I finished Travers chapter on Suvla this morning. My reading of it has been a bit patchy and spread over the last few days so I thought it a good idea to reflect from memory the reasons why I believe Suvla failed between 7 – 12 August (see how much I remember).

First and foremost, poor communication. This starts at the very top with Hamilton and his Staff. Stopford neither requested clear instructions from Hamilton or gave clear orders to his Divisional or Brigade Commanders. Objectives were hazy – an eventual intention to occupy Chocolate Hills and W Hills.

Failure to occupy/take the high ground that would secure Suvla as a winter harbour. Obviously the sooner this was occupied the better. Whilst only vague orders seem to have been given this must have been an obvious requirement to the cascading chains of command although the advance required co-ordination and cooperation.

Lack of artillery support and Stopford’s reluctance to advance without it (his favour to wait until artillery had been landed – but when)? No effective Naval big gun support.

Lack of leadership at all levels, which added to the extremely low morale amongst all ranks. Numerous instances of poor and inexperienced officers.

Lack of experienced troops.

No water leading to extreme cases of thirst in intense heat. Little in way of food available.

In view of the controversial Dallas-Moor VC it is worth considering the conditions the men found themselves in. The men themselves lacked experience with very few pre-war regulars amongst their numbers. This lack of experience was exasperated by reticent Bttn Commanders, out of their depth subalterns and incapable senior NCOs (Travers gives first-hand accounts reporting all of these). The men had been given only a somewhat brief and rudimentary training period and were unused to combat conditions. To effect an amphibious landing, commencing in darkness under enemy shelling, was not the best way to introduce inexperienced troops to combat conditions. Almost from the beginning low morale ensued and this negativity could not be improved due to lack of experienced or firm leadership, or experienced senior NCOs to fill any voids. They had been under fire from Turkish shelling (shrapnel) and to a lesser degree sniping and MG fire. They were asked to advance when already tired (no reinforcements coming through the forward bttns?), they were hungry and with empty water bottles – it is likely that some men may have only been replenished with a half bottle of water in the first three days and others with none at all. In many instances any advances were met with men coming under fire from their own side as chaos reined. The men were tired and fatigued – some given route marching on 6 Aug just hours before they effected the night landing. They came under increasing heavy Turkish attacks as men of the Turkish 7 and 12 Dvns arrived from Bulair and effected a strong counter-attack (note the Turks had rested on arrival [this actually and incorrectly led to Fezi Bey being replaced by Mustafa Kemal]). Finally and in fairness to Dallas-Moor, retreating men at Suvla had already been shot at (and killed?) by their officers in order to stop men retreating, before his VC action.