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Allied Command at Gallipoli


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By this I really mean the British and Imperial Forces Command.

I am about half way through Travers for the second time and it seems to me (and probably to many others) that irrespective of any other issues such as disease, difficulty of supply, minimal reinforcements, lack of artillery/shells etc, that there are two primary reasons why the Gallipoli campaign was not successful:

1) The quality of the Turkish command - in particular the shrewd decisions taken by Liman von Sanders and the instinctive leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

2) The amateurish and uncoordinated conduct of the war by the British command from Staff Officer to General and the repeated inability by many in authority to press home an advantage.

Attaching to this thread I will include various quotes that I come across which I want to keep for future reference (less the comments already posted on Hamilton and Hunter-Weston).

Other Pals should feel free to criticise/comment as they see fit.

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Jonathan Saunders

Posted

First up is this comment on Braithwaite:

P 111

source:Orlo Williams

“ I fear the G [Hamilton] is run by the CGS [braithwaite]. Who may be a good soldier but is a stupid man, with no ideas … [and] fond of his own way. CGS relies almost wholly on Aspinall and Dawnay …”

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Jonathan Saunders

Posted

Col Antill (Bge Major, 3 LH Bge)

P 122

source: Lt-Col Brazier (CO, 10 ALH)

situation: The Nek

"I reported to Antill ... who was alone in the HQ dug-out with his back to the wall. He said there was a flag in the Turks' trenches and ordered me to push on. I replied there was no flag in the enemy's trenches and that it was murder to push on. He simply roared 'Push on'. Returning to my position ... I said 'I am sorry boys the order is to go'. Ten seconds later the men near me had nearly all been killed or wounded and were falling back into the trench."

P 122

source: Bean

Situation: Account of The Nek for the AOH

"Antill's comments are worthless: he says he never heard of a flag appearing in the Trukish trenches - actually he was the first man who, three or four days later, gave me an account of the incident! His statements are dangerously inaccurate in every respect in which I can readily check them; many of his facts seem to have been invented in the intervening years."

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So true of Anthill. "Twas bloody murder."

For a cross reference try Goodbye Cobber, God Bless You, by John Hamilton.

Cheers

Kim

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Jonathan Saunders

Posted

Stopford / Hamilton

This morning I began Travers chapter on Operations at Suvla. If Travers research and evidence is to be believed then Hamilton and not Stopford should take the lions share of the blame for Suvla.

All emphasis from HQ was for Stopford to ensure Suvla as a winter harbour. The taking of W and Chocolate Hills was secondary.

Whilst Stopford should have seized the initiative, Hamilton appears to have withheld information, not given direct or clear orders and was completely out of touch with the intended operations for the 6 Aug offensive.

Also Hamilton was a downright liar when writing to the WO and referring to the operations at Helles and ANZAC as "feints" (p 139). There has been nothing else in Travers to suggest this was ever the intention.

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Jonathan Saunders

Posted

Stopford / Hamilton

This morning I began Travers chapter on Operations at Suvla.  If Travers research and evidence is to be believed then Hamilton and not Stopford should take the lions share of the blame for Suvla. 

All emphasis from HQ was for Stopford to ensure Suvla as a winter harbour.  The taking of W and Chocolate Hills was secondary. 

Whilst Stopford should have seized the initiative, Hamilton appears to have withheld information, not given direct or clear orders and was completely out of touch with the intended operations for the 6 Aug offensive. 

Also Hamilton was a downright liar when writing to the WO and referring to the operations at Helles and ANZAC as "feints" (p 139).  There has been nothing else in Travers to suggest this was ever the intention.

Found this quote in Travers, which is a rather good example of the complete mess that took place at Suvla:

Hamilton blamed [Rear Admiral] Christian for the delay in landing 10 Div, for the casualties suffered by the troops, and for their fatigue at having to march further to reach Hill 10. Christian replied quite effectively:

The real delay was due to the Generals of Divisions not having been told one syllable of where their men were to land, Europe or Asia, or the plan of operations - the casualties were unavoidable and as to the fatigue the distance from C Beach to ... [Hill 10] is only about 1200 yds further than from A West to ... [Hill 10]. But we didnt know A West existed when my decision was made."

Hamilton, according to Travers, was so preoccupied with not giving away the intended landing location that not only did he fail to properly brief Stopford, the French, or it would appear his Divisional Generals, but he also had maps issued of the Asiatic side, as a precaution should these come into the possession of Turkish spies presumably.

Stopford for his part, accepted to undertake a night amphibious landing for his IX Corps without insisting on full and clear orders from Hamilton. Stopford, for whatever reason, then failed to go ashore himself and left the landing to its own chaotic and rudderless development. Finally there are accounts in Travers of the rawness and the indiscipline of the men, as well as the inexperience and often idleness of the officers. In this regard, Stopford must take the blame for not "leading".

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armourersergeant

Posted

Jon as an aside

I have seen a diary at the IWM from Ward Jackson who was camp commandant of VII Coprs for most if not all of its existance. It takes the form of a gossip type diary, I am not sure if he wrote it for himself or if he sent it home, it reads more like a personal diary.

Anyway he refers on 10th October that he thought Stopford was incompetant not to push on! I am not sure how he got his info on Gallipoli but as far as i recall he makes no remarks on Hamilton's performance. I am not sure if this is indicative of other Officers opinions at the time?

In regard to Hamilton's conduct I do feel to push the blame onto Brithwaite a little hard to swollow, it is like saying that Gough was brilliant but it was his Chief of Staff Neil Malcolm who made him look bad! (which is what Farrar Hockley tries to do in his bio of Gough)

In my little knowledge I find Hamilton not to take any real control. I get the impression, probably incorrectly, of an observer rather than a man driving the show.

regards

Arm

Ps have you read John Lee's bio on Hamilton?

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