The French Army of 1914 – Bill Philpot

The reality of the French army in 1914 was romantic rather than professional:

• There had been a lengthy debate on updating the uniform prior to 1914. This led to the ideological assertion that “red trousers ARE France”. (Britain had converted to khaki field dress in 1908 and Germany to field-grey in 1910).

• There was a pre-occupation with how to avenge the defeat of 1870 at all costs.

• A propensity to confront one’s enemies by suicidal bayonet charges.

• Super-annuated and poor quality Generals.

• Unprofessional officer corps

• Men badly led and deployed in the field

• Despite having the best all-round field gun in the 75mm, badly utilised artillery.

The French had no definitive plan. They were still debating their war doctrine after mobilisation had taken place in August 1914. There were two main groups – the technocrats such as Petain, or the historians like Foch (also known as the "Napolenoic thinkers" who believed in waging an old style of warfare and tactics).

Without any concensus on tactics, Joffre (C-in-C since 1912), put in operation Plan 17B (by its very title, evidence that France thought too much without being decisive). Joffre probed the German army for a weakspot in order to deliver a break through. His intention was to take the offensive with 5 armies on France’s eastern border, however there were no weak spots. Additionally Joffre had given no consideration to German intentions and had little awareness on the size of the German army now threatening France.

France symbolically advanced into Alsace at Mulhouse but were unable to retain the town against German counter-attacks. Joffre then turned his attention to the Belgiums request for assistance in the north. He believed with the BEF the French could punch a hole through the German line and turn their flank. Joffre had underestimated the extent of the German resources and was not able to absorb the intelligence or offer a counter-proposal to break through the German Line. The advance concluded with mass casualties for both the French and Germans, but with the French army routed and the BEF’s flank exposed leading to an enforced withdrawal.

Joffre blamed both Belgium and the BEF but his actions in sacking 9 Divisional Commanders and 38 Corps Commanders was confirmation of the poor quality of French Generalship.

Other factors why the French advance failed were:

• As a neutral country, pre-war manoeuvres had never involved Belgium when France undertook exercises to resist possible German aggression.

• The Germans allowed the French to develop their probing before unleashing heavy counter-attacks. (The French habit was to advance in Line).

• Lack of understanding of intelligence and inability by Joffre and his Staff to react to developing situations and be more flexible in their conduct of war.

However the Miracle of the Marne can be viewed as a success based on French corrections to earlier errors. Joffre coolly took the decision to counter-attack and was ably supported by the French 75mm.

Conclusion:

• Both the Schliffen Plan and Plan 17B meant there was never likely to be a decisive victory in 1914.

• France had poor Generalship at many levels and few examples of initiative.

• French army at this time were of poor educational standard.

• Problems with integrating/accepting technological advancement and also educating the men in this process.

• French either did not believe, or choose to ignore, intelligence reports concerning the strength of the German army.

• Preoccupation with 1870 lesson to take the offensive as soon as possible to impose their will on the battlefield (in this instance without considering the German intentions or strength).

• The BEF, although a highly trained force, was relatively insignificant due its small size of numbers.