War Aims

[AndyHollinger]

My research on this is circ 1975-6 when, during Graduate School, I looked fairly deeply into the who issue of German War aims during WWI. (I was thinking about this as I prepared my lecture today on the war aims of the American Revolution)

As far as I can remember German War aims were at the beginning necessarily vague ... "We want to win" would be a humorous summary, I guess. The civilian gov't kept pestering them for statements I believe after the failure in 1915 for anything signficant to happen. Then began the process of the Warlords being dragged to put into writing just how much they'd settle for in the event a peace could be arranged. Obviously it gets more interesting and confusing in 1917 - 18 ...

The Allies initial war aims can be summarized as "No you don't." But, then, they, too, get greedy and all sorts of secret Treaties (thank you Trotsky for their publication) about who wants what and all that stuff ...

By the time Wilson gets into it (and mucks everything up) the Allies, too have confusing public and private war aims.

What is the current literature saying about Public and Private War Aims by both the German and Allied Gov'ts?

[PhilB]

This is the only thread I can find on German war aims and it didn`t get any response. I`m re-raising it with a simple question - what were Germany`s aims in August 1914 - what did they hope and expect to get out of the war?

[truthergw]

Since I suggested you start a new thread, I'll post a first reply. I didn't see Andy's first post or I'd have commented.

This is a VEXED QUESTION. Believe it or not, it is arguable that Germany went to war with no clear war aims other than, as Andy said, to win. It seems to have been an opportunist decision, riding piggy back on Austria's war on Serbia. There were of course long standing grievances, that Germany was not accorded the respect that she was due, that she was entitled to a larger share of colonial possessions and so on but she did not cross the Belgian border or stand in East Prussia with any more substantial aim than to crush France then Russia and then???? The plan was purely a military one. Neither Schlieffen nor von Moltke had any political aims. Their's was purely a military plan. As far as they were concerned, the what then? was for the politicians to decide and the diplomats to fix, at the treaty which would be dictated by Germany after the victory.

This ought not to greatly surprise us. France did not have war aims or even a strategic plan either. Plan 17 was a mobilisation and concentration plan. The plan ended with the troops assembled at their designated points. Then it was to be a matter of, take it from there. Britain's plan, known only to a few, was to concentrate on the left wing of the French Army and take orders from the French CiC. Apart from that, as Grey said on another occasion, she would consider her own interests.

[Philip Wilson]

J.H.Morgan writing his prefatory note to 'The German War Book' published in January 1915 provides a remarkable insight into the then German View of War. The German War Book is a literal and integral translation of the Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege issued by the German General Staff to German Officers.

German policy, diplomacy and academic teaching since 1870 are integrally related; they all envisage the same problem. That problem is War........ Peace is but a suspension of the state of war instead of war being a rude interuption of a state of mind. The Hague Conventions are treated by the authors as little more than "scraps of paper" the only "laws" recognised by the German Staff are the military usages laid down in the manual, resting upon "a calculating egotism" and injudicous "form of reprisals".

If these words sound harsh then that was how it was seen in 1915.

As for Germany's war aims I would suggest:

1) To preserve her ally, Austria, from the consequences of the attack on Serbia

2) To maintain and extend Germany's prestige as a world Power.

3) To preserve German security - the Kaiser believed there was a conspiracy to destroy Germany.

4) To begin the inevitable War by way of a surprise attack. Britain had troubles in Ireland and India to contend with. Also the Germans believed the British Government to be weak in its handling of the suffregate campaign.

Each of the 5 Great Powers came into the War for differing well recorded reasons.

The world has changed since 1915. Inevitably as the years roll by our understanding of past events may shift, especially when these are viewed by those who would wish to write about them with fresh eyes. Sometimes these fresh eyes are not always in tune with the harsh reality of what was actually experienced by those who lived through those troubled times.

Philip

[MichaelBully]

It should also be remembered that France and Russia had their own agendas too by 1914. Sometimes it is difficult to talk of a country as having a unified interest as there could be diverse military and political factions.

In respect of France there was resentment in certain quarters for the humliation of the France-Prussian war defeat, and the taking of Alsace-Lorraine. Defeating Germany in a future war would restore their prestige.

Russia certainly had its share of pan-Slavists with their own plans for the Balkans, and those who wanted to secure the Straits to be able to move the Russian Black Sea fleet in to the Mediterranean. Having an ally in Western Europe could help their interests in these respects.

These two countries had been allied since the early 1890's , both quite diverse societies, but they obviously found an affinity. How much of this was based on a desire to crush Germany is an important consideration.

I am still trying to read up on French politics leading up to 1914; it is certainly a complex subject, but one day I hope to start a thread on this topic.

[PhilB]

The above posts almost suggest that wars were thought worth fighting for their own sakes, simply for national prestige. Rather like the World Cup in football decides dominance every four years. We do too easily slip into assessing these events through modern eyes, as PW suggests. Maybe we`re looking too deeply for plans and reasons?

[salesie]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ May 26 2010, 10:11 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The above posts almost suggest that wars were thought worth fighting for their own sakes, simply for national prestige. Rather like the World Cup in football decides dominance every four years. We do too easily slip into assessing these events through modern eyes, as PW suggests. Maybe we`re looking too deeply for plans and reasons?

You almost certainly have a point, Phil. Here's a letter written by von Moltke (the elder) to the international law expert, Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, in 1880. Although he welcomes a move to more humanitarian warfare, he clearly sees war as God-given and an end in and of itself.

"December 11, 1880

You have kindly sent me the handbook published by the Institute for International Law and would like my acknowledgment of the same.

First, I find the humanitarian striving to lessen the sufferings that come with war completely worthy. Eternal peace is a dream --and not even a beautiful one. War is part of God's world-order. Within it unfold the noblest virtues of men, courage and renunciation, loyalty to duty and readiness for sacrifice--at the hazzard of one's life. Without war the world would sink into a swamp of materialism. Further, I wholly agree with the principle stated in the preface that the gradual progress in morality must also be reflected in the waging of war. But I go farther and believe that waging war in and of itself--not a codification of the law of war--may attain this goal.

Every law requires an authority to oversee and administer its execution, and just this force is lacking for the observation of international agreements. What third state would take up arms because one or both of two warring powers had violated the law of war [loi de guerre]? An earthly judge is lacking. In this matter success is to be expected only from the religious and moral education, the sense of honor and respect for law, of individual leaders who make the law and act according to it, so far as this is generally possible to do in the abnormal conditions of war. Indisputably, humanity in the waging of war has in fact followed the general mitigation of morals. Only compare the savagery of the Thirty Years' War with the battles of the modern era.

In our day, an important step toward the attainment of the desired goal has been the introduction of universal military service, which has enlisted the educated classes in the army. Certainly, the raw and violence-prone elements have remained, but they no longer, as formerly, constitute the general complement.

Two further and effective means lie in the hands of the governments to avoid the worst excesses: military discipline, established and managed in peacetime; and the carefully administered provisioning of troops in the field. Without this precaution, discipline can be maintained in only limited fashion. The soldier who suffers sorrow and deprivations, exertion and danger, can do so only in proportion to the resources of the nation (en proportion avec les ressources du pays); he must take all that is necessary for his existence. We cannot expect him to be superhuman.

The greatest good deed in war is the speedy ending of the war, and every means to that end, so long as it is not reprehensible, must remain open. In no way can I declare myself in agreement with the Declaration of St. Petersburg that the sole justifiable measure in war is "the weakening of the enemy's military power." No, all the sources of support for the hostile government must be considered, its finances, railroads, foodstuffs, even its prestige.

With this sort of energy, and yet with greater moderation than ever before, the recent war in France was waged. The campaign was decided after two months, and only after a revolutionary government continued the struggle for four more months, to the ruination of its own country, did the battle take on an embittered character.

I gladly acknowledge that, better than in previous attempts, the manual recognizes the necessities of war in clear and concise sentences. However, even though governments recognize the rules [in the manual], that does not ensure their execution. It is a long-time usage of war that a parliamentarian should not be shot. Nevertheless, we have seen it violated several times in the last campaign.

No paragraph (no. 2 and 43) learned by rote will convince soldiers who are in fear of their lives every moment of the day and night that an unorganized civilian who picks up a weapon of his own free will is to be viewed as anything but a regulation enemy.

Individual demands of the manual may not be feasible, e.g., establishment of the identity of the fallen after a great battle. Consideration should be given to the insertion of modifying phrases such as, "circumstance permitting," "if possible," or "if necessary." Without such elasticity, the bitter seriousness of reality will burst the bonds laid upon [soldiers].

In war, where everything tends to be comprehended individually, only those paragraphs directed essentially at the leaders will, I believe, be effective. Among these are the what the manual wants to establish with regard to the wounded, the sick, doctors, and medical supplies. Universal recognition of even these principles, as well as those concerning treatment of prisoners, would already represent substantial progress toward the goal which the Institute for International Law strives toward with such praiseworthy steadfastness.

Most respectfully,

Count Moltke"

Stated source: Harry Pross (ed.), Die Zerstörung der deutschen Politik: Dokumente 1871-1933 (Frankfurt, 1959), pp. 29-31. Translated by Richard S. Levy.]

Cheers-salesie.

[truthergw]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ May 26 2010, 10:11 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

The above posts almost suggest that wars were thought worth fighting for their own sakes, simply for national prestige. Rather like the World Cup in football decides dominance every four years. We do too easily slip into assessing these events through modern eyes, as PW suggests. Maybe we`re looking too deeply for plans and reasons?

Perhaps the thing we should give more weight to is the type of government. It is the government of a country which decides strategy, that is the aims of war. France and Britain were democracies where government policies were largely decided by a democratically elected government. In Germany, there was not the clear distinction between the army and government because the final decisions did not rest with the Reichstag but with the Kaiser. When elected, William II declared openly that it was his intention to take back from the Reichstag much of the power it had gained in previous years. Although there were different parties in the Reichstag and they were elected by a reasonably universal suffrage, much of the power was still concentrated in the Kaiser. The Chancellor, for instance, could be dismissed by the Kaiser, who could force an election at any time. This meant that the actual commander in chief of the German army was also the real ruler of the country. With a circle of advisers drawn from military circles and having been a serving officer since a teenager, the Kaiser's policies were lacking in statesmanship. He saw all problems relating to Germany and her international relations through military spectacles. He sought military solutions to international problems . The question which Phil has posed is not really a military one, it is a political one.

[MichaelBully]

I beg to differ- from what I have read so far, the Foreign Policy of France and Britain were decided by very few individuals with political or military power in the run up up to the outbreak of the Great War, not by elected governments debating and setting foreign policies , even considering the franchise was limited by the standards of 2010.

Regards

Michael Bully

Perhaps the thing we should give more weight to is the type of government. It is the government of a country which decides strategy, that is the aims of war. France and Britain were democracies where government policies were largely decided by a democratically elected government. In Germany, there was not the clear distinction between the army and government because the final decisions did not rest with the Reichstag but with the Kaiser. When elected, William II declared openly that it was his intention to take back from the Reichstag much of the power it had gained in previous years. Although there were different parties in the Reichstag and they were elected by a reasonably universal suffrage, much of the power was still concentrated in the Kaiser. The Chancellor, for instance, could be dismissed by the Kaiser, who could force an election at any time. This meant that the actual commander in chief of the German army was also the real ruler of the country. With a circle of advisers drawn from military circles and having been a serving officer since a teenager, the Kaiser's policies were lacking in statesmanship. He saw all problems relating to Germany and her international relations through military spectacles. He sought military solutions to international problems . The question which Phil has posed is not really a military one, it is a political one.

[AndyHollinger]

This morning, on my usual rounds before class - I see my name pop up and an interesting thread ... then I look at the date ... ???

We mustn't overlook the German internal needs for war as well. The socialists were rising fast, there was discontent in the Reichstag for being, essentially, a rubber stamp. The whole civilian hierarchy was turbulent over the Navy as was the Army. A lot of this comes back to the German Navy which comes to the character of WhlmII and his power (almost medieval) inside the German State. I don't know where it is now, but during the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a considerable amount of academic history opinion that the War really WAS a German conspiracy ... not to start, but to exploit Austria's Serbian situtation into a war to solidify the Hollenzollern regime.

As to the character of gov'ts ... I would draw back from that. Democracy is no defense against war, in fact, as recent US history shows, all it takes is a active press and a power structure who thinks it offers immediate gain. The Molke letter above - which is wonderful - illustrates much ... and one of the real key points is that War is the suspension of peace in terms of man's thinking ... Molke goes as far as to place it into God's plan ... and people need little motivation to think the worst of others and then "defend" themselves against them.

Back to War Aims - Germany NEEDED to win and needed to reshuffle the balance of power against internal and external threats.

They also had all this WAR STUFF and WAR PEOPLE to be used ... sooner or later you'll actually play with the toys.... well, except the German Navy ... no, mussn't risk that! (smile) or maybe it was all those unused flamethrowers that Germany had to use (smile, smile)

[MichaelBully]

Hello Andy, I am not sure about German 'internal needs' for war. Do you think that the same could apply to Britain in the sense that taking part in the Great War averted a serious crisis over Ireland which could have led to armed rebellion?

Do you think that greater sense of national unity is more of a consequence of going to war rather than the need for greater internal unity being a strong enough cause for a war?

But thanks for all the points that you have raised.

Regards

Michael Bully

This morning, on my usual rounds before class - I see my name pop up and an interesting thread ... then I look at the date ... ???

We mustn't overlook the German internal needs for war as well. The socialists were rising fast, there was discontent in the Reichstag for being, essentially, a rubber stamp. The whole civilian hierarchy was turbulent over the Navy as was the Army. A lot of this comes back to the German Navy which comes to the character of WhlmII and his power (almost medieval) inside the German State. I don't know where it is now, but during the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a considerable amount of academic history opinion that the War really WAS a German conspiracy ... not to start, but to exploit Austria's Serbian situtation into a war to solidify the Hollenzollern regime.

As to the character of gov'ts ... I would draw back from that. Democracy is no defense against war, in fact, as recent US history shows, all it takes is a active press and a power structure who thinks it offers immediate gain. The Molke letter above - which is wonderful - illustrates much ... and one of the real key points is that War is the suspension of peace in terms of man's thinking ... Molke goes as far as to place it into God's plan ... and people need little motivation to think the worst of others and then "defend" themselves against them.

Back to War Aims - Germany NEEDED to win and needed to reshuffle the balance of power against internal and external threats.

They also had all this WAR STUFF and WAR PEOPLE to be used ... sooner or later you'll actually play with the toys.... well, except the German Navy ... no, mussn't risk that! (smile) or maybe it was all those unused flamethrowers that Germany had to use (smile, smile)

[truthergw]

I beg to differ- from what I have read so far, the Foreign Policy of France and Britain were decided by very few individuals with political or military power in the run up up to the outbreak of the Great War, not by elected governments debating and setting foreign policies , even considering the franchise was limited by the standards of 2010.

Regards

Michael Bully

The actions of the Prime minister and his cabinet needed the tacit approval of the House. No action was taken unless he was certain he would gain that approval. The House in turn consisted of elected members. That may not be rule by referenda, which you seem to be demanding but it is as close to democracy as we are likely to get for some time. A nodding acquaintance with the procedures of the French government would reveal that contact with the front was direct with serving soldiers as Deputies and active inspection and control by Senators and senior politicians. A case could be made that there was too much direct connection between soldiers and politicians in France.

[PhilB]

The greatest good deed in war is the speedy ending of the war, and every means to that end, so long as it is not reprehensible, must remain open.

With this sort of energy, and yet with greater moderation than ever before, the recent war in France was waged. The campaign was decided after two months, and only after a revolutionary government continued the struggle for four more months, to the ruination of its own country, did the battle take on an embittered character.

I assume that the above would encapsulate Wilhelm`s attitude towards starting the war of 1914. But there must have been a drastic rethink by mid 1915? Did the Germans then settle for attrition in the hope of an agreed settlement? Or did they still hope to drive the BEF into the sea on the assumption that we`d not contemplate a seaborne invasion, especially after Gallipoli?

[truthergw]

Schlieffen and his supporters have always claimed that his plan ignored diplomatic and political influences. That was for the Foreign service and politicians to see to. von Moltke followed suit. The OHL plan was to crush the French then inflict enough damage on the Russians to bring all parties to the treaty table with Germany there as victor and in a position to make heavy demands on the defeated. In other words, a re-run of the Franco-Prussian war and the other episodes in Prussia's military progress through the 19th century. Bethmann-Hollweg's demands in Autumn 1914 give a clear indication of the fruits Germany expected to gain from beating her two continental rivals. The way would then be clear to overhaul the remaining off-shore one, Britain. Whether we can describe all that as War Aims, I am not sure. I think they are better described as widely held aspirations of long standing. The Autumn demands seem to be the first time they had been gathered together and formally expressed. The much amended Schlieffen plan dated back at least a decade in some form or other but was purely a military operations plan with no hint of the strategic purposes behind it.

[geraint]

I've always thought of the events that led to war in 1914 as being reactive - by all concerned; including Germany. Ie reacting to incidents in a belligerent and saber- rattling manner, but stopping from all out war. Germany didn't "start the war" Phil - it was pulled in owing to Austro/Serbian relationships at Sarajevo. Correct me if I'm wrong, but not a single Power had a proactive, aggresive plan of action which would lead to deliberate large scale European war (in contrast with Hitler in 1939 who aggresively planned domination through warfare). Even the Schlieffen strategy was defensive and not upgraded (in the event of France declaring war, we will....)

I believe that all the powers wanted to preserve the status quo established at Vienna and other peace conferences 1815-40. Though the changing needs and situations in Europe affected that. In my mind- the two greatest changes were the growth of nationalism, and the establishment and growth of Germany from 1870 onwards. Conflict was inevitable - but it was thought of as a 'controlled and limited' conflict which could be resolved following a bit of cannon firing at fringe incidents. I don't think anyone wanted, nor foresaw a deliberate clash of powers as had bought such cataclysm to Europe during Napoleon's reign.

[truthergw]

I've always thought of the events that led to war in 1914 as being reactive - by all concerned; including Germany. Ie reacting to incidents in a belligerent and saber- rattling manner, but stopping from all out war. Germany didn't "start the war" Phil - it was pulled in owing to Austro/Serbian relationships at Sarajevo. Correct me if I'm wrong, but not a single Power had a proactive, aggresive plan of action which would lead to deliberate large scale European war (in contrast with Hitler in 1939 who aggresively planned domination through warfare). Even the Schlieffen strategy was defensive and not upgraded (in the event of France declaring war, we will....)

I believe that all the powers wanted to preserve the status quo established at Vienna and other peace conferences 1815-40. Though the changing needs and situations in Europe affected that. In my mind- the two greatest changes were the growth of nationalism, and the establishment and growth of Germany from 1870 onwards. Conflict was inevitable - but it was thought of as a 'controlled and limited' conflict which could be resolved following a bit of cannon firing at fringe incidents. I don't think anyone wanted, nor foresaw a deliberate clash of powers as had bought such cataclysm to Europe during Napoleon's reign.

I'm sorry, Geraint. Much of that is demonstrably wrong. Germany had planned an attack on France and Russia for years. The Schlieffen plan and its successors depended on a swift invasion of France for success. All modern analysis of the Austro Serbian conflict agrees that Austria-Hungary went ahead with the declaration of war on receipt of the celebrated ' Blank Cheque' issued by the Kaiser. War was inevitable, all the great powers knew it and they all knew that Germany would start it. That is why Russia, France and Britain were allies. To help each other when the greatest single military power in Europe finally put that power in motion. The only question was when it would start.

[Guest]

Found this online book. It may be of use.

The new German empire; a study of German war aims from German sources

Mike

[Guest]

Also

from

Germany's Annexationist Aims

Mike

[geraint]

Lots of stuff to chew the cud over on this one Tom! I'm relying on early 70s uni work, and need to upgrade my thoughts. (Not that I'm saying that I agree nor disagree wholeheartedly with your response!) Bit of a curate's egg - good in parts!

[PhilB]

Well, a range of war aims to choose from there, gents. From a little local effort a la 1870 to (in Skipman`s link) the generation of a German India from pieces of the British, French & Belgian Empires. Have the historians come to a pre- or post-revision concord on this yet?

[truthergw]

The great controversy in Germany is the one which racked Europe post Great war. War guilt. Not quite the same as war aims but certainly linked. Initially, the allies were in no doubt that Germany caused the war and forced her to sign a treaty which included that as a clause. In the thirties, politicians, with the ubiquitous Lloyd George in the lead, put forward the view that the war was not the fault of any single country but Europe had ' slid gradually over the precipice'. This absolved LL G et al from any accusations of not having taken proper steps to avoid the war. If no one saw it coming they could not have been expected to avoid it. This was of a piece with his thesis of stupid generals making the war much longer and more costly than it needed to be. The idea that it was inevitable was accepted in the main in Germany as it justified their refusal to make full reparations. Post WW2, a German historian, Fritz Fischer, was one of the leaders of a new school or perhaps a follower of the old school. Using modern methods of historical research, he once again placed the blame for the war squarely on the shoulders of the Kaiser and OHL. There is a wide ranging debate which is still not over but I think the ' inevitable, couldn't be helped ' point of view is no longer accepted as completely true. There are several good books in English on this matter of war guilt and Fischer in particular is worth reading as he ties it closely to war aims. He sets out his arguments for who caused the war and why.

[AndyHollinger]

The great controversy in Germany is the one which racked Europe post Great war. War guilt. Not quite the same as war aims but certainly linked. Initially, the allies were in no doubt that Germany caused the war and forced her to sign a treaty which included that as a clause. In the thirties, politicians, with the ubiquitous Lloyd George in the lead, put forward the view that the war was not the fault of any single country but Europe had ' slid gradually over the precipice'. This absolved LL G et al from any accusations of not having taken proper steps to avoid the war. If no one saw it coming they could not have been expected to avoid it. This was of a piece with his thesis of stupid generals making the war much longer and more costly than it needed to be. The idea that it was inevitable was accepted in the main in Germany as it justified their refusal to make full reparations. Post WW2, a German historian, Fritz Fischer, was one of the leaders of a new school or perhaps a follower of the old school. Using modern methods of historical research, he once again placed the blame for the war squarely on the shoulders of the Kaiser and OHL. There is a wide ranging debate which is still not over but I think the ' inevitable, couldn't be helped ' point of view is no longer accepted as completely true. There are several good books in English on this matter of war guilt and Fischer in particular is worth reading as he ties it closely to war aims. He sets out his arguments for who caused the war and why.

I remember his book and thought it valid.