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First Ypres by Ian Beckett


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First Ypres by Ian Beckett

Sir John French thought by obtaining move to the northern sector for the BEF that he would be able to act independently of the French army. Whilst Joffre wanted the BEF under his own command so as to maximise their involvement.

German forces were also moving north in strength with objective to secure Antwerp. However the German army around Ypres (“The Innocents”) generally lacked teh required instruction and training and can be regarded as poor quality troops. Von Falkenhayn was also critical of the work of the Staff in the Ypres sector.

At the time of First Ypres, modern and mass industrial warfare was not fully understood. The emerging importance of artillery meant that the British suffered from a shortage of munitions, some guns being rationed to 30 shells a day. (I am sure I have seen reference to even lesser shell rationing but possibly this was immediately after First Ypres).

The French army sustained much larger losses than the BEF. However British army losses were significant in that many of the casualties were the most experienced of their officers, NCOs and men.

IB made a couple of comments were noting:

1) According to De Groot: Haig’s ride to the Front Line at Gheluvelt was after the Worcesters charge had secured the area and not as Haig had promulgated – to push stragglers forward and encourage. (The timing of Haig’s ride will continue to be argued …)

2) IB comment that Hunter-Weston went off pheasant shooting when his Brigade was in action. (Is this really true?)

Was it as a consequence of First Ypres that Haig developed his theory that the German army failed because the they gave up too easily and did not persist with their offensive and bring it to a successful conclusion? A mistake that Haig was determined he would not repeat - with tragic consequences.

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armourersergeant

Posted

Jon,

You must feel like I am stalking your every waking thought!!!

Was this a talk you listened to?

I heard a talk from IB last tuesday. He said much the same as you seem to note. I noted the Hunter Weston hunting thing, I am inclined to think this is true.

As for the Haig instance this was said almost the same, but i got the impression that he was saying that Winter implying that two rides did not take place was rubbish. there was definately two rides.

He also said that Haig has/had never said he rallied the troops for the assault that retook the Chateau, but that he decided to ride up and collect any straddlers he could find. Whilst I can see that this might be a gentle infurance that he was instrimental in it, he did later attribute it to Fitzclarence when he found out it was he that had ordered the charge, I believe.

He also did say that Haig thought the Germans relented to soon in thier attacks and that this had an effect on Haig that he would not do the same, with Bloody consequences.

regards

Arm

PS

This is the first time I have heard IB talk and I was much impressed with him. he is now at Northampton Uni so I may get to hear alittle more.

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Jonathan Saunders

Posted

Arm,

I put my Blog comments in categories ... this is in the notes from the NAM 1914 Conference held last November.

IB's book on this subject was late in publication I think but a copy is now sitting on my shelf ready to be opened.

Re Haig and Gheluvelt - Winter did make a similar comment but according to my notes, IB was referring to a comment made by Gerard de Groot. I'll pull the book from the shelf later and see what IB says.

Re Fitzclarence, I think sometime had passed, weeks rather than days, before Haig realised it was Fitzclarence who had rallied the Worcesters.

Keep the comments coming ...

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armourersergeant

Posted

Jon,

I see the headings now, strange what you can see when you look.

I think you are correct on the time for Fitzclarence but it does not change the fact that Haig had him noted as the officer who sorted the problem.

regards

Arm

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Jonathan Saunders

Posted

Jon,

I see the headings now, strange what you can see when you look.

I think you are correct on the time for Fitzclarence but it does not change the fact that Haig had him noted as the officer who sorted the problem.

regards

Arm

Arm ... sorry I wasnt trying to imply Haig was trying to take credit in this regard, but I was surprised, even given the chaos of the time, that some weeks had passed before Haig as GOC 1 Corps, became aware of the full details.

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armourersergeant

Posted

Jon,

If we take this as read that Haig accepted that Fitxclarence, I beleive it was in an official report, then why do we constantly see the issue raised as a sign of Haig trying to take the credit?

I guess its just another area of people reading into what Haig wrote in his diary as an attempt to take some credit for this action. Though seeing as his diary did not come to light until after the war (King and like accepted) and officially Fitxclarence had already been given the credit, one (me!) wonders why this is such a point of contreversy

When you read Haigs entry in his diary he seems to say that he went up to the line but found it all under control. What had he to gain from lying about going up to the line, in a diary, even if the King would see the entry?

regards

Arm

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Jonathan Saunders

Posted

Arm,

I think there are two groups and I think they both do equal damage to Haig's reputation.

On the one hand you have those that will grasp at any event in Haig's career that can be twisted towards controversy and used to support the theory he was a donkey.

Then you have the other extreme and those that believe the Somme, as example, can be dismissed as a learning curve and Haig was the educated soldier that Terraine portrayed.

IMHO the truth is somewhere in between. Haig made enormous and catastrophic mistakes and he should be rightly criticised for them. He was fortunate in that he kept his job and was C-in-C in the last 100 days and this has allowed his Command to be revised. He was certainly no technophobe and theoretically he was an excellent soldier but I am not sure what the extent of his influence was over those last one hundred days. We have to look critically at his command in the context of the conditions that prevailed and for me, that includes blaming him for failure when the evidence dictates.

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