Pershing & the 100 days.Egoist,Pro or deranged?

[59165]

In the days leading up to the 90th 11,11 there were several good programs on TV,one that comes to mind was about General Pershing,Co.of the 1st Army in France & the final battles around the Verdun & other regions.This one I watched with great interest as I was due to be at Verdun on the 11th.Got there & duly visited a couple of sites with an American connection.See this thread:-

St.Mihiel,Patton etc.

Truly an enlightening visit.

The programme ,who's title escapes me,mentioned a General Pershing,Supreme(?) Commander,American Expeditionary Force,a man who jumped over quite a few higher rankers to get this post because of his backing by the President of the day,Woodrow Wilson.Pershing went on to lead the 1st.Army,later known as,I believe,the big red 1.

In the prog,several mentions were made of the voracity of several officers in attacks made on the 10th & 11th Nov.1918 & the waste of American lives in a war that most knew would be ending in a matter of hours or,to some,minutes.That man who took a village at high cost to secure warm showers for the troops springs to mind.

The boss at St.Mihiel told me that Pershing's intended 'carry on to Berlin' strategy was in play as he didn't trust the Germans with an Armistice.He may have thought that it was a feint to win time so,fighting until the last minute might save a later,2nd operation Micheal,if you follow.

I could go on but I want to learn from an American perspective.We are short on knowledge of the US involvement in the Great War on this forum & a precursor to this thread let it be known that quite a few of us would be interested in finding out more.

I would like to hear what the Americans among us have to say.Black Jack,hero or villain?

As a closing point,Foch , before meeting the Germans for the 1st chat about cessations ,had been informed of the deaths of his son & son in law.He was in no frame of mind to talk of anything other than unconditional surrender.

Pershing lost his wife & three daughters in a base camp fire not too long before American entry into the War.Was he the full quid after such a sad occurrence?If any of this is wrong,tell me.I want to learn about this period of US involvement

Please feel free to add any info.

Dave.

[Ice Tiger]

Dave

As stated on your previous thread, I know far too little to comment in this area yet.

I shall sit back & wait to be educated.

Thanks for starting the post

Andy

[truthergw]

I know very little about 1918 beyond the bare bones and so I know almost nothing of the American contribution in the field. I am more au fait with the political goings on but that is another story. I would like to read a general description of the ' American war' . So, any recommendations?

[Pete1052]

Significant American involvement in action began at the end of May 1918 and steadily increased until the time of the Armistice. In June American divisions fighting under French command defended the line of the Marne River against a German offensive that came within 50 miles of Paris. Defense of the Marne resulted in the battles of Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood. This was followed by the Aisne-Marne offensive in July-August and the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient in September. The final chapter was the Meuse-Argonne offensive in September-November, when fighting as an independent command the AEF pushed the Germans back 30 miles. In October 1918 American units held 23 percent of the line on the Western Front. One of the better books on the subject is by Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

[paul guthrie]

You can get an inexpensive reprint of the Coffman book from University Press of Kentucky. We live in the same town, he's a friend. This book will not be equalled because he researched it in the 50's when many participants were alive including some high ranking member's of Pershing's staff.

[truthergw]

Many thanks, gentlemen. I'm off to the South American jungle bookshop now.

[geraint]

.The boss at St.Mihiel told me that Pershing's intended 'carry on to Berlin' strategy was in play as he didn't trust the Germans with an Armistice.He may have thought that it was a feint to win time so,fighting until the last minute might save a later,2nd operation Micheal,if you follow.

.Dave.

Persico refers to this as well in 11th Month..., hence the severe fighting in November right up to the armistice on 11 Nov - to gain a strategic foothold for further attacks. The British strategy at that time was to ensure the collapse of the German army on the western front. The idea of 'on to Berlin' quickly dissipated in 1915. Had Pershing drawn up a full scale strategy for this? If he had, was it to be a punitive operation or a possessive one? Did the weakened allies figure in this?

[4thGordons]

Many thanks, gentlemen. I'm off to the South American jungle bookshop now.

Limited reexamination of Pershing in Paul Braim's book "The Test of Battle" and most recently in Ed Lengel's book - To Conquer Hell which has been discussed a bit in the Books section.

The former is dense and a bit difficult but detailed and full of information , the latter has lots of excellent new "ground level" information but stylistically and organizationally is not really my cup of tea (IMHO). I have seen reference recently to a book entitled" The AEF Way of War" - by Mark Grotelueschen (IIRC) but it seems very expensive (75.00). From the reviews and blurb that I have read it seems to apply the idea of a sort of high-speed learning curve to the AEF....I would be interested in thoughts if anyone has read it

Since I have been living in the US I have made a concerted effort to read-up on the US involvement, I think I read 20 or 25 fairly standard texts on the topic in the past 2 years alone, (in addition to unit histories etc). I have the list somewhere if it would be of interest. I too, thought the Coffman book was very good, though I am not sure it is the last word on the topic.

I think, interestingly, there is a reverse of the Haig situation with Pershing in terms of the historiography. For 40 or 50 years it is quite hard to find a critical word about him yet more recently his record has come under more systematic (and it would appear to me) deservedly more critical scrutiny. With Haig of course the reverse might be said to be true.

Commanders (and their reputations) are not really my thing, I don't go too much for the "great men" approach to history, although for what it is worth I find some of the more measured recent criticisms more convincing than the earlier unquestioning adulation.

Chris

[phil andrade]

There was a fairly balanced assessment of Pershing's determination to press home attacks until the last moment in Michael Palin's documentary on the last day of the war shown recently on BBC.

On the one hand we have a visceral detestation of anyone insisting on squandering mens' lives in the last minutes...on the other, we are made aware of Pershing's prescient notion that the Germans should not be left intact to start another war.

Rather a simplistic summary on my part; was there an echo of Grant's "Unconditional Surrender" ethos influencing US conduct of operations?

Phil.

[59165]

That's the prog I saw.Just got confused after all the 'finding celeb's Grandad' progs.I enjoyed it and learned from it.That episode really helped me in my conversation with the Bob from St'Mihiel.Long time employee & question dodger from the American battle monuments assoc.

I think he was a little impressed & slightly disconcerted by my questions answers as I had learnt my new history off a Brit TV prog which showed a different perspective to the (apparent?Dunno)believed American one.

Thats why I started this thread.To find the history that the Americans believe contre the one I saw with Palin & the few bits I've learned since 11 11 08.Call it 'the American revisionist'thread.

We have seen several times what non UK members think of the heirarchy of the BEF.God knows,theres been enough books but(you Americans),tell me about your Pershing & his ilk.

We need educating.

Dave.

[dutchbarge]

Dave,

I wasn't really being serious when I suggested the topic! Still, since you ask...........His supporters make lots of excuse for old Black Jack (the sanitized nickname..........actually he was called N****r Jack because he lead Black troops at one point in his career) such as he had to build a modern army from scratch, had too few talented officers, no existing modern staff to build upon, clouded mission, long lines of communications, etc. Pershing's punative incursion in Mexico (1916) was a fiasco yet his political connections (deseased wife was daughter of US senator) jumped him ahead of other officers for the post of leading the AEF. Everyone's heard the tragic story of his wife and most of his kids burning to death at the SF Presido (1915). Must have effected him. But he was a professional soldier and anyway it was several years in the past by the time he arrived in France. I don't think anyone who has read much about AEF tactics or logistics would be impressed. The fighting spirit of local commanders and individual soldiers (and very heavy casualties) won the battles not efficient staff work. Wilson believed the only way the US would get a seat at the peace table was as a fully participating combattant. To this end Pershing was under pressure to prove his army the equal of the British and French. One of the reasons Pershing was loathe to allow AEF troops to be placed under British/French command was because the AEF had to be seen as an independent partner not just as a source of soldiers for the British/French. I get the impression that he knew the war was coming to an end and reckoned it was now or never to prove this point and in the event rushed inexperienced troops into hastily planned operations. The results were predictable. Gee whiz, sounds a lot like Haig. Well meaning but inexperienced in modern warefare, huge pressure to get results, lots of casualties but still keeping on with his mission. In Haig's defence no one was experienced in 1914. By 1918 Pershing could have learned alot about evolving tactics (and probably saved lots of lives) if he'd listened to the British and French. The US needed a hero and he was picked. Physically impressive, looking like a warrior (like Haig) he fit the bill. That he hasn't been dragged over the coals like Haig is only due to the fact that no one really thinks about America's involvement. But if anyone wanted to start an Enfield Collector's style witch hunt for the Yanks, Pershing would be a good place to start. Cheers, Bill

[Paul Hederer]

Bill,

Excellent post.

Paul

[59165]

By 1918 Pershing could have learned alot about evolving tactics (and probably saved lots of lives) if he'd listened to the British and French.

Hiya Bill.

Thanks for your post.I didn't know Mrs.Pershing had Washington ties.Why was Wilson such a backer of Pershing?

As to the quote above,here's my take on why this did not happen.1st,after the Somme debacle & the large losses suffered by our commonwealth allies under our command,what General,entering the war late,would wish to be led by commanders who had basically made no gains in three years?(thats badly put & a bit simplistic but I hope you get the ghist)

2nd.Ego? I dont know enough of the mans personna yet to answer that one.

3rd.National pride?It was only 100 years before that US & Brit forces were at war,America was still relatively a 'new' country,finding it's feet.Growing ,learning & evolving.

That this was the largest overseas use of the US Army to that date,mistakes were bound to occur on this,the harshest of learning curves.

I wonder if he had sought our advice,would the outcome of the war have been altered somewhat?Would the Germans have held back forces around the Meuse/Argonne for political leeway in any peace talks?

I believe that is what he feared.

Dave.

[truthergw]

As I am waiting delivery of my first book devoted to the US involvement, I can't make any informed comment but I can give the impressions garnered from general reading. I have read quite a few biographies of Foch and Haig and of course, the American contribution is covered in these. The impression I have is that the Americans suffered unnecessary casualties because of a reluctance on their high command's part to listen to French and British advice. That is, if you like , the standard view and is mine as well since I have not pursued the point. From a political aspect, however, I have a slightly different slant on this. Wilson was adamant that Pershing was not to allow himself to be swallowed up by either the French or British and used as cannon fodder. The Americans were dependent on their European partners for equipment and training. The position that Pershing found himself in was not dissimilar to that of Sir John French in August, 1914. He was to fall in with the vastly bigger French forces but retain a separate command, he was responsible for the safety of his army. Possibly the easiest and most sensible use of the American forces was to slot them in to the existing armies in the way the New Armies had been introduced in 1915. That was expressly forbidden so really, it is hard for me to see how they could avoid having to make their own mistakes and take losses that the more experienced armies would have avoided. I have seen some fairly harsh criticism of the standard of their officers, I shall wait until I have read a bit deeper before I venture an opinion. It would not surprise me. They were brand new and very keen. I think it was Haig who said they were very quick to learn.

[59165]

Makes sense to me,Tom.

Noting the comparison to French has got me thinking (oh dear ).US junior officers of the time had seen what (if any)action? I can't compare our 1914 troops to theirs of 1917/18 as we had a good few old timers & seasoned men who had already ducked bullets.

I've no idea how to find out what ratio the Americans had of pure sprogs vs seasoned troops but (& this is from memory from a chat with Bob),before they entered the war,I was told that the US Army consisted of something like 18 000 f/t troops,not counting any national guard of course.

Quite an amazing thing considering some 3 million US troops were in ,or on their way to France by the armistice.

If these figures are total rubbish,I do beg your pardon as they were taken from Bob off the cuff just in conversation.

[4thGordons]

If you are interested in bare facts and figures for comparisons etc you could do worse than have a look at:

Leonard Ayres: The war With Germany a Statistical Summary. (I have hyperlinked it to the full text on Google Books)

Ayres was the head US Govt Statistician and compiled these figures in 1919 at a time when empirical study and statistics was the new cutting edge place to be! The figures given still appear to form the basis of most discussions which quote numbers (proportions of men, training, casulaties etc etc) - they do make "interesting" reading for comparative purposes. I have not found any wild inaccuracies or distortions as yet (although the commentary sometimes has a rather uncritical eye). It is the "official" US view circa 1919.

I have found it useful for context as I am reading other books, to give the big picture in which to situate other stats.

Regarding your last comment: see graph on p14.

Chris

[Paul Hederer]

The U.S. Army in April 1917 was a bit bigger than has been mentioned here. I've seen different figures, but it was around 128,000 for the regular army, and between 70-80,000 National Guard troops still in service.

Paul

[4thGordons]

The U.S. Army in April 1917 was a bit bigger than has been mentioned here. I've seen different figures, but it was around 128,000 for the regular army, and between 70-80,000 National Guard troops still in service.

Paul

Ayres agrees, he says: "When war was declared there were only 200,000 in the army, two thirds were regulars and one third were national guardsmen who had been called to federal service for duty along the Mexican border" (p16)

[Martin Bennitt]

I haven't read Persico's book but

here he is with a summary of it. It appears Pershing certainly did nothing to stop any already planned attacks on 11/11 and justified the fact by saying he did not know if the Armistice would hold.

Lengen comes down on most of the American high command in his book on Meuse-Argonne and concludes that American performance improved eventually because of the mid-level commanders ignored their superiors and applied the lessons they had learned in the field. Like Dave, it's a subject I would like to know more about

cheers Martin B

[Pete1052]

From American Military History, Volume II, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005:

The British [in 1917] had their own solution to use American manpower. General [George T.M.] Bridges, a distinguished divisional commander, proposed the rapid mobilization of 500,000 Americans to ship to England, where they would be trained, equipped, and incorporated into the British Army. This proposal would be the first of many schemes to integrate American battalions and regiments into one of the Allied armies.

Amalgamation, as the general concept of placing American soldiers into British or French units became known, had the advantage of expanding the existing military system rather than establishing an entirely new one. If the United States decided to build a separate force, it would have to start at the ground level and create the entire framework for a modern army and then ship it overseas. That endeavor would require more shipping and more time, both of which were in short supply in 1917. Conversely, using American troops in foreign armies would be an affront to national pride and a slur especially on the professionalism of the American officer corps. Furthermore, amalgamation would decrease the visibility of the American contribution and lessen the role American leadership would be able to play in the war and in the peace that followed. For these political and patriotic reasons, President Wilson rejected the proposal of having American troops serve under the British flag; however, he did agree to Joffre’s recommendation to send a division to France immediately.

With the decision to send a division overseas, Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, the Chief of Staff, directed the General Staff to study a divisional structure of two infantry brigades, each consisting of two infantry regiments. In consultation with Joffre’s staff, the Army planners, headed by Maj. John M. Palmer, developed a division organization with four regiments of 17,700 men, of which 11,000 were infantrymen. After adding more men, Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, Scott’s deputy, approved this “square” organization—four regiments in two brigades—for the initial division deploying to France.

*****

Before Pershing departed for France, Secretary [of War Newton D.] Baker told him: “I will give you only two orders, one to go to France and the other to come home. In the meantime, your authority in France will be supreme.” Baker thus had given Pershing a free hand to make basic decisions and plan for the shape and form of the American ground contribution to the war in Europe. Consequently, during the summer of 1917, Pershing and his small staff went about building the AEF’s foundations.

[59165]

From American Military History, Volume II, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005:

The British [in 1917] had their own solution* to use American manpower.

*Pete.Is there a comma or stop due there? Read it twice & a comma/stop would make quite a difference to this thread.I just want to get it right .

Dave.

[59165]

Conversely, using American troops in foreign armies would be an affront to national pride and a slur especially on the professionalism of the American officer corps.

*****

Thanks Pete.

I would like your personal views on this passage quoted.

To me,& it's only one sentence,it makes me think that there may have been an 'ego' thing going on with the AEF officers in France.

Is/was this a West Point thing?

[Pete1052]

That sentence has no punctuation in the middle of it. The following is the context of the quotation, taken from the same source:

In the latter part of April 1917 the French and British governments sent delegations to the United States to coordinate assistance and offer advice on the form of American involvement. Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour, Maj. Gen. G. M. T. Bridges, and the rest of the British mission arrived first; a few days later the French mission followed, led by former French Premier René Viviani and Marshal Joseph Joffre. Characteristic of the lack of planning and unity between the two Allies, the missions had devised no common plan for American participation, nor had they even held joint sessions before meeting with the Americans. Public ceremonies were well coordinated and presented a common, unified front; in private, each delegation pressed its own national interests and viewpoints. After obtaining American loans for their depleted war chests, the French and British officials proposed ways to best make use of American manpower. Neither of the Allies believed that the United States would be able to raise, train, and equip a large army quickly. Marshal Joffre, the former French Army Commander and victor of the 1914 Battle of the Marne, offered his proposal first. To bolster sagging morale, the Frenchman suggested that an American division be sent to France to symbolize American participation. He proffered French help with the training of the American units, but he was careful to point out that the United States should eventually have its own army.

The British had their own solution to use American manpower. General Bridges, a distinguished divisional commander, proposed the rapid mobilization of 500,000 Americans to ship to England, where they would be trained, equipped, and incorporated into the British Army. This proposal would be the first of many schemes to integrate American battalions and regiments into one of the Allied armies.

[4thGordons]

If I recall correctly a rather different take on this is given in John Eisenhower's book.

Unfortunately I can't find my copy at the moment - but going from memory ... I believe he suggests Joffre, based on discussions with his staff and political advisors on the way over, had decided that the only way the US would enter the war was as an independent force and therefore took a "political" decision to support an independent American force...

That is to say the French delegation had decided that this was the only way the American domestic political situation would allow the US to participate and so, regardless of their feelings on the efficiency or otherwise of that approach, and contrary to the British tactics, - that is what they supported.

As I say - working from memory so I hope I am not doing anyone (Eisenhower or Joffre) a disservice.

Chris

[Pete1052]

My interpretation of the American response to the amalgamation proposal is that it evolved from a curt "no" in April 1917 to "not only no but damned no" as the idea was repeatedly raised. It was a matter of American national pride that there would be an independent AEF under American command. It wouldn't surprise me if much of the wartime and postwar opinion of British officers commenting upon American operations was influenced by the perception that the Allied cause would have been better served had amalgamation instead of an independent AEF been put into effect.