely possible that somewhere, possibly still in Egypt, the remains of the World’s first military aircraft still survive.) However Napoleon, for reasons too lengthy to include here, was in essence profoundly anti balloon and disbanded the Corps d’Aerostatier on his return from Egypt.

During its brief existence this first air force experienced many of the problems that the balloon observers of a hundred and more years later had still to overcome at the onset of WW1. A problem that has always bedevilled observation balloons is that of stability. Any flow of air on a tethered spherical balloon will cause it to rotate. This makes it difficult for the observer to maintain a useful view of the area he is monitoring. At first in the 1790s and during the American Civil War this was solved by using two widely spaced mooring ropes but with the introduction of balloon winches (by the RE in the 2nd half of the 19th century) this approach became impractical. Moreover in gusty weather a tethered balloon will experience violent movements with the observers’ basket swinging wildly below. In such circumstances merely staying in the basket becomes the main priority and accurate observation becomes impossible. The balloon would normally have to be lowered back to ground level and secured until the wind eased. In 1893 two German military engineers Parseval and Sigsfeld came up with a radical solution to these issues by redesigning the balloon.

Instead of a spherical balloon they created one that was essentially tubular with rounded ends. At the one end of this was fitted a huge ear shaped bag, this was not filled with gas and was inflated by the wind, the bottom part having a large vent for this purpose. An air filled bag being heavier than a hydrogen filled envelope this made the balloon heavier at one end so that it would assume a position where the envelope sloped upwards at about 25 degrees. Given that the effect was of a rigid inflated tube sticking upwards from a large often wrinkly sac the German Army nick name for this new balloon is not printable in polite publications, the more official nomenclature was Drachen (dragon or kite) and to most of the world they became known as sausage balloons.

The bag performed much the same function as does a sea anchor in a marine environment and kept the balloon facing into the wind, as more powerful winds expanded the bag it in turn pressed upon the gas envelope reducing its volume(and therefore lift) which also dampened (but did not eliminate) the effect of wind turbulence. Additional stabilisation was achieved by streaming out a ‘kite tail’ with drogues (often mistaken for balloonets).

Whilst not solving all the problems the Drachen was a great improvement over the spherical tethered balloon and soon became standard in the German Army and later that of Austria Hungary (KuK). Drachen were also sold to the Belgian Army and the Imperial Russian Navy (the deeply conservative Russian Army continued with spherical balloons). Britain also continued with spherical balloons (France had once again abolished her balloon corps). Thus when WW1 broke out Germany had a significant lead in the technology used for observation balloons. However the managing director of C. G. Spencer and Sons, the long established British balloon and parachute manufacturers, had previously (possibly in 1912 or 13) ‘acquired’ a complete set of production drawings for the Drachen plus all the additional information necessary to set up a production line. Where this material came from is unknown but given their close collaboration in other matters before the war one might suspect that Wing Captain E. M. Maitland, of the R.N.A.S. had been indulging in some pre war espionage activities. Whatever the souce it meant that Spencers were in a position to start some production as soon as Maitland and some other RNAS ‘balloonatics’ persuade the powers that be of the need.

France once again re-established her Corps d’Aerostatier but still with spherical balloons that would not have seemed unduly strange to Captain Coutelle and his fellow observers. Britain was so short of balloons that French was forced to borrow a company from the Corps d’Aerostatier in April 1915 but I have been unable to determine if these were equipped with spherical or other types of balloon. Both Britain and France had begun to convert to the Drachen type balloon by mid 1915 using the design material acquired by Spencer. There was only one small British plant in Manchester capable of supplying Spencers with the material needed for the manufacture of Drachens so initially reliance was placed on imports of French produced fabric. However the first British Balloon Company equipped with a Drachen went into action at Aubers Ridge in May 1915 and 15 others followed shortly. Italy also adopted the Drachen at about this time. By 1916 most major powers were using the same design of observation balloon and in significant numbers. However in America a “not invented here” attitude seems to have prevailed (or perhaps Pershing merely objected to his army using a balloon with a scrotum) and attempts were made to develop a different design using canvas flaps and fins instead of the wind inflated bag. Although at least one of these balloons was used in Mexico they were not very successful. By 1917 the US Army was also adopting the Drachen.

Although the Drachen was a huge improvement over the spherical balloon it still had a number of drawbacks. There was a limit on how large they could be ( the majority being of 600 Cu M capacity) which in turn limited the lifting capability so that in order to reach the required altitude most operations were flown solo to keep the weight down, this in turn reduced the scope of observations that could be made. Many German observers appear to have dispensed with many of the items normally regarded as essential safety features (such as ballast) in favour of achieving a greater altitude. The size of the basket meant that it was very constricted which reduced the observer’s efficiency and hastened the onset of fatigue reducing the effective length of a flight. The problem of wind turbulence had been reduced but not eliminated. The balloon was also complex and relatively expensive to produce.

In 1914 the French engineer Lt Albert Caquot commanded a company in the Corps d’Aerostatier. Today Caquot’s monuments are bridges, dams and other huge concrete structures throughout France (the giant dry dock that was the principle target of the WW2 St Nazaire raid was one of his designs) but Caquot was a leading world expert in fluidics and understood the problems caused by airflow round a spherical balloon and he set out to produce an improved design. Caquot’s basic design was based on a near teardrop shaped envelope with three inflatable fins at the rear end. The fins were not filled with hydrogen but were wind inflated through an aperture in the lower, ventral, fin. Behind the aperture, concealed in the fin, was a relatively complex system of chambers that adjusted the pressure within all three fins automatically to maintain stability. The Caquot balloon would remain stable in winds of up to 45 mph much higher than was possible with the Drachen. The Caquot design was scaleable and could be built in a variety of sizes [ the 4 standards being P - 750 Cu M, P2 - 820 Cu M, M2 - 930 Cu M, and R - 1,000 Cu M] The P and P2 were the most common varieties and had two observers housed in a relatively spacious basket (at least compared to that of the Drachen’s) but by the end of the war the use of larger balloons (the Rs) carrying three observers was increasing. Of great importance was the fact that the design was easy to manufacture and lent itself to mass production.

In 1916 most major powers began to convert to Caquot type balloons (the USA was lagging a bit behind). Germany built a copy (called the AE) but, because they had not captured an intact Caquot, they were unable to duplicate the ingenious auto stabilising chambers in the ventral fin so that the German copies were not as stable as the real thing (but still a major improvement over the Drachen). The KuK, Bulgaria and Turkey also used the AE. [it was not until Autumn 1918 that an American Caquot fell intact into German hands and some of the last German balloons built had the full stabilisation fitted]. Mis captioning of photos of German balloons is quite rife so many photos of German Caquot type balloons appear under the Parseval – Sigsfeld label

Late in 1918 Caquots fitted with a motor and a propeller began to appear, these were not true dirigibles, the propulsion was to make it easier to shift position to another tethering site. Also late in 1918 Italy produced a spherical observation balloon with elaborate vents and fins around its equator so that it did not spin and was relatively stable. Given the success of the Caquot one wonders why. Caquot balloons were made in various forms in WW2, indeed many of the most iconic photos of the period show these in the form of the ubiquitous barrage balloon.

By November 1918 over 500 balloons, 170 German, 330 Allied, were flying over the Western Front. All of these were of the Caquot type.

.

[squirrel]

Excellent yet again. Thank you.

[centurion]

Two of the balloons were destroyed on the ground and two very close to the ground so probably not attacked from below. The other three were higher (but probably on their way down) but there is no info on the relative position of the aircraft when they attacked. All the attacking aircraft were damaged and apart from Nixon a number of pilots (including Mannock) were injured. It certainly appears to have been a sting and the AA crews attention was probably focused on the threatening triplanes. It would be difficult to pull off such a surprise very often and if the AA crews were alert and expecting the possibility of a low level raid a suicidal enterprise.

Further to this a combat report by Lt Parry confirms that the balloons were being pulled down and those destroyed near the ground were less than 10 feet from it (so an attack from below seems unlikely). The observers had bailed out before the winch down. It does sound increasingly as if the Germans were fooled into the winch down by the decoy triplanes.

Parry had to crash land before getting back to base - of the planes that returned all appear to have been write offs

[Adrian Roberts]

Thanks, this throws a lot of light on a neglected subject.

What I don't quite follow is how the French were able to start their balloon companies from scratch at the beginning of the war, and apparently overtake the British who had started manufacturing the Spencer/Drachen type before the war, to the extent that we had to borrow trained men from them. Was it simply a matter of having more resources made available? Did they have balloons left over from when the Corps d’Aerostatier was previously disbanded? Were spherical balloons ever used on the Western Front?