Out of curiosity, Jonathan, was the expression "Command and Control" used at the time of the Great War?

Was NB just referring to 1914, as some of the points you make would only refer to the later stages of the war.

I am not sure "Command and Control" was a phrase used in 1914.

The Conference was on 1914 and I agree some of these points are more easily identified with latter years of the war but I can relate to the same problems existing in 1914.

If you have any specific items you want to talk through I am more than happy to share my thoughts.

Thanks for that. Perhaps I need to read the book (or attend the conference) before commenting. I have no great issue with most of the comments, and I agree with most of them, but one thought was at the forefront of my mind after I had read the list.

NB states “Potential of new technology not fully understood”

I have long subscribed to the view that war is a great trigger for technological innovation. As such, I find it hard to understand what this “problem” refers to. I simply can’t see the point that he’s trying to make.

Well there was new technology in 1914:

The MG as a defensive weopon was still not fully understood - I think Richard Holmes tv War Walks told us of 1914 cavalry charging an entrenched defensive line protected by MGs.

In the BBC The Great War series - I recall an RFC veteran explaining how his intelligence report that he gave directly to John French was dismissed - the inference being that he was RFC and not cavalry and could not possibly amass accurate intelligence. The cavalry having previously been the army's eyes and scouts behind enemy lines. After entrenchment the cavalry were redundant in this regard. The aircraft, with the advantage of height and by the end of 1914 probably photographic reconnaisance as well, was only grudgingly accepted by many senior army officers as the war became immobile.

At sea we had the threat of the U-boat and the calamity that was Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue, when as each ship was sunk, the other ship held its station believing the danger was [floating?] mines and completely disregarding the U-boat threat.

These are all examples of how new technology was not really understood in 1914 but of course as you correctly say, war creates great dynamic changes in technology and as the war went on, technological advancement continued at a rapid pace.

Does this help?

Jon

In the BBC The Great War series - I recall an RFC veteran explaining how his intelligence report that he gave directly to John French was dismissed - the inference being that he was RFC and not cavalry and could not possibly amass accurate intelligence.  The cavalry having previously been the army's eyes and scouts behind enemy lines. 

I think this was probably that French did not want to hear the news as it did not fit with what he was willing to believe, more so than it was an RFC officer! He also did not want to hear what Macdonogh (RE) and Spears (11th Hussars!!) wanted him to understand!

regards

Arm

Jonathan

Thanks for the clarification. It all makes perfect sense now.

Sorry for being dense !!

Steve

Steve ... there is no such thing as a stupid question. Perhaps your question came from how poorly I had written up the point.

Arm ... you may have noticed I havent posted much on my Blog recently. This was because I was concerned you were stalking me

Any one who has any knowledge of the Great war understands the problems that arose from poor comunications. However this as been used as an excuse for poor performance of many of the early Generals. But when did this communications problem ever stop them from launching the biggest battles the world had ever seen and loosing control over every one.

Arnie