Maj.Gen.Sir G.M.Harper

[Arnie]

Robert

Sorry but it was that Jim said his father told him they were held up by snipers in the long grass, then we have the Brigadeers report of the few german dead then Davidson reporting three piles of cartridge cases, indicating only three machine guns.

Liddle Hart writes about Davidson finding the cartridge cases.

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

If you believe that there were so few defenders in Flesquieres and its surrounds, I can quite see why you would regard Harper and 51st Division as incompetent. Although I have presented some evidence that there were considerably more defenders than this, indeed more than in other single part of the Forward or Support lines on day one, I will continue to work on collating the original German material. This will take more time.

Robert

[Jim Gordon]

Arnie

know I said I was withdrawing from this debate but I cannot let recent remarks made by you about my father go without correction.

I never said my Father told me about snipers holding up the Divisional advance. For the record my Father told me nothing about his WW1 experiences. He collapsed and died at The Scottish Cup Semi of 1937 when I was 11 years old. Even if he had been given time to tell me anything, I doubt very much that he would have.

Most of the remarks I made re snipers etc. were direct quotes from the War Diary of his Battalion the 1/7th. Gordons and are definiteley not atrributable to him and neither are are my views on the battle. In fact re snipers, I did not say that they stopped the Division but that the C.O. of the 1/7th Gordons reported an abnormally high proportion of sniper-inflicted bullet wounds among the casualties referred to in his Battle Report which is reproduced in the War Diary.

Jim Gordon

[Jim Gordon]

Just to hammer home the point I made above may I make it quite clear that my only sources of information on the Battle of Cambrai and Harper are:-

"The Life of a Regiment - The History of the Gordon Highlanders, Vol.IV 1914-1919" by Cyril Falls.

War Diary 1915-1918 of 1/7th. Gordons

History of the 51st (Highland Division) by Bewsher

Official History of Military Operations France and Belgium 1917

Haig's Command by Dennis Winter

Access to Liddell-Hart's "The Real War"

Access to Baker-Carr's "From Chauffeur to Brigadier"

"Uncle Harper at Cambrai - A Reconsideration" by John Hussey

"The Long Week-End 1897-1919: Part of a Life by Wilfred Bion.

"Buthchers and Bunglers" by John Laffin

"Battle Tactics of the Western Front" by Paddy Griffith

"The Ironclads of Cambrai" by Brian Cooper

And from correspopndence over the years with various historians such as Sir John Keegan, Pierre Breton, John Laffin (who for some reason did not reply) and more recently Bryn Hammond.

Jim Gordon

[Arnie]

Robert/jim

Can I transgress a little before I answer the points you and Jim have raised?

I have been giving you references to the Schwerpunkts some thought because it has been ‘niggling in my mind’. If my memory serves me correct, I seem to remember that when I was doing a exchange visit with the German Bundeswehr, a Schwerpunkts was the main point of attack and had nothing to do with defense. I did a little searching and found an article on Storm troopers, which I think you will find interesting. Below is two quotes from the article One from the Artillery section and the other from the Infantry one

The shelling were precisely timed so that the maximum concentration of fire could be brought down against the "Schwerpunkts" (eng = center of gravity/break in point) on the enemy line. The shoot it self could be altered from the storm troopers by the use of flare signals, thus overcoming the problem of keeping the enemy positions in a suppressive state until the attackers were upon the trench line.

This would further induce panic amongst the enemy at the frontline and paralysis the hostile troops ability to respond effectively. In order to succeed von Hutier had to rely on the surprise, so by the aid of the artillery brought down on the entire length of the line (to hide the "Schwerpunkts") under a five hour period, with mixed in gas shells (containing diethyl sulphide) to further incapacitate and disrupt the Russian Defence.

My Webpage

If you accept this theory could it not be that the German mention in their accounts of the Flesquires battle actually meant the British main point of attack.

Like your opinions please

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

You are quite right that Schwerpunkt was (is) a concept that applied to offensive actions. Martin Samuels ('Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918', ISBN 0 7416 4214 2) noted:

'As with many German military terms, it is difficult to translate Schwerpunkt into English adequately. The term was first applied to war by Clausewitz, who borrowed it from physics, where the Schwerpunkt is the "centre of gravity". In a military context, it is usually translated as "point of main effort", but this misses the full meaning of the term. We therefore suggest that a better translation might be "focus of effort".

Although apparently first defined in a military context by the Reichsheer in the 1920's, the Schwerpunkt was central to German military thought by the 1870's. It was based on Clausewitz's maxim, "The forces available must be employed with such skill that even in the absence of absolute superiority, relative superiority is attained at the decisive point". The concept of the Schwerpunkt was that this decisive point must be identified and all available energy focused upon it: victory at the decisive point rendered reverses elsewhere unimportant, whereas "economy of force" at the decisive point might result in defeat, rendering victories at other points meaningless.

The importance of the concept is evident from Hindenburg's maxim, "An attack without a Schwerpunkt is like a man without character".'

Samuels went on to make the following point, which is of relevance to how we should consider the defence of Flesquieres village:

'The Schwerpunkt applied equally to both attack and defence [my emphasis]. In defence, it might be either ground of decisive importance, or an enemy force.'

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert/Jim

The following quote is from John Lees 'The Warlords Hindenburg and Ludendorf'

The huge French offensives at Champagne in 1915. There, a Colonel Fritz von Lossenberg had observed how German defenses placed on the reverse slopes of ridges under attack had avoided enemy artillery fire and had been able to break up the leading waves of attacking infantry, and render them vulnerable to counter-attack. This was worked up into a theory advocating deep but loosely held 'forward zone' that functioned partly to absorb and disorganise the attackers, and a 'main line of resistance' that functioned partly as protection to the field artillery and partly as the base from which the counter-attacks would be launched. The new theory gave the  front line infantryman a great deal of initiative and countenanced his retreating in any direction he chose to avoid the worst of the the enemy attack, before making rapid counter-attacks to regain the lost ground . If  the opportunity for a quick riposte passed, then more seriously organized counter-attacks, often involving specially prepared Gegenangriff Divisions, were to be made as soon as possible.

The tactics mentioned in the quote above became, with minor adjustments, the main German main Defence formula in 1917.

Questions asked why in the light of these tactics did the Germans reinforce Flesquires or should we ask what the strength of the garrison was? and How many reinforcements? It could be a matter of degrees.

If the battle was as intense, starting when you say it did and going on until night fall. Why were did the Germans stay as long as they did in view of the initiative allowed. Or could it have been that commander at Flesquires did not feel he had done enough to delay the Jocks considering they had not pushed home their attacks for most part of the day

I'd like both of your opinions please

Arnie

[Arnie]

Robert/Jim

Just a quick one I once heard that before Cambrai Luddendorf shortly after taking command did an assessment into the danger produced by the tanks on the battle field. he told his troops something to the effect: That tanks did not attack with infantry, therefore not to frightend of them as the artillery would take care of them.

It would seem in the case of Flesquiries he was right every where else at Cambrai he was wrong

Arnie

[Arnie]

Jim

I can see your very well read on the subject. However you did give two opposing views and ask for our opinions.

You cannot have hoped that both of them are correct. The fact is in this case as strange as it may seem only one can be right, but they both can be wrong.

Any way all the arrogance and patronising makes me faint!!!!

Any way I'm glad you are taking part in the debate

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

Lees' description of late-war German defensive doctrine is an over-simplification. I am travelling at the moment so I don't have access to my sources at present. I will post more on this when I get back. Suffice to point out the reference to the idea that the 'forward' zone was "partly to absorb and disorganise the attackers". This was not achieved by all defenders falling back. When walking the Cambrai battlefield and seeing the village of Flesquieres in relation to the British attack, it is not hard to realise why the Germans would have decided to hold on for as long as possible. As you point out, the commander would have had the authority to retreat at any time had this been deemed appropriate but the fact that the defence continued throughout the day not only disrupted the attack by 51st Division but also to prevented the majority of the cavalry getting forward is testament to the commander's choice to hold on. Flesquieres was a very strong position, well supported by artillery in the first part of the day and strongly defended/defensible later in the day when the artillery had been overcome/withdrawn. There were plenty of defenders, seemingly no shortage of ammunition, and no evidence that the defenders would be overcome. I can imagine the sense of pride and determination that further empowered the defenders. Some of Ralph Whitehead's quotes from the defenders on the Somme give a good impression of this. Without question, in my mind, the defence of Flesquieres absorbed and disorganised the attackers. This allowed the gaps in the German rear to be shored up, rather than the launching of a counter-attack as happened in other circumstances.

I have Ludendorff's comments and will post these when I get a chance. It is important to note that the comments were designed to inspire confidence. They do not necessarily reflect a realistic appraisal, just as Ludendorff's insistence that the German people just needed controlled propaganda to make them more focused on supporting the war effort needs to taken with a pinch of salt.

Having said which, 'every where else at Cambrai [other than Flesquieres]' can only be applied to day one. Tanks had a very difficult time after the first day, as you have observed previously.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The evolution of German defensive strategy was actively pursued by Ludendorff. I have already mentioned some of the key priniciples that existed at the beginning of the war. By late 1916, the German Army was suffering from the effects of the grinding offensive on the Somme - Materialschlacht. One of Ludendorff's first tasks was to undertake a detailed reappraisal of German defensive tactics. He wrote:

'I attached great significance to what I learned about our infantry, about its tactics and preparation. Without doubt it fought too doggedly, clinging too resolutely to the mere holding of ground, with the result that losses were heavy. The deep dug-outs and cellars often became fatal man-traps. The use of rifle was being forgotten, hand grenades had become the chief weapon, and the equipment of the infantry with machine guns and similar weapons had fallen far behind that of the enemy. The General Field-Marshal and I could for the moment only ask that the front lines should be held more lightly, the deep underground works be destroyed, and all trenches and posts should be given up if the retention of them were unnecessary to the maintenance of the position as a whole, and likely to be the cause of heavy losses.

The course of the Somme battle had also supplied important lessons with respect to the construction and plan of our lines. The very deep underground forts in the front trenches had to be replaced by shallower constructions. Concrete 'pill-boxes', which, hower, unfortunately, took a long time to build, had acquired an increasing value. The conspicuous lines of trenches, which appeared as sharp lines on every aerial photograph, supplied far too good a target for the enemy artillery. The whole system of defense had to be made broader and looser and better adapted to the ground. The large, thick barriers of wire, pleasant as they were when there was little doing, were no longer a protection. They whithered under the enemy barrage. Light strands of wire, difficult to see, were much more useful. Forward infantry positions with a wide field of fire were easily seen by the enemy. They could be destroyed by the artillery of the enemy, and were very difficult to protect by our own artillery. Positions farther back, with a narrower firing field and more under the protection of our own guns, were retained. They were of special service in big fights.'

The above recommendations need to been seen in the context of the German position on the Somme. As 1916 drew to a close, Ludendorff noted:

'The strain during the year proved too great. The endurance of the troops had been weakened by long spells of defence under the powerful enemy artillery fire and their own losses. We were completely exhausted on the Western Front.'

This led to a new defensive policy:

'The Field-Marshal and I were fully at one in this anxious view of the situation. Our conclusion was no sudden one, but had gradually grown upon us since we took over our posts at the end of August 1916. As a result of our opinionn the construction had begun as early as September of powerful rear positions in the West; the Siegfried line.' This was NOT designed as a line that would be easily given up if attacked. It used heavy belts of barbed wire, up to 50 yards wide as we have seen, deep trenches, deep underground shelters, concrete pill-boxes and numerous observation posts for the artillery.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

After the German 'retreat' of 1917, the Siegfried line served its purpose very well. Then came the Arras offensive with the attack on Vimy Ridge:

'The group of armies under the Crown Prince Rupprecht and the German Crown Prince were strengthened with divisions, artillery and munitions, and were provided with everything necessary for successful defense. I begged the command of the group of armies [responsible for the defense of Vimy Ridge] to bring up its reserves nearer to the line in the area of the Sixth Army. The last attacks at Verdun in October and December had confirmed the old adage that the right place for reserves is close to the firing-line. The tactics of a defensive battle demanded that, in many places on the front under attack, counter-attack divisions should be held in readiness in the second line to meet and throw back the enemy if he broke through the first line.

The divisions which constituted the second and third waves were indeed moved up by the Sixth Army, but on the 8th were not close enough. On the 9th, after a short but extraordinarily intense artillery preparation, our army encountered a powerful attack, led by tanks, on both sides of the Scarpe. Several of our advanced divisions were overcome. The neighbouring divisions which stood firm suffered heavy losses. The enemy succeeded before noon in reaching our battery positions and seizing heights which dominated the country far to the east. The counter-attacking divisions were not there to throw the enemy back; only portions of the troops could be brought up by motor transport. In view of the heavy losses in men, guns and ammunition resulting from such a break-through, colossal efforts are needed to make good the damage. But it was absolutely impossible, with the troops at our disposal and in view of the military situation, to have a second division immediately behind every division that might possibly fall out.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Army, General von Falkenhausen, whose Chief of Staff was Colonel von Loszberg, was very energetic in organizing the defense of a new position... and a further withdrawal... was not found to be necessary.'

Then to the Chemin des Dames offensive:

'The preparations for defense were carried out with extraordinary care [spurred on by detailed knowledge of the French plans] by the group of armies under the German Crown Prince and the Seventh and Third Armies. At first the troops would not believe in the possibility of an offensive, as they had seen no preparations for it. But gradually they brought themselves to face the severe fighting that lay before them.

After several days artillery preparation the French attackded early on April 16 between Vailly and Brimont. They broke through us at various points on the Chemin des Dames and forced us to withdraw with heavy losses from the Vailly salient to the heights of Chemin des Dames. Toward Brimont another break-through was made, but was neutralized by a push on the part of our counter-attack forces.

Meanwhile offensives in Champagne had also been opened and directed against the heights of Moronvilliers. One division gave way and we lost the heights which formed a key position. Our counter-attack divisions, as I subsequently ascertained in personal conversation with the regimental commanders, were thrown in too hastily. The new [French] offensive came to grief with heavy loss.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

'From July 31 till well into September was a period of tremendous anxiety. On July 31, the English, supported by a few French divisions on their left, attacked on a front of about fifteen miles. They had employed such quantities of artillery and ammunition as had been rare, even in the West. At many points along the whole front the enemy had penetrated with tanks. With the assistance of the counter-attack divisions the Fourth Army, whose Chief of Staff was now Colonel von Loszberg, succeeded in checking the hostile success and localizing its effect. But, besides a loss of from one and a quarter to two and a half miles of ground along the whole front, it caused us very considerable losses in prisoners and stores and a heavy expenditure of reserves.

The costly August battles in Flanders and at Verdun imposed a heavy strain on the Western troops. In spite of all the concrete protection they seemed more or less powerless under the enormous weight of the enemy's artillery. At some points they no longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for.

The enemy contrived to adapt himself to our methods of employing counter-attack divisions. There were no more attacks with unlimited objectives. He was ready for our counter-attacks, and prepared for them by exercising restraint in the exploitation of success. I myself was being put to a terrible strain. Our wastage had been so high as to cause grave misgivings, and had exceeded all expectations.

The actions in the third battle of Flanders had presented the same set-piece characteristics as those in the second and in the fighting at Verdun. The depth of penetration was limited so as to secure immunity from our counter-attacks, and the latter were then broken up by massed fire of artillery.

After each attack I discussed the tactical phenomena with General von Kuhl and Colonel von Loszberg, sometimes at the front, sometimes on the telephone. This time [september 1917] I again went to Flanders in order to talk over the same questions with officers who had taken part in the fighting. Our defensive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other. We were all agreed on that. The only thing was, it was so infinitely difficult to hit on the right remedy. We could proceed only by careful experiment. The proposals of the soldiers on the spot tended rather in the direction of our former tactics; they amounted to a slight, but only a slight reinforcement of our front lines, and the abandonment of the counter-attack by the counter-attack divisions, local counter-attacks being substituted for this. These local counter-attacks [Gegenstoss in der Stellung] were to made by a division in the second line, to be brought close up and spread over a wide front, before the enemy's attack began. So, while the whole front line was to be held rather more densely once more, in order to gain in power, the whole battlefield was to be given more depth than ever.

Early in October the artillery action revived, and on the 2nd and 3rd artillery engagements of great violence took place. The infantry attack took place on the morning of the 4th. It was extraordinarily severe, and again we came through it only with extraordinary loss. It was evident that the idea of holding the front line more densely was not the remedy.

I now followed my own judgement and recommended the Fourth Army form an advanced zone - that is to say, a narrow strip between the enemy's front line and line which our troops were to hold by mobile defense. The enemy would have to cross this strip in making his attack, and our artillery would have time to get on him before he could reach our main line of resistance. The great difficulty lay in withdrawing the garrison of the advanced zone in case of attack, and in bringing the artillery barrage back to our own line [especially when the German artillery was under enormous pressure from the counter-battery fire of the massed British artillery]. There were further severe engagements... The line held better than on the 4th, although in some places the enemy penetrated to a considerable distance. The wastage in the big actions of the fourth battle of Flanders was extraordinarily great. In the West we began to be short of troops. The impressions I received continuously were very terrible.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Ludendorff on tanks. Firstly, in September 1917:

'As to the tanks, opinion was unanimous; they were not thought particulary dangerous. I purposely made use of the expression "tank-fright," but the officers from the front would not admit there was any such thing.'

Then in the lead up to the Spring offensives in 1918:

'We had no tanks. They were merely an offensive weapon, and our attacks succeeded without them.

At Cambrai the tanks were very effective. In all other cases, although they had been a nuisance, they had achieved no decisive results. I took a much more serious view of "tank fright" than the troops did. In the fighting [after day one at Cambrai] around Bourlon and in Bourlon Wood our infantry had disposed of tanks at close quarters by multiple grenades. Our artillery had shot them to pieces. The best weapons against tanks were good nerves, discipline, and intrepidity, which enabled many brave men to climb onto them, or destroy them by short-range fire. Not until our infantry lost its discipline and fighting capacity did the employment of massed tanks, combined with artificial smoke, produce a fatal effect on the course of events.'

After Mangin's counter-attack in July 1918:

" I enquired into the reasons for our failure of the 18th. A divisional commander... told me... he had not seen the slightest sign of activity on the part of the enemy. The rapid movement of the numerous fast tanks in the high corn increased the effect of the surprise.'

And re August 8th, 1918:

'Early on August 8th, in a dense fog, rendered still thicker by artificial means, the English, mainly with Australian and Canadian divisions, and the French attacked between Albert and Moreuil with strong squadrons of tanks, but otherwise in no great superiority. Between the Somme and the Luce they penetrated deep into our positions. The divisions in line at that point allowed themselves to be completely overwhelmed.'

Robert

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Ludendorff attributed the initial success of the tanks at Cambrai to the fact that:

'they ran into a position held only lightly, chiefly by older men, but poorly equipped with artillery.'

He does not mention the defence of Flesquireres in his review of the battle.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I am most grateful to Jim for providing the following material. It is a personal account of a tank commander, Wilfred Bion, who accompanied the 51st Division in their attack on Flesquieres. The account was published in the book 'War Memoirs' (ISBN:1855751798). It is one of the most extraordinary pieces I have read, quite apart from its pertinence to this event:

'At last we were clear of Havrincourt Wood, out in the open and on firm ground. It was dark and silent. The last tank had reached its starting point long before and I imagined dawn was beginning to pale in the east.

The engine suddenly overheated and stopped. I think I must have ground my teeth with rage, but all I said was, “Give her time to cool.” After a few minutes it was evident that either it had not cooled enough and it would be blown to bits, or we should be dangerously late, caught in the barrage if we waited.

“Swing her!” I ordered the crew. A splutter and then a roar as it sprang to life. “Throttle down for God’s sake”, I said to Allen. It seemed noisy enough to start the enemy barrage at once. This time the engine went on running till we reached our starting point with a couple of minutes to go. We left the engine to idle as I thought it would be tempting Providence to stop it and hope to start it again.

Night had turned to pale grey. My watch hand crept on to zero and there were three individual bursts from our artillery. Then at once a moaning in the air. The enemy’s trench system was picked out along its length by our barrage, unregistered yet bursting, at most, twelve feet above ground level in a precision I have never seen equalled. I could have cheered as I saw the white puffs shot through with white sparks picking out the pattern in the pearly light.

A and C companies, forming the first wave, had already gone through. Our company, B, were to support and go through A and C at the Grand Ravine. We went through to avoid the enemy’s counter-barrage and then lay waiting beyond his barrage lines till our turn came.

As the light grew we could see our first line forging ahead. To us it looked as if the enemy’s surprise was complete. We could even see the Highlanders signalling the tanks on at crossing point of trenches and other obstacles.'

To be contd....

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

'It was our turn; soon it was the Grand Ravine which turned out to be no obstacle at all. A and C companies halted while we went through to take the lead. The ease and orderliness of the operation after the chaos of Ypres induced a sense of unreality. The battlefield was set out like a diagram; the functions of infantry gunners and tanks slotted together with such perfection that it seemed as if we were more pieces of a Staff Officer’s dream than soldiers at war. Small pockets of German prisoners were being marched back, filled more with curiosity than fear as the spectacle unrolled before them. It was as if the British Army had decided to have a mock field day on territory already in use by enemy troops. They seemed awfully decent about it and indeed quite keen to watch what we were doing.

I raced my tank - in those days four miles an hour - towards my objective, the village of Flesquieres. The firm ground made it easy and exhilarating. The ground sloped upwards to an enemy strong point. As we came nearer I could see how formidable was the barbed wire-at least six feet high and ten yards thick surrounding the fortification proper. As a routine I closed my flaps and plunged into the wire; for a moment I felt a slight tug as it gripped us. Then we broke through and over wire which at Ypres would have held fast for weeks any attack no matter how powerful the artillery support, and probably for as long as we cared to go on hanging our corpses on it.

I still had not got over my exhilaration when an appalling din broke out. It was probably only one gun left out of the depleted garrison, but there may have been as many as two. It sounded, each bullet, like a sledge hammer stroke against a sheet of cast iron held against one’s face. There was no way of seeing anything. Taking control I drove the tank so that the bullets struck in front of me; they could do no harm against our armour, and I argued that so long as the bullets were striking on the armour in front of me we must be heading straight for the machine-gun. As each bullet struck off a red-hot splinter from the armour, we had an improvised direction finder provided by the bullets themselves. Feeling my face pouring with a greasy sweat I put up my hand to wipe it away. Allen looked white-faced and scared as I saw him looking at me. I noticed that my hands were covered with blood. Another wipe with my hands showed me why Allen looked scared; my face was streaming with blood. ‘His gory visage down the stream sent.’ The words repeated themselves in my mind monotonously, rhythmically, like ‘Around the rugged rocks the ragged rascal ran.’

The gun stopped. The silence seemed to flow back with a suddenness that hurt one’s ears. The roar broke out on my left side.

“Put it in reverse! Fire the left six-pounder” - at anything, anywhere, to make them think we’re fighting someone, I thought to myself.

The moment the breach was opened to load, such a storm of bullets came up the barrel that gunner Allen left it in panic. At once the inside of the tank was an inferno. Richardson managed to close the breach and thanks to him we had nothing but a couple of flesh wounds amongst us.

“God damn your soul Allen you *******!” I yelled at the cowering boy. I was blubbing with rage and fear myself.

No sooner had the gun causing us such havoc been silenced, or had silenced itself, than an explosion from the rear of the tank rocked us all. The tank stopped.

“What’s up?”

‘Won’t go”, yelled Allen.

What on earth had happened? I had no idea and couldn’t think.

“I think it’s catching fire by the petrol tank”, reported O’Toole.

“Every man with a Lewis gun and as much ammo as you can carry. Now out you go! Richardson first - we’ve only one door - the left one. Fall out, firing your gun as you go. Into the trench!”

Richardson tumbled out with only one bullet through his thigh. The enemy must have been as surprised as we were; all eight of us arrived safe in a bay of the enemy’s trench system.

When I could look back I saw that the tank had a shell hole where the right rear driving mechanism had been; it was effectually out of action, but the destruction of the gears had saved the petrol tank and ninety gallons of petrol from exploding in flames.

So we were in the enemy’s strong point, holding a short bit of trench in a veritable fort. In front was a high brick wall. At right angles to this, and on our left, was a low wall about a copse of tall fir trees. As we and the enemy recovered from our surprise so the sense of menace grew. My utter ignorance of fighting, as contrasted with the professional soldier’s knowledge, was mercifully hidden from me. I could feel it, but I did not know it; subsequent events conspired to postpone my enlightenment.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

'We were under fire, but I had not the slightest idea where the bullets were coming from. They were in fact converging on us from all directions. At the time the most obvious seemed to be the high wall in front, but I had no clear reason for concentrating on that rather than any other possible target. I told O’Toole to take charge in the trench while I tried to deal with our tormentors.

Taking four drums of Lewis gun ammunition attached to my waist and a Lewis gun, I clambered clumsily onto the top of the tank and set up my gun under cover, as I thought, of the fascine - the bundle of faggots about four feet thick which had taken the place of the unditching beam as a special equipment for crossing the deep trenches of the Hindenburg Line trench system. I was not aware of any danger and therefore experienced none of the fear which might have served as a substitute for my common sense which was wholly lacking. I commanded a good view of the little copse behind the wall, this I proceeded methodically to spray. I soon exhausted almost the whole of my four drums of ammunition.

By this time my escapade had stirred up a veritable hornets’ nest in the copse. I do not know what I expected would happen - probably nothing - but I was surprised to find German troops, led by an officer, pouring out of a gap in the left distant corner of the wall. An officer pointed his swagger stick to direct his troops to me. I swung round and opened fire on them as they were coming through the gap. At the same moment my gun jammed.

I saw it was a simple stoppage, could not clear it, and realizing that my drum had no more ammunition left fell rather than scrambled back into the shelter of the trench.

By this time I must have been thoroughly scared though I was unaware of it. My crew were standing about nonchalantly doing nothing.

“Why the hell aren’t you firing?” I said to Lance Corporal Forman-he and O’Toole were the only men left. Allen, the driver, had been sent back with gunner Allen to take our two wounded, Pell and Richardson, to the trench on the perimeter. “For God’s sake man! Fire at them!” I pointed to the enemy now lying in the open. O’Toole was fiddling with a German gun.

“No ammunition left”, said Forman.

Before the enemy had recovered I said “Get back! “ - to the trench about a hundred yards distant - ”short rushes!” O’Toole struggled with the German gun.

I remember our short rushes; Forman and I with our last two Lewis guns. I remember being hauled by a Highlander into the trench. Safe at last, I thought as I realized that all three were present, still unwounded. Otherwise, but for a vague sense of being under fire, I remember no details.

Gradually I took stock. Richardson and Pell were in good shape, but both were too badly wounded for further fighting; the two Allens were very badly shaken and as there was nothing for Allen to drive I decided to send all four back under O’Toole who was to report to Advance Company HQ after handing over the two wounded to the first advanced aid post. The Allens he was to hand over to the Regimental Medical Officer. Forman and I stayed with our two Lewis guns and the German machine-gun which now was ready, after O’Toole’s ministrations, to fire again.

I reported to the Seaforth captain, Edwards who appeared to be the only officer left in his company. While I was talking to him in the trench there was the loud crack of a near bullet. He fell forward and I saw blood and brains bulge out at the back of his skull.

I was too stunned to know where or how the bullet was fired; it might have been chance but the infantry had no doubt it was aimed fire. As we were occupying the enemy trench system there was no parapet to protect us from fire within the planned strong point.

Search showed a suspicious thickening near the top of one of the tall pines; on this our Lewis gunfire was at once concentrated. Under the intense fire the thickening began to disintegrate, a body detached itself, caught in some branches, hung for an instant and crashed onto lower branches, was again halted and finally dashed to the ground. The Lewis guns continued their chattering search of all tree-tops in the radius of our segment, but there was no further result. Edwards was avenged. What does ‘avenged’ mean? Think it out - later.

At Ypres, and once again later, there was a sniper posted at least a mile within our lines. In each case it was clear that the end for the sniper was death or, very improbably, capture. Such cold-blooded bravery, if there is such a thing as bravery, I could envy but never emulate.

There was one similar act which was unknown to me at the time (but of which I learned from the Commander-in-Chief’s dispatches) which had led to the destruction of our tank and seven others. The Commander-in-Chief, in addition to all his other crimes, was much criticized for having given comfort to our enemies by having made known to the world the bravery of the German gunner officer whose devotion to duty, when all his men had fled, was responsible for our disaster. For my part I am glad that, even if one cannot oneself be capable of such courage, our C.-in-C. had the courage to acknowledge courage in our enemies. In 1976 I learnt there was no such German officer, but in 1917 there was a hole in my tank.

The Highlander senior NCO reported to me that there were no officers left. Would I therefore take command of the infantry? As I knew nothing of infantry fighting I asked him to stay near and advise me on my new duties.

They turned out to be insignificant. It was obvious that we had to hold our positions which we did against one powerful counterattack on our left flank. Although the troops of the infantry battalion on our left were forced to yield some ground we held our pivotal position. We lit our marker flares when one of our reconnaissance planes came over.

That was the end of my part in the Cambrai battle. Shortly after, the Colonel of the regiment, hearing my report of the position rapidly summed it up.

“Since you have no tanks you and your bloody Lance Corporal are no good to me. Get back to our HQ.”

I reported to our Major, was kindly received and told to turn in. My batman had produced my sleeping kit: I lay down and in the slight drizzle that had started fell fast asleep.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The description of being in action is quite riveting. Bion went on to become a famous psychoanalyst and this is reflected in his attention to details of his experience. Some points to note:

i. Bion's tank was part of B Company, which had the objective of attacking Flesquieres village in the second wave.

ii. Bion had to use his tank to breach the wire in front of the strong point - it was not done by a wire-pulling tank.

iii. The driving visors were closed for going through the six foot high (at least) wire.

iv. The tremendous impact of the machine gun bullets. It is possible the Germans were firing armour-piercing machine gun bullets but these did not pierce the stronger armour of the later Mk IVs - these bullets sliced through the weakly armoured Mk IIs at Bullecourt. In any event, the impact of the high velocity bullets created fragments of red-hot metal that spat around the interior of the tank. Bion drove blindly in the direction he thought was the source of the bullets. Note too how the German machine gunners were firing towards and into the barrel of the six-pounder as well. This is a reminder about why the British painted a black line just below the top of the sponsons - to hide the gunners' observation slits that were targeted by the Germans.

v. Bion never saw the field gun that fired at his tank and immobilized it.

vi. There is mention of the Highlanders being present soon after Bion and his crew got out of the tank, having just got through the wire.

vii. When Bion began firing back with the Lewis gun, his attention was fixed on the sources of heavy small-arms/machine gun fire. At no point does he describe looking for or even glimpsing the field guns.

viii. The Germans even attempted to mount a counter-attack.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

I enjoyed your last posts, very informative. I have read them over several and tried to see how they would have affected the course of the battle. I know that any points raised can all be at the most informed assumptions.

Post #110

prevented the majority of the cavalry getting forward

I would agree to a certain extent. We have read reports that said the when the Cavalry were required there was a long delay in getting the go ahead from the Cavalry Div. Commander who was situated 10 miles to the rear. Later in the battle the cavalry could not respond because the Squadrons in immediate reserve had been called upon to fight as infantry in Bourlon.

There were plenty of defenders, seemingly no shortage of ammunition, and no evidence that the defenders would be overcome. I can imagine the sense of pride and determination that further empowered the defenders.

I think we forget one factor here; the forward German positions were lightly held because of the fear of the terrible British Artillery bombardment. Cast you mind back to the Passchendaele battle. There the German tactics had been to hold the front line lightly, to fight and withdraw in an attempt to avoid casualties. During the battle after pressure from the front line soldiers the German resumed packing their front line with defenders, who were consequently blown to smithereens by the weight of metal put down by the Allied artillery. Do you not think after relearning the lesson in such a brutal fashion, the Germans would have hesitated to massively reinforced Flesquires, but rather put sufficient troops in to mount a reasonable delaying Defence?

I can imagine the sense of pride and determination that further empowered the defenders.

'The strain during the year proved too great. The endurance of the troops had been weakened by long spells of defense under the powerful enemy artillery fire and their own losses. We were completely exhausted on the Western Front.'

In Post #115 Ludendorf tells us that the Garrisons at Cambrai were mainly old men and in previous reports we have heard the this area was a rest area for the shattered Divisions recuperating from the Passchendaele battle. I would suggest that neither category were the material of a stout defense. It would not seem to be the case in other areas of the battle field.

The quote regarding exhausted men reminded me of a quote by Lord Moran, who was Churchill’s personal physician and a former Medical officer in the trenches in his book ‘The Anatomy of Courage’

Even prodigal youth had to husband its resources. Likewise in the trenches a man's willpower was his capital, and he was always spending, so that wise and thrifty company officers watched the expenditure of every penny lest their men went bankrupt. When their capital was done they were finished.

Post #115

The large, thick barriers of wire, pleasant as they were when there was little doing, were no longer a protection. They withered under the enemy barrage. Light strands of wire, difficult to see, were much more useful.

I think that Ludendorf was concentrating more on the morale factor and forgetting the defense value. Any barbed wire entanglement is useless unless covered by fire and defenders. Even Barbed wire destroyed by artillery was often still considered an obstacle to fast moving infantry. Strands of wire are little or no obstacle. However at Flesquires we do have a report of Jocks losing the gaps in the wire and being held up until some were found.

On the 9th, after a short but extraordinarily intense artillery preparation, our army encountered a powerful attack, led by tanks, on both sides of the Scarpe.

We are told that the Cambrai battle was preceded by a short intense barrage. So, therefore the ingredient was similar to the Scarpe battle in the quote above. It seemed to have worked in other areas. Little use seems to have been made of Artillery Fire by Harper either in preparation for his attack and especially in counter battery fire in support of the tanks.

The costly August battles in Flanders and at Verdun imposed a heavy strain on the Western troops. In spite of all the concrete protection they seemed more or less powerless under the enormous weight of the enemy's artillery. At some points they no longer displayed the firmness which I, in common with the local commanders, had hoped for.

The great difficulty lay in withdrawing the garrison of the advanced zone in case of attack, and in bringing the artillery barrage back to our own line [especially when the German artillery was under enormous pressure from the counter-battery fire of the massed British artillery].

Perhaps Robert, the above quotes answers in part questions regarding the temper of the men manning the defenses at Flesquires and the use of artillery.

The proposals of the soldiers on the spot tended rather in the direction of our former tactics; they amounted to a slight, but only a slight reinforcement of our front lines,

Robert do we have a clue here as to the strength of the reinforcements arriving at Flesquires before (during) the battle. We must still be aware that this change in procedure cost the Germans dearly at Passchendaele.

Not until our infantry lost its discipline and fighting capacity did the employment of massed tanks, combined with artificial smoke, produce a fatal effect on the course of events.'

'Early on August 8th, in a dense fog, rendered still thicker by artificial means

The lack of artillery and the failure of Harper to use smoke must have played a part in the failure at Flesquires, especially in the light of reports of close Artillery support and the use of smoke elsewhere in the battle.

"I enquired into the reasons for our failure of the 18th. A divisional commander... told me... he had not seen the slightest sign of activity on the part of the enemy. The rapid movement of the numerous fast tanks in the high corn increased the effect of the surprise.'

This is another factor that was missing from the 51 Div attack supprise, Delays in starting and 90 minute pauses during the attack threw away the surprise and shock value of the tank attack.

I would like to conclude with two general points. If according to you Harpers attack was so bold and innovative surely Ludendorf in his close analysis of the German defense would have noted this together with the stout (?) defense by the Garrison at Flesquires.

I think we must not under estimate the effects of battle fatigue on both sides. The very bravest succumb to it. After WW1 more VC winners committed suicide than the national average and the incident psychological illness was also higher then the average among ex service men.

Arnie

PS I enjoyed reading the account of the Tanks at Cambrai. I believe it as pointers that support my case. I will try to reply before I go to Morocco on Friday.

[Arnie]

Robert

I too enjoyed the story of the tank attack but I got a different outlook.

As the light grew we could see our first line forging ahead. To us it looked as if the enemy’s surprise was complete. We could even see the Highlanders signaling the tanks on at crossing point of trenches and other obstacles.'

I assume from this quote that the first Line of tanks had broken through the first Barbed wire entanglement and were in the enemy’s outer Defence cordon. If not the must have crossed the ridge had had not been attacked by the defence artillery. So therefore they were not picked off at this stage.

'It was our turn; soon it was the Grand Ravine which turned out to be no obstacle at all. A and C companies halted while we went through to take the lead.

Still no picking off, and he’s over the ridge, Crossed the Grande Ravine and moving through the first wave up toward Flesquires Village. We still see no evidence of the tanks being picked off one by one.

Small pockets of German prisoners were being marched back, filled more with curiosity than fear as the spectacle unrolled before them. It was as if the British Army had decided to have a mock field day on territory already in use by enemy troops. They seemed awfully decent about it and indeed quite keen to watch what we were doing.

I think that for the cause of the narrative this event is out of sequence. German POWs strolling back does not seem likely near Flesquires in the middle of a battle. I believe this incident happened on the forward slope of the German outer defence zone in the dead ground.

It was probably only one gun left out of the depleted garrison, but there may have been as many as two. It sounded, each bullet, like a sledge hammer stroke against a sheet of cast iron held against one’s face.

How on earth would he know at this time whether there were one or fifty guns firing at him? He admits he was blind and he was being peppered with machine gun bullets that were ‘scabbing’ the inside of his tank. I think at this stage of writing he was using here say evidence

The moment the breach was opened to load; such a storm of bullets came up the barrel that gunner Allen left it in panic. At once the inside of the tank was an inferno.

To aim machine guns at a target 57mm approx (the bore of a 6 pounder) and expect a stream of bullets to enter the barrel is expecting the impossible. To achieve it you would in fact, have to insert the muzzle of the machine gun into the six pounder barrel. I only offer this as a matter of interest

In front was a high brick wall. At right angles to this, and on our left, was a low wall about a copse of tall fir trees.

We have reached the high wall shown in on a photo in one of your previous messages. We have had reports that tanks were seen in this area trying to break into Flesquires much later in the day. Could this tank be one of those?

but I was surprised to find German troops, led by an officer, pouring out of a gap in the left distant corner of the wall. An officer pointed his swagger stick to direct his troops to me.

I find this incident to be most interesting. The German pouring out were obviously a clearing patrol. Sent out to take the crew of the tank prisoner and search the tank. There is obviously no infantry supporting the tank or the Germans would not have made a sorte. . They certainly were not expecting to fight seriously for the tank otherwise the Officer would have been armed with his trusty Luger 08 and not waving his cane

Before the enemy had recovered I said “Get back! “ - to the trench about a hundred yards distant - ”short rushes!” O’Toole struggled with the German gun.

I remember our short rushes; Forman and I with our last two Lewis guns. I remember being hauled by a Highlander into the trench. Safe at last,

How far back were these Highlanders, surely more than 100 metres? Other wise why were they not engaging the German with the swagger stick?

The Commander-in-Chief, in addition to all his other crimes, was much criticized for having given comfort to our enemies by having made known to the world the bravery of the German gunner officer whose devotion to duty,

Make of this statement what you will. But, I must say it is strange statement to make when Harper used the lone German Gunner as an excuse for the failure of his division.

I also find it strange that he fails to use Harpers name or even his nick name. I sense a little cynicism here.

It was obvious that we had to hold our positions which we did against one powerful counterattack on our left flank. Although the troops of the infantry battalion on our left were forced to yield some ground we held our pivotal position.

I would not read to much into this counter attack late in the day. It was obviously localized and intended to secure the rout for the German withdrawal later that night.

We lit our marker flares when one of our reconnaissance planes came over.

Ah! here we have the Air Force making an appearance, why were they not spotting for the artillery when the unaccompanied tanks were being shot to pieces?

Robert I note that this article was written in 1976 or there abouts I would assume from notes never the less apart from the sequence appearing to go awry at times and having to truncate it to for the narrative. Other wise very good.

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

I am not sure there is a problem with the sequence. I have reloaded the German relief map of the Cambrai battlefield. You can see the blue-dotted line representing the forward trenches of the Germans. Then the tanks descended down into the valley, wherein lay the Grand Ravine, before climbing up the hill to Flesquieres ridge. It was not until they crossed the latter that they came into view of the German field guns.

A and C Companies appear to have halted at the bottom of the valley or thereabouts. They would not have been visible to the artillery, who were having real trouble on the reverse slope seeing anything at this stage. There was fog, presumably thickened with smoke, and the batteries had to keep sending forward officers and NCOs to try and make out what was happening. Having stood in the areas where the artillery were located, the only time they could see the artillery was when they crested the Flesquieres ridge - you cannot see the British front line or down into the Grand Ravine.

The story of the C-in-C and the lone gunner is taken up in Haig's diaries and letters. On Thursday 22 November 1917, Haig wrote:

'About 10 am I left in motor with Butler and went via Bapaume to Trescault. HQ of 51st Division were in dugouts about 500 yards from road. We walked there and saw General Harper... His leading troops are now in Fontaine-notre-Dame. I thought the Divisional HQ were very far back! But the division had done very well notwithstanding the distance from its commander.

On the ridge about Flesquieres were a dozen or more tanks which were knocked out by artillery fire. It seems that the tanks topped the ridge and began to descend the ridge into the village then came under direct artillery fire. An eyewitness stated that on the appearance of the first tank all the personnel of a German battery (which was in a kind of a chalk pit) fled. One officer was able to collect a few men and with them worked a gun and from his concealed position knocked out tank after tank to a number of 8 or 9. The officer was then killed. This incident shows the importance of infantry operating with tanks at times acting as skirmishers to clear away hostile guns and reconnoitre.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I think we forget one factor here; the forward German positions were lightly held because of the fear of the terrible British Artillery bombardment. Cast you mind back to the Passchendaele battle. There the German tactics had been to hold the front line lightly, to fight and withdraw in an attempt to avoid casualties. During the battle after pressure from the front line soldiers the German resumed packing their front line with defenders, who were consequently blown to smithereens by the weight of metal put down by the Allied artillery. Do you not think after relearning the lesson in such a brutal fashion, the Germans would have hesitated to massively reinforced Flesquires, but rather put sufficient troops in to mount a reasonable delaying Defence?

Arnie

We need to be careful interpreting the information from Ludendorff. It illustrates that the defensive tactics underwent change in accordance with local requirements - that there was not a single all-encompassing set of defensive policy and procedures. There are several indications that the defense of the Hindenburg Line in front of Cambrai was based on different principles from those used in the defense of Passchendaele ridge.

Firstly, in keeping with the rest of the Hindenburg Line, there were several parallel trench lines grouped into the Siegfried Stellungen, Zwischen Stellung (known as the Hindenburg Support Line) and the Wotan Stellungen. However, in front of Cambrai, only two of these lines had been completed - the Forward and Support lines; the former represented by the blue dotted line in the map of the previous post, and the latter running just in front of Flesquieres. Behind these were ill-prepared trenches, some barbed wire, and some pill-boxes. Some of the villages were prepared for all around defence but in essence there were only two lines of defence. Thus the Support Line formed the main backstop of the defence, as if the Germans were not too worried that the British would get through to this point. The latter was a fair assumption based on British performances against the Hindenburg Line to date.

Secondly, there is the behaviour of the German defenders on the day. More of this anon - I have almost finished the translation work.

In Post #115 Ludendorf tells us that the Garrisons at Cambrai were mainly old men and in previous reports we have heard the this area was a rest area for the shattered Divisions recuperating from the Passchendaele battle. I would suggest that neither category were the material of a stout defense. It would not seem to be the case in other areas of the battle field.

It could be that Ludendorff had a different reason for making this statement. Perhaps he was desparately trying to play-down the significance of tanks, having let German tank development languish. A bit like the approach on the British side of making Harper the scapegoat when perhaps the German defence was the problem. I suggest that we revisit this once the information about the performance of the German defenders is available.

The lack of artillery and the failure of Harper to use smoke must have played a part in the failure at Flesquires, especially in the light of reports of close Artillery support and the use of smoke elsewhere in the battle.

Artillery was not lacking. Smoke was used. I have IV Corp's artillery barrage map and will post this in due course. The key problem is that artillery was not re-called once it became clear that Flesquieres was seriously holding things up.

I would like to conclude with two general points. If according to you Harpers attack was so bold and innovative

This has never been my contention. I have suggested that there were factors supporting Harper's idea of the infantry following the tanks. It was not an eccentric notion or whim. This is not the same as saying the attack plan was bold and innovative.

Just to repeat. I postulate that the tactic of the infantry following the tanks was not the source of failure at Flesquieres. The key missing ingredient was the systematic suppression of the Flesquieres village and immediate surrounds beyond the conclusion of the initial barrage. Without this, IMHO, no amount of re-organisation of the tanks and infantry sequence would have overcome the defences.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

The following are extracts from 'Die Tankschlacht bei Cambrai 1917', published by the Reichsarchiv in 1929. It is a secondary source but contains significant detail. Throughout the translation, there are references to the pioneer park and associated ammunition dump. The location of this is marked in blue on the map below. The translation is my own - any mistakes therein are solely due to my inadaquacies. At the very least, it should give a flavour for what was happening.

The account starts with some information about what was happening on the day before the British launched. There is a lot more besides, indicating that the Germans were preparing a defence of the area thinking the attack would come at some point in the not too distant future. I have highlighted only those quotes that pertain to Flesquieres. I have not gone into the information about the pre-existing plans - that will come later.

'19 November

The batteries of IInd Artillery Battalion* were set up near Graincourt, and the IIIrd Artillery Battalion set up near Flesquières alongside some heavy batteries and Major Rosendahl’s Artillery Group from the Division of the Line. There were major problems supplying these artillery reinforcements with enough ammunition; relays of the IIIrd Howitzer Battalion were sent to another depot and finally, at 0400 hours on 20 November, the batteries had a few hundred rounds in their positions**.

The 84th Infantry Regiment from Manstein (Schleswig), which was in position near Havrincourt, was led by the acting-commander Major Hofmeister. The 9th Infantry Company from the Ruhebattalion (III), reinforced the I Battalion on the right wing; 10th and 11th Companies occupied that part of the Oetinger Switch Line in the regiment’s sector, halfway between Havrincourt and Flesquières; and the 12th Company moved into the Hindenburg Support Line just south of Flesquières. When the 1st Machine Gun Company of the 27th Reserve Infantry Regiment arrived in the evening, 2nd Lieutenant Helff allocated six guns to each of the two forward battalions. Two of the previously trained companies (1st and 2nd) of I/27th Reserve Infantry Regiment received orders from the division to move forward into the shelters in Flesquières.

*Abteilung

** The artillery of the 107th Infantry Division came, as ordered, without ammunition. According to the report of the 54th Infantry Division’s artillery company on 19 November, there was barely two days ammuntion for all field and foot artillery batteries in the morning; the stores in the divisional depot amounted to about 1000 field artillery rounds, 500 light field howitzer rounds and some 100 shells for various other foot artillery guns. By the evening, all batteries were replenished from the existing stocks with up to two and a quarter times the daily rate of shells . Persistent requests were made by the artillery for more. Only the following amounts were, however, dispatched: 7220 field artillery, 4392 light field howitzer, and 500 heavy field howitzer shells. The light field howitzer ammunition arrived from Marcoing however only on the morning of 20 November, and then only half of what was expected.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The events pertaining to Flesquieres first thing on the morning of the 20th November:

'The Tank Assault on the Morning of 20th November

Meanwhile, Major Stubenrauch had collected the remainder of his battalion into the park beside Flesquières. When, however, the artillery fire became ever more violent, he ordered the lead company into the Hindenburg Support Line south of the village. Despite the severe leg injury he sustained as a company commander of the 84th Infantry Regiment in 1914, Major Stubenrauch was constantly striving to get an exact picture of the situation but 2nd Lieutenant Bromm, who was with 12/84th Infantry Regiment in front of Flesquières, did not have any news. Then the fog momentarily lifted somewhat, which revealed the tanks advancing everywhere; 6th and 7th Companies, which had not sent any messages, must therefore have been fighting against the tanks. At this point Major Stubenrauch sent the remainder of II Battalion to follow after the 5th Company into the Havrincourt Switch Line. At first, the 27th Reserve Regiment made their way forward quite easily past the well organised 84th Regiment. Further forward, however, the trench became more and more congested. Colonel Steffen, the 5th Company commander, and 2nd Lieutenant Bormann jumped out of the deep trench with the leading troops in order to quickly get forward across the open ground. They were hit by heavy machine gun fire. The tanks realized what the 27th Reserve Regiment were trying to do and forced them back into the communication trench again. The battalion commander, who had accompanied the advance, now ordered that no ground was to be given up and that 5th Company was to reinforce the 84th Regiment along the trench. They immediately opened fire on the tanks and the enemy infantry that were following behind. When the tanks then moved closer, hand grenades were thrown. But the fight was totally one-sided. Small arms fire and hand grenades were ineffective against the metal tanks. Then the Battalion Adjutant, 2nd Lieutenant Röhlk, who should have been checking the locations of the heavy machine guns, returned with news that a tank was blocking the Havrincourt Trench to Flesquières. The attempt to get past failed. Röhlk, Line Officer Hulsch, and a handful of men were killed when they tried to get to their objective by crossing over the open ground.'

Robert