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Remembered Today:

The "machine guns" of Mons ?


i_m_bob

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Then we come to your most contradictory piece yet. You tell us that you find Conan-Doyle's 1916 work to be "surprisingly accurate, or, at least, free from hyperbole" and then, virtually in the same paragraph, you tell us that "In absolute numbers, he exaggerates the losses" but that you believe his ratios are correct. I won't even comment on that one - I've no intention of becoming involved in nonsensical arguments.

Cheers-salesie.

Here we have a history, written at the height of the war, when the author had to make a reasonable guess as to the casualty exchange rate between the two sides who fought at Mons. He attributes a rough and ready two to one rate in favour of the British. In this, he is moderate compared with Holmes and Ascoli. I did not say that I believe his ratios are correct.

Phil.

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Here we have a history, written at the height of the war, when the author had to make a reasonable guess as to the casualty exchange rate between the two sides who fought at Mons. He attributes a rough and ready two to one rate in favour of the British. In this, he is moderate compared with Holmes and Ascoli. I did not say that I believe his ratios are correct.

Phil.

OK, Phil, take out "believe" and put in "strongly imply" that his ratios are correct. The paragraph is still highly contradictory and nonsensical.

Now, any chance of answering - "Which is the more preposterous - Edmonds' assertions, or the German Army having it's class of 1918 "killed" off in 1917, a full year early, and then claiming much lower casualties than the British?"

Cheers-salesie.

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OK, Phil, take out "believe" and put in "strongly imply" that his ratios are correct. The paragraph is still highly contradictory and nonsensical.

Now, any chance of answering - "Which is the more preposterous - Edmonds' assertions, or the German Army having it's class of 1918 "killed" off in 1917, a full year early, and then claiming much lower casualties than the British?"

Cheers-salesie.

Was this allusion to the class of 1918 being killed off in 1917 from intelligence garnered under the aegis of Charteris, by any chance?

Phil.

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Was this allusion to the class of 1918 being killed off in 1917 from intelligence garnered under the aegis of Charteris, by any chance?

Phil.

Phil, I was alluding to my post #265 and the research of Dr Michael Occleshaw as outlined in his highly detailed book on British Military Intelligence in WW1, but I take it from your question that if such intelligence were garnered under the aegis of Charteris then you would seriously doubt its validity?

If so, I would tend to agree that Charteris was ill-suited to being head of intelligence at GHQ, but I would not agree that he was totally wrong in his manpower calculations, and when we bring Lt. Gen. Macdonogh into the debate, he was the Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office (previously at GHQ) and was an undoubted intelligence genius, then we have no cause at all to doubt the validity of German classes being called-up well before their time and the negative light this throws on the accuracy of the official German casualty returns - after all, the evidence was there for all to see in the German paybooks, and Macdonogh showed GHQ the small errors in Charteris' calculations and corrections were made.

That said, here's another piece from Dr Occleshaw's research:

"...An assessment of the situation by Macdonogh (autumn 1917). He stated that Germany had 620,000 reserves in her home territories but that the 1920 Class was still to be called up and that might yield a further 550,000 men, although these were unlikely to be in the field before the spring of 1918. His final assessment was:

'It should be noticed that if fighting continues on the western front with the same intensity as during the last year Germany may not enter 1918 with more than 200,000 men in reserve in addition to the 1920 Class. She will probably hold back her 1921 Class as long as possible, and it seems highly unlikely that more than a quarter of a million of that class could be made fit for field service during 1918. If, therefore, casualties continue at their normal rate the whole available reserve would be exhausted during that year'.1

Macdonogh recognized German reserves were running out and at this stage the difference between his and Charteris's view is measured in months rather than years. By the time Macdonogh's paper was presented, the GHQ figures were already out of date...

1 W.P. 49, Cabinet Committee on War Policy, 'The Man-power and Internal Conditions of the Central Powers', Note by the Director of Military Intelligence, 31st August - 1st October 1917, PRO WO106/312."

Please note that this was written in 1917, and that not only had the 1918 class taken to the field by 1917 but the 1919 class had already been called-up (it must have if the next in line was the class of 1920) - the evidence, of course, being for all to see in German soldiers' paybooks (don't you just love Prussian efficiency).

British Intelligence, especially under Macdonogh's aegis, were well ahead of the game when it came to the true level of German casualties. So, perhaps now you can see more clearly where I'm coming from when I ask the question: "Which is the more preposterous - Edmonds' assertions, or the German Army having it's class of 1918 "killed" off in 1917, a full year early, and then claiming much lower casualties than the British?"

Cheers-salesie.

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Thank you, Salesie.

The name Charteris is synonymous with the practice of telling your boss what he wants to hear. That might be unfair, but, true or false, it is the image that many of us carry when we hear the name. In regard to German manpower losses being so severe that they were scraping the barrel by bringing the 1918 class forward a year, it doesn't accord with the fact that in the autumn of 1917 Germany was able to contain the British offensive in the West, deliver a huge blow against the Russians at Riga and nearly knock the Italians out at Caporetto, let alone deploy three and a half milllion men on the Western front before the start of the Kaiserslacht.

I state that with diffidence, and acknowledge that I know little about the role of Military Intelligence....but it just doesn't sound right, the notion that attrition was so drastic on German manpower that an entire annual class was used up in the year prior to its proper deployment.

I am not complacent about the damage that was being inflicted : the British hurt the Germans badly on April 9th at Arras, on June 7th at Messines, and on September 20th and 26th, and October 4th at Ypres, and a severe blow was delivered at Lens in August. Moreover, the French limited attacks in the late summer and autumn on the Aisne and at Verdun were very succesful. In these episodes the Germans suffered casualties that were at least the equal of the British, and heavier than those of the French, who attacked them.

The German Reichs Archiv tabulate their casulties on the Western Front in 1917 at about 885,000, of whom 450,000 were suffered against the British, who lost 750,000. That suggests a ratio of 5 to 3 in Germany's favour. I suspect that the true figure was indeed somewhat higher - the SB puts them at 1,058,000( total for the entire front, against French as well) - but even that would not allow for a German loss against the British in excess of 550,000, or less than three quarters of the British total.

Edmonds, I suspect, had access to the most authentic German tabulations and chose to ignore them. In this I think he was guilty of deliberate distortion. His claim that the Germans lost 50%+ more than the British at Passchendaele beggars belief.

This has not really done justice to the challenge of your question : I must reflect carefully.

Phil.

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PJA said:
Thank you, Salesie.

The name Charteris is synonymous with the practice of telling your boss what he wants to hear. That might be unfair, but, true or false, it is the image that many of us carry when we hear the name.

This has not really done justice to the challenge of your question : I must reflect carefully.

Phil.

Phil, there is no doubt in my mind that Charteris, in the main, did tell his boss what he wanted hear, and that Haig was happy to hear what Charteris told him - it was not a one-sided relationship in this respect. But this should cast no doubt that Germany was calling-up classes up to two years before their time, and there is no doubt that British intelligence were ahead of the casualty game; Macdonogh was an intelligence genius, he accurately predicted where and when the German Spring Offensive would begin. To get an idea how on top of the intelligence game he actually was, take a look at another of his eerily accurate assessments

However, whilst you reflect on my question, I will add that Macdonogh's assessment (previous post) was done before Russia collapsed and Germany was able to re-deploy some forty divisions to the west, and therefore Macdonogh's note had to revised not too long afterwards. But this does not change the relevance to this debate of British Military Intelligence's knowledge of the true level of Germany's casualty returns - and that senior British figures (military and political) may have had knowledge of this when writing/talking about such things, but were unable, for obvious reasons, to divulge the true source of their assertions regarding understated German casualty reports.

Cheers-salesie.

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Thanks salesie, I took a look at that Macdonough report.

Why was he so clued up about dissent in Germany, and yet so silent about the disintegration of the Russian war effort?

Apart from mentioning the name Kerensky, he makes no allusion to Russia whatsoever.

Perhaps I didn't read it carefully enough.

Phil.

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Thanks salesie, I took a look at that Macdonough report.

Why was he so clued up about dissent in Germany, and yet so silent about the disintegration of the Russian war effort?

Apart from mentioning the name Kerensky, he makes no allusion to Russia whatsoever.

Perhaps I didn't read it carefully enough.

Phil.

Phil, Macdonogh didn't mention Kerensky himself, but quoted a "German of considerable standing". It needs a good read for it to sink in - the report was about Germany's internal situation not Russia's.

He was so clued up about Germany because he had an extensive network of agents in the occupied territories, and also on his payroll he had a good few German dissidents/deserters in neutral Holland, with cross-border contacts into Germany - not only was he gaining intelligence from the dissidents but he was actively bankrolling their political subversion as well. But Russia was also looked at by British Military Intelligence. Though, for obvious reasons, their intelligence was not as extensive as that for Germany. However, there were reports on the situation in the East and on the implications of a collapse but I haven't shown them here as they're not pertinent to this thread, except that Russia's collapse not only gave Germany extra divisions in the west but also a morale boost that would explain why they managed to continue for another year and not collapse in the spring of 1918 as Macdonogh's earlier assessments had anticipated. And don't forget it was Russia's collapse that directly led to Macdonogh's accurate assessment as to when and where the spring offensive would strike.

Anyway, enough about Russia, back to the main theme of this thread and my unanswered questions:

Firstly - based on Dr Occleshaw's research, does this indeed provide a stock answer to those who glory in the persistent argument that German losses were nearly always far lighter than the British, and show as being unfounded the Junkerphiles' insistence that British sources can't be relied upon when criticising German casualty returns as being understated?

And, secondly - "Which is the more preposterous - Edmonds' assertions, or the German Army having its class of 1918 "killed" off in 1917, a full year early, and then claiming much lower casualties than the British?"

Cheers-salesie.

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Phil, Macdonogh didn't mention Kerensky himself, but quoted a "German of considerable standing". It needs a good read for it to sink in - the report was about Germany's internal situation not Russia's.

He was so clued up about Germany because he had an extensive network of agents in the occupied territories, and also on his payroll he had a good few German dissidents/deserters in neutral Holland, with cross-border contacts into Germany - not only was he gaining intelligence from the dissidents but he was actively bankrolling their political subversion as well. But Russia was also looked at by British Military Intelligence. Though, for obvious reasons, their intelligence was not as extensive as that for Germany. However, there were reports on the situation in the East and on the implications of a collapse but I haven't shown them here as they're not pertinent to this thread, except that Russia's collapse not only gave Germany extra divisions in the west but also a morale boost that would explain why they managed to continue for another year and not collapse in the spring of 1918 as Macdonogh's earlier assessments had anticipated. And don't forget it was Russia's collapse that directly led to Macdonogh's accurate assessment as to when and where the spring offensive would strike.

Anyway, enough about Russia, back to the main theme of this thread and my unanswered questions:

Firstly - based on Dr Occleshaw's research, does this indeed provide a stock answer to those who glory in the persistent argument that German losses were nearly always far lighter than the British, and show as being unfounded the Junkerphiles' insistence that British sources can't be relied upon when criticising German casualty returns as being understated?

And, secondly - "Which is the more preposterous - Edmonds' assertions, or the German Army having it's class of 1918 "killed" off in 1917, a full year early, and then claiming much lower casualties than the British?"

Cheers-salesie.

At this point I must put my head over the parapet.

As far as German casualty returns are concerned, there is too much openness in disclosure to convince me that there was any deliberate understatement. I am sure that the periodic anouncements made by the Central Enquiries Office were not able to keep up with the true totals at the time of announcement - for example, by the end of 1914, about 840,000 casualties had been admitted: the actual total was probably well in excess of a million, but it took months to "catch up". Likewise, by the end of 1918, about 6.6 million casualties had been registered, but it took years before the final totals - in excess of 7 million dead, wounded and missing German soldiers - were properly recorded. This does not amount to deliberate distortion, and it certainly does not result from a refusal to include large numbers of lightly wounded, as Edmonds would have us believe.

Where I do find anomalies is the difference between the Central Enquiries figures and those of the SB. In 1914, the SB figures, which Jack consults, were significantly lower than those of the Government Bureau - for 1914 they amounted to about 793,000 for all fronts, significantly lower than the Government figure which was itself understated for the reason given above. After that early period of the war, the SB figures begin to overtake the Government ones, but there is a significant difference : the number of killed is lower, but the preponderance of wounded is much greater. The Central Enquiries, for example, give 885,000 casualties for the Western Front in 1917, of whom nearly 150,000 were posted as killed, whereas the SB give 1,058,000 casualties, but only 125,000 of these were reported killed. One thing is all too apparent - there is no way those SB figures surpressed numbers of lightly wounded.

Things aren't at all clear, I have to confess. Statistics are notoriously difficult to reconcile, especially when casualty figures are concerned. And I do think, Salesie, on the evidence of that part of the Macdonough report that you focus on, that if there was an "agenda" to manufacture dubious statistics, the British were culpable. It seems that there was a contrivance to present the British offensive on the Western Front in late 1917 in the most favourable light; keep pressing on in Flanders and Germany will break. At that juncture it was imprudent to persist in attacks in the mud, especially after the middle of October. I don't buy into the claim that the class of 1918 in Germany was "killed off" in 1917. On no account imagine that I view the ordeal of the German army with one iota of complacency - there must have been examples of extreme casualties in some of its divisions. I would hate to be depicted as glorying in the argument that German losses were nearly always far lighter than those of the British, and I am certaily not a junkerphile. I am more persuaded by Churchill's argument "...On the terms of 1915,1916 and 1917 the German man power was sufficient to last indefinitely.....It was not until 1918 that the change fatal for Germany occurred".

Phil.

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Firstly - based on Dr Occleshaw's research, does this indeed provide a stock answer to those who glory in the persistent argument that German losses were nearly always far lighter than the British, and show as being unfounded the Junkerphiles' insistence that British sources can't be relied upon when criticising German casualty returns as being understated?

Salesie,

Over the whole war, German losses in individual battles were nearly always lighter because the Germans sat and the British attacked.

And will you please dispense with this nonsense about 'glorying' and 'Junkerphiles' - it is childish, tiresome and not remotely helpful. You are extremely free with your condemnations of German sources, but, if I'm not mistaken, you don't speak German and have no personal experience whatever of researching German material.

Mick

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You are extremely free with your condemnations of German sources, but, if I'm not mistaken, you don't speak German and have no personal experience whatever of researching German material.

Mick

Mick,

I don't believe that one needs to speak German or have personal experience of researching German material in order to form the opinion that histories of the Great War released by departments of the German army between the years 1933 - 1945 ought to be regarded with great suspicion. Common sense is all that is required for that.

The comments which have angered me most in this thread are those which, quite frankly, have slandered the British Official Historian, Sir James Edmonds, as a fantasist whose figures are no more reliable than a used car quote from Arthur Daley. For Jack to then pretend that his own strong endorsement of German sources, such as 1934's Sanitaetsbericht, is merely to follow in Edmonds' lead is in my view unworthy. I intend to set out my thoughts on this in detail when I find the time. In the meantime, whilst Jack is here and more than capable of himself rebutting unhelpful jibes such as 'Junkerophile,' Edmonds, the main creator of a unique and admirable body of work on the Great War, is not.

George

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Mick,

I don't believe that one needs to speak German or have personal experience of researching German material in order to form the opinion that histories of the Great War released by departments of the German army between the years 1933 - 1945 ought to be regarded with great suspicion. Common sense is all that is required for that...

George

George,

A large percentage of German related histories were released before the period you mention. To a degree they should all be regarded with some suspicion, but not in relation to the regime in power, but with the intent behind the writers, this extends to well before the period 1933-1945.

Also I think we also need to define our suspicions. I do not believe there was any fact fudging, for example in relation to German casualties. My cautions are based more on the portrayals of German leaders and their decisions as opposed to the accounts of individual battles, actions, facts or figures. This was caused by the writers being biased towards individual German commanders. They either disliked them personally, or disagreed with their decisions. These are more shades of subtleties in portrayal that any disinformation. If one looks in the archives there are exchanges of correspondence in relation to this very issue--proof readers expressing concerns over the portrayal of German figures. There are also extensive exchanges where witnesses and participants of events send corrections to the drafts sent for their review.

In the military archives in Freiburg, while researching the files used in the writing of Volume X of the German OH in relation to Verdun I have not seen anything to suggest that the account of the battle and actions themselves should be regarded as anything but an attempt at an accurate portrayal. For example, in regards to casulaties a massive amount of work was done to try and compile the most accurate figures possible. This is evident in looking through the files.

Markus Pöhlmann's excellent work "Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: Der Erste Weltkrieg. Die amtliche deutsche Militärgeschichtsschreibung 1914-1956," covers the fascinating topic and is a must to understand the intent behind the writers of the German official histories, as well as the regimental histories and the "Schlachten des Weltkrieges," series.

I would disagree with you statment on German in relation to forming an understanding of German materials. I would venture to say that knowing German is an obvious requirement to forming any real understanding of the German sources--that is also common sense. To a lesser extent the same goes for personal experience with the sources. Unfortunately, even reading newer academic works, such as Pöhlmann's is not possible without knowledge of the German language.

Paul

P.S. Just a slight correction--In regards to casualties the Germans also suffered lighter casualties at Verdun, while they were on the offensive.

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Salesie,

Over the whole war, German losses in individual battles were nearly always lighter because the Germans sat and the British attacked.

And will you please dispense with this nonsense about 'glorying' and 'Junkerphiles' - it is childish, tiresome and not remotely helpful. You are extremely free with your condemnations of German sources, but, if I'm not mistaken, you don't speak German and have no personal experience whatever of researching German material.

Mick

Am I not entitled to form an opinion, and openly express it as I see fit, about those who I see as perpetuating a myth that the "the best team (the German Army) lost"? I happen to believe that the best team actually won, and, it seems to me, Mick, that the words "childish, tiresome and not remotely helpful" are often used when answers to awkward questions are being avoided.

As for me speaking German, how is that relevant? The cold, hard numbers that British intelligence took from German paybooks are not language specific, and the paradox created earlier (still unanswered) is there for all to see and sprang from a post written in English. I will also add that the Junkerphiles, as I call them, do the translating for me and I simply challenge the logic of their own words. Are you suggesting that those who do speak German, and have experience of researching German material, should be put into a special, read-only section of the forum because of their language skills? Suggesting that they should go unchallenged because their knowledge of German gives them a unique, invariably correct, insight into events?

Cheers-salesie.

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George

1. What I think of Edmonds' use of figures is irrelevant to the point I made. What I am saying is that if German sources produced at any time from 1915 to 1942 were reckoned by the British Official Historians to be trustworthy and, demonstrably, that is the case, what is wrong with making identical use of them? What do you know that neither they, nor the rest of us do not? It was through reading the 'German parts' of the BOH that I originally became aware what a large quantity of material was available. Not only that, to some extent I also obtained the titles of books I needed to obtain or consult from the same source.

2. There is nothing original about doubting or even ridiculing official attempts at twisting and distorting statistics. Churchill got the ball rolling in 1930 (The World Crisis Chapter XXXVIII 'The Blood Test'). I am not going to attempt to summarise his arguments, or the mass of figures he cites, but they are worth reading. Quite apart from anything else, it was this book in particular that sparked off the debate to which you referred earlier. I will, however, quote Churchill's two main conclusions (his emphasis each time).

"During the whole war the Germans never lost in any phase of the fighting more than the French whom they fought and frequently inflicted double casualties on them. In no one of the periods into which the fighting has been divided by the French authorities did the French come off best in killed, prisoners or wounded. Whether they were on the defensive or were the attackers, the result was the same. Whether in the original rush of the invasion, or in the German offensive at Verdun, or in the great French assaults on the German line, or even in the long periods of wastage on the trench warfare front, it always took the blood of one and a half to two Frenchmen to inflict a corresponding injury upon a German.

The second fact which presents itself from the tables is that in all the British offensives the British casualties were never less than 3 to 2 and often nearly double the corresponding German losses. However, comparing the French and British efforts against the Germans on the Western Front, the French suffered in all periods concerned, irrespective of the kind of operation, heavier losses than those they inflicted on the enemy: whereas while the British suffered heavier losses in all offensives, they exacted more than their own losses when attacked by the Germans."

That is the background against which Edmonds set out to 'prove', most notoriously with regard to the Somme and Third Ypres, that the British army in the attack inflicted casualties in excess of their own (and, in the case of the Somme, of the British and French combined) on an army which was outnumbered and on the defensive. Laughable. His case was questioned from the start, demolished comprehensively over forty years ago and is supported by no serious historian I know of. If we are going to go into detail, I think, as I said earlier, that we need to open a new thread. We are straying too far from the original, which has rather been paused while you complete your survey of the accounts of Le Cateau in the British regimental histories. In that context I have come across a copy of the E Lan R war diary, which I will post, because it provides a useful insight into the timing of the withdrawal of the British left flank into Ligny.

Jack

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Thank you, Tom.

Never let it be said that I am anything but open minded about these statistics and their implications - even to the extent that I am severely criticised for changing my mind in a most bemusing way!

The information in those reports certainly supports the argument that Germany was overdrawing on its manpoower reserves. How typical are they of the general situation? I note a reference to Prussia, where, apparently, the process is not so pronounced.

It might be constructive to resort to a very generalised view of the war in statistical terms. Germany, from a population of 65 million, put 13.25 milion of its men into the armed forces. This is just over one in five of the overall population, whch is about the maximum that a nation can mobilise if it relies on its pool of military manpower i.e. those males who are of military age at the beginnig of the conflict, or who reach it during its duration. This compares with France, which, from a population of 39 million, mobilised just under 8 million. From the German armed forces of 13.25 million, rather more than 7 million became casualties - dead, wounded or missing - and of these, just over 2 million died. These are figures which are authenticated by the Zentral Nachsweisant, which kept its research going for years after the war in order to register and reconcile information about the casualties from 1914-1918. The figure of 2,037,000 deaths is also acknowledged in the Sanitatsbericht. These are very heavy losses - the highest number of recorded deaths from any belligerent. This does not suggest a nation attempting to conceal or distort the extent of its casualties. As a proportion of all males who were between the ages of 15 and 49 when the war started, the German deaths represented 12.5%, compared with a French total of 13.3% and a British one of 6.3%. This is what one would expect, and suggests an above board and meticulous effort to make a proper record. The destruction of German documents in the Second World War is often mentioned as a reason for formulating wild guesses as to what German casualties might have been in the Great War, but those records were available for access in the 1920s and 30s, and at least one British researcher availed himself of them at Churchill's bequest.

Here I speak from memory, and hope that my statement can be substantiated, but I recollect reading in Cyril Falls's history of the Great War, that Edmonds speculated that while Germany officially announced a total of two million deaths, the real total was four million. This, he claimed, could be authenticated by studying regimental Rolls of Honour. Now that, I think, is a serious and mischievous exagerration - even Falls commented that the figure was too high. If four million German soldiers did die in the Great War, then all the suggestions about the class of 1918 being killed off in 1917 would be true: indeed, if we add on the wounded and prisoners, then virtually every able bodied German male of military age would have been a casualty!

No, the figure as it stands is high enough. The ability of the German armies to hold the Allies at bay in France and Belgium for so long, and yet defeat Russia and Romania and Serbia, and come close to victory again in the West in 1918, would not, I think, have been attainable if the attrition of their armies had been as severe as Edmonds, would have us believe in the battles of 1916 and 1917.

Phil.

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George

1. What I think of Edmonds' use of figures is irrelevant to the point I made. What I am saying is that if German sources produced at any time from 1915 to 1942 were reckoned by the British Official Historians to be trustworthy and, demonstrably, that is the case, what is wrong with making identical use of them?

This is precisely what I intend to get back to you on.

If we are going to go into detail, I think, as I said earlier, that we need to open a new thread. We are straying too far from the original, which has rather been paused while you complete your survey of the accounts of Le Cateau in the British regimental histories. In that context I have come across a copy of the E Lan R war diary, which I will post, because it provides a useful insight into the timing of the withdrawal of the British left flank into Ligny.

No, Jack, this is something which, for me at any rate, needs to be properly debated before we can move on. I wll get back to you.

George

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First; here is the promised extract from the War Diary of 1 E Lan R which fought forward of Ligny.

'26th August

4.00 am Left bivouac and marched to take up position ordered after considerable hesitation. C & D Coys took up a position on La Carriere Hill just south of Beauvois with the Rifle Brigade on our right and the Hampshire Regiment on our left. The remainder of the battalion moved south. The transport on Beauvois village came under fire about 5.00 am, but escaped.

6.00 am C & D Coys came under machine gun fire at a range of about 800 yards. One gun in particular from a position in a cornfield caused us considerable loss. A & B Coys were moved back to the support of the other two coys. In spite of our fire the enemy advanced and, at about 10.00 am, C & D coys (less Lt Hopknison's platoon) retired a short distance and took up a position on the railway line and along a sunken road. About this time the enemy started to shell our position along the railway but without doing any damage. Lt Col Le Marchant was hit in the foot, but not seriously hurt. From this position we held up the enemy's attack until about 12 noon when German reinforcements came up and they pushed forward. They also managed to establish a machine gun somewhere which enfiladed the sunken road and we had a good number of casualties, chiefly wounds in the leg. Casualties: Lt Chisholm killed, Maj Collins DSO and 2Lt Hooper wounded and prisoners, 2Lt Salt wounded Lt Flood RAMC prisoner and about 250 OR killed, wounded and missing.

1.30 pm Orders received to retire on Ligny village and take up a position on the hill covering the village. The battalion, less a part of C Coy under lt Hopkinson which with the Rifle Brigade covered the retirement, formed up with the rest of the brigade under cover of the hill and then retired across the one and a half miles of open country which separated us from the village. During this retirement we were subjected to very heavy rifle, machine gun and shell fire and lost considerably. Almost everyone was bruised or hit through the clothing. The battalion reformed in the village and took up a position covering the east end of the village. While this was being done the village was attacked, but the attack was repulsed.

6.30 - 7.30 pm The battalion retired in three parts...

Second; if we really have to start a debate on figures, so be it, but I feel strongly that it belongs elsewhere. Nevertheless I look forward to your observations, George. One thing you may wish to ponder, concerning the campaign Mons to the Aisne (Ref: BOH Military Operations France and Belgium, 1914 Mons, The Retreat to The Seine, The Marne and The Aisne August - October 1914 compiled by Edmonds). We have already metaphorically crossed swords over the use of the word 'stupendous' by Edmonds, but then he had a way with words when it came to casualties. Why do you think Edmonds' final general summary of BEF losses appears on P262 and only concerns the figures to 5 Sep 14? Put it another way, why do you suppose he does not discuss them in his 'Retrospect of The Battle of the Aisne' (pp 407 - 410). Anyway, here is the relevant quote.

"On the 5th September there were some twenty thousand men absent of the original numbers of the BEF; but, as in all great retreats, a large proportion of these rejoined later; the official returns show a figure of a little over 15,000 killed wounded and missing...Such a casualty list can, in the circumstances, be only considered as astonishingly light..."

Could it have anything to do with the fact that selective additional figures in the volume at reference of...

6 - 10 Sep 14 - 1,701 (p312)

14 Sep 14 - 3,500 (p 360)

17 Sep 14 - 200 (p 387)

20 Sep 14 - 1,800+ (p 393)

plus whichever other figures did not get a mention

... suggest that by the end of the campaign the lightness of the overall figures was little less astonishing?

Jack

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Following on from Jack's presentation of British accounts of Le Cateau, I have attempted to do the same for Mons. Before presenting the following information gleaned from the various War Diaries, it should be noted that this information is not designed to denigrate the musketry skills of the BEF. The information covers the performance of the German forces, from the British perspective. It also illustrates some of the difficulties in estimating German casualties when using the British perspective. While many of the diary entries are relatively contemporaneous (it was not always possible to write up the diaries on the actual day), other anecdotal accounts are included that were written some time after the actual battle took place. I will indicate where this was the case.

To make it slightly easier, I will start from the British II Corp's right flank, which was held by the 3rd Division. II Corps saw most of the action during the Battle of Mons. Of interest, the 3rd Division's Intelligence Summary for the 21st August, two days before the battle, noted that 'touch may be established any minute near MONS'. Next day, Allenby visited personally and verbally reported that the British Cavaly Division was in touch with German cavalry patrols to the north and northeast of Mons. He 'gave his impression that infantry were backing up cav'. On the 23rd, the General Staff diary noted that the German attack was directed against the right of 9th Brigade and left of 8th Brigade. They explicitly noted that these areas were 'where our positions formed a pronounced salient'. The attack was timed at 11 am and the 'considerable [German] force... broke through about 2 pm'. Orders had been issued to destroy the bridges but 'the enemy’s infantry and machine gun fire made this difficult'. The 3rd Division diary commented that the Germans 'apparently suffered rather heavily' but in this instance the inference was made because the Germans 'did not press home against the second position'. The diary then goes on to note that the Germans 'however crossed the canal in considerable strength', opening up a gap between the 3rd 5th Divisions and then working their way around 3rd Division's left flank - '...the enemy was advancing, though slowly'.

“A” Squadron, 15th Hussars, were the divisional cavalry. They made contact with a substantial German force at Havre but 2nd Troop was then ordered to go to Mons 'to relieve the pressure on the Infantry. They assisted in a rear guard action until 8 pm, when they were ordered to escort a Battery safely out of action, which had been almost surrounded.'

The 1/Gordon Highlanders' Diary is very brief. The battalion was still in its trenches at 10 pm. Only the reference to casualties ('[1 officer] and 2 other ranks killed, [2 officers] and several NCOs and men wounded') belies the excellent role played by the Gordon Highlanders in stopping the last major German assault of the day on the right flank of 3rd Division.

2/Royal Irish started the day essentially in reserve. Just after midday, they received orders to proceed forward at once to reinforce the 4/Middlesex Battalion. This was carried out 'under very heavy shrapnel, Howitzer and M.G. fire - Casualties among officers and men very heavy'. An additional comment was made that the British artillery seemed unable to locate the Germans, who were seeminly concentrating all of their fire on the Middlesex and Royal Irish Battalions.

The Royal Irish were forced to retire, along with the remnants of 4/Middlesex. At 5.30 pm the order was given for the Royal Irish to link up with the Gordon Highlanders but the 'Enemy following up very closely prevented this being carried out'.

Major St Leger, the Senior Major of the 2/Royal Irish Regiment, left a very detailed account. When the battalion advanced, the MG section was brought into action near a major cross roads. As soon as the MGs opened, 'a very heavy M.G. and rifle fire was brought to bear on this road, also it was heavily shelled'. Later, St Leger noted that D Company 'were almost at once driven back by concentrated M.G. and rifle fire and retired on HYON' and that 'A, C and the 2 platoons of B Coy... at once came under a very heavy rifle and shell fire'.

When the retirement took place 'all these movements were carried out under exceptionally heavy rifle and shell fire, both shrapnel and high explosive'. By now, late afternoon, the 'losses from shell and rifle fire were now considerable and Major St Leger was severely handicapped by loss of officers'. The German infantry had penetrated to with 250 yards and the 'situation was desperate. The German Artillery had complete ascendancy and it was obviously impossible to withstand the fierce onslaught of the advancing hordes of German Inf much longer or prevent the position from being outflanked on the left'.

The battalion now took up a defensive position but this was subjected to 'very heavy shell, M.G. and rifle fire. The buildings at X roads and configuration of ground, however, afforded a certain amount of cover from rifle fire. The enemy could be seen coming over the ridge vacated by Major Painter-Downes in great numbers.'. At this point, Major St Leger had to reorganize the battalion because of the losses to officers and NCOs.

Later, after the Royal Irish had made contact with the Gordons, St Leger say the attack on the Gordon Highlanders and the Royal Scots mentioned above. 'This attack was delivered in perfect formation. There was however no Artillery support'.

Afterwards, Major St Leger reflected on the 'preponderance of Enemy's Artillery and MGs' as well as the 'bold use of MGs'. He again noted the confidence of the German infantry attack but 'the outburst of rapid fire that met them was no doubt a revelation'.

Next I will present the accounts relating to 4/Middlesex.

Robert

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A nicely put together survey of existing sources, Robert. To my reading, none of them denigrate the musketry of the BEF and I know you have not quoted them to try to do so. I would, however, like to quote a relevant passage on the report of the officer whose task it was, some nine months after Mons, to begin gathering these sources, the survivors of which you've quoted from. It has particular relevance to examples such the Diary of the 1/Gordon Highlanders which is, as you rightly note, "very brief [and] belies the excellent role played by the Gordon Highlanders in stopping the last major German assault of the day on the right flank of 3rd Division."

"In May 1915 Captain C. T. Atkinson was sent over to the Western Front [by the Historical Section, (Military Branch)] and began collecting unit diaries. He reported back on the difficulties of compiling diaries during actions, such as the retreat from Mons, when few were kept and those that were contained large gaps. He also suggested to the Historical Section that the Diaries alone would not show why things had happened." (My bold italics).

source: Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the official histories 1915 - 1948, by Andrew Green, published by Frank Cass, 2003, p. 6.

George

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Thanks George. You are quite right. Many of the anecdotal accounts that are contained within the diaries were addressed to Captain Atkinson. They contain significant extra details. I don't recall if St Leger's account was one such, but the level of detail is superb.

Robert

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Now to 4/Middlesex Battalion. The diary reference is very succinct: 'Battle commenced at 10.15 am, retirement started at 3 pm.'. Included with the War Diary is a series of extracts from Lieutenant and Adjutant T. Woollcombe, based on his diary accounts of the days leading up to and following Mons. He noted that the German attack began in their sector at about 8 am. The heavy artillery bombardment went on for at least two hours before the infantry component of the attack was evident. Around 11 am, a message was received from D Company requesting reinforcements. This request could not be met as A Company had been deployed forward. Brigade HQ sent a message saying that the bridges could be blown at 4/Middlesex's discretion but this was not possible as, by about 1 pm, 'it was too late. The enemy were across or crossing'. A platoon of A Company was spotted retiring, the officers having been killed. The adjutant rallied them, noting that '[the sergeant who was killed later in the day] caused all the rest of his Company to retire earlier than they would have otherwise have done and we had to stop them on the line of this track to prevent the enemy from coming up too far in the centre and so cutting off the retirement of B and C Companies who were slowly retiring'.

Woollcombe mentioned that 'C. Company stood firm in their trenches all the time and did excellent work with their rifles'. C Company was targeting 'a vast crowd of the enemy ' but later he notes that this 'excellent work' did not prevent the same 'crowd' from 'cutting off... D. Company by crossing the canal outside the Battalion frontage on the right of D. Company)'. Woollcombe infered that C Company 'must have done tremendous execution as they were firing for a tremendous time incessantly'. Furthermore, there were remarkably few casualties so 'they cannot have had much reply to disturb their aim' although 'one platoon under Lieut. Wilkinson [of C Company] was not heard of again'. Woollcombe again inferred that the low casualty rate in C Company 'was probably [my emphasis] due chiefly to the fact that enemy used to fire from the hip as he advanced and consequently his aim was not accurate and most of the bullets went over our heads. It was also due no doubt to the fact that our men knew how to shoot and then they got a mass of Germans as a target they could not fail to take a heavy toll of them'. Later in the day, Woollcombe met up with an officer from C. Company. This officer shared one of the exciting incidents where they shot at German infantry. A German officer appeared on the road about 200 yards from C Company's position. The officer signalled his men to follow but they refused. The officer went back and forced them to cross the road. 'A great number of [the German infantry] were shot crossing the road by murderous fire from the trench'. There were 'about 50 of them' who crossed or attempted to cross the road; the proportion killed was not stated.

4/Middlesex casualties were the highest of any BEF battalion on the day. Out of 27 officers and 970 men, 15 officers and 467 men were reported as casualties in Woollcombe's account.

Robert

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9th Brigade was on the 4/Middlesex's left flank. The Brigade's General Staff Diary recorded that the brunt of the German attack struck 4/Royal Fusiliers 'though the whole line was engaged and a strong attack was a little later developed on JEMAPPES held by the R Scots Fus'. When the Royal Scots Fusiliers retired south of the Canal, 'heavy fire was opened on them from some soil heaps on their left flank. This came from the Germans who had pushed across the Canal at JEMAPPES'.

The 4/Royal Fusiliers War Diary describes how the battalion 'suffered severly on the bridges over the Canal by rifle and artillery fire' (my emphasis). The final order to retire was given at 1.40 pm.

1/Royal Scots Fusiliers 'held on until informed that units on both flanks had withdrawn'. About 3 pm, they retired to just north of Flameries. Far from being cautious, 'the Germans followed up our retirement through MONS over a bridge not successfully destroyed and opened fire from the coal dumps of FLAMERIES. They also had brought artillery close up to the firing line'. The battalion suffered losses but was quickly able to extricate itself, partly due to the prompt response of neighbouring units who helped enfilade the Germans.

1/Northumberland Fusiliers first mention an attack on their C. Company at about 11.0 am 'by heavy shell fire'. This fire was shifted onto B. Company 'about noon, in this case supplemented by heavy rifle fire'. The Germans got to within 150 yards of the blockade. 'Owing to the smoke from the houses which were burning and to dust caused by the gun fire it was impossible to locate their position accurately but the enemy must have lost very heavily'. The Fifth Fusiliers Regimental history records the story of the children crossing and re-crossing the street, which caused the men to hold their fire. The Germans got forward into a position where they could bring fire to bear on the Fusiliers from the side. A field gun was moved forward and began engaging the Fusilier's with direct fire. A small detachment were in a house that was hit. Two men survived and they reported later that 'ten minutes after the barrier had been vacated [by the Fusiliers] the Germans started to cross the bridge and were marching across it - in fours continuously for 3 hours'.

Fifth Division next.

Robert

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I have not had a chance to review the 5th Division's General Staff Diary yet. “A” Squadron 19th Hussars, the 5th Divisional Cavalry, merely remarked that the 'German advance began'. An officer patrol of this squadron was in action against Bloem's company. The 5th Division Cyclist Company was also succinct in its summary: 'Several small skirmishes with enemy’s mounted troops'. Both units had a not insignificant impact on the fortunes of their infantry colleagues.

13th Brigade was on the right flank, with the 1st Battalion The Queen’s Own (Royal West Kent) Regiment holding the outpost line on the right. At 4.45 am, shortly after the morning's stand-to, the battalion received orders to push one of their advanced companies along the road towards Tertre. Its role was to support the reconnaissance by the 19th Hussars and the 5th Division Cyclist Company. "A" Company was sent forward. At 7.30 am

the company came under 'heavy fire (rifle and shrapnel)' and was 'forced to retire on the line of the canal'. From 12 noon until dusk, the rest of the battalion was shelled continuously but althought the buildings were damaged, the men and horses were relatively unscathed.

Next in line to the west was 2nd Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers. Their diary simply noted: 'Action at the canal lasting from about NOON till dusk'.

The 2nd Battalion Duke of Wellington’s (West Riding) Regiment was initially in reserve. Their diary entry was even shorter: 'Battle of Mons'. It did include the casualty figures:- killed: 5 officers, 9 ORs; wounded: 50; missing: 244. The Officer Commanding that day, Colonel Gibbs, submitted a report on 14th April 1924. He went forward to the canal 'from which we could get a fairly good view with glasses'. Rather than masses of Germans, in this part of the line he spotted 'occasional glimpses of Germans creeping along hedge rows at from 400 to possibly 700 yards'. The men were warned not to fire until they had a 'really good target... When they did begin [firing], I think it fairly staggered the enemy who went to ground at once.' The Germans then opened up with shrapnel on the buildings beside the canal, but there were few casualties.

I haven't been able to gather information about the East Surrey's, and have not had to time to check the details for units further west. The only other information that is relevant comes from Brigadier General Bird, who wrote some 'Remarks on the Tactics of August 1914'. He was formerly the OC 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, which played a role in the Battle of Mons. Bird noted that 'In two items of previous preparation our system was full vindicated - viz marching and rapid fire. The Germans never stood up to our rapid fire for more than quarter of an hour'. In commenting on German offensive tactics, he said that they 'appeared very like our own, in principle. They seemed to make deliberate preparation before launching an attack, bringing up guns and infantry on the ground. The artillery preparation then began more or less simultaneously along the front of the attack, and where it was thought sufficient effect had been produced the infantry came on with all available machine guns. If the infantry attack did not succeed it was at once abandoned and more preparation commenced'. Referring specifically to the Battle of Mons, Bird wrote that the 'German attack [on the British right flank at the end of the day] developed on the lines usually practised in 1914. Owing to the contour of the ground the enemy attacking the bluff were invisible from about 1500 yards until they closed to 300 yards, where they were checked.

The company flanking the position of the main body of the R. Scots, and the machine guns, however, caused a good many casualties in the troops attacking the R. Scots.

The enemy's artillery fire was fairly heavy, shrapnell only being used. The bursts, however, were high and accuracy poor, a good many shells bursting in the trees which lined the MONS road'.

Bird's initial point about the German tactics fits very well with other details of the attack at Mons, especially on the salient, from the British perspective.

Robert

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