Haig the Corps Commander – Gary Sheffield

At the outbreak of war Haig was of the opinion that the BEF should not be sent to France until they were fully prepared and provisioned and Haig believed a delay of 3 months was optimum. Haig subsequently changed his view and GS used this as evidence of Haig’s flexibility – an important component of Battlefield Leadership.

Haig was junior to Smith-Dorrien and thus “not even the most senior Corps Commander in 1914”. From memory this was a suggestion that whilst from the outset Haig believed Sir John French to be the wrong man to command the BEF, he would have seen his own candidature as someway down the list of seniority.

On GHQ: Haig was aware of French’s strengths and weaknesses and believed the weaknesses outweighed the strengths. Haig did not consider Sir Archibald Murray was strong enough to stand up to French as Chief of Staff. Haig was suspicious of Henry Wilson and found him untrustworthy. GS also mentioned that later on when he was C-in-C, Haig surrounded himself with good people, Horne (Gunner), Trenchard (Airman), Charteris (!) (Intelligence) etc

GS repeated the assertion that Haig was “good with people”. This conflicts with the inarticulate, dour and abrupt Haig who could be somewhat aggressive and unapproachable in his dealings with subordinates.

GS wanted to dispel the myth that Haig’s diary was a post-war forgery or a political statement, Haig having been a conscientious diarist throughout his life.

GS reflected on his recent work with Dr Bourne on Haig’s Diary and stated that comparison and scrutiny of the three different versions gave no hint that the Diary had been rewritten to any significant extent, at any stage, to improve the perception of Haig (yes but Haig must have had some concept from an early stage that the diary had political overtones and certainly by December 1915 that it would eventually attract public interest as a testament to how war on the Western Front was conducted).

During 1915 Haig used the diary to put forward his case to KGV in his pursuit to be Commander-in-Chief.

Finally GS discussed the retreat from Mons. Haig believed at the time that Smith-Dorrien made an error when he made the stand at La Cateau but Haig did later reassess this conduct and was sympathetic to Smith-Dorrien’s reasons for making the stand. At any rate, during the retreat Haig had little confidence in directions from Sir John French or that GHQ would make the right decisions based upon the available intelligence.

Haig firmly believed that 1 Corps had to outmarch the Germans in the retreat, whilst keeping in touch with the French withdrawal. Haig believed this was of greater importance than protecting Smith-Dorrien’s flank and that by outmarching the German advance the BEF and French army could later reorganise.