Battle of Loos – The Untold Story by Nick Lloyd

NL offered a reassessment of Loos, traditionally the battle for which Sir John French has been condemned as missing an opportunity because of the placement of the Reserves (XI Corps). NL puts forward that Douglas Haig was solely responsible for the plan and conduct of the battle and that he either misinterpreted or acted against French’s instructions.

The battle characterised by immediate British successes followed by strong German counter-attacks and regaining of lost ground. British army suffered heavy casualties.

Battle of Loss marked a significant experience:

• Largest land battle

• Use of chlorine gas

• Blooded new volunteer troops of British army

• Was catalyst for Haig’s appointment as C-in-C

Main controversy surrounds deployment and eventual retreat of two divisions in XI Corps who had been held in reserve. It is generally believed that Sir John French (sJF) held them too far back and the time taken to bring them into the battle led to an opportunity missed. This feature of the battle was a direct contributing factor to the recall of sJF.

Was Haig’s conduct surrounding the battle more to do with the furtherance of his career than the battle itself? NL put forward an argument that this was indeed the case.

Backgound:

• The Loos offensive was part of a much larger attack (the French at Champagne) – Joffre’s intention was to attack the flanks of the German salient

• French pressure on Britain to take the offensive in 1915 (and Neuve Chapelle??)

• sJF was pessimistic about the attack and Kitchener had to intervene and request sJF to comply with the French – as a consequence sJF then seemingly had little interest in the battle.

• Haig was originally an opponent of the battle – Haig had made a report on conducting an offensive on the Loos - La Bassee line. Haig believed the flat ground could be easily defended by German MG positions and that the industrial nature of the region would make the terrain difficult for a successful offensive. (Was this in part responsible for sJF’s pessimism??)

• Haig seemingly changed his mind about Loos and from around mid-August became more optimistic that a breakthrough could be achieved.

Characteristics of Haig’s battle preparations for Loos:

• sJF instructed Haig to draw up plans for the battle and for the troops to be involved “to full extent of their power” – this was meant for Haig to ensure the attack was conducted with commitment but NL believes evidence suggests Haig interpreted this as attacking with the full weight of his force. This is a critical point in NL’s reassessment.

• Whilst Haig was drawing up his battle plans sJF had been ill and unavailable. sJF’s grasp of the proposed battle was therefore fractured

• Haig was an incurable optimist and backward looking, that is to say he believed there was nothing wrong with the Victorian attitude to warfare (a disciple of Henderson at Camberley “war must end with a decisive offensive”) but you needed to find a way to successfully apply the new technology to the old principles. (Therefore at this stage Haig believed in the one battle, winner takes all conclusion to warfare?)

• Haig’s sense of destiny supported by his strong faith.

• The cause for Haig’s over optimism was his sudden enthusiasm and belief in the use of chlorine gas – Haig even dawdled a gas cylinder in his diary

• Haig began to tell his surbordinates of the effectiveness of gas. He obtained clarification that it would travel for two miles and NL put this forward as the primary factor to his over optimism.

• Haig believed the gas would more than make up for the limited supply of shells and the inexperience of the artillery

• The result was that Haig’s became over confident and extended his plans as if this would be a breakthrough and in contradiction to sJF instructions.

Other Considerations:

• The Germans had built a second defensive Line a small distance behind the first. This was defended in much more strength. The second Line was protected by wire and strategic strongpoints. By extending the objectives beyond the first line Haig was seriously overestimating the realistic ability of his troops.

• The gas was meant to be let off simultaneously all along the line but due to the meandering of the line Poultney commented that if the gas was blowing in the right direction for one part of the line and it could travel for two miles that would mean it was travelling in the direction of British troops in another part of the Line. (I am not sure I heard this correctly – also thought Poultney was III Corps and not involved?)

• The Germans had gas masks and there was not enough gas to render the gas masks useless.

• Haig increased the frontage for the attack. This weakened the effectiveness of an already over stretched artillery.

• Only 61 batteries were detailed for counter-battery work. This was simply not enough.

• British artillery was nearly always operating from disadvantageous observation posts and did not know what impact shelling had on the German defences.

What happened:

• Charteris did not give Haig accurate intelligence reports but told him what he thought Haig wanted to hear.

• Reports failed to notify on extent of losses.

• By mid-afternoon Haig should have been aware that advances were held up by MG fire and that ground taken was being lost to heavy German counter-attacks – messages in this regard were being received by GHQ.

• Following the battle Haig confided to his diary that the men had not been relieved or received provisions and had been exhausted.

• Haig never gave any indication that he felt the objectives he set were anything but achievable and realistic.

Initially the battle went well with British successes. However the Reserves were too far behind to expose any weaknesses created in the German Line.

The Reserves:

• Haig had wanted the Reserves (XI Corps) immediately behind the take off place for the advance so that they could be deployed swiftly and with effect. Because sJF understood that the small British involvement in the offensive was going to be slow and progressive he intended to hold XI Corps much further back. Eventually sJF agreed to Haig’s request to site XI Corps immediately behind the advance but by this time it was too late to get the Reserves forward in time. This is crucial to NL’s argument. Haig wanted the Reserves close by because he had turned the Loos offensive into a major breakthrough and not an attack to support a much bigger offensive.

• Rawlinson commented afterwards that XI Corps had behaved badly.

• In truth they had arrived late due to no fault of their own and when deployed, there lack of battlefield experience was obvious.

• The controversy surrounding the Reserves sealed the fate of sJF but it masks poor judgement and misunderstanding by Haig.

A final comment was that Gough commented on Loos in 1926 and said if the attack had to be staged then it should have been a strictly limited battle and not as it was.