Western Front tactics in 1917

[Robert Dunlop]

Now to the next section from Travers:

"Why couldn't Haig, as commander-in-chief, control his army commander, Gough, when setting objectives for the Passchendaele offensive of 31 July 1917? Partly because Haig himself evidently wanted to try a breakthrough offensive, which he had espoused as far back as January 1917, saying then that the 'whole essence is to attack with rapidity and push through quickly'; partly because Haig had accepted the advice of Plumer to try for a breakthrough; partly because Gough would not take advice; and partly because of Haig's belief that army commanders should be left to run their own battles. This last point is also illustrated by the possibility that the troublesome right flank of the offensive might be solved by attacking the area from the south and southwest. This plan was give to Gough by Haig, but Gough refused to do it, and Haig again apparently did not insist. This 'hands'off' approach was all the more curious in that Haig did not apparently trust Gough, since after one significant meeting on Passchendaele, Haig 'clearly hinted that whatever Gough said should be taken with more than a grain of salt' [no reference provided]. This was a curious method of command in war, especially with a volatile, intolerant and unreceptive subordinate such as Gough. In fact, the whole decision-making process before Passchendaele was fatally flawed with Gough being afraid to confront Haig over the plan, and at the same time an atmosphere of 'terror' operating in Gough's own army, so that 'none of his subordinates dared to tell him [Gough] the truth' [from handwritten notes made by G Wynne in 1944 re information from Colonel Robertson (GSO 1, Second Army) to Edmonds]. However, Haig was now stuck with a stalled offensive and a not very capable commander. The solution was to bring in Plumer and his Second Army, and gradually phase out Gough, which occurred towards the end of August. Yet what were the aims of Passchendaele now to be?" Source: T. Travers. op. cit., pp. 15-16.

Robert

[salesie]

Robert, it seems we have gone full circle i.e. many more posts from you basically saying that, apart from a few misunderstandings and little fits of jealousy, the senior staff of the BEF were all more or less in tune in their thinking, and that, in the main, fairly clear objectives were set, and the plans they produced were bloody marvellous really.

Perhaps I've overstated it a little, but that's the impression I get from your posts - just the same as when I first entered this debate.

You are obviously an expert in the fine details of the BEF's tactical/operational planning, and being such a knowledgeable soul you must also, by definition, be equally expert as to why the BEF never made anything more than insignificant dents in the German line in 1916/17. Consequently, a direct answer to the following questions must be easily within your grasp:

1) In essence, I cannot see any real difference between the battles of 1916 & 1917. I understand the arguments of the learning-curves of the chief players, of the differences between long advances after static barrages and the tactics of bite & hold behind creeping barrages etc. etc. etc., but, despite all the highly detailed, and so called learning-curve planning, the campaigns of 1917 resulted in the trading of relatively small gains of ground for high numbers of casualties just as in 1916 (apart from small decreases in the percentages) - why?

2) Given Haig's pre-war belief in his 4 phase doctrine, would you say that Haig knew throughout 1916/17 that despite any strategic objectives he gave and whatever the plans presented, rush through or stepped assaults etc., that no breakthrough was remotely possible until phase 3 was over i.e. German manpower/morale collapsed?

3) Given Haig's "wearing out" beliefs, do you believe that he only "interfered" in lower echelon planning to ensure that maximum damage to enemy manpower ensued?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Travers is suggesting that Haig could not 'control' the objectives that Gough was setting. This suggestion comes from Travers belief that Gough had his sights on the 'rush through'. As we have seen, Gough had set several steps as objectives, with the last step being contingent on the German resistance collapsing. Even the last step was short of Passchendaele. There was certainly no 'rush through' to the coast on day one. Leaving these points aside, let's examine each of the reasons that Travers provides:

1. Haig wanted a breakthrough offensive, based on his comments in January 1917. If this were the case, then there would be no need to 'control' Gough's objectives. Alternatively, Travers could be arguing that neither Haig nor Gough could control the objectives, rather than Haig control Gough. Either way, the January 1917 rationale had been superceded by events. As we have seen above, Haig's January gee-up to Plumer had to be considered at a time when a breakthrough 'might' have been possible. The collapse of Nivelle's offensive had put paid to the pre-conditions necessary for the January option. Haig himself acknowledged that in his briefing to the Army Commanders on 14 June 1917, as quoted above. At that briefing, Haig had mentioned that it might not be possible to go beyond the Passchendaele Ridge.

2. Haig accepted Plumer's advice to try for a breakthrough. This reason is not referenced. I believe it comes from a quote from Gough in his book 'The Fifth Army'. The reference was quoted earlier in this thread. Gough mentioned a meeting between himself, Haig, Kiggell, and Plumer 'some weeks before the battle'. Gough said he favoured 'more regular and systematic series of attacks, each with a limited objective.' Plumer, Gough said, 'was of opinion that after so much preparation we should be allowed to go "all out".' Source: H Gough. 'The Fifth Army'. p 198. London. FWIIW, I believe there is considerable doubt about the accuracy of Gough's recollection. This was not Plumer's style, as evidenced by the request from Haig to get Plumer to recast his plan for Third Ypres at the end of 1916 because the plan was too slow. If Gough was correct, then Travers should have noted that Haig did control Gough's objective, based on Plumer's recommendation. But I don't believe this was correct, even discounting the other material that Travers quoted, such as Gough saying the attack was a 'sitter', etc.

There is some evidence for Gough's desire to have a 'step by step' attack. Earl Stanhope recalled after the war that 'In this Passchendaele attack General Gough complained severely that GHQ expected him "to go right off the map," whereas he felt that with limited objectives and the attack carried out in successive stages the battle was far more likely to be successful and that success would be obtained with far fewer casualties'. Source: B. Bond. 'War Memoirs of Earl Stanhope 1914-1918'. p. 131. Brighton. This recollection does not square with the documented interchange between Davidson and Gough in the days before the attack.

3. Gough would not take advice. There is no doubt that Gough was very robust in refuting Davidson's memorandum of 26th July. It could be argued as evidence for Gough not accepting advice. There is more to Travers' point though. Later in the paragraph he describes Gough as 'volatile, intolerant and unreceptive'. Earlier in this thread, evidence was presented for the inclusive approach that Gough adopted with his Corps Commanders (Source: A. Simpson. 'Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-18'. p.89-100. Stonehouse.). Simpson noted 'from the first conference, Gough's approach seems to have been more hands-off and consultative than in 1916.' This description contrasts with Travers' view. The reference to Colonel Robertson's evidence given after the war also contrasts sharply. Given that Robertson was GSO1 of Second Army, not Fifth Army, his view might only be a partial one. As Jonathan Saunders mentioned, Earl Stanhope provides some contrary views. "General Gough has been roundly abused as a bad commander, a massacrer of troops, a murderer, etc. The truth is - and I got to know him well - that no Army Commander, with the possible exception of General Plumer who took more interest than General Gough in the preparation of rearward services, took more pains to make his preparations complete for a big attack than did General Gough." Source: B. Bond. op. cit. p. 131. Earl Stanhope also provided a practical example of Gough's approach during the planning of the Battle of Pilckem Ridge: "Sir Claud Jacob told me that when he sent in to General Gough his plans for his first attack, the Army Commander criticised them severely, so General Jacob replied that he must carry out his attacks in his own way or he had better resign and hand over command of II Corps to someone else. Sir Hubert Gough replied that this was the last thing he wanted and let him carry out the attack as he had planned it." Source: B. Bond. op. cit. p. 130.

4. Haig believed in leaving his Army Commanders to run their own battles. This is consistent with Samuels' hypothesis of umpiring in 'Command or Control? Command, Training, and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918.' The problem with this reason is that there is one strong piece of evidence to contrary, namely Davidson's (aka GHQ's, aka Haig's) memorandum directly challenging Gough's approach. There is a second piece of more indirect evidence, which was quoted earlier in this thread. It comes from the interrogation that Haig put Plumer through during the planning of the Battle of Messines. As with the Battle of Messines, if Haig felt that some key issue had not been addressed, he would require it to be implemented, such as the advance beyond Plumer's objectives on the first day of Messines.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, you have raised several important questions. I will defer answering, if I may. I would like to focus on the Travers' issues first but will return to your points.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Travers put Haig in the list of those "more concerned with the immediate problem of capturing the Passchendaele Ridge" than those concerned about the style of the attack, "either a rush-through, or a step by step limited objectives, advance." As we have seen, it was Haig's job as C-in-C to take the political mission (stop U-boats operating from Belgian coastal ports) and translate this into a military mission (clearing the coast). Haig believed, quite rightly, that an attack from Nieuport and a coastal landing could not, by themselves, achieve the mission. During the 18 month lead up to the campaign of Third Ypres, Haig consistently articulated the same strategy in fulfillment of the mission to clear the coast. There would be an attack out of the Ypres salient, capturing the high ground, and then advancing deeper into Belgium. This would threaten the German hold on the coast, at which point a combined land-based (Nieuport) and amphibious (Middelkerke) landing would finally break that hold. Haig set intermediate objectives for the attack out of the salient.

At this point, it is worth pausing to consider why the Ypres part of the mission was needed. The following map illustrates the reason. If the British attack had reached the Thourout-Roulers objective, the Germans defending the coast would have been squeezed into a small pocket and Bruges would have been under direct threat. The green line on the map indicates the German defensive position that, if breached, would have led them to withdraw further back into Belgium, as indicated by Crown Prince Rupprecht. Haig did not know about Rupprecht's analysis, but militarily he realised this would be likely. The risk to the British lay in German counterattacks against the right flank of the British salient. Here is where the high ground came into play. Provided the high ground was captured, then the Germans would have had a very difficult time dislodging the British, especially as the Germans would also have had to defend against the progress into Belgium.

So much for the rationale. Even if the prospects were extremely remote, it was still important to have a credible military plan for the overall mission. Otherwise, the C-in-C would lose credibility with his subordinates, as happened with Nivelle prior to his ill-fated Chemin des Dames offensive. The overall mission had to be broken down into a series of intermediate objectives, which Haig did. The sequence of the campaign was clear: break out of the Ypres salient, then land on the coast, then clear the rest of the coast. Given that the landing was an important component of the overall plan, Haig devoted attention to it. He put Rawlinson in charge and gave him clear goals. The details were down to Rawlinson and his Naval counterparts. A summary of the operation is available here:

http://www.1914-1918.net/BATTLES/hush/hush.htm (last accessed 4 Feb 2008)

Haig set clear intermediate objectives for the Ypres attack. The first objective was the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge. It was down to his Army Commander, Gough, to translate the first high-level objective into a realistic set of objectives for the first day. We have seen that Gough did just that. There was debate about his furthest objective, but even this fell short of Haig's first higher-level objective. Given that no plan survives contact with the enemy, the detailed plans would have had to be re-examined after day one, as they were. Unless there was a major catastrophe or a huge collapse of the German army, or some other reason to call off the campaign, then Haig's overall objectives would have remained to guide the next round of planning. This process was very clear to all concerned.

To say that Haig was "more concerned" with the Passchendaele objective than with the style by which this objective would be fulfilled is not correct, IMHO. Davidson's memorandum is the clearest evidence for Haig's concern. In addition to this, Haig was also trying to ensure there would be enough men and guns to achieve more than his first objective (hence the debate at the War Cabinet). He was also in constant contact with Pétain, both in regards to the French involvement in Third Ypres and elsewhere on the Western Front. This involved direct meetings and information fed back via the liaison service. Haig had to monitor the preparations for Operation Hush, and review the timetable according to the optimal tides for the landing.

Even before launching Third Ypres, Haig was aware of the new German defensive strategy. Charteris was responsible for collating the information from day one, which confirmed the extent and the focus of the latest iteration of the 'elastic' defence. Haig ensured this information was acted on, as well as disseminated the information to other Army Commanders.

Haig was concerned about the timing of the transfer of the ridge from Fifth Army's sector to Second Army. Even before the campaign had got underway, Haig had informed Gough that the ridge would be handed over to Plumer so that Second Army could protect Fifth Army's southern flank.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Now to pick up on some additional points made by Travers:

'The battle of Passchendaele... was flawed from the very beginning. One difficulty was that Haig, just as he was to do before the March 1918 German offensive, became over-confident and expected that the war would be won in 1917. It is true that there was some justification for this belief... However, Haig overlooked the fact that in 1917 the German army had gone onto the defensive, and also planned to conserve manpower through new defensive tactics.' Source: T. Travers. op. cit., pp. 11

It is not at all clear that Haig was 'over-confident and expected the war to be won in 1917'. Even allowing for the possible doubt around his expectations of war's end (bearing in mind his comment to Army Commanders on June 14 for example, when Haig doubted that they would get beyond his first objective), such expectations should not be equated with over-confidence. Haig condoned a debate between Davidson and Gough about the furthest objective on day one, for example. Had Haig been over-confident, he would have overridden Davidson in favour of Gough. Throughout the lead up to July 31st, Haig remained concerned about the ridge and Gheluvelt Plateau in particular. It is absolutely not true that Haig overlooked what the German army was doing. Davidson's memorandum refers to German defensive tactics.

"Thus Haig was mistaken when he told Robertson in early June 1917 that Germany was nearly at its 'last resources', and mistaken when he told the War Cabinet later in June that Germany was within six months of total exhaustion at the present rate of progress. By mid-July Haig was informing Rawlinson that all one had to do was press the Germans on all fronts, and the war could well be finished in 1917." Source: T. Travers. op. cit., pp. 11

In his discussion with Rawlinson on 21 July, Haig gave an accurate appraisal of the various options that might arise to trigger Operation Hush:

"a. If on our attack being launched Enemy gave way in disorder, and we were able to gain ground very quickly.

b. If enemy fought a prolonged battle and in the course of it used up his Coast Garrisons.

c. If we progressed and were by degrees advancing from the Clerken-Staten ridge against Coukelaere-Thourout hills" Sheffield and Bourne. op. cit. p. 305.

In his June 14th briefing, attended by Rawlinson, Haig had even mentioned a 4th possibility: the attack would not get past Passchendaele Ridge. Travers appears to be having difficulty in recognising Haig's ability to hold several scenarios at once. Modern business analysts call this 'scenario planning', which is a very sophisticated way of thinking ahead. Examples of recent works on this include:

Geuss, Arie de 1998. "Planning as Learning". Havard Business Review March-April.

G Ringland. 'Scenario Planning: Managing for the Future' (ISBN: 047197790X)

K. van der Heijden. 'Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation.' Chichester.

Briefly, the process involves thinking through different futures, holding that each is equally probable. A plan of action is implemented but contingencies are mapped out. There is an elegant phrase that describes what is achieved: 'developing memories of the future'. Signs are looked for that indicate if another scenario is playing out, and plans adjusted accordingly. If one is not aware of this process, then it can appear strange that different views are expressed. Moreover, it enables critics to latch onto one scenario and interpret this as the only view of the owner. When seeking to understand what Haig was focused on, in terms of implementation, then it is necessary to look at the formal written plans for day one. II Corps had a solid plan to gain some ground in a series of steps, with each step clearly laid out and contingent on success in the previous. The last step, from the Green to the Red Line, required a confirmatory order from above. It reflected the possible scenario of the Germans collapsing. It did not reflect over-confidence in reaching the Passchendaele Ridge, or even the Red Line, and certainly not the coast. It did reflect the contingency of ensuring that whatever ground was gained was also held. In other words, the potential to reach the Red Line if all went well did not overrule the need to hold onto whatever was gained in case another scenario played out - the attack was not as successful and/or the Germans counter-attacked in force.

"Because of this confidence, Haig did not seem to be worried by some obvious problems that he actually admitted soon after the battle commenced; for example that the front of the attack was too narrow; that the Germans had good artillery observations over Fifth Army positions, while his own guns were unavoidably exposed; and that the ground on the right was unfavourable for attack. Moreover, it is curious that Haig did not exploit the Messines success that had occurred earlier in June, and which his commanders Plumer and Jacob both wanted to pursue." Source: T. Travers. op. cit., pp. 11

IMHO, Travers is quite wrong in his first sentence. The second sentence, paradoxically, bears this out. Before touching on this, Travers has an endnote after the last sentence:

"According to [a post-war interview with Jacob], it was Gough that stopped the proposed Messines exploitation." p. 189

Travers also ignores the fact that Haig required permission from the War Cabinet before launching Third Ypres. As late as July 21, Haig noted that this approval had not been forthcoming. This is not the key issue though. On July 7, Haig recorded in his diary:

"I held a conference with General Gough regarding the date of attack. The guns of XIV Corps on his left were he said suffering considerably from Enemy's fire. 27 guns out of 36 had been damaged. He asked for postponement for 5 days. I pointed out that the date of attack could not be definitely fixed now. We had first to gain supremacy in the air, and then to dominate the Enemy's artillery. Much depended on the weather. We were not engaged in the artillery battle and must expect losses..." Sheffield and Bourne. op. cit. p. 302.. I interpret this to mean that a reason (not the only one) for delaying the exploitation of Messines was that Haig was worried about the 'obvious problems'. He knew, just as Gough did, that adequate preparation was needed. In the event, as was brought out in the earlier part of this thread, there were problems in getting all of the artillery and other assets in place for the attack.

Robert

[salesie]

In his June 14th briefing, attended by Rawlinson, Haig had even mentioned a 4th possibility: the attack would not get past Passchendaele Ridge. Travers appears to be having difficulty in recognising Haig's ability to hold several scenarios at once. Modern business analysts call this 'scenario planning', which is a very sophisticated way of thinking ahead.

Briefly, the process involves thinking through different futures, holding that each is equally probable. A plan of action is implemented but contingencies are mapped out. There is an elegant phrase that describes what is achieved: 'developing memories of the future'. Signs are looked for that indicate if another scenario is playing out, and plans adjusted accordingly.

Robert, having been a company director for nigh-on twenty years (a managing director for nine) I have to agree with you about the importance of "scenario planning" and "developing memories of the future".

However, as with any management theory, military or otherwise, nothing is foolproof - the computer adage sums this up i.e. sh*t in then sh*t out. In other words, any decision made is only as good as the information (intelligence) that forms the basis of each individual scenario under consideration (though, I have to admit that gut-feeling, however unscientific, can be just a valuable, but only sometimes).

Consequently, it seems to me, that a 5th scenario should have been in Haig's mind, and, given his experiences of the previous three years, this scenario should have developed into a definite "memory of the future" in his thoughts i.e. the trading of small gains of ground for high casualties. So, when the signs of this 5th scenario began to play themselves out at 3rd Ypres were plans adjusted accordingly?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, first to your previous set of questions. Direct answers as follows:

the campaigns of 1917 resulted in the trading of relatively small gains of ground for high numbers of casualties just as in 1916 (apart from small decreases in the percentages) - why?

Reserves, and the capacity for all sides to keep pace with each other. Throughout 1916 and 1917 there were many advances in tactics and weaponry. None of these advances overcame the ability of the defense to patch over any cracks with reserves. Until all of the reserves had been used up, it was always easier close a break in the line than it was to push through one. Furthermore, each side was able to appraise any technological or tactical advance and nullify it, relatively speaking.

would you say that Haig knew throughout 1916/17 that despite any strategic objectives he gave and whatever the plans presented, rush through or stepped assaults etc., that no breakthrough was remotely possible until phase 3 was over i.e. German manpower/morale collapsed?

I don't know. I believe Haig simultaneously planned for a German collapse and planned for continued German resistance. The primary focus, as evidenced by the detailed plans in every major attack that I have studied, was on the latter, with some contingencies in case of the former. More on this anon.

Given Haig's "wearing out" beliefs, do you believe that he only "interfered" in lower echelon planning to ensure that maximum damage to enemy manpower ensued?

No, that does not appear to have been the only reason why Haig paid close attention to any attack plans.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, you are right. There was a 5th scenario. Travers described it as one of the three aims that caused 'serious confusion' - the aim of "wearing down the enemy in preparation for a decisive offensive... (It is also worth noting that attrition - the killing of more enemy soldiers than BEF soldiers - was not one of Haig's specific aims.)" Source: Travers. op. cit. p. 11. After the robust German defense of 31st July 1917, plans were adjusted accordingly.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Throughout this latter discussion, the issue of a decisive battle in 1917 has been raised. Travers does not regard this as one of Haig's aims, citing only "reaching and clearing the Belgian coast; wearing down the enemy in preparation for a decisive offensive; and capturing the Passchendaele Ridge and the village of Passchendaele." Source: Travers. op. cit. p. 11.. Nevertheless, the issue is worth examining more closely. I have mentioned Nivelle and his offensive on several occasions. I now propose following up on this with more details. If ever there was a clearly stated intent to smash the Germans in 1917, then Nivelle was the proponent. Analysis of Nivelle's approach casts light on this issue of decisive battle in 1917, IMHO.

Some background material on Nivelle first of all:

"When France's political leaders chose a new commander of French forces in north and northeastern France, they had about a dozen officers from whom to choose, including the chief of staff (Castelnau), army group commanders (Foch, Pétain, Franchet d'Espèrey), and army commanders (Gérard, Nivelle, Humbert, Gouraud, Mazel, Fayolle, Villaret, and Micheler). Though one would expect the chief of staff and army-group commanders to be amongst the finalists, all had faults of one type or another that led to their not being chosen. Castelnau and Foch suffered from their long association with Joffre, as well as from their being devout Catholics. Briand had especially strong doubts about Castelnau's abilities. Since Foch had recently been injured in an automobile accident, questions also arose about his health. Franchet d'Espèrey, though hugely successful in the early part of the war and a confidant of Brian on strategy in the Balkans, had done nothing extraordinarily special since becoming an army group commander and was not highly regarded by his peers.

Of France's most senior army leaders, only Pétain seemed a viable candidate to replace Joffre. While Pétain was a Catholic, he did not attend mass regularly and thus encountered few objections from the radical elements in French political circles. Yet he had not curried favour with people such as Briand and Poincaré and had surprised some with his comments about French politics. At one point he had told Poincaré that he did not 'give a damn' about the French constitution. At the moment Briand chose Nivelle, he wanted to appoint a general officer with whom the new technical advisor could work smoothly. Neither he nor Joffre found Pétain's pessimism appealing, and neither relished the prospect of contending with his obstinacy.

Of the army commanders only Nivelle had the reputation and political support to merit serious consideration. While treating visiting politicians courteously and warmly, he had caused a sensation throughout France with his successful capture of Forts Douaumont and Vaux. Among his supporters, for example, was André Maginot, who told Poincaré that Nivelle would make a superb commander-in-chief. The most important supporter of Nivelle, however, was Joffre. Joffre had long been impressed with Nivelle's optimism and his 'can do' spirit.

Nivelle had risen in rank remarkably quickly since August 1914. Beginning the war as colonel in the artillery, he became a brigade commander on October 27 and received command of a division on February 19, 1915. His technical competence as an artillerist enabled him to coordinate infantry and artillery better than most officers, and he proved to be an innovative and inventive officer with his development of the rolling barrage. After distinguishing himself at Verdun, he became commander of Second Army on May 1, 1916. Six months later, after capturing forts Douaumont and Vaux, he received a telephone call from Briand on the night of December 12 and quickly drove to Paris. On December 13 a presidential decree made him commander of the armies of northern and northeastern France. With the outcome of the war at stake, France's political leaders had placed all their bets on an officer with no experience as a strategist, little understanding of how to work with allies, and only six months' experience as an army commander" Source: R. Doughty. 'Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War.' pp. 323-4. Cambridge.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

A little more from Doughty:

"Nivelle nonetheless brought new ideas and great energy and optimism to his new position. Shortly before becoming general-in-chief, he told a French officer, 'We now have the formula.' Some political leaders such as Paul Painlevé have insisted that Nivelle was chosen because of 'doctrine' rather than 'personality', since he represented the swift, sure methods of Verdun (in particular the capture of Fort Douaumont) instead of the slow, costly, methodical methods of the Somme. Nivelle's new 'formula' resembled the method employed by the Germans at Verdun when they had concentrated their fires on narrow zones, destroyed defenders throughout the depth of these zones, and thereby opened corridors for the infantry to attack. His method relied on an extraordinarily high concentration of artillery fired in depth throughout a carefully chosen zone. Though the French had tried such tactical methods in the past, they had lacked sufficient long-range artillery - particularly long-range heavy artillery - to devastate entire zones of the enemy's defences and open routes for the infantry. With accompanying batteries following as closely as possible, infantry, Nivelle believed, could drive quickly and relatively easily through the enemy's devastated defences until they reached his artillery. After the successful attack of December 15 at Verdun (when the French reached the original front line again), Nivelle bade farewell to Second Army by saying, 'The experience is conclusive; our method has proved itself'." Source: Doughty. op. cit. p. 324

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Edward Spears, in his inimitable style, provides the following description of Nivelle:

"The new Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies was a gunner. He was good-looking, smart, plausible and cool. Typically French in appearance, he showed no sign of his mother's English blood. He was a man of medium height, judged by our standards, with regular well-drawn features, thoughtful brown eyes, a slightly greying well-brushed moustache, dark hair showing white at the temples and a mouche or tuft of hair, also turned grey, under the lower lip. He gave an impression of vigour, strength and energy.

His career had been brilliant... It was while he [was commanding the Army of Verdun under General Pétain] that he elaborated a system of attack which proved singularly successful and which a growing number of officers, especially those on the Staff, thought irresistible.

What remained to be seen was whether the glorified raids of Verdun (for in the last analysis his successful operations before the fortress could only be so described) were applicable on a larger scale, and if the leader had the balance, poise, and vision to stand alone without the sure and firm hand of a Pétain or a Joffre to guide him; above whether he was strong enough to keep his head on the lonely and dizzy heights of supreme command. Would the shadowy and enigmatic figure of France standing behind him, scrutinizing his every gesture, cause him to look over his shoulder at her rather than at the enemy on his front?

One thing everyone in the army knew about Nivelle, and that was that he had the dashing soul of a cavalryman [spears was a cavalry officer]. Always fond of horses and a good rider, he could beat younger men across country. Thus the French and British Armies were now both commanded by men who were essentially horse-soldiers; but the Frenchman, although not technically a cavalryman, was probably far more typical of that arm than his more prudent Scottish counterpart, Sir Douglas Haig." Souce: Spears. 'Prelude to Victory. pp. 31-32. London.

Robert

[salesie]

salesie, first to your previous set of questions. Direct answers as follows:

Reserves, and the capacity for all sides to keep pace with each other. Throughout 1916 and 1917 there were many advances in tactics and weaponry. None of these advances overcame the ability of the defense to patch over any cracks with reserves. Until all of the reserves had been used up, it was always easier close a break in the line than it was to push through one. Furthermore, each side was able to appraise any technological or tactical advance and nullify it, relatively speaking.

I don't know. I believe Haig simultaneously planned for a German collapse and planned for continued German resistance. The primary focus, as evidenced by the detailed plans in every major attack that I have studied, was on the latter, with some contingencies in case of the former. More on this anon.

No, that does not appear to have been the only reason why Haig paid close attention to any attack plans.

salesie, you are right. There was a 5th scenario. Travers described it as one of the three aims that caused 'serious confusion' - the aim of "wearing down the enemy in preparation for a decisive offensive... (It is also worth noting that attrition - the killing of more enemy soldiers than BEF soldiers - was not one of Haig's specific aims.)" Source: Travers. op. cit. p. 11. After the robust German defense of 31st July 1917, plans were adjusted accordingly.

Robert

Several points, Robert:

1) It seems we agree that the battles of 1917 were, despite the many advances in weaponry and tactics, in essence the same as 1916 in that they traded small gains in ground for high casualties. Consequently, the logical conclusion has to be that no matter what tactical/operational plans were made, no military victory was possible for one side or the other until a collapse in the manpower/morale of their opponent ensued.

2) The fact that your expert knowledge of tactical/operational planning tells you that Haig's primary focus when planning the numerous battles you've studied was on continued German resistance, with only a few contingencies for German collapse, leads me to the conclusion that Haig believed an outright victory in the field to always be a remote possibility no matter what advances were made in weaponry/tactics.

3) I accept that Haig paying close attention to attacking plans to ensure maximum attrition of the enemy was one reason of several.

4) I'm a little confused here, Robert. After a myriad of your posts and thousands of "your" words to show that Travers was wrong, you now seem to be saying that Travers was right about Haig creating "serious confusion" with a 5th scenario, and that he was right when saying Haig never had the specific aim of attrition. Have I misunderstood? How can Travers be wrong when saying Haig never gave clear and unambiguous objectives (you gave several arguments to say that Travers was wrong in this) but right when saying Haig caused "serious confusion" with a 5th scenario? And, it seems to me, that wearing down the enemy in preparation for a decisive offensive is attritional by definition - indeed, in Haig's final despatch he says that it is in phase3 (the wearing out phase) where victory is won, and the heavy price we have to pay for that victory cannot be avoided.

Also, despite the plans being adjusted after the robust German defence of 31st July 1917, the end-result was still trading small gains in ground for high casualties. However, that takes us back to points 1, 2 & 4.

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, just be clear, I do not think there was "serious confusion". On this point, I disagree with Travers. The 'wearing down' scenario warrants a closer look but I would like to complete the review of Nivelle's offensive first. Thanks.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Doughty is suggesting that Nivelle was appointed, in large part, because he had seemingly devised a war-winning plan based on his latest successes at Verdun. Pierrefeu provided an anecdote that is of interest, perhaps, but not of great significance. Bear with me on this minor indulgence. It illustrates one of the many tasks facing a C-in-C:

"On the evening of [Nivelle's] arrival I submitted the communiqué to him. His first day of command coincided with the receipt of bad news. The Army of Verdun, which he had just left, had sustained a slight check. The enemy had taken 1,200 metres of trenches and a certain number of prisoners.

I studied him while he carefully examined by draft. His face had assumed a grave look which struck me. It was like one of whose portraits by Carrière, in which may be seen the mind of the sitter. He seemed the very incarnation of thought; this was not the face of the trifler, nor yet of a gambler. The burden of responsibility and the grandeur of his task were already marked by the furrows of his brow and the gravity of his eyes. With the stroke of a pen he struck out the paragraph dealing with our repulse. 'Let us wait till to-morrow,' he said; 'perhaps the position will have been regained.'

I was rather surprised that so small an event should have seemed to him of real importance. Next morning, as the situation had remained the same, I re-inserted the item; the German communiqué would appear in the afternoon, and would not fail to exaggerate the details as usual. But still he wished to wait, and now I perceived in his voice a shade of irritation and a certain nervousness in his manner. I realized that his mind was no longer free. 'This is the penalty of being a new man,' I thought." Source: Pierrefeu. 'French Headquarters 1915-18'. p. 121. London

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

In terms of acceptance into GQG, Nivelle got off to a good start. His handling of General Castelnau, a former superior officer and now his subordinate, helped:

'To know that the French Army was in the hands of this young and courteous commander, who had at the first opportunity shown his skill, tact and perfect mastery over himself was a matter for congratulation to anyone who felt for the welfare of his country. I described the scene to the officers I met. They were as much impressed as I was, and accepted it as a happy omen. Although in the eyes of many, General Nivelle's qualities were not to be compared with those of Foch, Pétain or Castelnau, yet from this moment of his arrival he enjoyed boundless confidence. We bowed before his fortune, saw in it the sign of destiny more powerful than the slow progress of promotion, and we trusted in his good luck.' Source: Pierrefeu. op. cit. p. 120

Nivelle's reputation preceded him in other ways that were helpful:

'I met Lieutenant Madelin, who was passing through GQG. Madelin, until now attached to Second Army, had seen a lot of General Nivelle during the Battle of Verdun. He was at his Headquarters at the time of the recapture of Douaumont and Vaux, at the same time as Captain Henry Bordeaux. Both had perceived his worth, and praised him very highly.' Source: Pierrefeu. op. cit. p. 122

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

General Nivelle is a very well known name from the French Army. By way of contrast, his chef de cabinet is almost unheard of. Yet Colonel d'Alenson, a cavalryman, was to play a pivotal role in planning the forthcoming attack:

'General Nivelle had brought from the Second Army three officers who formed his entourage: his two orderly officers, and a third, Colonel d'Alenson. Although the latter's name never became known to the public, it is important that he should not be neglected. He played a considerable part, and his influence on the progress of events was great... One of the most brilliant officers who had passed through the Staff College, Colonel d'Alenson had the face of an ambitious man. Dark and tall, of a height unusual even in a cuirassier, he was at the same time exceedingly thin [in no small part due to his suffering from TB]. His distant air concealed a great shrewdness and an extremely sound judgement. But to tell the truth this is more correctly the portrait of the man I met in Third Bureau in the early months of 1916, for Major d'Alenson had previously belonged to GQG.

When he returned to GQG with his new chief, honoured with his confidence, and lit up, so to speak by the rays of the rising sun, he seemed to me darker, more gloomy and more furrowed. ...he seemed anxious of his own will to increase his isolation.

His old comrades of the Third Bureau [the Operations section of GQG] noticed his changed nature for themselves. I know that they showed displeasure in spite of their discretion in these matters. It was easy to see that they had paved Nivelle's path to power, and so made sure that all Joffre's personnel would be retained retained - Colonel d'Alenson being their intermediary. They hoped that their old comrade, having secured this desirable end, would abdicate the authority he had acquired in favour of Colonel Renouard, the popular head of the Third Bureau. But apparently he did nothing of a kind. The post of chef de cabinet, which he got for himself, was irregular, and interfered with these plans. Always intervening between the Commander-in-Chief and the head of the Third Bureau, who with the Deputy-Director of Operations, is the true arbiter of the conduct of the war, the chef de cabinet wields a power all the stronger because it is not defined and carries no responsibility. A constant and intimate colleague of the Commander-in-Chief, he is in a better position than anyone to secure the acceptance of his ideas to the exclusion of those of others. He identifies himself with the Commander-in-Chief, and then by the use of the formula 'The C-in-C wishes so and so,' he is in fact giving orders to everyone.

I repeat that nobody confided in me on this subject, but as the time passed and the plans for the great April offensive became definite, it was plain that Colonel d'Alenson's credit and authority were growing, that he entrusted to no one the care of preparing this great event, and that he found opposition round him of which, in his determined resolve, he took no heed. This silent and frigid giant, formerly indifferent to everything outside his duties, stood revealed as an autocrat of the most pronounced type, convinced of the important part that he played, and confident to the extent of rashness in his own star. ...in spite of a thousand daily difficulties, and the obvious lukewarmness of the Third Bureau, he seemed like an inspired man, utterly rapt in his visions, certain of their realization, and awaiting his triumph. I, who, at this period, saw him every day, can affirm that he was full of confidence and energy; that he reached those heights of enthusiasm trodden by great leaders who feel themselves uplifted by their genius. General Nivelle was carried away by him. From this hearth came the fire that consumed him. Between this devouring flame and Mangin, that forge showering sparks, how could he have helped believing that he was about to be saviour of French.

But let us not anticipate. In December, 1916, there was no question of these vast schemes. General Nivelle had only just arrived. He seemed slightly dazzled by his future, and seemed nervous. Colonel d'Alenson, following his example, although apparently calm, felt within him the leaven of ambition; and this did not escape the eyes of those around him.' Source: Pierrefeu. op. cit. pp. 123-125

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Nivelle had a meeting with General Haig on December 20th, 1916. The next day he sent the following letter to Haig, outlining his plans:

'My Dear General,

Following our conversation of December 20th, I have the honour to explain to you, as follows, my views on the subject of our offensive in 1917 and the modifications which I think it indispensable to make in the original plan for these operations.

Object to be attained

The offensive of the Franco-British Armies in 1917 must have as its object the destruction of the principal mass of the enemy forces on the Western Front. This result can only be obtained by a decisive battle, delivered by a numerically superior force against all the available forces of the enemy.

It is necesessary therefore:

To pin to their front as large a part as possible of the enemy forces.

To break through the enemy's front in such a manner that the break-through can be immediately exploited.

To defeat all the available forces that the enemy can bring against us.

To exploit by every possible means the results of the decisive battle.

Necessary means

To carry out this programme, it is essential to have available, over and above the forces necessary at the beginning of the operation to hold the enemy to his front and break through, a mass of manoeuvre sufficiently powerful to attack the forces the enemy may have available.

I estimate that this mass can only be constituted by self-contained forces, assembled and trained for their task by the commanders who will lead them. It follows that these forces cannot be drawn from the armies employed in the wearing-down offensive or in breaking-through on the enemy's front.

I estimate the force necessary for this mass of manoeuvre at a Group of three Armies each of three corps of three divisions.

General nature of the operations

Starting from these premises, I visualise the development of the operations of our armies as follows.

The enemy forces will be held to their front in the region Arras-Bapaume and in that between the Oise and the Somme, by attacks delivered by the armies under your command and by French forces respectively.

Meanwhile an attaque brusquée delivered on another part of the front will make a break-through. This will be immediately followed by the rapid enlargement of the breach and by the concentration at that point of the armies of manoeuvre which are to take part in the decisive battle.

This battle, whose results will make themselves felt along the whole length of our front, will include an exploitation on a large scale, in which the British and French Armies will participate with all their available means.

Composition of the mass of manoeuvre

[Nivelle outlines the requirement for the British to take over more front line to free French units for the mass of manoeuvre]

Role of the British Armies

To sum up, the role of the British Armies in our common offensive should be:

1. To make it possible for me to constitute without delay the mass of manoeuvre which is indispensable to the decisive battle.

2. To undertake on the front of attack you contemplate [battle of Arras, prior to the retreat of the Germans to the Hindenburg Line] an offensive on a sufficiently wide front and powerful enough to absorb an important part of the available German forces.

3. To participate in the general exploitation that will follow the decisive battle delivered on another part of the front, by disrupting the enemy forces on your front of attack and by beginning the pursuit of the enemy in a zone which we will ultimately fix by common agreement.

Finally, the plan of operations which I have explained to you does not exclude the possibility, if the need arises, of an operation for the conquest of Ostend and Zeebrugge, as this could not take place before the summer.

This operation can be studied in all its details on the lines of the plan already adopted, and I even think that our Belgian allies might prepare their part in it at once.

If our great offensive succeeds, it is certain that the Belgian coast will fall into our hands as a consequence of the retreat of the German Armies, without having to be directly attacked.

If, on the other hand, our attack fails, it will always be possible when the fine weather comes to carry out the projected operations in Flanders.

Agréez, etc.

Nivelle'

Source: E. Spears. op. cit. pp 527-29.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

On January 2nd 1917, Nivelle again wrote to Haig:

'Monsieur le Maréchal.

You were good enough to explain to me verbally your plans for your forthcoming attacks, and I, on my side, explained my views on the employment of the Franco-British forces in France. Following on these conversations, it seems to me necessary to summarize in writing the essential points we discussed.

The attacks which our armies are to carry out on the Western Front constitute one and same battle, to which we can therefore devote not only thirty-five divisions, as you had in mind, but approximately one hundred divisions, whose co-ordinated action should permit us to count on great results. On account of the length of the front and the considerable mass of troops which, both on the enemy's side and on ours will be involved, this battle will be long-drawn-out [d'une durée prolongée] and will have a number of phases.

The first, in the course of which we will endeavour to immobilize the greatest possible number of enemy reserves, while obtaining tactical results which can be extensively developed.

The second, in which the principal mass of the French Armies will be engaged in order to break through the enemy's front and defeat the forces remaining at his disposal.

And finally the third, in the course of which the British and French Groups of Armies will undertake the large-scale exploitation of the success previously obtained, and will pursue the enemy armies.

The British forces should play, in the general battle, a role proportionate to their numbers and strength; and the effort which will be asked of them is based on the high opinion I have of their fighting value and of the considerable part which will be due to them in the final victory.

[There follows a series of paragraphs relating to phases one and two. One paragraph is of relevance:] I feel I must allow myself to draw your attention to the necessity of avoiding dissipation of effort by allowing the attack to break up into a number of secondary actions. The forces which would be necessary for this can be replaced by powerful artillery action, and they could be usefully employed in continuing the struggle and in exploiting the success on your principal front, south of Arras.

The third phase of the battle will comprise the exploitation of the success previously obtained and the pursuit. It is necessary, with this object, that our respective Armies should follow a combined plan.

After breaking through the enemy's front, the French Armies engaged, either in the zone of attack or on the Oise, will continue their offensive in a northerly direction. The one, covering its eastern flank, will pursue its advance in the direction of Laon and Guise; the other in the direction of St Quentin.

During this time, I consider that the British Armies should push on in the direction of Cambrai, covering themselves on the Scarpe facing north.

This combined manoeuvre should result in the destruction or retreat of the enemy forces on the front between Reims and Arras; its success will make possible the ultimate development of the pursuit towards the north-east and the east, the British and Belgian Armies operating together north of the Sambre, and the French Armies south of that river.

Please let me know your views on these different questions and the direction and limits of your attack south of Arras, as well as the forces which you will be able to devote to it.

Agréez, etc.

Nivelle'

Source: E. Spears. op. cit. pp. 530-32

The intent of Nivelle's plan was clear. Why did he need to write two letters in quick succession? The answer lies, in part, in Haig's written reply to this January 2nd letter.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

'[Haig to Nivelle: January 6th, 1917]

My dear General

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letters...

I will first deal with the plan of operations, on which the solution of all minor problems depends. It is essential that there should be no room for misunderstanding between us on this question.

In your letter of January 2nd you divide the operations into three phases.

In the first phase you propose that strong attacks shall be made by our respective Armies with the object not only of drawing in and using up the enemy's reserves, but of gaining such tactical success as will open the way for decisive action on the fronts of attack, either immediately, or - later on - as a result of success obtained by you in the second phase. During this first phase adequate reserves are to be held ready either to exploit success immediately, or to continue to use up the enemy's reserves, according to the development of the situation.

I have already agreed to launch such an attack as you describe, but not to such an indefinite continuation of the battle to use up the enemy's reserves. Such continuation might result in a prolonged struggle, like that on the Somme last year, and would be contrary to our agreement that we must seek a definite and rapid decision.

In the second phase you propose that my offensive shall be continued while you seek a decision on another front. This I have also agreed to on the definite understanding that your decisive attack will be launched within a short period - about eight to fourteen days - after the commencement of the first phase; and, further, that the second phase also will be of very short duration. You will remember that you estimated a period of 24 to 48 hours as sufficient to enable you to decide whether your decisive attack had succeeded or should be abandoned.

The third phase, as described in your letter of the 2nd January, will consist of the exploitation, by the French and British Armies, of the successes previously gained. This is, of course, on the assumption that the previous successes have been of such magnitude as will make it reasonably certain that by following them up at once we can gain a complete victory and, at least, force the enemy to abandon the Belgian coast. On that assumption I agree also to the third phase on the general lines described in your letter.

But I must make it clear that my concurrence in your plan is absolutely limited by the considerations I have explained above, on which we have already agreed in our conversations on the subject. It is essential that the Belgian coast shall be cleared this summer. I hope and believe that we shall be able to effect much more than that, and within limitations of time I will co-operate to the utmost of my power in the larger plans which you have proposed.

But it must distinctly be understood between us that if I am not satisfied by this larger plan, as events develop, promises the degree of success necessary to clear the Belgian coast, then I not only cannot continue the battle but I will look to you to fulfill the undertaking you have given me verbally to relieve on the defensive front the troops I require for my northern offensive.

In short, the first two phases of the battle cannot be of une durée prolongée, as you suggest on the first page of your letter of the 2nd January. If these two phases are not so successful as to justify me entering on the third phase, then I must transfer my main forces to the north. To enable me to do this in sufficient time to carry out my plans it would be necessary that the relief of the troops on the southern part of my front should be carried out by the middle of June. Moveover, to give me sufficient force to carry out the northern attack, I should ask you to take over my front up to the Ancre valley.

Thus, there is, in fact, a fourth phase of the battle to be provided for in our plans. The need to carry it out may not, and, I hope, will not, arise. But the clearance of the Belgian coast is of such importance to the British Government that it must be fully provided for before I can fully agree to your proposals.

In our conversations you have already agreed in principle to these stipulations, and I shall be obliged if you will now inform me, after fuller consideration, that you can definitely accept them.

In this connection I beg you will give full consideration to the question of what is the greatest extent of front on which you could relieve my troops if the need should arise, and if there should be doubt of your being able to take over as far as the Ancre I beg that the possibility of obtaining the help of the Italian troops may be carefully examined.

As regards the relief of your troops on my present right, subject to our final agreement on our plan of operations I have given orders that it is to commence on January 15th, and I am engaging with the G.A.N. for a meeting to be held with representatives of my Fourth Army on Sunday next to settle details.

I calculate that it should be possible to complete the relief as far as the Villers Bretonneux road about February 15th.

I trust that I have already made it clear to you that I cannot relieve your troops to the south of the road unless a larger number of divisions are sent to me than have so far been promised.

For my operations in co-operation with you on the Bapaume-Vimy front, I require not less than 35 divisions. On my defensive front, to the Villers Bretonneux road, I cannot do with less than 27 divisions until active operations are on the point of commencing.

This makes a total of 62, of which I have at present only 56. I expect two more from England this month and have been told that it is probable, but not certain, that I shall receive two in February and another in April, besides one Portugese division.

No hope of any beyond these has been held out to me so far. I am again writing to the War Office on the subject.

In regard to the date of the Allied offensive, it was agreed at the last conference of Commanders-in-Chief that the Allies be prepared to attack by the date mentioned in your letter of December 27th if circumstances should render it necessary to do so. At the same time, however, I pointed out that my Armies could not be ready to attack in full force before May 1st, and both the Russian and Italian representatives were also in favour of this later date.

It was recognized that it is of great importance that all the Allies should attack practically simultaneously and in the greatest force possible, and personally I hold that view very strongly. Circumstances may compel us to take offensive action, with such forces as can be made available, before we are fully ready; but we must regard it as a grave disadvantage if this should occur and we must strive to avoid it. We have evidence that the enemy fears the results of combined simultaneous action by the Allies in full force. We must expect him to take steps intended to prevent such combination, and we must beware of being deceived into complying with his intentions by launching attacks prematurely on any one front, or even on all.

Yours very truly,

D HAIG

Field Marshal'

Source: E. Spears. op. cit. pp. 533-35

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I have quoted Haig's reply in full. Nivelle was livid, as I will demonstrate subsequently. In essence, Haig was saying: I will support your all-out offensive up to and including 48 hours of phase two, as long as phase one is not too long. Unless a major breakthrough has occurred by then, I will move my forces to the north and try to clear the coast. In other words, the 'northern operation' took precedence over total endorsement of the more ambitious plans to end the war in 1917.

At the same time as this was going on, Lloyd George was hatching a plan of his own. After the Chantilly Conference of 1916 had seemingly set the inter-Allied strategy for the following year, LG called a conference in Rome in the first week of January 1917. He 'proposed a Franco-British-Italian attack through the Julian Alps, with Trieste, Pola and eventually Vienna as its objectives.

This proposal had a mixed reception' [understates Spears]. Source: E. Spears. op. cit. pp. 36

The details of LG's plan are not pertinent. 'On the return journey of the British delegation from Rome, General Nivelle presented himself to them at a wayside station. He said he wished to modify General Joffre's plan, and begged for British support for the ideas he began then and there to expound: but the time was short and the proposals he made too radical to be lightly accepted; so he was invited to come to London, where he could explain his plans at leisure, and this invitation he gladly accepted.' Source: E. Spears. op. cit. pp. 38 The ink had hardly dried on Haig's reply of 6th January. Nivelle had begun the process of undermining Haig's authority to give less than total support to Nivelle's plan. The upshot of the London meeting is well known:

'So deeply had General Nivelle impressed the Cabinet, that the day after the London Conference General Robertson was ordered to send a special instruction to Haig, telling him that the Government attached the greatest importance to the agreement arrived at in London being carried out "in the letter and in the spirit". The British forces were instructed to be ready to play their part on or before the date laid down. On no account were the French to have to wait for us.' Source: E. Spears. op. cit. pp. 46

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

General Nivelle met with Spears and another more senior British officer [?Clive] 'a few days after his return from London. He was in the highest spirits, but his visit to England, in spite of his convictions to the contrary, had done him harm.

He had gained the impression that he could bend the politicians to his will and override the military advisers of his allies when he chose by appealing over their heads to their political chiefs. At the same time his frequent exposition of his proposed method to all and sundry bound him to it more and more, and made it increasingly difficult for him to modify it should he desire to do so; this fact may have had a greater share in his ultimate decision than anyone will ever know.

After listening to my report, he said how pleased he was at having obtained two more divisions from England. This he evidently looked upon as a personal achievement. 'Sixty four British divisions in France,' he said, 'that is splendid.' He then plunged into the delicate question of GHQ's cherished plan to clear the Belgian coast because of the submarine menace. It was an obsession: "C'est une idée fixe," he said. I trembled lest he should put into words the thought that had troubled me for some time: that British soldiers, unconsciously perhaps, specially favoured this operation because it would be entirely removed from French interference; but if he shared my impression he made no sign.

What he said was that to clear the Belgian coast was purely a local operation... Moreoever the danger would be in no way removed if the whole coast fell into our hands, it would only be "pushed back. The Admiralty cannot really contend that to drive the submarines a little farther east will materially change the situation...".

He looked at us keenly as if to make sure he had made his point, then went on to say in a more conversational tone that in his opinion to make the attack on the coast our main objective implied that the war must last another year, since the effect of such an operation could only be felt in 1918. He said that, speaking quite frankly, he thought the French could not last another twelve months, and I, visualizing the wastage and the paucity of reserves, was inclined to agree with him.

He seemed determined to make it clear that he believed the Flanders offensive to be a purely GHQ idea, and at the same time to convey the impression that British Ministers shared his own point of view on the question...

He then asked us some questions on matters of precise detail concerning our army, but the Flanders offensive was evidently the one thing that preoccupied him; like the leit-motif in an opera it keep recurring irrepressibly in his conversation.

He went on to say that the War Cabinet had asked him what meaning he gave to the words bataille décisive, and that his answer had been that the term had been loosely used; that the result sought for must depend upon the means employed, that in fact no "decision" could be hoped for unless decisive means were employed. Sensible words, with which the British Staff would certainly have agreed, and to which General Nivelle would have done well to adhere.' Source: E. Spears. op. cit. pp. 65-6

At this point, Spears' colleague appears to have made a faux pas. He mentioned to Nivelle that there 'was some jealousy at GHQ concerning the tasks allotted to the French and British Armies respectively under his plan.' Nivelle 'jumped in his chair. "Comment?" he shouted, and banged the desk with his fist. "What is that you say?"

My companion, by this time anything but happy, repeated haltingly what he had said. General Nivelle burst out. Under the influence of anger he revealed the resentment I was alarmed to see he felt against the British Commander-in-Chief. This outburst had very little to do with what my companion had said. Unfortunate as had been his words and justified as was General Nivelle's displeasure at hearing them, his attack on Sir Douglas showed a pent-up annoyance and even of anger that was very disquieting. We both felt deeply this criticism of our leader and were amazed at the depth of feeling what could prompt the French Commander-in-Chief thus to criticize the British Commander-in-Chief in front of two comparatively junior English officers.' Source: E. Spears. op. cit. pp. 67-8

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here are some maps to illustrate the various plans. Please ignore the unit designations on the map, which reflect the positions at the end of the Battle of the Aisne in 1914. Firstly, Joffre's original plan, timed to start of 1st February. This was the plan 'agreed' at the Chantilly Conference:

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Now, Nivelle's first plan, as outlined to General Haig. The blue arrows represent the expected advance of the French 'mass de manoeuvre'. The red arrows was the expected line of advance of the British Army.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Another slightly different perspective on the outcome of the London meeting. This time from Viscount Dillon, who had a British-French liaison function as well. He sat in on the meeting between the War Cabinet, Haig, and Nivelle. His notes on that meeting add little. On January 21, however, Dillon recorded in his diary:

"Nivelle's appearance in London was not in the least to get DH ordered to do something which he had refused to do, but to strengthen his hand in procuring for him [Nivelle] the troops he requires." Source: Dillon, 'Memories of Three Wars'. p. 80. London.

Robert